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What is a country? A country is a piece of land surrounded on all sides by boundaries, usually 
unnatural. 0F1 
 
History is written from the perspective of the settled. 1F2 
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Introduction 
What, however, of the case of those who have resided all their lives in a 
specific country, who have perhaps been in that country as a distinct group 
for generations, who never had or who no longer have effective links with 
another country, who are not the subjects of a transfer of territory but who 
have, nonetheless, failed to acquire the nationality of the State in which they 
reside? What of those who have never had the nationality of the country in 
which they have all ties... A similar question may be put for those who, in the 
context of State succession, fail to acquire nationality in the place where they 
have permanently resided because they are deemed to have links 
elsewhere.2F3 
The twentieth and twenty-first centuries have been ones of enormous stress for many 
nomadic peoples. Taken as a whole, research on nomads points to a deep and enduring 
marginalization of nomads by governments around the world. Historians and 
anthropologists often attribute this stress to colonization, modernization, and 
globalization, including the shift to a wage economy, the growing dominance of large-scale 
agriculture and resource extraction, centralized government, increased urbanization, 
armed conflict, and the resulting destruction of natural ecosystems. 3F4  
This dissertation will explore nomad marginalization through a particular lens - that of 
nationality and statelessness. Much is already known about nomad statelessness in 
individual countries. In particular, the United Nations has identified certain nomadic and 
mobile groups as stateless or at-risk of statelessness. 4F5 But the question of nomad 
nationality and civic inclusion has yet to be addressed in depth.  
Identifying the causes of statelessness and, in particular, the modes by which nomads 
become stateless is crucial to any analysis of solutions. There has not yet been a review of 
 
3 C. Batchelor, ‘Statelessness and the Problem of Resolving Nationality Status’ 10 Int’l J. of Refugee L. 156 
(1998) (hereinafter Batchelor, 1998) 177. 
4 This dissertation adopts the word ‘stress’ to describe the current situation of many nomads, rather than 
speaking of a decline or disappearance, as many nomadic and mobile communities continue to cycle in and 
out of a mobile lifestyle as they adapt to new circumstances. A. Manderscheid, ‘The Decline and Re-emergence 
of Nomadism’ 53 GeoJournal 173 (2002) 173. See also T. Arkell, ‘The Decline of Pastoral Nomadism in the 
Western Sahara’ 76 Geography 162 (1991) 163; A. Fisher, ‘Research and Nomads in the Age of Globalization’ 
in A. Fisher and I. Kohl, (eds.) Tuareg Society Within a Globalized World: Saharan Life in Transition (Tauris 
2010) 13-14. 
5 UNHCR, ‘Global Action Plan to End Statelessness 2014-2024’ Division of International Protection (2014) 18 
(hereinafter Global Action Plan, 2014). The Global Action Plan lists nomads as one of the key groups who may 
be at risk of statelessness. This dissertation hopes to add to the study of the problem. 
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the commonalities and differences faced by different nomadic groups when it comes to the 
causes of their nationality and/or statelessness. Nor has there been a systematic 
examination of possible solutions to the statelessness of nomads. 
This dissertation is divided into three parts. Part 1 contains the introduction and 
methodology sections. Part 2 looks at three examples of nomad statelessness to identify the 
root causes of the problem and to examine why nomad statelessness persists. These 
examples are drawn from nomadic populations whom the United Nations has identified as 
being stateless or at risk of statelessness, according to existing research. 5F6  
Part 2 is primarily a legal analysis, tracing the extent to which nomads have qualified under 
the law and identifying the points at which they either gained a nationality or became 
stateless. Part 2 also, however, will contain an analysis of the social, historical and political 
forces that have shaped the evolution of nationality law to help explain why nomads have 
been included or excluded at various points in history through the present day. As Matthew 
Gibney puts it, “(a)s a political issue statelessness challenges one to understand the 
dynamics behind the exclusion from national membership of substantial numbers of 
people.”6F7 Writing of Tuareg nomads in West Africa, anthropologist Baz Lecocq observes 
that, “...it is hard to underpin exactly why nomad existence is found so disturbing by those 
who are not nomads.” 7F8  
Part 3 is devoted to looking at possible solutions to the gaps identified in Part 2. Over the 
last hundred years, states have established within international law a right to a nationality 
for all. Part 3 will look at the solutions offered by states in international law and, in 
particular, the right to a nationality. To do so, it will apply international law to the gaps 
identified in Part 2. In examining the usefulness of international law as a solution to nomad 
statelessness, Part 3 will look at the international legal regime, focusing primarily on treaty 
law and general principles of law, but also other sources, including draft treaties, 
declarations, statements by treaty bodies and case law.8F9  
Beyond a strictly legal analysis, this dissertation will also seek to provide a more in-depth 
analysis of the relationship between nomads and nationality. As Tendayi Bloom puts it, 
speaking of indigenous peoples, “(e)xamining the political realities of the claims of 
members of Indigenous groups can help uncover deeper problems in the nature of 
 
6 Global Action Plan, 2014, 18. 
7 M. J. Gibney, ‘Statelessness and Citizenship in Ethical and Political Perspective’ in A. Edwards and L. van 
Waas (eds.), Nationality and Statelessness Under International Law (Cambridge University Press 2014) 44-45 
(hereinafter Gibney, 2014). 
8 B. Lecocq, Disputed Desert: Decolonisation, Competing Nationalisms and Tuareg Rebellions in Northern Mali 
(Brill 2010) 132 (hereinafter Lecocq, Desert, 2010). See also B. Lecocq, That Desert is Our Country: Tuareg 
Rebellions and Competing Nationalisms in Contemporary Mali (1946-1996) (PhD thesis, AISSR 2002) 82 
(hereinafter Lecocq, Desert, 2002).  
9 For a full list of sources of international law, see M. Shaw, International Law (6th ed. Cambridge UP 2008) 
23-24 (hereinafter Shaw, 2008) 69-128. 
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dominant State citizenships.”9F10 Laura van Waas and Amal de Chickera point to 
statelessness as “a deeply personal problem” for individuals, but also one with deep 
ramifications for the nation-state system as a whole.10F11 To explore issues that go beyond 
technical fixes to nationality laws, this dissertation also looks at the law in context, 
exploring deeper conflicts between nomadism as a way of life and the rules and 
requirements of the nation-state system. 
Part 1: Research Statement, Methodology and Research 
Questions 
1.1 The Choice of Topic 
Why Statelessness? 
This dissertation is analysis of the causes of nomad statelessness and the possible solutions 
offered by states in international law. Arguably, statelessness should be an eminently 
solvable problem, because in most countries it is the direct result of government laws and 
procedures over which governments have a great deal of control. Everyone on earth has 
links to at least one state, both through birth and connections established during their lives 
like residence, education, family ties, military service and many others. Resolving 
statelessness by formalizing these links through the medium of nationality laws and 
procedures is clearly within the ambit of governments and is, in fact, one of their primary 
functions. Yet statelessness persists. 
It is impossible to overstate the devastating effects of statelessness. 11F12 Without a 
nationality, stateless persons often cannot access their civil or human rights under the 
law.12F13  Nationality status has always been intimately entwined with civil and political 
rights, as well as internationally recognized human rights.13F14 While today, basic human 
 
10 T. Bloom, ‘Members of Colonized Groups, Statelessness and the Right to Have Rights’ in T. Bloom (ed.) 
Understanding Statelessness (Routledge 2017) 158 (hereinafter Bloom, Members, 2017). 
11 L. van Waas and A. de Chickera, ‘Forward’ in Institute on Statelessness and Inclusion, The World’s Stateless: 
Children (2017) 1 (hereinafter Van Waas and De Chickera, Forward, 2017). 
12 Van Waas and De Chickera, Forward, 2017 1. 
13 J. C. Scott, The Art of Not Being Governed: An Anarchist History of Upland Southeast Asia (Yale 2009) 
(hereinafter Scott, 2009); E. Fouberg, A. Murphy and H.J. de Blij, Human Geography: People, Place and Culture 
(9th ed., Wiley 2009) (hereinafter Fouberg, Murphy and de Blij). “The right to a nationality (is) a ‘gateway’ to 
the recognition of a plurality of other rights.” W. van Genugten, A. Meijknecht, B. Rombouts, ‘Stateless 
Indigenous People(s): The Right to a Nationality, Including Their Own’ 19 Tilburg LR 98 (2014) 98 
(hereinafter Van Genugten et al.). 
14 Hannah Arendt famously claimed that the nation-state system somewhat uncomfortably “combined the 
declaration of the Rights of Man with national sovereignty,” and anyone who was without a nationality was 
therefore also “deprived of human rights.” H. Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism (Harcourt 1976) 272 
9 
 
rights are assured by states in international law regardless of nationality status, 14F15 it 
remains true that many vital civil rights, such as the power to petition one’s government, to 
access the courts and to vote, are tied to nationality. Many mechanisms to advocate for 
human rights protections are reserved for nationals. Critically, many ethnic, religious and 
cultural minorities struggle to assert their rights without a nationality and indigenous 
peoples often cannot access their lands or support their cultures without nationality in a 
state. 
In some cases, stateless persons may be expelled from the countries in which they live, 
refused re-entry into their former countries of residence, deprived of their lands or placed 
in detention. 15F16 In many states, access to a residency permit is not possible for stateless 
people due to the inability to provide documents. 16F17 Some of the vital rights that are 
frequently reliant on nationality include the right to own land, civil rights such as voting 
and political participation, the right to access services like health care, the right to work 
and attend school, the right to own land and many others. All of these rights are crucial to 
individuals, but cultural, religious, linguistic and ethnic groups also require nationality on a 
group basis in order to, for example, vote for political autonomy, for culturally appropriate 
education, for preservation of their languages and culture, and for a host of other collective 
rights. 
Statelessness is also bad for states as it increases instability and political tensions, can 
make it more difficult for states to address crime, poverty and other social problems and 
may raise tensions with neighbouring states. Arendt rightly called statelessness an 
“element of (state) disintegration.” 17F18 Yet statelessness persists, despite its negative effects 
on states, individuals and communities. As a result, research is needed to understand the 
modes by which statelessness occurs and the solutions by which it may be solved. 
 
(hereinafter Arendt, 1976). See also B. K. Blitz, ‘The state and the stateless: The legacy of Hannah Arendt 
reconsidered’ in T. Bloom (ed.), Understanding Statelessness (Routledge 2017) 70. 
15 Importantly, since Arendt’s time, many vital human rights have been decoupled from nationality. For 
example, the International Covenant on Social, Economic and Cultural rights mandates access to work, 
education and health care without references to nationality status, reasserting the principle that many basic 
human rights are available to all. This issue will be discussed in more detail in Part 3, below. 
16 UNHCR Handbook on the Protection of Stateless Persons (2014) 7 (hereinafter Handbook, 2014). See also 
the European Network on Statelessness, ‘Protecting Stateless Persons from Arbitrary Detention: An Agenda 
for Change’ (April 2017); R. M. Razali, R. Nordin and T. J. Duraisingam ‘Migration and Statelessness: Turning 
the Spotlight on Malaysia’ 23 Pertanika J. Soc. Sci. and Hum. 19 (2015) 8-9; J. Tucker, ‘Questioning de facto 
Statelessness’ 19 Tilburg Law Review 276 (2014); Batchelor, 1998 158; The Equal Rights Trust, ‘Unravelling 
Anomaly: Detention, Discrimination and the Protection Needs of Stateless Persons’ (2010) 53, 74; Fripp, 
2016, 10. 
17 Handbook, 2014, 47-49, 52-53. 
18 Arendt, 1976, 269. It is important to note that Arendt did not distinguish between de facto stateless people 
(refugees) and de jure stateless people. 
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Why nomad statelessness? 
As stated above, the marginalization of nomadic and mobile peoples has been widely noted 
by experts. Nomads “are almost by definition marginal in most countries, especially where 
the state has risen and is based primarily in settled agricultural population.” 18F19 As nomad 
rights expert Jérémy Gilbert puts it, “(m)any nomadic peoples are invisible citizens of their 
own states.”19F20 Bronwen Manby notes that, “(t)hose communities within Africa whose 
members have found that their legal right to belong to the national community is contested 
(include) ethnic groups whose pre-colonial boundaries cross modern borders, so those 
speaking the same language now find themselves in two (or more) different States. Among 
these groups are pastoralists whose nomadic lifestyle takes them across multiple 
borders.”20F21 Yet there is a need for a deeper analysis of how the marginalization and 
exclusion of nomads is linked to their nationality, statelessness and civic participation. 
While UNHCR has frequently noted that nomads may be at risk of statelessness, to date, 
what limited research exists has primarily focused on individual groups.21F22  
Due to a lack of research into nomad statelessness, the current state of knowledge about 
the issue is limited, though experts have noted a high risk of statelessness for nomadic 
groups. The former head of the Statelessness Unit at the United Nations High Commissioner 
for Refugees noted four categories at high risk of statelessness: (1) persons living in border 
regions, (2) minorities and “persons who have perceived or actual ties with foreign states,” 
(3) nomads and (4) migrant populations. 22F23 As UNHCR, the UN agency mandated to address 
statelessness, put it in 2017, 
(m)ore than 75% of the world’s known stateless populations belong to minority 
groups. These populations include the descendants of migrants, many of whom 
arrived or who were displaced to a territory before it gained independence; 
nomadic populations with links to two or more countries; and groups that have 
 
19 D. Aronson, ‘Must Nomads Settle? Some Notes Toward Policy on the Future of Pastoralism,’ in P. Salzman 
(ed.) When Nomads Settle: Processes of Sedentarization as Adaptation and Defense (Praeger 1980) 180. 
20 J. Gilbert, ‘Nomadic Peoples and Human Rights’ (Routledge 2014) 160 (hereinafter Gilbert, Nomadic, 2014). 
21 B. Manby, Citizenship in Africa: The Law of Belonging (Hart 2018) 313. 
22 Van Genugten et al., 2014, 99. The authors point to the experiences of the “Hill tribes” of Thailand as an 
example of the consequences of statelessness for minority, indigenous, nomadic peoples. Van Genugten et al., 
2014, 100. It should be noted that new studies and information about stateless nomads continues to be 
published as part of this emerging field of study. For example, see this article about the Jogi in Afghanistan: L. 
Hadi, N. Shayan, A. Siddique ‘Jogis: Afghanistan’s Tiny Stateless Minority Strives to Survive Without Rights, 
Services’ Gandhara (October 14, 2019). 
23 M. Manly, ‘UNHCR’s mandate and activities to address statelessness’ in A. Edwards and L. van Waas (eds .) 
Nationality and Statelessness under International Law (Cambridge UP 2014) 108 (hereinafter Manly, 2014), 
citing UNHCR, ‘Action to Address Statelessness: A Strategy Note’ March 2010, para 35. 
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experienced ongoing discrimination despite having lived for generations in the 
place that they consider to be home. 23F24 
Besides UNHCR, other organizations have noted the risk of statelessness for nomads. As far 
back as 1983, the Council of Europe, speaking of nomads in Europe, stated that “many 
nomads experience problems with their legal status...because they lack a sufficient link of 
nationality or residence with a given state.” 24F25 In more recent years, an emerging body of 
research by anthropologists, sociologists and legal experts shows the problems in accessing 
nationality faced by nomadic groups in specific countries. This dissertation will provide a 
synthesis of existing research on three nomadic groups in an attempt to identify some of 
the underlying causes of nomad statelessness.  
As stated above, the question of nomad statelessness is fundamentally a question of law 
and the implementation of law, but such questions inevitably touch on the perceptions 
about nomads held by governments and non-nomadic groups, the perceptions of 
nationality and its benefits and costs held by nomads, the ongoing question of nomad 
political independence in many parts of the world, nomad land use and ownership and the 
history of nomad-government relations more generally. This dissertation will explore not 
only how the laws of nationality have been applied to nomads and the extent to which 
international law can offer solutions, but also how wider political and sociological trends 
have affected the exclusion of nomads and may impact possible solutions. 
Why International Law? 
In Part 3, this dissertation explores solutions for nomad statelessness available under 
international law. International agencies and governments often promote international law 
as a solution for statelessness. Yet, as stated above, the root causes of nomad statelessness 
are poorly understood, so the extent to which international law can offer a solution to 
nomads is also unclear.   
International law is frequently invoked as a solution by major actors, including both state 
governments and the United Nations. International law has recently been actively 
promoted as a solution to statelessness by important state actors like the United States. 25F26 
UNHCR has frequently cited to international law as a solution for statelessness and 
adherence to international law and norms is a major goal of the IBelong campaign to end 
statelessness. 26F27 In some case, international human rights law has already been applied as a 
 
24 UNHCR, ‘This is Our Home: Stateless Minorities and Their Search for Citizenship: #IBelong’ (2017) (my 
italics). 
25 Council of Europe, Committee of Ministers, ‘Recommendation No. R (83) 1 of the Committee of Ministers to 
Member States on Statelessness Nomads and Nomads of Undetermined Nationality’ (22 February 1983) 1. 
26 The United States Department of State, for example, has engaged with the Human Rights Council process in 
order to resolve statelessness. U.S. Dept. of State website, archived content, accessed 10/12/2020 at 
https://2009-2017.state.gov/j/prm/policyissues/issues/c50242.htm 
27 UNHCR Global Action Plan, 2014, 18. 
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potential solution to statelessness, and Part 2 will see if such solutions could work for 
nomads.  
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights affirms that everyone has the right to a 
nationality.27F28 This right has since been enshrined, in different iterations, in a multitude of 
international and regional treaties, many of which will be discussed below. It has also been 
invoked by individuals and communities, and its substance further developed and defined 
through an expansive body of ‘soft law,’ including the authoritative guidance of UN bodies 
whose mandate encompasses the issue, non-binding declarations and draft conventions 
that signal the direction in which the further evolution of these standards may progress, 
and the doctrinal work of international legal scholars whose analysis helps to further 
unpack the content of the norms. This soft law will also form part of the legal analysis in 
Part 3, below. 
In the last five years, there has been an enormous push to end statelessness worldwide, 
spearheaded by UNHCR’s global campaign, and based on the right to a nationality in 
international law. 28F29 UNHCR, which has the global mandate to end statelessness, is currently 
the global leader in solutions to address statelessness and has, in particular, been pushing a 
specific package of solutions based on international law. The solutions offered by UNHCR 
are based on international human rights principles, such as the right to a nationality, the 
prohibitions against statelessness and the right to be registered at birth. 29F30 Central to the 
campaign by UNHCR to end statelessness has been the push to encourage more and more 
countries to accede to the Statelessness Conventions. 30F31  
 
28 UN General Assembly, Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 217 (III) A (Paris 1948) Art. 15. 
29 See generally the ‘Ibelong campaign’ at http://www.unhcr.org/ibelong/. See also UNHCR, ‘I am Here, I 
Belong: The Urgent Need to End Childhood Statelessness’ (2015). The Global Campaign is also being 
reinforced at the regional level through networks and activism, all based on the human rights framework. See 
for example A. Leas, ‘Creating a regional network on statelessness in Central Asia and lessons from Europe’ 
(2016) at http://www.statelessness.eu/blog/creating-regional-network-statelessness-central-asia-and-
lessons-europe. The UNHCR Ibelong campaign, with the DHRRA (Development of Rural Resources in Rural 
Areas), recently hosted a photo exhibit on stateless people in Malaysia to raise awareness. A. M. Khalib, ‘I 
Belong Here Too’ 30 Dec. 2015 at http://www.themalaymailonline.com/opinion/azrul-mohd-
khalib/article/i-belong-here-too. 
30 See the UNHCR Ibelong campaign website at https://www.unhcr.org/ibelong/. See also the UNHCR Global 
Action Plan 2014. 
31 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees, Geneva, 28 July 1951, United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 189, 
p. 137, with 146 states parties (hereinafter 1951 Convention). Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness, 
New York, 30 August 1961, United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 989, p. 175, with 75 states parties. (hereinafter 
1961 Convention or, when grouped with the 1954 Convention, Statelessness Conventions). See for example 
the recent accession of Belize at http://www.unhcr.org/55d6fa176.html. See also L. van Waas, Nationality 
Matters: Statelessness Under International Law (Intersentia 2008) 40 (hereinafter Van Waas, Nationality, 
2008). See also E. Simperingham, ‘The International Protection of Stateless Individuals: A Call for Change’ (U. 
of Auckland 2003). 
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In conjunction with this campaign to end statelessness by UNHCR, the wider international 
human rights system has worked to identify, prevent and resolve statelessness through a 
variety of human rights and humanitarian mechanisms, including international treaties and 
treaty bodies, courts and lobbying for domestic legal changes and best practices. 
Meanwhile, UNICEF, the World Bank and other actors have pushed for the expansion of 
birth and civil registration, in part to end statelessness. Implied in all of these initiatives is 
the idea that international law can provide a solution for nomad statelessness, or if it 
currently does not, future developments can potentially fill any gaps. These assumptions 
will be interrogated by this dissertation. 
International law may be an important mechanism for resolving statelessness, yet it is 
crucial to remember that international law is itself a product of agreement by states. The 
fact that international law was created by states that have also created statelessness means 
that it is important to interrogate the extent to which international law solves 
statelessness, even were states to apply international law perfectly or to adopt all 
developments. It is also important to examine international law with a critical eye, as 
solutions that may work for other populations may not be applicable to nomads or may 
even be harmful. 31F32  
This dissertation will therefore look at the solutions to statelessness currently offered by 
states in international law to see if these solutions work for nomads by applying 
international law to the gaps uncovered in Part 2. Once the modes by which nomads 
commonly become stateless are understood, the solutions proposed by states in 
international law writ large can be analysed to see if they provide a solution that is 
effective for nomads, and if not, why not.  
Part 3 will focus in particular on the international law frameworks currently being 
promoted by key actors such as the United States, UNHCR, UNICEF and the World Bank: (1) 
the right to a nationality under international law, (2) the laws to identify, prevent and 
reduce statelessness, including through registration and the issuance of birth certificates 
(3) the prohibitions against discrimination in the granting of nationality and (4) the 
prevention of statelessness during the succession of states. 32F33 Other relevant human rights 
treaties and frameworks will be discussed where appropriate. 
 
 
32 For an example of a critique of international law as a solution for statelessness, see C. Allerton 
‘Statelessness and the lives of the children of migrants in Sabah, East Malaysia’ 19 Tilburg Law Review: Journal 
of International and European Law 26 (2014) 27, 250 (hereinafter Allerton, Lives, 2014). 
33 UNHCR’s Global Action Plan, 2014 stresses ending discrimination, assuring birth registration and access to 
identity documents and preventing statelessness during state succession among other solutions. See the ten 
actions to end statelessness at https://www.unhcr.org/ibelong/global-action-plan-2014-2024/ 
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Methodology 
This thesis offers an in-depth critique of the substance of the right to a nationality under 
international law as it pertains to nomads. The thesis first undertakes an evaluation of the 
root causes of nomad statelessness through a rigorous exploration of three case studies, 
focusing on the laws and policies of governments over time. Having identified some of the 
reasons why nomads became stateless and the factors that have contributed to the 
endurance of this plight over time, the thesis analyses to what extent international law 
provides solutions to nomad statelessness.  
In doing so, the thesis goes beyond a superficial reading of international law as out-of-step 
with the reality of nomadism to expose which norms are useful and which fall short in 
offering solutions to nomad statelessness. Based on the lessons learned from the case 
studies, what gaps exist in the “hard” treaty standards that provide binding obligations to 
state parties? To what extent have jurisprudence and soft law evolved to fill these gaps? 
Even if states were to approach the right to a nationality for nomads from the perspective 
of the most protective standards that current and emerging international (soft) law has to 
offer, would this be sufficient to resolve and prevent nomad statelessness?  In so doing, this 
dissertation focuses almost exclusively on the policies and legal frameworks developed by 
states and by the systems they use internationally to see to what extent states live up to 
their obligations. The views of nomads and nomadic communities will be touched upon 
throughout. 
To identify some of the root causes of nomad statelessness, Part 2 of this dissertation will 
look at the development of nomad nationality and/or statelessness from the pre-colonial 
period to the present day. As this is a law dissertation, it will primarily focus on legal 
analysis and an exploration of how the law has been applied, relying on sources of legal 
analysis. 
Decisions over nationality, however, are often made for political reasons. As stated above, 
politics and history are vital to understanding how and why nationality laws came into 
being and were applied, or not applied, to various groups like nomads. This dissertation 
will also explore the historical and political context that surrounded the adoption and 
implementation of nationality. This dissertation will look beyond the legal question of 
qualifying for nationality under the law at broader historical and sociological causes of 
nomad statelessness, providing the context within which the law operates. These historical 
sections are not meant to be exhaustive, but are a summary of what is known about the 
development of nomad nationality in the context of wider sociological and political trends. 
These historical sections rely primarily on academic research, but where this is lacking, 
other sources such as non-governmental reports and media sources will be used. Non-
academic sources will be noted. 
A full analysis of the nationality and statelessness of nomads would not be complete 
without an exploration of solutions. Part 3, as stated above, will focus on to what extent 
solutions for nomad statelessness currently exist under the international human rights 
framework, if properly applied. Part 3 will rely on international legal analysis. 
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This dissertation therefore seeks to make a contribution towards answering the following 
questions: (1) What are some of the root causes of nomad statelessness? (2) Why does 
nomad statelessness persist? (3) Does international law provide solutions to nomad 
statelessness? (4) Are these solutions consistent with the human rights of nomads?  
1.2 The selection of three nomadic groups used as examples 
It is not possible to analyse all of the diverse peoples worldwide that either self-identify as 
nomads or have been labelled as such. This dissertation has therefore selected as examples 
three groups who are nomadic and/or historically associated with nomadism by their 
governments and who have been identified as stateless or at risk of statelessness by 
experts. These three examples are not taken as representative of all nomads, but are 
selected for their diversity of location, background and type of nomadism. This dissertation 
will look for commonalities in how nationality has, or has not, been applied to these 
nomads, while also highlighting the differences experienced by these very different groups.  
All three selected groups are either currently or recently associated with nomadism and a 
mobile lifestyle, including both pastoralism and hunter-gatherer lifestyles. As well, the 
groups represent geographic diversity. Geographic diversity and diversity of lifestyle 
allows these examples to capture a range of nomad types and experiences. As well, 
consideration was given to the strengths of the researcher, including languages (French 
and English), regional familiarity and the availability of existing information on nomad 
statelessness. 
The first example selected for this dissertation is the Bedouin of the Gulf region in what is 
now Kuwait. The Bedouin are a nomadic group practicing pastoralism and long-distance 
trade. While nomadism is no longer practiced in Kuwait, many people living in the Gulf 
region, including in Kuwait, are descendants of Bedouin. 33F34 For the Bedouin example, this 
dissertation has chosen to focus on Kuwait because of the wealth of information that 
already exists on the problem of statelessness for former Bedouin in that country. 34F35 As this 
dissertation will discuss in detail, in Kuwait, the descendants of certain Bedouin groups 
make up the majority of stateless people known as bidoon, or “those without status.” 
Though the vast majority of former Bedouin in Kuwait are now settled, many as part of 
government-sponsored settlement plans, they continue to be associated in Kuwaiti society 
with nomadism. 
 
34 The region that is now Kuwait is seen as having been traditionally occupied by Bedouin in the desert, 
settled, urban Hathar living in towns, and semi-settled arib dar living on the outskirts of those towns and near 
oases. C. Beaugrand, Stateless in the Gulf: Migration, Nationality and Society in Kuwait (Tauris 2018) 22 
(hereinafter Beaugrand, Stateless, 2018); C. Beaugrand, Statelessness and Transnationalism in Northern 
Arabia: Biduns and State Building in Kuwait, 1959-2009 (London School of Economics, PhD dissertation 2010) 
88 (hereinafter Beaugrand, Transnationalism, 2010).  
35 Bedu/Bedouin groups are stateless in a number of Arabian countries. While this case study focuses on 
Kuwait, many of the points made apply to other countries in the region. D. Chatty, ‘The Persistence of Bedouin 
Identity and Increasing Political Self-Representation in Lebanon and Syria’ 18 Nomadic Peoples 16 (2014) 
(hereinafter Chatty, Persistence, 2014) 16. 
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The second group is the Tuareg, or Kel Tamasheq, a pastoral nomadic group living in the 
Sahel region of Africa, primarily in Niger, Mali, and Algeria. 35F36 Today, there are more than a 
million Tuareg in the Sahel spread out across five countries, divided by contested 
borders.36F37 Though the extent to which the Tuareg are stateless in unknown due in part to a 
lack of data on registration, 37F38 Tuareg political marginalization has been well-documented 
in Mali, where a civil war and refugee crisis has greatly heightened the risk of statelessness. 
Expert interviews conducted for this dissertation have noted that many Tuareg in northern 
Mali lack identity documents. 
The third group is the Sama Dilaut/Bajau Laut 38F39 living in the Sulu Sea, which lies between 
what are now Malaysia, Indonesia and the Philippines, a zone of contested borders. The 
Sama Dilaut are one of a number of “sea nomad” groups who used to live primarily on boats 
and practice a hunter/gatherer lifestyle, though a large percentage of Sama Dilaut are now 
settled.39F40 Sabah, Malaysia was chosen as the country of consideration due to the well-
documented problem of statelessness in Sabah by UNHCR and other experts. 40F41 In addition 
to these three groups, this dissertation will occasionally mention other nomadic groups 
where appropriate to provide context or to help with the analysis. 
 
36 P. Boilley, Les Touaregs Kel Adagh : dépendances et révoltes : du Soudan français au Mali contemporain 
(Karthala 1999) 10 (hereinafter Boilley, Les Touaregs, 1999). It should be noted that while the Tuareg 
experience in Niger is similar to that of Mali, the Tuareg experience in Algeria is very different. Keenan notes 
that the Algerian Tuareg are much better integrated into their states, where they have “equal rights and 
political representation," though they remain marginalized minorities. J. Keenan, The Lesser Gods of the 
Sahara: Social Change and Contested Terrain amongst the Tuareg of Algeria (Routledge 2004) 10 (hereinafter 
Keenan, Lesser Gods, 2004). Keenan is another noted anthropologist working with the Tuareg. 
37 A. Gaudio, Le Mali (2nd ed., Karthala 1988) 183 (hereinafter Gaudio, 1988). 
38 Based on expert interviews. 
39 The Sama Dilaut are also sometimes called the Bajau Laut. This dissertation will refer to them as Sama 
Dilaut on the advice of expert anthropologist Helen Brunt. 
40 Sama Dilaut have much in common with other “sea nomad” ethnic groups including the Moken in Thailand 
and the Orang Suku Laut in Indonesia. See generally Human Rights Watch, ‘Stateless at Sea: The Moken of 
Burma and Thailand’ 25 June 2015 at https://www.hrw.org/report/2015/06/25/stateless-sea/moken-
burma-and-thailand, on the Moken; W. White, Sea Gypsies of Malaysia (Ams Pri 1922, 1981) (hereinafter 
White, 1981). See also C. Chou, Indonesian Sea Nomads; Money Magic and fear of the Orang Suku Laut 
(Routledge 2003) (hereinafter Chou, Indonesian, 2003), on the Orang Suku Laut. Due to their similar 
experiences, this dissertation will also refer from time to time to the parallel experiences of the Moken and 
Orang Suku Laut. 
41 For example, see the research of anthropologist Helen Blunt. 
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1.3 Definition of Terms 
Nationality and Citizenship 
First, this dissertation accepts as a given that the study of nomad statelessness must be 
accompanied by a study of nationality law.41F42 Some nomads are stateless under the laws of 
their countries, but others are of undetermined, or contested, nationality. Others are at risk 
of statelessness due to a lack of identity documents, even though they qualify as nationals 
under the law. As a result, this dissertation will look at the nationality and the statelessness 
of nomads, but also at cases of contested or unknown nationality. Cases of contested and 
unknown nationality will be noted where necessary. 
This dissertation looks at nationality under the law. Despite being a legal concept, it is 
not easy to formulate a clear definition of nationality. As some experts have pointed 
out, attempts to define nationality usually “fall short” given the complexity of the 
concept and the many ways nationality has evolved over the centuries. 42F43 Some experts 
point out that nationality is too limited to fully explain the relationship between 
individuals and states. 43F44 Some experts argue that nationality must have some 
minimum content. 44F45 Others view nationality as first and foremost a legal status, or 
identifier. 45F46 Hirsch Ballin defines nationality as “a status that entitles persons to 
citizens’ rights, the status that is fleshed out in the legal relationships between the 
 
42 M. Manly and L. van Waas, ‘The State of Statelessness Research’ 19 Tilburg Law Review 3 (2014) 5 
(hereinafter Manly and Van Waas, 2014). 
43 E. Isin and P. Nyers, ‘Introduction’ in E. Isin and P. Nyers, Routledge Handbook of Global Citizenship Studies 
(Routledge 2014) 1 (hereinafter Isin and Nyers, 2014). The authors define nationality as “a negotiated and 
dynamic institution mediating rights between political subjects and their polities..." 2. See also R. Slone, 
‘Breaking the Genuine Link: The Contemporary International Legal Regulation of Nationality’ 50 Har. Int’l L. J. 
1 (2009) 3 (hereinafter Slone 2009). 
44 T. Bloom, ‘Citizenship and Colonization: Liberal concepts of citizenship are not adequate for understanding 
contemporary individual-state relationships’ 67 Soundings 114 (2018) (hereinafter Bloom, Citizenship, 2018) 
115. 
45 L. N. Kingston, ‘Stateless as a Lack of Functioning Citizenship’ 19 Tilburg Law Review 127 (2014) 
(hereinafter Kingston, Stateless, 2014). See also L. Kingston, ‘Worthy of rights: Statelessness as a cause and 
symptom of marginalisation’ in T. Bloom, Understanding Statelessness 17-18 (hereinafter Kingston, Worthy); 
E. Fripp, Nationality and Statelessness in the International Law of Refugee Status (Hart 2016) 10 (hereinafter 
Fripp, 2016). “The right to an education is more than simply the right to attend school," but also includes the 
right to advocate for culturally appropriate schooling." H. Alexander, ‘The Open Sky or a Brick and Mortar 
School? Statelessness, Education and Nomadic Children’ in Institute on Statelessness and Inclusion (ed.) The 
World’s Stateless Children (January 2017). 
46 F. Jault-Seseke, Droit de la nationalité et des étrangers (Presses universitaires de France 2015) 21 
(hereinafter Jault-Seseke, 2015). See also H. Gulalp, ‘Introduction: Citizenship vs. Nationality?’ in H. Gulalp 
(ed.), Citizenship and Ethnic Conflict: Challenging the nation-state (Routledge 2009) 1. 
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state and the citizen.”46F47 Edwards argues that nationality must, at a minimum, provide 
diplomatic protection and the right to enter and reside. 47F48 Lindsey Kingston also 
questions the idea of “functioning citizenship,” or nationality that ensures the full 
spectrum of rights. 48F49 This dissertation looks both at the extent to which nomads have 
a status of any kind under the laws of their countries and the extent to which this 
status protects and ensures their rights.  
As noted above, this dissertation will primarily look at nationality as a matter of law. It will, 
however, also look beyond nationality as a legal status to important historical and 
sociological considerations that provide context for why and how nationality laws have 
been applied, or not applied, to nomads. As Tendayi Bloom puts it, “the core ideals of liberal 
citizenship are compelling, but they are often lost in the real-world systems ostensibly built 
upon them.”49F50  Discrimination is often closely related to statelessness 50F51 and nationality can 
be used as a tool of assimilation for minorities. 51F52 The cultural and political forces that 
shape nationality law are therefore vital to understanding the evolution of the law itself.  
As a result, this dissertation will also look at nationality as a sociological and cultural 
identity. Nationality can signify membership not only in a political state, but also in a 
cultural nation, or a community of people sharing a common way of life and a shared 
history of living in a particular place or homeland.52F53 Nationality law also contains moral 
 
47 E. M. H. Hirsch Ballin, Citizen’s Rights and the Right to be a Citizen (Brill Nijhoff, 2014) 65 (hereinafter 
Hirsch Ballin, 2014). 
48 A. Edwards, ‘The meaning of nationality in international law in an era of human rights: procedural and 
substantive aspects’ in A. Edwards and L. van Waas (eds.) Nationality and Statelessness under International 
Law Cambridge UP 2014) (hereinafter Edwards, 2014) 30-38. See also H. Alexander and J. Simon, ‘No Port, No 
Passport: Why Submerged States Can Have No Nationals’ 26 Wash. Int’l L. J. 307 (2016); P. Lagarde, La 
nationalité français (2nd ed., Dalloz 1989) 8; G. R. de Groot and O. W. Vonk, International Standards on 
Nationality Law: Texts, Cases and Materials (Wolf LP 2016) 36 (hereinafter de Groot and Vonk). 
49 Kingston, Stateless, 2014, 127. 
50 Bloom, Citizenship, 2018, 114. 
51 As UNHCR has noted, “discrimination and lack of documents can be both causes and consequences of 
statelessness.” UNHCR, ‘This is Our Home: Stateless Minorities and Their Search for Citizenship’ (2017) 2. 
52 For more on how nationality can be a tool of assimilation, see H. Alexander, ‘The Open Sky or a Brick and 
Mortar School? Nomad Children and Education’ The World’s Stateless Children (Institute on Statelessness 
and Inclusion 2017). See also Interim report of the Special Rapporteur on the right to food, O. De Schutter, 
submitted in accordance with General Assembly resolution 64/15, UN General Assembly 11 Aug. 2010 7. See 
also K. Staples, ‘Recognition, nationality, and statelessness: State-based challenges for UNHCR’s plan to end 
statelessness’ in T. Bloom, (ed.) Understanding Statelessness (Routledge 2017) 173 (hereinafter Staples, 
2017). 
53 D. Miller, On Nationality (Oxford UP 1995) 27 (hereinafter Miller, 1995). Miller sees a connection to a 
particular territory as a constituent part of nationality in the cultural sense. Fripp, quoting Weis, calls this the 
“sociological” aspect of nationality. Fripp, 2016, 4-5, quoting P. Weis, Nationality and Statelessness in 
International Law (Brill 1979) (hereinafter Weis, 1979). See also J. H. J. Verzijl, International Law in Historical 
Perspective (Martinus Nijhoff 1998) 6 (hereinafter Verzijl, 1998); I. Brownlie, ‘Relations of Nationality in 
International Law’ 39 British Yearbook of Int’l L. 284 (1963) 344-345; M. Koessler, ‘Subject, Citizen, National 
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elements. It formalizes the claims of some people to live in a particular territory and to 
participate in a particular government, while excluding others. 53F54 As a result, this 
dissertation will explore nationality as a legal status, but also give context to the 
development and application of the laws by looking at the ways in which sociological 
concerns effect the law. 
This dissertation will use the term nationality rather than citizenship throughout because 
nationality is the generally preferred term in international law. 54F55 This dissertation will use 
“citizenship” where it occurs in original quotes or documents. It is important to here note 
here that the term citizenship is sometimes used by experts to express distinct concepts or 
meanings.55F56 Fransman, for example, differentiates between the two terms in British law: 
Citizenship...defines one’s place and conduct in society, such as voting, standing 
for election, jury service, military service, eligibility for appointment to the civil 
service, state financial assistance and health care and state-sponsored 
education...(whereas nationality is) one’s international identity as belonging to a 
sovereign state and may be evidence by a passport...In the case of citizenship, the 
relationship is more concerned with the individual within the state, in the case of 
nationality, it is more concerned with the individual and the state in the 
international context. 56F57 
For the purposes of clarity and simplicity in this dissertation, however, the word 
nationality will be used to define both the municipal and the international aspects of 
nationality. 
Statelessness and Risk of Statelessness 
This dissertation adopts a broad, inclusive definition of statelessness as advocated by 
UNHCR and many experts. According to the 1954 Convention Relating to the Status of 
Stateless Persons, Art. 1, a stateless person, or apatride, is a “person who is not considered 
as a national by any state under the operation of its law.” 57F58 Statelessness occurs for many 
 
and Permanent Allegiance’ 56 Yale Law Journal 58 (1946) (hereinafter Koessler, 1946); E. Ehrlich, 
‘Fundamental Principles of the Sociology of Law’ (Transaction Publishers 1936) 55; Jault-Seseke, 17. 
54 Miller, 18-19. 
55 De Groot and Vonk, 3. See also Eric Fripp, Nationality and Statelessness in the International Law of Refugee 
Status (Hart 2016) 3 (hereinafter Fripp, 2016). 
56 I am indebted to Bronwen Manby for her comments on this point. See also Edwards, 13-14. 
57 L. Fransman QC (ed.), Fransman’s British Nationality Law (3rd edn., Bloomsbury 2011) 3-4 (hereinafter 
Fransman, 2011). 
58 Convention Relating to the Status of Stateless Persons (1954), United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 360, 117, 
art. 1 (hereinafter 1954 Convention, or, when grouped with the 1961 Convention, Statelessness Conventions). 
Though many states have not ratified the Convention, this definition is arguably a matter of customary law. 
Handbook, 2014 9. See also L. Pilgram, ‘International Law and European Nationality Laws’ (EUDO Citizenship 
Observatory 2011) 2 (hereinafter Pilgram, 2011), 8; L. van Waas, ‘The U.N. Statelessness Conventions’ in A. 
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reasons, including via expressly discriminatory nationality laws, discrimination in how 
nationality laws are applied, gaps between otherwise neutral nationality regimes within 
states and gaps between the nationality laws of different states. Statelessness is also a 
common result of the breakup of states, including during the decolonization process and 
the creation of new states in the middle of the 20th century. Statelessness may also be 
caused by denationalization or by the renunciation of nationality.  
It is important to understand what is meant by “under operation of its law” in the definition 
of statelessness. 58F59 The operation of law is made up of many different aspects, including 
court decisions, statutes, administrative rules, procedural rules, and treaties and custom. 
Sources of law may vary depending on the legal system used in a country. Sources of law in 
the common law system, for example, include case law and statutes, as well as customary 
law and “conventional law”, or law by agreement. 59F60 As a procedural matter, nationality can 
either be conferred automatically, when the requirements of the law are met, or following a 
formal procedure. 60F61 As a result, the registration of nationality and the issuance of 
documentation may play a determinative role in establishing nationality, or may be 
important evidence of nationality. Operation of law also includes the actions of tribunals 
and administrative bodies who apply the law.  
When determining statelessness, therefore, it is necessary to look at all points at which 
nationality is determined, from the procedures used at local registration offices in issuing 
documents to relevant court cases to changes made to the laws by legislatures, to the 
actions of embassies. 61F62 As the UNHCR Handbook on Protection of Stateless Persons puts it, 
“(t)he reference to ‘law’ in Article 1(1) should be read broadly to encompass not just 
legislation, but also ministerial decrees, regulations, orders, judicial case law (in countries 
with a tradition of precedent) and, where appropriate, customary practice.” 62F63 In so doing, 
this dissertation adopts an expansive definition of statelessness. As Gabor Gyulai puts it, 
“(e)stablishing statelessness is often a cumbersome exercise and if the evidentiary rules 
 
Edwards and L. van Waas, Nationality and Statelessness Under International Law (Cambridge UP 2014) 78 
(hereinafter Van Waas, Statelessness Conventions, 2014). 
59 1954 Convention. 
60 J. Salmond, Jurisprudence, or the Theory of Law (7th edn, Sweet & Maxwell 1924) 168 (hereinafter Salmond, 
1924). 
61 While the acquisition of nationality is automatic in some cases where certain conditions are met, such as 
birth within the territory of the state, the failure to obtain an ID or register a birth can result in undetermined 
nationality, even where the individual qualifies as a national under the law. Handbook ,2014, 13. 
62 Van Waas, Statelessness Conventions, 80-81 (discussing the meaning of “under the operation of law”). See 
also Salmond, 182. For example, an individual may qualify as a national under the nationality law of a state, 
but be denied nationality by a court or embassy. See S. Jaghai, ‘Statelessness at Home: The Story of a Stateless 
Student at Tilburg Law School’ 19 Tilburg L. Rev. 108 (2014). 
63 Handbook, 2014, 12. 
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are too strict, this can easily undermine the protection objective of the 1954 Convention.”63F64 
As UNHCR has pointed out, the manner in which the law is applied, the practice of the state, 
is key.64F65 “Widespread discrimination” against certain groups in the granting of nationality 
and the issuance of documents “should give rise to a presumption of de jure 
statelessness...”65F66 This dissertation will therefore look not only at the letter of the law, but 
also how it is applied, including the absence or presence of identity documents. 
At the same time, this dissertation remains sensitive to the problems with applying the 
term “stateless” to nomads. The term “stateless” may impose a negative label on persons 
who view themselves as rightfully the nationals of their state. Calling some nomads 
“stateless” risks doing them harm or reinforcing negative government stereotypes. The use 
of the term “stateless” should be seen as referencing a legal category defined by states in 
international law, not making a value judgment. Nevertheless, in recognition of the 
sensitivity of the issue, the term “stateless” is therefore used with caution. 66F67  
Some nomads may qualify for a nationality under the law, but have no identity documents 
to prove their nationality. The mere fact that an individual lacks identity documents does 
not mean that person is stateless. 67F68 As Mark Manly points out, “(l)ack of birth registration 
is not sufficient to render a person stateless."68F69 Persons who have no identity documents 
and whose parents have no identity documents, however, may be at-risk of statelessness. 69F70 
Lack of registration can have many of the same affects as refusing to grant nationality, such 
as making it impossible for children to attend school or for an individual to return home 
 
64 G. Gyulai, ‘The Determination of Statelessness and the Establishment of a Statelessness-specific Protection 
Regime’ in A. Edwards and L. van Waas, Nationality and Statelessness under International Law (Cambridge UP 
2014) 137 (hereinafter Gyulai). See also Van Waas, Statelessness Conventions, 79; R (on the application of 
Semeda) v Secretary of State for the Home Department (statelessness; Pham (2015) UKSC 19 applied) IJR 
(2015) UKUT 658 (IAC). 
65 Handbook, 2014, 13. 
66 L. Bingham, J. H. Reddy and S. Kohn, ‘De Jure Statelessness in the Real World: Applying the Prato Summary 
Conclusion’ (Open Society Justice Initiative 2011) 5-6 (hereinafter Bingham, Reddy and Kohn). 
67 H. Massey, ‘UNHCR and de facto Statelessness’ UNHCR Legal and Protection Policy Research Series (2010) 
(hereinafter Massey) 53. See also Batchelor, 1998, 158. 
68 “Failing to distinguish between the stateless and those who lack documentation, and the failure to 
distinguish stateless persons who lack documentation, can lead to the wrong solutions and frameworks being 
pursued, with little or even negative gain.” A. de Chickera and L. van Waas, ‘Unpacking Statelessness’ in T 
Bloom (ed.), Understanding Statelessness (Routledge 2017) 65. As Mark Manly points out, “the definition of a 
stateless person in the 1954 Convention is more complex than it appears at first glance and has been 
interpreted in wildly diverging manners,” so this section opts here for the most inclusive interpretation. 
Manly 2014 95. See also Van Waas, Nationality, 2008, 20. 
69 Manly, 2014, 107. 
70 UNICEF, ‘Every Child’s Birth Right: Inequalities and Trends in Birth Registration’ (2013) at 
https://www.un.org/ruleoflaw/files/Embargoed_11_Dec_Birth_Registration_report_low_res.pdf. 
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from abroad. 70F71 As UNHCR has noted, failure to register and obtain an ID or paperwork can 
lead to a cycle of exclusion that is compounded by discrimination and marginalization, 71F72 
placing people at risk of statelessness. 72F73 The line between statelessness and at-risk of 
statelessness can be fluid and blurry. 73F74 As the Institute on Statelessness and Inclusion has 
noted, persons lacking in documentation may be at risk of statelessness and “some of them 
are likely to already be stateless.” 74F75 This dissertation will also use the term “at risk of 
statelessness” where appropriate. 
As well, this dissertation will also look beyond the narrow interpretations of the law to 
explore the wider context of discrimination and exclusion that makes up a large part of 
statelessness. Laws and their implementation are not the only factors relevant to an 
analysis of statelessness. Government attitudes and policy goals are crucial in 
understanding why nationality laws are drafted and applied in certain ways. An overly 
narrow focus on laws and their implementation in isolation risks missing the larger context 
of why and how statelessness occurs. This dissertation therefore follows the advice of the 
UNHCR Handbook in applying a broad and flexible approach to discuss the nationality 
status of nomads, looking at the totality of the circumstances and history of each group. 75F76 
Nomad 
“Nomad” is not a legal term and has no definition in law, but it is frequently employed by 
anthropologists, governments and settled peoples 76F77 to define the shrinking minority of 
people who do not rely on agriculture and the cultivation of plants as the primary source of 
 
71 Van Waas cites to the 1997 issue of UNHCR’s ‘The State of the World’s Refugees’ as the beginning of 
UNHCR’s push to highlight the importance of registration to establishing nationality and preventing 
statelessness. Van Waas, Nationality, 2008, 151-152, citing to UNHCR, ‘Statelessness and Citizenship’ in 
UNHCR, The State of the World’s Refugees - A Humanitarian Agenda, (Oxford 1997) 226. Registration may also 
be used in an international setting to establish “functional nationality”, or nationality for the purposes of 
settling an international disputes and determining the subjects of international treaties. I. Brownlie, 
‘Relations of Nationality in Public International Law’ 39 British Yearbook of Int’l L. 284 (1963) 347-349 
(hereinafter Brownlie, Nationality). 
72 For example, see UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), Persons at Risk of Statelessness in Serbia, 
June 2011. See also Van Waas, Nationality, 2008, 153-157; B. Manby, ‘Legal Identity for All’ and Childhood 
Statelessness’ in Institute on Statelessness and Inclusion (ed.), The World’s Stateless Children (January 2017) 
320-321 (hereinafter Manby, Legal). 
73 See generally the Institute on Statelessness and Inclusion, The World’s Stateless (December 2014) at 
http://www.institutesi.org/worldsstateless.pdf (hereinafter Institute, Stateless). 
74 Batchelor, 1998, 172. See also Massey; Handbook, 2014 5; Fripp, 2016, 102.  
75 Institute on Statelessness and Inclusion, The World’s Stateless (Wolf 2014) 43. See also Manly, 2014, 103. 
76 Handbook, 2014, 12-14. 
77 In anthropology, “sedentism”, or what I will call “settlement,” is defined as “the settled, immobile location of 
the household during the annual round of productive activities.” P. Salzman, ‘Introduction’ in P. Salzman (ed.) 
When Nomads Settle (Praeger 1980) (hereinafter Salzman, Introduction) 10. 
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their food.77F78 There is no established and agreed upon definition for the word nomad and, 
as a result, this dissertation will take an inclusive approach, looking not only at currently 
mobile and nomadic groups, but recently nomadic groups who are still strongly associated 
with mobility by their governments and other outsiders. 
While there is no definition in law for the term nomad, several organizations have made an 
attempt to define it. The Council of Europe defined nomads as; “persons who, for 
traditional reasons, are accustomed to follow an itinerant way of life." 78F79 This definition 
arguably fails to capture the diversity of nomadic lifestyles, however. A joint report by the 
International Organization on Migration, ECOWAS, the European Union defines nomadism 
as, “(c)ontinuous movement of people with their herds. Very mobile production system, 
opportunistic movements according to pasture availability, often without own fields and 
annual return to a fixed base.”79F80 Once again, this definition fails to take into account mobile 
traders and artists and is therefore too limited. The ECOWAS report also distinguishes 
nomadism from pastoralism and transhumance. This dissertation will adopt an expansive 
view of the term nomad to include all forms of mobile lifestyle, including pastoralism, 
mobile fishing, trade, mobile arts and transhumance. 
Self-identification is often a key factor in nomad identification. This is in part because 
colonial attitudes have coloured and distorted the historical record in ways which are still 
being uncovered and discussed. 80F81 Nomadism is a diverse, mutable and changeable 
characteristic, with many nomadic populations moving in and out of nomadism over 
time.81F82 Nomads move in and out of nomadism. They may have relatives who are sedentary 
and/or close contractual relationships with settled communities. As such, it can be difficult 
to speak of nomads as separate, distinct groups. For example, Youssouf Diallo prefers not to 
classify cattle herders as nomads, but rather as herders who have gone through periods of 
nomadism.82F83 
Defining nomadism is also difficult because nomadism is not simply an economic activity, 
but also a social and cultural way of life. Nomads may also be defined as a separate 
 
78 For a discussion of the origins of the word “nomad,” see Y. Diallo, Nomades des espaces interstitiels: 
Pastoralisme, identité, migrations (Burkina Faso - Cote d’Ivoire) (Rudiger Koppe Verlag 2008) (hereinafter 
Diallo) 23-28. 
79 Council of Europe Recommendation No. R (83) 1 of the Committee of Ministeres to Member States on 
Stateless Nomads and Nomads of Undetermined Nationality (Adopted by the Committee of Ministers on 22 
February 1983 at the 356th meeting of the Ministers’ Deputies). 
80 Regional Policies and Response to Manage Pastoral Movements within the ECOWAS Region, International 
Organization on Migration, ECOWAS, the European Union and ECOWAS ‘Support to Free Movement of 
Persons and Migration in West Africa’ (FMM West Africa) (September 2017) vii. 
81 Recent studies of Australian aboriginals highlight the dangers of labeling groups as nomadic. B. McMahon, 
‘Scientist debunks nomadic Aborigine “myth”’ The Guardian (9 Oct. 2007). 
82 D. Chatty, Mobile Pastoralists (Columbia UP 1996) (hereinafter Chatty, Pastoralists) 82. 
83 Diallo, 27- 33. 
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ethnicity or as a class of people within an ethnicity. Many nomads practice different 
religions or speak unique languages from nearby, settled communities, but in other cases, it 
is cultural or economic practices that form the primary point of difference with agricultural 
or urban groups. As a result of the difficulties in defining nomadism and classifying 
nomadic and mobile peoples, this dissertation will apply a broad approach. 
Many groups that were historically associated with nomadism during the colonial period 
are now semi-settled or settled, a fact which will be explored at length in this dissertation. 
Many nomads have close family or patronage relations with settled, urban or agricultural 
peoples and live in a state of economic and social inter-dependence with settled 
communities, forming part of complex societies where the line between nomad, farmer and 
urbanite was frequently blurred. The distinction between nomadic and settled groups is 
therefore often not clear nor is it always politically or socially relevant. While nomadism 
was frequently a feature drawn out and much commented upon by the colonial 
administrators who often created important historical records, recent scholarship has done 
much to correct the record on nomad land use and the extent of nomad land ownership, 
their relations to settled and urban communities and the extent and limits of their 
mobility.83F84 
The term nomad is also fraught with problems due to its negative connotations. 84F85 
Anthropologist Dawn Chatty promotes the term “mobile peoples” in response to the 
imprecise and often negative connotations of the term nomad. Her use of “mobile peoples” 
is in line with the Dana Declaration on Mobile Peoples and Conservation.85F86 
This dissertation will use the term nomads rather than mobile peoples because nomads is 
the term most used by governments and other outsiders to describe historically mobile 
peoples and others associated, rightly or not, with a nomadic lifestyle. The bias and 
negative perceptions associated with the term nomad are very much a factor in nomad 
statelessness. In some cases, the term nomad continues to be applied to settled, former 
nomads in tandem with their continued exclusion. In this context, the context of outsider 
perceptions and biases, the term nomad is appropriate. 
In particular, as this dissertation will explore, the term nomad imposes an imagined 
ideology, a world-view, on otherwise dispirit groups coming from different cultures and 
living in vastly different circumstances, creating a dichotomy between nomads and the rest 
of society. It is inherently a loaded and exclusionary term and this dissertation will explore 
they ways in which its negative connotations, and tendency to isolate and exclude the 
groups to whom it is applied, are very much relevant to nomad statelessness. For example, 
nomadism has sometimes been negatively associated with illiteracy and, as a result, a poor 
 
84 See for example Diallo, 28-32. 
85 Diallo, 27-28. 
86 D. Chatty, ‘Nomadic Peoples, Migration and Biodiversity’ SGI Quarterly (October 2003) (hereinafter Chatty, 
Nomadic Peoples). See also the Dana Declaration on Mobile Peoples and Conservation, Fifth World Parks 
Conference, Durban, South Africa (September 2003) (hereinafter Dana Declaration). 
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understanding of religion. Max Weber, for example, believed that “urban life in contrast 
with rural or desert life provides an individual with greater facilities for becoming literate, 
for becoming acquainted with the written, authentic version of his or her faith..." 86F87 
There are also difficulties and ethical issues associated with labelling marginalized peoples 
like nomads, where a clear classification does not exist for the group in question and there 
are negative associations with the term. 87F88 As a result, it is difficult to say how many mobile, 
nomadic and non-settled peoples remain in the world, nor is it the purpose of this 
dissertation to uncover the number. As with statelessness, discussed above, it may not be 
possible or desirable to quantify the practice of nomadism. Therefore, this dissertation will 
not enter into a detailed discussion of different types of nomadism or evaluate the extent to 
which modern populations continue to practice nomadism. For the purposes at hand, this 
dissertation selected three groups as examples which are commonly and historically 
associated with nomadism by others, including governments, and have members who self-
identify as nomads or mobile peoples or who identify with a nomadic lifestyle or culture as 
part of their identity, even though they may not practice a mobile lifestyle themselves. 
Despite the enormous diversity of nomad lifestyles and societies and the dangers 
associated with a term that has frequently been used pejoratively, there are some general 
points to help frame the populations that are the subject of this dissertation, beyond the 
simple fact of self-labelling or having been labelled as nomads by outsiders. According to 
the Dana Declaration on Mobile Peoples and Conservation, cited above, mobile peoples may 
be defined as, 
a subset of indigenous and traditional peoples whose livelihoods depend on 
extensive common property use of natural resources over an area, who use 
mobility as a management strategy for dealing with sustainable use and 
conservation, and who possess a distinctive cultural identity and natural resource 
management system. 88F89 
According to the 2007 Segovia Declaration of Nomadic and Transhumant Pastoralists, 
 
87 P. Clarke (ed.) The Oxford Handbook of the sociology of religion (Oxford 2009) 127, quoting R. Bendix, Max 
Weber: An Intellectual Portrait (London 1966), (hereinafter Clarke) 114.  
88 For examples of some of the ethical and practical concerns in counting and quantifying indigenous and 
nomadic peoples, see B. Elias, K. Busby and P. Martins, ‘One little, too little: Counting Canada’s indigenous 
people for improved health reporting’ 138 Social Science and Medicine 179 (August 2015). The authors 
describe some of the problems with classifying and labeling indigenous populations, including self-
identification, gender discrimination and mixed-race individuals, problems with record keeping and defining 
family relationships. See also L. Heikkilä, ‘Welfare services in enhancing good life for the Sámi: A reflection on 
conducting ethically responsible research and developing an improved sense of culture’ 59 International 
Social Work 653 (2016) for reflections on the ethical challenges of field research of the Sami people, an 
indigenous, mobile nomadic group, including the role of subjectivity, the challenges of participatory 
approaches and carrying out research applying indigenous concepts and theory. 
89 Dana Declaration. 
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Pastoral livelihoods are based on seasonal mobility and common property of 
natural resources (particularly rangelands), regulated by customary law and 
practices, customary institutions and leadership, all making use of local and 
indigenous knowledge. 89F90 
Seasonal, patterned mobility is one of the common features that many anthropologists use 
to categorize nomads. 90F91 Drawing on this definition, the groups chosen as subjects of this 
dissertation all use, or have used in the past, mobility as a strategy to manage natural 
resources. All have a distinct cultural identity from the majority populations of what are 
now the nation-states in which they live. 
Finally, some, but not all, nomadic peoples may also self-identify as indigenous peoples. 
Many indigenous peoples are also nomadic and mobile, or were nomadic or mobile in the 
past. Some indigenous peoples were labelled nomadic by colonizing governments, though 
the extent to which this is true is now debated. 91F92 The intersection between nomadism and 
indigenous status will be referenced in this dissertation where appropriate. 
Sources 
This dissertation does not employ any original field research. Instead, this dissertation 
aims to be a synthesis and an analysis of what is already known about government laws, 
attitudes and policies towards the three selected nomadic groups, an analysis which is then 
used as grounds to explore and critique possible solutions under international law. As this 
is a law dissertation, it will focus on nationality law, both in the municipal and international 
 
90 Segovia Declaration of Nomadic and Transhumant Pastoralists, La Granja, Segovia, Spain (14 September 
2007). 
91 Nomadism may be defined as “movement of the household during the annual round of productive 
activities.” P. C. Salman, When Nomads Settle: Processes of Sedentarization as Adaptation and Response 
(Praeger 1980) 11. Keenan points out that nomads live in areas where “natural resources are not only scarce, 
but also insecure from year to year,” so movement is required. Keenan, Lesser Gods, 2004, 165. See also F. 
Hole, ‘Pastoral Mobility as an Adaptation’ in J. Szuchman, Nomads, Tribes and the State in the Ancient Near 
East (U Chicago 2009) 269-270, where he says, “I see pastoralism in its various forms as examples of 
adaptation to environmental and social conditions within a mixed agro-pastoral economy.”  
According to Bourgeot, nomadism may be defined as “regular and periodic migration for the purpose of 
pastoral industry” or “a mode of herding or raising livestock over long distances.” A. Bourgeot, Les sociétés 
touarègues; Nomadisme, identité, résistances (Karthala 1995) 155 (hereinafter Bourgeot, Résistances) (my 
translation), citing to the definitions of A. Bernard, N. Lacroit and R. Capot-Rey. Nomadism, however, should 
not be treated as synonymous with pastoralism as it also encompasses wandering traders, peripatetic 
minorities and hunter-gatherers. Some anthropologists argue the term nomad should be reserved for 
pastoralists. “In my view, wandering hunters and gatherers on the one hand, and mobile pastoralists, on the 
other, have too little in common to unite them under a single label.” A. Khazanov, Nomads and the Outside 
World, (2nd edn U Wisconsin P 1983) (hereinafter Khazanov, Outside) 15-16. Khazanov’s work focuses on the 
interrelation and inter-dependence between nomadic and settled peoples. 
92 See generally J. Castellino and C. Doyle, ‘Who are Indigenous Peoples: An Examination of Concepts 
Concerning Group Membership in the UNDRIP’ in J. Hohmann and M. Weller, The UN Declaration on the Rights 
of Indigenous Peoples: A Commentary (Oxford 2018) (hereinafter Castellino and Doyle). 
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spheres. To do so, it will look both at nationality laws and how they are implemented, 
including the implementation of nationality at the local level.  
This examination is multi-faceted, looking not only at nationality laws, but also at the 
issuance of identity documents by registration departments, the courts and other organs of 
the state. It will also explore access to nationality rights and proof of nationality by looking 
at voting records, school attendance, land ownership and other areas where nomads 
interact with the organs of the state. Reference will therefore be made both to laws and 
their implementation, as well as secondary scholarship documenting voting histories, 
access to education, health care and official work, taxes, the census and other official 
registries. 
But the problem of nomad statelessness should not be examined only through legal 
analysis. This dissertation will draw on a diverse wealth of sources to explore why certain 
nomads became stateless by examining key state goals that affected and intersected with 
the status of nomads. Manly and Van Waas cite the “need to explore statelessness from an 
interdisciplinary perspective...”92F93 Statelessness as government policy is influenced by 
negative perceptions held by governments, government officials and society at large. 
Matters of perception and what is sometimes referred to as “public opinion,” including the 
presentation of nomadic groups by media and outside scholars, are of relevance. This 
dissertation will look beyond the fact of the law to explore the rationale behind how the 
law has been applied, or not applied, to nomads and the wider political context, looking at 
history, philosophy, geography, politics and sociology.  
Perhaps most crucially, this dissertation includes an analysis of the political theories and 
philosophies that have influenced nomad-state relations from the colonial period through 
the modern age, including the philosophies underpinning the nation-state system and the 
use of nationality to govern citizen-state relationships. It will also look at how nomad 
inclusion and exclusion relate to the control and use of land, including theories of private 
property ownership and state control. To do so, this dissertation will draw from other 
disciplines including history, sociology, geography, anthropology and others to inform its 
legal analysis. 
This dissertation does not seek to do any quantitative analysis of nomad statelessness 
because reliable data does not exist for either stateless persons or nomads in most 
countries.93F94 Quantifying statelessness in many contexts may not be possible or desirable 
due to the ways in which stateless people are often invisible to state structures and 
 
93 Manly and Van Waas, 2014, 6. 
94 There are currently a number of statelessness mapping projects being undertaken in various countries. 
UNDP is currently undertaking a mapping exercise of statelessness for one of the three groups cited in this 
dissertation: the Sama Dilaut of Sabah, Malaysia. Future mapping projects may assist in quantifying 
statelessness, but at the time of writing, statistics on statelessness are usually not available. 
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bureaucracies and the ways in which official statistics may be manipulated and misused. 94F95 
Likewise, the difficulties in defining nomadism and identifying nomads make quantitative 
studies of nomads extremely difficult. 95F96 Instead, this dissertation presents an in-depth 
analysis of the legal framework in the three selected states, as pertains to the three selected 
nomad groups. This academic research is fleshed out by an analysis of media, government 
and non-profit publications about nomads, documents which help to explain the attitudes 
and opinions of nomads held by many governments and international actors during 
different key historical moments in nomad-state relations. 
Missing from this dissertation are the opinions and views of the nomads themselves, 
including how they see nationality. It is hoped also that this dissertation will serve as a 
jumping off point for further discussion of nationality from the nomadic perspective. 
Another limitation on this dissertation is the frequent lack of quality sources from the 
colonial period. Due to the lack of nomad sources from the colonial period, this dissertation 
must rely on colonial sources that may be inaccurate and biased. In fact, the topic of 
colonial bias against nomads is a major topic of this dissertation, so there is a certain irony 
in being forced to rely on biased sources for a dissertation about that very bias. The 
challenges in using colonial sources are acknowledged where appropriate. 
A good example of reliance on colonial sources is the use of J. Spencer Trimingham’s Islam 
in West Africa.96F97 While subsequent scholars have criticized Trimingham’s book as being 
“outdated,” it remains “the only survey of its kind,”97F98 in that it is one of the few major 
works pulling together a broad array of scholarship into one place. Another example would 
be the contested history of the origins of Bedouin tribes in the Gulf region, where much of 
the scholarship is contradictory. 98F99 Another example is arguments between anthropologists 
on the extent to which the Sama Dilaut were a “pariah people” during the precolonial 
period given that many of the records of the Sama Dilaut are based on colonial European 
sources.99F100 A number of more recent scholars have worked to place colonial era sources in 
their proper context and this dissertation will therefore also rely on the work of 
anthropologists like Dawn Chatty and historians like Bruce Hall to help interpret and 
situate colonial sources. It will also acknowledge disputed history where necessary. 
Part 3 will look at a wide variety of sources, including treaties, customary international law 
and general principles of law, but also draft treaties, declarations, cases, treaty body 
 
95 See Manly, 2014, 101 for a discussion of the difficulties of quantifying statelessness. For an example, see the 
discussion around collecting statistics on the bidoon of Kuwait in C. Beaugrand, Stateless, 2018, 33-38. 
96 See generally the work of Dawn Chatty and the Dana Declaration. 
97 J. Spencer Trimingham, Islam in West Africa (Clarendon 1959) (hereinafter Trimingham). 
98 R. S. O’Fahey, ‘Islamic Hegemonies in the Sudan: Sufism, Mahdism and Islamism’ in Louis Brenner (ed.), 
Muslim Identity and Social Change in Subsaharan Africa (Indiana 1993) 21. See Part 2, below. 
99 For more on this issue, see Part 2, below. 
100 For more on this issue, see Part 2, below. 
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reports and guidance issued by organs of the United Nations. 100F101 Soft law is particularly 
important in the case of nomads, where little treaty law exists beyond bilateral treaties on 
specific populations.101F102 Soft law can assist in interpreting key terms and how key concepts 
in treaties may be applied to the specific circumstances faced by nomads. It is therefore 
necessary to explore international law writ large and draw on all available sources. This 
approach will also allow Part 3 to examine not only what states have bound themselves to 
do, but also where the law might develop in the future, particularly on emerging issues. 
Regional instruments are particularly important because they are often supported by 
regional human rights courts or committees and can help to define key terms and concepts 
and show how the law might be applied to particular groups, like nomads.102F103 Court cases 
often involve an in depth examination of particular terms and concepts. “The courts are 
often a valuable tool in vindicating the equal rights of stateless people, including their right 
to a nationality.”103F104 Where applicable, Part 3 will explore these regional instruments, 
including the dicta of courts and findings of relevant committees. 
Draft conventions and declarations can give insight into the emerging consensus on the 
importance of the right to a nationality in the international sphere, even where they are not 
yet legally binding on states. 104F105 They can give a picture of possible reforms and future 
advancements in international law. They can also help guide the interpretation of existing 
treaties and commonly used terms in the law. As Brownlie puts it, “such instruments…may 
stand for a threshold of consensus and confront states in a significant way.” 105F106 
Finally, this dissertation will look explicitly at guidance provided by organs of the United 
Nations, particularly UNHCR, which the UN General Assembly has given the global mandate 
to combat statelessness.106F107 UN guidance can help define how treaties are to be applied in 
certain circumstances. Where applicable, this dissertation will also consider the opinions of 
noted international law scholars, in line with Article 38 of the Statute of the International 
Court of Justice. Such guidance can illuminate legal consensus on how treaties like the 
Statelessness Conventions should be applied to particular groups under particular 
 
101 Shaw, 2008, 70. 
102 For an example, see the Jay Treaty, Standing Senate Committee on Aboriginal Peoples, ‘Border Crossing 
Issues and the Jay Treaty’ Senate of Canada (June 2016). 
103 See Shaw, 2008, 70. Shaw cites to Article 38(1) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice as the 
authority on international law sources. See also Brownlie, 2008, 3-29. 
104 A de Chickera and J. Whiteman, ‘Addressing statelessness through the right to equality and non-
discrimination’ in L. van Waas and M. Khanna, Solving Statelessness (Wolf 2017) 119. 
105 See for example the Draft Articles, 24. See also Edwards, 38; de Groot and Vonk, 71-72. 
106 Brownlie, 2008, 4. 
107 UNGA Resolution A/RES/49/169 of 23 December 1994 and A/RES/50/152 of 21 December 1995. 
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circumstances. For a list of sources organized by topic, see the section on Sources by Topic 
at the end of this dissertation. 
Part 2: The Nationality and Statelessness of Nomads 
2.1 Nomads and Empire 
Introduction 
(T)he root causes of statelessness are complex and multifaceted including 
state succession, decolonization, conflicting laws between States, domestic 
changes to nationality laws, and discrimination. 107F108 
Part 2 will discuss the nationality and statelessness of the Bedouin, the Tuareg and the 
Sama Dilaut in Kuwait, Mali and Malaysia during the pre-colonial and colonial periods. It 
will explain how nomads went from being vital participants in pre-colonial states to 
marginalized minorities during the colonial period. It will also examine the types of status 
given to some nomads during the colonial period and the reasons why some nomads 
received no status at all. This history is crucial to understanding how and why some 
nomads became stateless and what types of status were available to nomads during the 
colonial period. 
Part 2 begins by introducing the three nomadic groups examined in this dissertation, 
summarizing how belonging was defined in their societies in the decades before colonial 
conquest. This section is mainly a work of historical analysis. Next, Part 2 will discuss the 
colonial period, a time when the status and role played by nomads in society radically 
changed. The section on the colonial period begins with a historical analysis and concludes 
with a section on legal analysis. 
  
 
108 Institute for Human Rights and Development in Africa (IHRDA) and Open Society Justice Initiative (on behalf 
of Children of Nubian Descent in Kenya) v. the Government of Kenya, Decision No 002/Com/002/2009, African 
Committee of Experts on the Rights and Welfare of the Child (ACERWC) (22 March 2011) (hereinafter Nubian 
Children) para. 45. 
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Nomads Before Colonization 
The Bedouin of the Persian Gulf 
 
 
Possible Locations of Bedouin Tribes During the Colonial Period 
 
For thousands of years, the Bedouin practiced nomadic pastoralism and trade across the 
Arabian peninsula, living alongside and intermingled with settled oasis and coastal 
communities.108F109 The area today known as Kuwait has always been very dry, containing less 
than 1% arable land, making nomadic pastoralism an ideal use of land away from oasis and 
coastal areas.109F110 As will be shown, the desert environment that made pastoralism so ideal 
would also prove to contain large quantities of oil and natural gas, but during the pre-
colonial period, pastoralism, pearl fishing and trade formed the foundation of the desert 
economy.110F111 Much of Kuwaiti history is disputed, particularly when it comes to the origins 
 
109 Chatty, Pastoralists, 5-6. See also A. al-Ashker and R. Wilson, Islamic Economics: A Short History (Brill 
2006) 4; F. F. Anscombe, The Ottoman Gulf, the Creation of Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and Qatar (Columbia U. Press 
1997) 11-12 (hereinafter Anscombe). Anscombe is a historian who has published widely on Ottoman and Gulf 
history. This section relies on a blend of sources from anthropology, history and other social sciences. Where 
there are different opinions from scholars from different fields, these differences will be noted. 
110 M. Casey, The History of Kuwait (Greenwood Publishing Group 2007) (hereinafter Casey) 4-5. 
111 As Commins puts it, mobility was one of the “distinctive features” of Gulf society. D. Commins, The Gulf 
States: A Modern History (Tauris 2012) (hereinafter Commins) 6. 
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of certain Bedouin tribes. Nevertheless, this section will attempt to present an overview of 
what is known about Bedouin society prior to British Protectorate period. 
Modern Kuwait is located on the Persian Gulf and is centred around Kuwait City, an ancient 
trading port. During the 1700s, a “wave” of Bedouin tribes migrated to the region. 111F112 Over 
time, the economies of the Gulf region and the area now known as Kuwait came to rely on 
regional trade both by sea and by camel caravan. Bedouin served as guides and protection 
for the caravan trade that drove the regional economy. 112F113 Bedouin society was hierarchical, 
with camel herding tribes at the top of the social structure. 113F114 The desert came to be 
dominated by noble Bedouin tribes, either nomadic or semi-settled and often practicing 
long distance trade, and semi-nomadic tribes employed in sheep, camel or goat pastoralism 
and centred around oasis or coastal towns. 114F115 
For much of its recent history, the Gulf was nominally controlled by various empires, 
including the Romans, Persians, and Ottomans. During this period, local Bedouin sheiks 
retained control over their domains, though they remained influenced, pressured and, to a 
certain extent, threatened by larger and stronger empires to their north and west. 115F116 
Kuwait Town became rich off of trade, fishing and pearling and developed a wealthy 
merchant class. 116F117 During the early modern period, the town, ruled by the powerful Al-
Sabah family117F118, capitalized on its position at the edge of the Ottoman empire, where it 
could benefit from being somewhat independent from the Empire and attract non-Ottoman 
trade, including British trade. 118F119 Beyond the walls of Kuwait Town, Bedouin confederations 
controlled the desert, herding camels, sheep and goats and trading in caravans between the 
Mediterranean and the Gulf port cities, including Kuwait. 119F120 Tribes would trade over long 
distances between urban centres; such seasonal trade was called musabila and formed an 
 
112 Commins, 9. 
113 Commins, 8. 
114 Beaugrand, Stateless, 2018, 68. 
115 Beaugrand, Stateless, 2018, 45-53. 
116 Casey, 18. 
117 B. J. Slot, Mubarak Al-Sabah: Founder of Modern Kuwait: 1896-1915 (Arabian Publishing 2005) 8. Slot is a 
historian publishing on the region’s history, particularly its early history. See also Casey, 18. 
118 A. N. Longva, ‘Citizenship in the Gulf States: Conceptualization and Practice’ in Nils A Butenschon, Uri Davis 
and Manuel Hassassian (eds.), Citizenship and the State in the Middle East (Syracuse 2000) 181. See also A. al-
Dekhayel, Kuwait: Oil, State and Political Legitimization (Ithaca Press 2000) 1 (hereinafter al-Dekhayel); J. S. 
Ismael, Kuwait: Dependency and Class in a Rentier State (UP of Florida 1993) 17, 21 (hereinafter Ismael). I am 
indebted to anthropologist Anthony Toth’s comments. 
119 P. Carmichael, Nomads (Collins and Brown 1991) 66-78 
(hereinafter Carmichael). 
120 Slot, 8, 11. 
33 
 
important part of town-desert relations. 120F121 The ruling Al-Sabah family in Kuwait Town 
relied on loyal Bedouin groups to protect the town from Saudi raids and to work in the 
pearl industry.121F122 As well, connections with powerful Bedouin camel tribes gave the Al-
Sabah family access to the caravan routes and long-distance trade. Groups would travel 
from northern Arabia and what is now Iraq to trade in the town and pasture their 
animals.122F123 
Like with other pastoral nomads such as the Tuareg, discussed below, pastoral Bedouin 
maintained a relationship to land that was shifting and seasonal, frequently relying on 
collective ownership and informal agreements between tribes to determine control of a 
dira, or pasturage area, and water sources. 123F124 Many Bedouin tribes, however, also owned 
land which they hired out to others for cultivation, blurring the distinction between settled 
and non-settled peoples, particularly in oasis areas. 124F125 The coastal areas contained diverse 
communities, including many Bedouin practicing agriculture, fishing and pearling. 125F126 
Several of the tribes inhabiting what is now northern Kuwait had extensive areas of 
influence in what are now Saudi Arabia and Iraq. The Bedouin in this area are sometimes 
now called the “northern tribes”.126F127   
Belonging and membership in Bedouin tribes was based on family and kin relationships, 
but Islam also served as a cultural unifier across the region. The foundation of Bedouin 
society was the tribe, with membership based on descent from a Bedouin father. Clans, or 
ibn ’amm, would often encompass multiple generations descended from the same male 
ancestor. 127F128 Belonging in Bedouin society was based along kinship lines, with clans 
organized into large confederations. 128F129 But as Beaugrand notes, Bedouin political alliances 
were often fluid and shifting, particularly when it came to alliances with settled, urban 
 
121 Beaugrand, Stateless, 2018 11. 
122 Carmichael, 66. 
123 R. Fletcher, ‘Between the Devil of the Desert and the Deep Blue Sea: Reorienting Kuwait: 1900-1940’ 50 
Journal of Historical Geography 51 (2015) 58. 
 
124 Chatty, Pastoralists, 3; J. Janzen, Nomads in the Sultanate of Oman (Westview Press 1986) 64; Anscombe, 
11 (hereinafter Janzen); J. C. Wilkinson, ‘Traditional Concepts of Territory in South East Arabia’ 149 
Geographic Journal (1983) (hereinafter Wilkinson) 306-307. For more on Bedouin territoriality see K. Franz, 
‘The Bedouin in History or Bedouin History?’ 15 Nomadic Peoples 11 (2011). 
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rulers.129F130 The delineation between nomads, agriculturalists and urbanites was not strict in 
pre-colonial Arabia and there was much intermingling and overlap between settled and 
nomadic communities. Many families settled in Kuwait Town had Bedouin relatives, while 
clans and federations were frequently allied with settled families. 130F131 
For example, the Bani Khalid confederation dominated the Arabian interior and had a 
significant presence in what would become Kuwait, coming to run the large caravan trade 
with Iraq.131F132 Kuwait Town is usually described as being founded by the Bani Utub 
federation who migrated to the region, settled on the natural harbour and took up fishing 
and trade.132F133 Kuwaiti historian Salwa Alghanim argues that the Utub lacked the 
connections to desert clans that had typified the rule of the Bani Khalid. 133F134 While the 
history of these tribal confederations is often disputed by modern scholars, alliances forged 
during this period of Bedouin history play a role in modern Kuwaiti politics, including the 
politics of belonging. Over centuries, other groups settled in the area, including Bedouin 
from other parts of Arabia, as well as immigrants from Persia. 
Territoriality as the basis of political membership played a role in Bedouin society. Yet, the 
role of territoriality in forming group identity under Islamic law is debated.134F135 What is 
knows is that adherence to Islam and family ties could united Bedouin leaders and urban 
elites across long distances. While Islam bound together Bedouin and urban and oasis 
dwellers, however, it is important to note that Bedouin custom differed in important points 
 
130 Beaugrand cites the shifting allegiances of the Ikhwan during the early 20th century. Beaugrand, Stateless, 
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of Historic Title: Non-Western Pre-Colonial Normative Systems and Legal Resolution of Territorial Disputes’ 
27 Leiden J. of Int’l L. 727 (2014) 741. 
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from Sharia law, particularly in matters of the solving of disputes and inheritance, a fact 
which sometimes complicated nomad-urban relations. 135F136 
Though ownership of resource points like water sources and grazing land was not 
delineated on maps, both settled and nomadic families had clear ownership of territory. 
Ownership could change hands as families declined in importance or lost control of a 
resource.136F137 As historian Ben Slot puts it, “(t)he desert is like the sea: it is difficult to 
delineate precise borderlines there. Nomadic peoples move amongst each other and tribal 
loyalties may shift from one paramount shaikh to another.”137F138 Bedouin land ownership 
was often non-exclusive and changed over time. This fluidity suited the desert environment 
and the fragility of water sources, pastures and trade routes.  
The Bedouin had clearly established connections with both settled oasis towns and coastal 
trading ports like Kuwait. These relationships can be demonstrated through the systems of 
taxation and contracts that existed at the time:  
Economic life functioned through a series of integrating structural processes, 
activated by face to face participation, formulated in terms of contracts, treaties 
and agreements and validated through customary law and practice.138F139 
As trade increased in importance throughout Arabia, it led to the growth of finance, money 
lending, money changing and other commercial activities that required regulation by 
contract and custom guided by tradition and, over time, Islamic legal principles.139F140 Islam 
provided a comprehensive set of economic, cultural and political rules that helped 
standardize things like taxes, land ownership and trade throughout the region, rules which 
blended with ancient customs and practices. 140F141 Important to this system was the payment 
of various types of taxes such as khuwwa (brotherhood) or zakat (alms). Settled 
populations and traders would often pay various taxes to powerful Bedouin in exchange for 
protection while traveling across their territories or as an expression of allegiance. 141F142 
Beaugrand argues such payments were a de facto recognition of tribal dominance in a 
 
136 Al-Serhan and Furr, 22. 
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particular region and would later be used by Ibn Saud in the early 20th century to claim 
territory in what would become Saudi Arabia.142F143 
Islam also created the concept of umma, or a community of believers that could incorporate 
all Muslims, a fact which would sometimes cut against territorial divisions in Gulf society. 
Islam would also create new divisions in Gulf society between different Islamic sects, 
particularly between Sunni and Shi’a Muslims. 143F144 Throughout this period, the Bedouin 
occupied a central role in broader Gulf society, linked to urban and oasis dwellers by blood, 
religion, culture and the trade economy. At the risk of over-simplification, Gulf society 
before the colonial period is best described as one of mutual dependency between nomadic 
and urban groups; a web of economic, social and family relationships.  
The example of the Bedouin in the Gulf region is instructive of the ways in which nomadic 
and settled society blended together into an inter-dependent whole. 144F145 Common family, 
social, religious, linguistic and economic ties united many Bedouin communities with 
settled coastal and oasis towns. The line between nomadic and settled Bedouin was often 
unclear or not determinate of either allegiance or status. 145F146 Yet, while Kuwait Town 
became an important hub of trade and, as a result, relations with merchant families were 
critical to Bedouin welfare, relations with other regional cities were also important. Many 
Bedouin families maintained wide-ranging alliances with clans in what are now Saudi 
Arabia and Iraq.  
While remaining independent, the arrival of British interests in the Gulf would begin to 
change the relationship between the Bedouin and the settled merchants of Kuwait Town as 
well as the Al-Sabah family. No longer on the edge of the Ottoman Empire, Kuwait became 
central to British power in the region. In particular, the British period would usher in an 
era dominated by obsessive concerns over Kuwait’s borders and the protection of the port 
city from being “overrun” by “lawless” desert nomads. 146F147 Meanwhile, the fluid and complex 
political structure if the Bedouin did not easily align with a territorial model of statehood 
upon which the British empire was based, as future sections will explore. 
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The Tuareg of the Sahel 
 
 
Tuareg Trade Routes, 13th-14th century 
 
Bedouin and Tuareg society contain many points of similarity. Like the Bedouin, the 
Tuareg, or Kel Tamasheq, are a nomadic, pastoralist group. They occupy a broad area from 
northern Mali and Niger to southern Algeria. Today, they remain one of the region’s main 
pastoralist groups, though many Tuareg are settled in towns. 147F148 It is difficult to generalize 
about Tuareg society before colonization as many of the sources for our knowledge of pre-
colonial Tuareg society come from verbal histories of Tuareg that have been filtered 
through the writings of outsiders like Muslim explorers, French soldiers and 
administrators and non-Tuareg scholars based in urban areas like Timbuktu and Masina. 
Many important histories of the region are old, though more recent scholarship has done 
much to fill in the blanks and correct the record. This section will attempt to acknowledge 
weaknesses in the source material where appropriate. Nevertheless, scholarship into 
 
148 D. Boureima, ‘La constitution d’un réseau régional avec les communautés pastorales d’Afrique de l’Ouest : 
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Arabic sources and the oral record have augmented colonial sources and given a clearer 
picture of Tuareg society, though there is still much work to be done and the recent 
political situation has made field research difficult. 148F149 As with the Bedouin section, above, 
this section will rely on the work of historians and anthropologists. Disagreement between 
experts will be noted where appropriate. 
The exact origins of the Tuareg are unknown, but it is generally agreed upon that they are 
Berber peoples who first migrated south into present day Mali in the fifth century, 
increasing in numbers in the 1700s. 149F150 Unlike the Bedouin in the Gulf, the Tuareg migrated 
into a region that had been the site of several major empires over several centuries, 
including the Mali and Songhai Empires and, in the 19th century, the Masina caliphate. 
When the Tuareg arrived, major trading cities like Timbuktu had already been famous 
centres of learning and culture for hundreds of years. During the period immediately 
preceding French conquest, Tuareg society was in a state of constant flux, changing rapidly 
due to internal social pressures, but also as a result of the turmoil that accompanied the fall 
of the Songhai Empire and the rise of the Masina caliphate in what is now central Mali. 150F151 
The collapse of the Songhai Empire in the 16th century led to a period of instability in the 
region in which multiple smaller caliphates, like the Ayar Sultanate in what is now Niger 
and the larger Masina caliphate, would flourish. Some scholars argue that the arrival of the 
Tuareg in the Sahel played a role in the decline of the Songhai Empire, but this claim is 
disputed.151F152 
Like Bedouin society, nomadic Tuareg society was hierarchical. Pastoral Tuareg were 
divided into clans, or “drum groups,” each comprising a noble class in charge of military 
protection or religious learning, vassals in charge of raising livestock, slaves and haratin, or 
semi-free agriculturalists and herders, often of sub-Saharan origin. 152F153 The slaves and 
 
149 See the discussion of sources on this period of Tuareg history in D. M. Hamani, Au carrefour du Soudan et 
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haratin were involved in agriculture, goat herding and other tasks, leaving the Tuareg 
nobility free to focus on warcraft, learning and culture. 153F154 
As with the Bedouin, there was much contact, conflict and cooperation between nomadic 
and settled Tuareg. 154F155 Tuareg society included both settled and nomadic elements, as many 
Tuareg settled in large, urban centres like Timbuktu. There was also considerable diversity 
of lifestyles between Tuareg groups, with some drum groups, such as those near Air in 
Niger, forming fixed, sedentary villages along the caravan routes and others living an urban 
lifestyle in capital cities such as Agades. 155F156 The relationship between Tuareg rulers and 
settled rulers was often complex. Rulers of the kingdom of Mali, 156F157 for example, would have 
had sovereignty over local villages and their inhabitants. 157F158 The place of the Tuareg in 
relation to the rulers of sedentarised kingdoms, however, is less clear. Tuareg nobles often 
occupied positions of high status in the region, in control of political, religious and 
economic life. While the Tuareg nomadic nobility was politically independent for much of 
this time, it maintained strong economic, cultural and social ties with urban rulers. 
At the time of the French invasion, the Tuareg city of Agadez was critical node in the 
Saharan web of trade and a centre of learning and culture. 158F159 Though the Sultan of Ayar 
and other urban rulers would collect taxes, their power was always weak and 
decentralized, running parallel to the power of the nomadic Tuareg nobility. 159F160 The line 
between pastoralists and agriculturalists in the Sahel was often fluid. French sources likely 
confused the extent to which nomadic and settled Tuareg formed separate communities. 160F161 
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Urban and pastoral Tuareg communities, however, were parallel communities politically, 
with pastoral communities organized into a loose federation headed by an Amanokal who 
wielded considerable power, and urban communities such as the Ayar Sultanate governed 
by a Sultan. According to the French, who spent “much time collecting and drawing up 
genealogical tables” of nomadic society, the following major drum groups of nomadic 
Tuareg existed in French West Africa (Afrique occidentale française - AOF) in the late 1800s 
and early 1900s: the Iwellemmedan, Tengeregif, Igawaddaran, Kel Temulayt, and 
Irraganatan.161F162 Each of these drum groups occupied a particular region of the Sahel and 
each would have had many vassal clans, slaves and haratin families under their 
protection.162F163 
Tuareg traders played an important role in the salt trade, running some of the trans-Sahara 
caravans upon which the region’s economy was based. 163F164 In exchange for military 
protection, noble Tuareg families levied taxes of grain and other agricultural products, 
called tiwse, against their vassals, but also taxed the trading caravans who travelled 
through their lands. 164F165 Despite operating under parallel power structures, there was much 
inter-connectedness and inter-relatedness between town and countryside. 165F166 Strong 
cultural and linguistic bonds connected nomadic and urban Tuareg in places like the 
Moroccan-influenced kingdom of the Arma based around Timbuktu, as well as Hausa 
kingdoms to the south and, in the 19th century, the Sokoto and Masina caliphates. These 
post-Songhai kingdoms prospered from the Sahel’s far-flung system of trade in which 
nomadic Tuareg played a key role in offering military protection, as well as profiting from 
local livestock-rearing and agriculture, activities with which the Tuareg were deeply 
involved.166F167 
While unified by a common language, nomadic Tuareg society was often multi-racial 
incorporating Berber people, local agriculturalists and slaves from as far away as what is 
now Sudan. This diversity of both ethnicity and lifestyle means that the Tuareg are united 
primarily by language, culture and family alliances. The Tuareg, however, unlike the 
Bedouin, were a small minority in much of the Sahel, even in pre-colonial times. Alongside 
the Tuareg lived many Arab clans like the Kunta, who also engaged in Sahara trade and the 
spread of Islam, as well as communities of settled agriculturalists such as the Songhai and 
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Bambara peoples. 167F168 The region was also home to Mande West Africans, Arma peoples 
descended from Moroccan invaders, and many others. 168F169 
In part because of their minority status, Tuareg played an important role in the spread and 
interpretation of Islam, though the level of adherence among the Tuareg to Islamic law 
should not be overstated.169F170 While many other communities retained animist beliefs in the 
Sahel,170F171 certain noble Tuareg families had abandoned the warrior lifestyle and devoted 
themselves to Islam, becoming a religious class, with prominent religious figures offering 
advice and council throughout the region. 171F172 In this, they served a similar function to Arab 
scholars who would sometimes cross the Sahara to spread Islamic learning. Islam served a 
unifying role across the region by creating a common frame of reference between traders 
and rulers of various caliphates in the 18th century. The Sahara caravans, through which 
Islam spread, also served as a cultural unifier across the region and a connection to Muslim 
communities to the north and east. 172F173 Being Muslim indicated adherence to a common 
system of laws. 173F174 Tuareg and other nomad groups would attend prayer in towns when 
possible and all Muslims were expected to give Zakat as part of mandatory taxation, 
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including a tithe from nomad herds. The extent to which the Tuareg adhered to Islamic law 
as opposed to their customary traditions, however, remains somewhat disputed. 174F175 
Like the Bedouin, pastoral Tuareg clans dominated specific territories that were well 
defined and recognized by neighbouring clans and urban rulers. Certain Tuareg groups 
became associated with particular regions, or akals, such as the Air massif in Niger or the 
Adrar des Ifoghas, the mountains of the Ifogha clan, in the Soudan. 175F176 Like the powerful 
Bedouin clans, Tuareg drum groups would escort caravans that travelled through their 
areas in exchange for a tax, an expression of their sovereignty over their regions. 176F177 It 
should be noted that the issue of Tuareg territoriality is debated by anthropologists. As 
with the Bedouin, Tuareg land use differed from that of agricultural societies like the 
Songhai, who had a long established system of individual, family-based land tenure. 177F178 As 
the next sections will show, these differences in land ownership systems would play an 
important role in how the Sahel was administrated by the French. 
Land use often caused conflict in the Sahel before colonization between the Tuareg and 
other ethnic groups. Urban rulers sometimes attempted to bring pastoral Tuareg under 
their control178F179 and Tuareg often enslaved and raided sedentary villages. 179F180 During the 
18th century, Tuareg mobility was also sometimes viewed as inhibiting the spread and 
development of Islam, which required daily prayer and study. Perceived tensions between 
the practice of Islam and the practice of nomadism was sometimes a factor in Tuareg 
settlement programs instituted by caliphates like Masina prior to the arrival of the French. 
As the next section will explain, these attempts to settle the Tuareg would foreshadow 
future settlement policies of French administrators. The relationship between nomadic 
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Tuareg drum groups and the various urban and agricultural empires, caliphates and 
kingdoms that developed in the Sahel in the 16th, 17th and 18th centuries was therefore 
multi-layered, complex and overlapping. 
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The Sama Dilaut of the Sulu Sea 
 
 
Sama Dilaut Fishing Zones, 1960s, in green (orange and blue are other “sea gypsy" groups) 
 
The Sama Dilaut (Bajau Laut)180F181 are an ocean-dwelling group who have lived for centuries 
in the Celebes and Sulu Seas between the southern Philippines and the island of Borneo. 
They occupy an area that is now divided between Malaysia, the Philippines and 
Indonesia.181F182 While some facts about the Sama Dilaut are contested, there is more 
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Rights Network 2015) 3 (hereinafter Brunt, Vulnerability). See also G. Acciaioli, H. Brunt and J. Clifton, 
‘Foreigners Everywhere, Nationals Nowhere: Exclusion, Irregularity, and Invisibility of Stateless Bajau Laut in 
Eastern Sabah, Malaysia’ 15 J. of Imm. and Ref. Studies 232 (2017) 233. 
The “sea nomads” of southeast Asia can be divided into three main groups: the Moken of Thailand/Burma, the 
Sama Dilaut/Bajau Laut of Malaysia/Philippines and the Orang Suku Laut of Indonesia. Acciaioli, Brunt and 
Clifton are anthropologists working on the Sama Dilaut/Bajau Laut. See also L. Lenhart, ‘Recent research on 
Southeast Asian sea nomads’ 36 and 37 Nomadic Peoples 245 (1995) 246 (hereinafter Lenhart). Lenhart is an 
45 
 
consensus about their lifestyle and relationship to settled kingdoms than for the Bedouin 
and Tuareg. However, there is less agreement over the extent to which the Sama Dilaut 
should be classified as nomads. While some scholars argue that the Sama Dilaut are not 
nomads because they do not practice pastoralism and should instead be referred to as 
mobile peoples, this dissertation will refer to them as nomads because this is how they are 
viewed by the Malaysian government and many outsiders. 182F183  
In the pre-colonial period, boat nomadism could be found scattered throughout Southeast 
Asia183F184 and until the mid-1950s, the Sama Dilaut lived almost exclusively in boats. 184F185 They 
practiced hunting, gathering and mobile, seasonal fishing. 185F186 There is evidence of sea 
nomadism off the coast of what is now Sabah, Malaysia going back as far as 3,000 years. 186F187 
The Sama Dilaut, however, had a close relationship with shore communities, trading sea 
products, collecting fresh water and burying their dead on land. 187F188 Before the arrival of the 
British, Sama Dilaut migration followed a seasonal pattern throughout the Sulu Sea 
between what is now Malaysia, Indonesia and the Philippines. 188F189 
Like the Tuareg and the Bedouin, the Sama Dilaut had established relationships to certain 
ocean zones and islands. Sama Dilaut families would fish in certain areas or regions, 
controlling moorage and fresh water points. 189F190 Boats of families would travel the seas 
within recognized fishing ranges, fishing for valuable sea cucumber and other commodities 
to trade with shore-based groups.190F191 Like other nomads, however, the ways in which the 
Sama Dilaut related to their ocean domains was dominated by seasonal and shifting use 
 
ethnologist working on “sea gypsy” groups, including the Bajau Laut/Sama Dilaut, Moken and Orang Suku 
Laut. Where relevant, this section will make references to the experiences of these related groups. 
183 Lenhart argues against the use of the term nomadic for non-pastoralists, because nomadic implies pastoral 
nomadism. Lenhart 245.  
184 A. Wink, Indo-Islamic Society: 14th-15th Centuries (Brill 2004) 103-104. 
185 Sather, Commodity, 2002, 27.  
186 Sather, Commodity, 2002, 20. See also C. Warren, ‘Consciousness in Social Transformation: The Sama 
Dilaut of East Malaysia’ 5 Dialectical Anthropology 227 (1980) 227 (hereinafter C. Warren, Consciousness); C. 
Sather, The Sama Dilaut: Adaptation, History, and Fate in a Maritime Fishing Society of South-eastern Sabah 
(Oxford UP 1997) 2-8 (hereinafter Sather, Adaptation). Sather and the two Warrens are anthropologists 
whose careers have produced much of the scholarship on the Sama Dilaut (Bajau Laut). 
187 B. Andaya and L. Andaya, A History of Malaysia (Palgrave 2nd 2001) (hereinafter Andaya) 14. 
188 Sather, Commodity, 2002, 23; C. Warren, Consciousness, 1980, 227-228.  
189 J. Warren, The North Borneo Chartered Company's administration of the Bajau, 1878-1909; the pacification 
of a maritime, nomadic people (Ohio U. 1971) 65-66 (hereinafter J. Warren, Chartered). 
190 Sather, Commodity, 2002, 27 See also C. Chao, The Orang Suku Laut of Riau, Indonesia: The Inalienable Gift 
of Territory (Routledge 2010) 10 (discussing the similar practices of the Orang Suku Laut) (hereinafter Chao, 
Riau). Chao writes generally of the sea nomads of the Sulu Sea region during the colonial period. 
191 Sather, Commodity, 2002, 27.  
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without hard borders or exclusive ownership arrangements. Families might shift fishing 
areas from season to season as fishing stocks changed and certain islands and reefs might 
become too dangerous due to the presence of pirates. 191F192 Families would also take longer 
voyages to visit relatives to what is now the Philippines and Indonesia, though the Sama 
Dilaut themselves did not engage in long distance trade. 192F193 Rather, they served as the first 
link in a chain of trade in sea cucumber and other delicacies that stretched all the way to 
the royal courts of China. 193F194 In this regard, the Sama Dilaut had a similar relationship to the 
ocean as the Bedouin and Tuareg did to the desert: shifting, seasonal use, though with close 
ties to certain islands and fishing zones. 
Like the Tuareg and Bedouin, the Sama Dilaut maintained close relations with shore-based 
peoples as they supplied products for regional trade. Many families had exclusive trade 
relationships with patrons from the land-based aristocracy in Borneo. This patronage 
relationship offered the Sama Dilaut a great deal of autonomy, but also provided them with 
clearly established trading partners and protection. Importantly, the Sama Dilaut were not 
slaves, but were rather clients of land-based communities under an established and widely 
recognized patronage system. Having a patron was vitally important in an age of “endemic 
violence” on the high seas. But patronage was not exclusive; Sama Dilaut families could end 
patron relationships at any time and would often have multiple patrons. 194F195  
Like with the Tuareg and Bedouin, therefore, the Sama Dilaut were involved in long-
distance trade, though they did not practice it themselves. The seas around Borneo were 
less dividers of land masses than they were linkages between trade-oriented city-kingdoms 
in constant competition with each other for trade and manpower, 195F196 and the Sama Dilaut 
formed the first link in a web of trade upon which much of the Sulu Sultanate’s wealth was 
 
192 Anthropologist Cynthia Chou writes that the Orang Suku Laut, a related group, view borders as “temporary 
markers” that shift along with the changing political realities of the region imposed upon them by outside 
groups. Chou, Riau, 80. 
193 Sather, Commodity, 2002, 27 See also Sather, Adaptation, 1997, 67. 
194 There are records of trade with India and China going back to the fifth century and records of Bajau 
maritime trade since at least 1,000 BC. Andaya, 11 See also V. Hooker, A Short History of Malaysia: Linking 
East and West (Allen and Unwin 2003) 29-35 (hereinafter Hooker). See also N. Tarling, Sulu and Sabah; A 
Study of British Policy Towards the Philippines and North Borneo from the Late 18th Century (Oxford U. P. 
1978) 1. 
195 C. Sather, ‘Sulu’s Political Jurisdiction over the Bajau Laut’ 3 Borneo Research Bulletin (1971) 59 
(hereinafter Sather, Political). 
196 This point is made most compellingly by James Warren in J. Warren, The Sulu Zone: 1768-1898 (Singapore 
UP 1981) (hereinafter Warren, Zone). See also Hooker, 16-17.  
James Warren refers to the Sulu Zone, or the area around the Sulu Sea, as a “web of exchange” that united 
various kingdoms and cities on the coasts together into a single economy in which the Sama Dilaut served a 
critical role as deep sea fishermen of valuable sea products like sea cucumber. See also J. Warren, ‘Looking 
Back on ‘The Sulu Zone’: State Formation, Slave Raiding and Ethnic Diversity in Southeast Asia’ 69 Journal of 
the Malaysian Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society (1996) 21-33, 23 (hereinafter Warren, Looking). 
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based. This trade fuelled the growth of great trading cities throughout the region like 
Melacca, Johor and Kuta Raja (Banda Aceh). 196F197  
The dominant rulers on the island of Borneo were the Sultanate of Sulu, centred around the 
Sulu Sea, and the Sultanate of Brunei, centred on northern Borneo. For many centuries, 
these kingdoms prospered off long distance Arab trade in pearls, sea cucumber and other 
sea products, particularly with India and, later, China. Many of these products were sourced 
by the Sama Dilaut. 197F198 Like in the Gulf region and the Sahel, these Sultanates did not have 
territorial borders, but rather ruler-client relationships with various subject groups, 
including the “sea nomad” populations.198F199 This does not mean that the Sultanates had no 
concept of territoriality, rather that they did not impose strict boundaries. As Clifford 
Sather puts it, “the state was defined...by reference to its centre, not its geographical 
boundaries.”199F200 
The role played by the Sama Dilaut in the Sultanate of Sulu, however, was arguably 
different than that played by the Tuareg or Bedouin. Like the Bedouin and the Tuareg, 
Sama Dilaut society was very much dependent upon the settled societies with which it 
traded. But many of the Sama Dilaut were not Muslims, unlike many of the Bedouin and 
Tuareg. While Clifford Sather argues that the Sama Dilaut were regarded by settled Bajau 
and other land-based communities as a “pariah class” due to their animist beliefs, this 
categorization is somewhat disputed. 200F201  
Like in the Gulf and the Niger Bend, belonging in the Sulu Sultanate was rooted in the 
customary law of the period blended with Islamic principles, with Islam creating a common 
sense of belonging and identity throughout the Sultanate. 201F202 As well, rather than offering 
protection to settled communities, the Sama Dilaut required protection from the ethnic 
Tausug (Suluk) ruling class, not the other way around. 202F203 Also, the Sama Dilaut were 
ethnically and culturally distinct from the ruling classes of the Sultanate of Sulu and were 
instead most closely related to other Sama/Bajau coastal peoples who lived under Tausug 
 
197 Andaya, 12-14; Hooker, 72-77; See also Chao, Riau, 8.  
198 Andaya, 61, 62, 80.  
199 Chao, Raiu, 42, 50 See generally International Court of Justice, Sovereignty over Pedra Branca/Pulau Batu 
Puteh, Middle Rocks and South Ledge (Malaysia/Singapore) (2008) ICJ Rep. 625. 
200 Sather, Political citing T. M. Keifer, The Sultanate of Sulu: Problems in the Analysis of a Segmentary State 46. 
201 Sather, Political Jurisdiction, 1971, 61. See also Sather, Commodity, 2002, 27-29; Sather, Adaptation, 1997, 
61-63; C. Warren Consciousness, 1980, 227 The idea that the Sama Dilaut were a “pariah class” is debated 
among experts. See also the work of James Warren. 
202 J. Holbrook, ‘Legal Hybridity in the Philippines: Lessons in Legal Pluralism from Mindanao and the Sulu 
Archipelago’ 18 Tulane Journal of International & Comparative Law (2010) 403, 409-410. 
203 Warren, Chartered, 109. Sather claims the Sama Dilaut’s status as non-Muslims was enforced by land-
based Muslims like the land Bajau and Tausug. Sather, Political, 62.  
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rule.203F204 While seafaring lay at the heart of the Sulu economy, long-distance seafaring was 
not an activity undertaken by the Sama Dilaut. Instead, long-distance trade was dominated 
by Arab seafarers. 
Nevertheless, like in Gulf region and the Sahel, the Sama Dilaut were critical to trade as a 
source of products to be traded. In North Borneo, powerful Tausug and Malay rulers relied 
on the Sama peoples for much of their wealth and competition for the allegiance of fishing 
communities was crucial to the survival of the great trading cities in northern Borneo. 204F205 
Over time, the Sultanate of Brunei declined and the Sultanate of Sulu became more 
prominent, in part by winning the loyalty of the coastal and nomadic Bajau/Sama 
peoples.205F206 The Sama Dilaut were one of a number of fishing societies whose allegiance 
was key to any trading empire in the region. The Sama Dilaut not only participated in trade, 
they may have been employed as crew on slave ships along with other Bajau/Sama 
peoples, though there is less information on this role played by Sama Dilaut. 206F207 In a 2002 
case before the International Court of Justice, the Malaysian government went so far to 
argue that the Sama Dilaut owed allegiance to the Sultan of Sulu. The government also 
claimed that the Sultan appointed the leaders of the Sama Dilaut clans, though these points 
are disputed.207F208  
Unlike the Tuareg and Bedouin, the Sama Dilaut did not share a common religion with 
shore-based peoples. Once again, however, as with Bedouin and Tuareg nomads, the 
relationship between settled communities, partially settled Bajau fishing communities and 
the Sama Dilaut in the Sulu Sea is best described as one of inter-dependence, with the Sama 
Dilaut occupying a valuable niche in the economy and politics of the region, despite their 
non-Muslim status. 208F209 The Sama Dilaut were quite well-integrated into the Sulu economy, 
 
204 Sather, Political, 61.  
205 J. Akamine, ‘The Role of Sama/Bajaus in Sea Cucumber Trades in the Sulu Sultanate Economy: Towards a 
Reconstruction of Dynamic Maritime History in Southeast Asia’ (Hitotsubashi University Conference Paper , 
March 2017).  
206 Andaya, 80.  
207 Andaya, 113. See also Sather, Adaptation, 1997, 40. See also S. Eklof, Pirates in Paradise, A Modern History 
of Southeast Asia’s Maritime Marauders (Nias Press 2006) 5 (hereinafter Eklof). See also J. Warren, ‘Trade for 
Bullion to Trade for Commodities and ‘Piracy’: China, the West and the Sulu Zone, 1768-1898’ in S. Amirell 
and L. Muller (eds.) Persistent Piracy: Maritime Violence and State-Formation in Global Historical Perspective 
(Palgrave Macmillan 2014) (hereinafter Warren, Trade). 
208 International Court of Justice, Sovereignty over Pulau Ligitan and Pulau Sipadan (Indonesia/Malaysia), 
(2008) ICJ Rep. 625. 
209 Sather, Commodity, 2002, 30 See also T. P. Barnard, ‘Celates, Rayat-Laut, Pirates: The Orang Laut and Their 
Decline in History’ 80 Journal of the Malaysian Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society 33 (2007) 34. 
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trading with settled Bajau, Tausug and Suluk communities in a state of mutual dependence. 
209F
210 
It is important to here note that despite some evidence that some Sama Dilaut might have 
been involved in ocean raiding, the Sultans drew distinctions between slave taking and 
“legitimate” raiding versus outright piracy. 210F211 Nevertheless, because the Sama Dilaut also 
served the Sultanates as fishermen and crew for raiding ships, they came with time to be 
associated with slaving during the colonial period and, later, with “lawlessness.”211F212 By the 
end of the eighteenth century, as the Sultanates declined, piracy and slave raiding in the 
Celebes and Sulu seas came to be dominated by the Illanun peoples, who also employed 
Samal and Bajau fishermen and sea nomads as crew. The links between the Sama Dilaut 
and their land-based patrons began to decrease in importance and increased political 
fragmentation meant that sanctioned raiding often blended seamlessly into piracy. 212F213 The 
relationship between the Sama Dilaut and what the British would come to call piracy would 
be extremely important during the colonial period, when the British came to see sea 
nomadism as associated with lawlessness and a challenge to establishing borders in the 
region. 
  
 
210 Lenhart, 247. 
211 Chao, Riau, 55. See also Sather, Adaptation, 1997, 40 (explaining that the economy of Sulu was maintained 
by “a system of active marauding”). See also T. Barnard, ‘Celates, Rayat-Laut, Pirates: The Orang Laut and 
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Conclusion 
The above sections show that the line between nomadic and settled communities in pre-
colonial society in the Gulf, the Sahel and the Sulu Sea was often blurry, with nomads and 
settled communities highly dependent on one another in trade-based societies where 
mobility, often across long distances, was key. Nomads often controlled their territories, 
even levying taxes on non-nomadic communities, but this control was not exclusive. There 
were few hard borders in pre-colonial kingdoms and allegiance relationships might exist 
over long distances, often based on the shared values of Islam or economic ties. 
Though enjoying a certain degree of political independence, nomads in the Gulf, the Sahel 
and the Sulu Sea also performed numerous specialized functions in society that were 
crucial to the local economy and society as a whole, including the spread of culture, religion 
and information, the protection of the caravan trade and the production of specialized 
products like sea cucumber. The place of nomads in wider society varied greatly and 
encompassed enormous diversity, but in none of the three examples explored in Part 2 
were nomads outsiders living apart from settled society. Quite to the contrary. The 
relationship between nomads and settled peoples in the three examples is perhaps best 
described as one of fluid inter-dependence. 
Critically, belonging in these pre-colonial societies in the Gulf, the Sahel and the Sulu Sea 
was often determined by factors like religion, trade contracts, and extended family and clan 
relationships. Such relationships often spanned long distances and knit far-flung empires 
together into a web of economic and social connections. Pre-colonial empires often 
contained both nomadic and settled communities. Place of birth was often far less 
important than religious, economic and social ties. Nevertheless, nomads had a strong 
sense of territoriality, occupying and claiming certain regions as their own, even if they did 
not set borders or use land or oceans exclusively. Frequently, these ownership rights were 
acknowledged and respected by others. Far from being wanderers with no claims to land, 
nomads frequently owned water sources, grazing areas, moorage points and other pieces of 
immovable property and were recognized as owning these resources by society at large.  
It is important to note, however, that negative opinions of nomadism existed among settled 
rulers and thinkers of the day, as can be seen in West Africa during the period of the 
establishment of various Islamic kingdoms, amongst the Sultans and administrators of the 
Sulu Sultanate, and even in the Gulf region amongst the settled, urban elite. Despite these 
negative opinions, however, nomads remained economically, socially, militarily and 
politically important to settled societies and kingdoms.  
In the Gulf and the Sahel, nomads often occupied positions of high status. In some places, 
like the Sahel, they were politically independent, though allied with urban rulers. In other 
places, they occupied a particular class in an existing empire, such as the Sulu Sultanate. 
Political independence, which was enjoyed by some nomadic societies for portions of their 
history, did not mean political isolation. In fact, it is perhaps unhelpful for the purposes to 
think of nomads as separate, discrete groups in the pre-colonial period, but rather as part 
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of a continuum of economic and social activity that made up trade-based societies that 
relied on mobility of all kinds.  
As the next section will discuss, the status of all three nomadic groups, the Bedouin, the 
Tuareg and the Sama Dilaut, would radically change with the coming of European 
colonization. The next sections will explore the changes brought by colonization to the 
nomadic way of life and to their standing in society and how these changes influenced the 
development of nationality law during the colonial period. 
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Colonial Policy Towards Nomads 
To regard a population in the normal case as related to particular areas of 
territory is not to revert to forms of feudalism but to recognize a human and 
political reality which underlies modern territorial settlements... 213F214 
The colonial period marked the beginning of the nationality and statelessness of many 
nomads. Nationality law developed in tandem with colonization and would evolve to be an 
important tool of colonial rule. The following sections will explore colonial policy towards 
nomads and how these policies affected nomad nationality during the colonial period. 
While the early colonial period was marked by an almost total vacuum of laws for 
colonized peoples, 214F215 over the course of the colonial period, many colonized peoples would 
be granted some sort of nationality status. Yet not all colonized peoples would be treated 
the same under this emerging system of laws.  
This section will explore colonial policies towards nomads. European governments saw the 
establishment of colonial empires as a fundamental good, necessary for the progress of 
civilization and modernization. This often-meant remaking colonized societies in the image 
of Europe.215F216 But colonization was also an economic endeavour, undertaken to enrich 
Europe. As a result, colonization was a fiercely competitive process. It was a scramble to 
grab, claim and secure territory against competing claims, both by other colonial powers 
and local leaders. It was these dual goals, the goal to remake colonized societies in the 
image of Europe and the goal to claim territory, that would drive colonial policy towards 
nomads. 
The British and French administrations are the two colonial administrations most relevant 
to this dissertation as they were the primary operators in the Gulf region, the Sahel and 
North Borneo.216F217 British and French policies would have a deep and lasting effect on the 
nomads living in their territories. Both the French and British colonial administrations had 
very clear policies and attitudes towards nomadic populations living in their colonies. 
These policies and attitudes would come to have a profound effect on the nationality of 
nomads, both during the colonial period and beyond. 
 
214 I. Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law (6th edn, Oxford UP 2003) 568 (hereinafter Brownlie, 
Principles). 
215 Van Genugten et al., 2014, 99.  
 
216 As historian J. Bury explains in the Idea of Progress, “(t)he ‘idea of progress’ means that civilization has 
moved, is moving, and will move in a desirable direction.” J. Bury, The Idea of Progress: An Inquiry into its 
Origin and Growth (Macmillan 1932) 2. 
217 The Ottoman Empire was also relevant to the Bedouin in the Gulf, though most of the Bedouin in the 
region around Kuwait were not directly affected by Ottoman policy, as Kuwait marked the outer-most sphere 
of the Ottoman Empires’ influence. See the section on the Bedouin, below. 
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Determining the proper role of nomads in the colonial project was not a side-issue in 
European colonial thought, it presented a major challenge to legal and philosophical 
thinking of the time. The examples discussed below did not happen in isolation, but were 
part of a global system and worldview. While important differences existed between the 
French and English colonial systems, there were many similarities in how colonial territory 
was invaded, conquered and administrated, and colonial policy towards nomads and 
mobile peoples also shared many commonalities. This section will summarize some of what 
is known about colonial theories on nomadism in order to understand the policies 
implemented in Kuwait, French Soudan and North Borneo, described in the next sections.  
This section is meant to be a summary of some of the main colonial theories on nomads. It 
should not be taken as an exhaustive account of this topic, nor is it a review of all the 
relevant literature.217F218 Where there is disagreement among experts, this will be noted. 
Colonial Theories on Nomads 
Since Europeans first came into contact with nomadic societies in the 15th century, 
European scholars struggled to fit nomads into the European model of the state.218F219 This 
section will explore the theories European colonialists developed towards nomads. Most 
importantly, European political theory developed the idea that nomads cannot form states. 
According to European legal theories popular at the time, land ownership is key to 
civilization and statehood. 219F220 Colonial powers needed to promote agriculture, mining and 
other activities that would make productive use of the land. 220F221 While not universally 
accepted, the colonial idea that nomads were incapable of forming states would prove to be 
 
218 For more on this subject, see the work of Jérémie Gilbert, which contains a thorough review of sources and 
theories. 
219 Diallo, 28, talking about colonial views of the Fulbe people in Burkina Faso and Cote d’Ivoire. For another 
example, see Great Britain’s Enclosure Act: An Act for the better Cultivation, Improvement, and Regulation of 
the Common Arable Fields, Wastes, and Commons of Pasture in this Kingdom 13 Geo 3. c. 81 (1773). To a 
certain extent, these ideas continue to influence nomad-state relations in Europe. See for example N. Sigona, 
‘How can a Nomad be a Refugee? Kosovo Roma and Labeling Policy in Italy’ 37 Sociology 69 (2003) 71-72, 75 
(discussing Roma in the Kosovar and Italian contexts). See generally M. Goodwin, ‘The Lessons of Romani 
National Claims for Conceptions of European Citizenship: From and Imaginary Community to an Imagined 
One?’ in A. Ott and E. Vos, Fifty Years of European Integration: Foundations and Perspectives (Asser Press 
2009) (discussing Roma people and the modern European conception of the territorialized nation-state).  
220 For a discussion on settlement and state formation in natural law theory, see Gilbert, Nomadic, 2014, 59-
70. 
221 Gilbert, Nomadic, 2014, 58-63, 60-61, 91-92. At the risk of oversimplifying European philosophy on state 
formation, European thought centered state legitimacy on property rights and the productive use of land. 
Locke, Grotius, Vattel and other Enlightenment philosophers believed that property rights are created when 
individuals make productive use of land. The political state forms in order to enforce exclusive and 
productive land use. K. Baynes, ‘Kant on Property Rights and the Social Contract’ 72 The Monist 433 (1989) 
434. See also S. Buckle, Natural Law and the Theory of Property: Grotius to Hume (Clarendon Press 1991) 189 
(hereinafter, Buckle). See also Sack, 74, (217). 
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highly influential throughout the colonial period and beyond.221F222 According to dominant 
theories of the day, nomads had no states of their own, but only tribes.222F223 Important to this 
theory was the idea that nomads were not territorial. New research has often uncovered 
that presentations of nomads as not territorial were a colonial interpretation, 223F224 yet this 
view of nomadism became entrenched during the colonial period. 
At the risk of oversimplification, under this widely accepted theory of European state 
formation, territoriality was key to statehood. The oft-cited starting point for the modern, 
territorial model of statehood in Europe is the Peace of Westphalia, which ending the 
Thirty Years War in Germany. This treaty helped to establish the principle of exclusive 
state sovereignty over an area of bounded territory, though the influence of this single 
event in European history remains the subject of much debate. 224F225 Under popular theories 
of statehood of the day, the state ultimately controls all territory and resources, like farms, 
mines, and fisheries.225F226 As international law expert Ian Brownlie put it, “(t)he state 
territory and its appurtenances (airspace and territorial sea), together with the 
government and population within its frontiers, comprise the physical and social 
manifestations of...the state.”226F227 
 
222 See for example K. Yelpaala, ‘Western anthropological concepts in stateless societies: A retrospective and 
introspective look at the Dagaaba’ 17 Dialectical Anthropology 431 (1992) for a critique of the “stateless 
society” theory. See also Tymowski, 5.  
223 Gibney, 2014, 54. 
224 For example, see B. McMahon, ‘Scientist Debunks Nomadic Aborigine ‘Myth’’ The Guardian (9 Oct. 2007). 
225 A copy of the treaty can be found online at Yale’s Avalon Project. For an overview of the role the Treaty has 
played in theories of state formation, see Gilbert, Territories, 2007, 59 . It is not the purpose of this 
dissertation to enter into this debate, but rather to demonstrate that hard borders between competing 
European empires was a major goal of colonial administrators. 
226 For an expression of this theory of state formation, see for example Island of Palmas, quoted in Shaw 2008 
211, footnote 74. See also Conklin, where he points to the state’s “radical title to all territory under its 
control.” W. Conklin, Statelessness: The Enigma of an International Community (Oxford 2014) 73. 
227 Brownlie, Principles, 57 71-72, 76, 105 (discussing the role of territory in the creation of states). See also 
the Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States, signed at Montevideo, 26 December 1933, 
entered into force, 26 December 1934, 165 L.N.T.S. 19 (1933) art. 1. See also Shaw, 2008, 197-204 (discussing 
the role of territory in the creation of states); Van Panhuys, 33, 43, 195; Weis, 7; T. Baldwin, ‘The Territorial 
State’ in Hyman Gross and Ross Harrison (eds.) Jurisprudence: Cambridge Essays (Clarendon Press 1992) 
(hereinafter Baldwin) 210-211 (examining the origins of the territorial conception of a state in Europe); M. 
Weber, ‘Politics as a Vocation’ in H. H. Gerth and C. W. Mills (eds.), From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology 
(Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1970), 78 (arguing that exclusive territorial sovereignty is necessary for the 
exclusive use of force); Crawford, 37 P. Jessup, ‘Remarks at UNSCOR, 383d mtg. at 9-11, Supp. No. 128,’ (2 
December 1948) UN. Doc. S/P.V. 383; R. Donner, The Regulation of Nationality in International Law (2nd Edn 
Transnational P. 1994), 5; Shaw, 2008, 48-64, 171; V. Lowe, International Law (Oxford University Press, 
2007) 207; J. McAdam, ‘Disappearing States, Statelessness and the Boundaries of International Law’ in J. 
McAdam (ed.) Climate Change and Displacement: Multidisciplinary Perspectives (Oxford, 2010), Sec. VIII.  
“A territory without a people, a government without a clearly bounded community to be governed, makes no 
sense.” V. Stolcke, ‘The “Nature” of Nationality’ in V. Bader (ed.), Citizenship and Exclusion (Universiteit van 
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As Gilbert puts it in his work on the treatment of nomads during colonization, nomads were 
seen as ineffective occupiers of their territories, creating a “sovereignty vacuum” that could 
only be filled by settled peoples. 227F228 Nomad areas were, to quote Sack, “an emptiable and 
fillable mold.”228F229 The amount to which colonized societies were recognized by Europeans 
as being states, or as “state-like,” depended upon the extent to which they resembled 
European societies, including the extent to which they were settled. 229F230 As Diallo, an 
anthropologist and expert on nomads in West Africa, puts it: 
On the question of land rights, the European system and the West-African system 
on agricultural and pastoral land use seem to oppose one another. 230F231 
Under European theories of state formation, nomadic land use, by contrast, did not create 
sovereignty, so nomadic communities had no rights to their land. 231F232 The early colonial 
period coincided with the feudal period in Europe, where the herding of animals was 
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limited by strict rules on land use. 232F233 Where pastoralism existed in Europe, it often did so 
as a highly regulated activity under the feudal system. 233F234  
The idea that nomads do not form states or own their lands would develop into the concept 
of terra nullius, which labelled nomad territories as empty and ripe for colonial 
exploitation.234F235 Because nomad lands had been deemed terra nullius in many regions, their 
lands were seen as being best administrated directly by the state.235F236 According to similar 
theories, the oceans could not be owned because they could not be improved upon or 
occupied.236F237 This theory, that of mare liberum, meant that the oceans could not be under 
private control or the control of any one monarch. 237F238  
It should be noted that the above theories on the lack of nomad statehood and territoriality 
were not universally accepted at the time and continue to be debated today. Some colonial-
era European scholars continued to argue in favour of nomad land rights. 238F239 Nevertheless, 
theories that nomads do not form states have been very influential,239F240 and these theories 
would influence colonial policy towards nomads during the colonial period and during 
decolonization. 240F241 Even today, the link between nomads, land and statehood remains 
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debated, but the idea that nomads do not form states and are not territorial persists and 
remains highly influential.241F242 
Closely related to the idea that nomads can’t form states is the colonial idea of nomadism as 
a backward stage of human development that is destined to die out. Even when seen 
through the misty lens of European romanticism that often typified European writings on 
nomads, nomads were considered to be an obstacle to progress by even the most admiring 
colonial administrators. Colonial administrators adopted negative views of nomadism even 
in places where nomadism was a crucial and thriving part of the local economy.  While on 
the one hand, these writings present nomadism as a “‘golden age of simplicity,” it was also a 
way of life that must die out for “progress” to occur. 242F243 As a result, European 
administrators consistently showed a preference for settled groups over the “wandering 
peoples.”243F244 
The view that nomadism was somehow backwards would persist into the post-colonial 
period. Writing of government responses to Bedouin nomads in the Middle East, 
anthropologist Hilary Gilbert points out that: 
(p)astoralism, constructed as rooted in a primitive, pre-agricultural past, affronts 
the linear narratives of ‘progress’ and ‘modernity’ adopted by many states.” 244F245 
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Yet, as the sections above showed, pastoralism was not a “primitive” or “pre-agricultural” 
way of life in the Middle East during the pre-colonial period. To the contrary, as the 
example of Bedouin nomads in Kuwait exposed, far from being a problem, nomadism in the 
Middle East was a key part of the economy, linking settled kingdoms together in a web of 
trade upon which the entire region depended. Pastoralism formed an integral part of the 
economy. Despite their mobility, many nomads in the Middle East claimed territory, owned 
land as individuals and had close ties to settled communities. Yet the idea that nomadism 
was somehow primitive and destined to die out became entrenched in colonial policy, 
influencing governments up to the present day. 245F246 
Importantly for the question of nomad nationality, nomads were seen as incapable of the 
exclusive allegiance that was necessary to create sovereignty. 246F247 Feudal society required 
exclusive allegiance between ruler and peasant. 247F248 The concept of exclusive allegiance was 
crucial to claiming colonized peoples as subjects under treaties. Tribal allegiance, however, 
as supposedly practiced by nomadic communities, was seen as incompatible with 
allegiance to a state. Even though colonial militaries signed treaties with nomad leaders, 
over the course of the colonial period, it became increasingly common to view nomads as 
tribal and as unsuitable subjects for such treaties.248F249  
While colonial administrators and military leaders did sign treaties with nomad leaders, 
these “colonial treaties were mainly acts aimed at achieving control over trade 
relationships with specific tribes, or capitulation arrangements.” 249F250 Over time, as 
colonization progress beyond the initial conquest period, treaties with urban rulers were 
favoured over alliances with nomadic leaders. Protectorate agreements and other, more 
permanent relationships were mainly forged with settled and urban rulers. 250F251 By the 19th 
century, under laws like the Berlin Act of 1880, earlier treaties with nomadic peoples were 
invalidated on the grounds that nomads could not form states or fulfil their obligations 
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under such treaties. 251F252 It should again be noted that not all legal theorists of the day agreed 
that nomads had no sovereignty. 252F253 Nevertheless, such views of nomads were dominant 
and very influential.  
Meanwhile, the existence of nomads in the colonies was seen as weakening colonial 
sovereignty and the primacy of settled, urban rulers.253F254 Nomadism came to be seen as a 
problem for colonization and the sovereignty of local, settled rulers under the colonial 
system.254F255 The prioritization of urban rulers would lead a sharp decline in the status and 
power of nomads, while many colonial administrators adopted forced and coercive 
settlement programs for nomads. These programs will be explored in depth in the 
examples, below.  
The idea that nomads did not form states also affected how they were seen by international 
legal theorists. Once again, though not universally accepted, nomads were also excluded 
from the international definition of statehood by some theorists: 
So entirely is (international law’s) conception of a state bound up with the notion 
of territorial possession that it would be impossible for a nomadic tribe, even if 
highly organized and civilized, to come under its provisions. 255F256 
These theories were highly influential on colonial policy in both British and French 
colonies. In particular, Gilbert notes that the forced settlement of nomads became a major 
goal of many colonial administrators. 256F257 Nomadic settlement was more than simply the 
accidental by product of political and economic development during the colonial period. 
Forced and deliberate, coercive settlement were major features of colonial policy. While 
nomadism has always waxed and waned as nomads have adjusted to the surrounding 
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conditions, moving in and out of the nomad economy as it suited them, the colonial period 
brought about a long decline in nomadism due, in part, to colonial policies deliberately 
targeting nomadism as undesirable and backward. 257F258 Meanwhile, negative views of 
nomadism would continue to dominate sociology, anthropology and other fields both 
before, during and after the colonial period. 258F259 These views would, in turn, deeply influence 
how nomads were treated during the colonial period and beyond. 
It is important to note that in other parts of the world not examined by this dissertation, 
the extermination of entire nomadic societies was not uncommon. 259F260 Negative treatment of 
nomads has been documented across the colonial system, including many cases of mass 
murder and mass forced removal from land. 260F261 As Jérémie Gilbert points out in his book on 
nomads and human rights, sometimes forced settlement, relocation and extermination was 
the inadvertent effect of disease and destruction of habitat, but often it was purposeful, 
part of clearing areas to make room for settlement and removing nomadic groups.261F262  
Acts of elimination and mass killing were based on a racist bias against nomadic 
peoples, not only because of their race or ethnicity but because they were 
nomads…262F263 the crimes (against nomads by colonists) were committed on the basis 
of historical stereotyping in which the nomadic element has played a central role. 263F264  
This section has summarized some of the negative theories on nomads and state formation 
that influenced colonial policy. The next sections will explore how these colonial theories 
on nomadism influenced colonial polices towards nomads in Kuwait, French Soudan and 
North Borneo. 
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The Bedouin in the Sheikdom of Kuwait 
 
Kuwait, 1954 
This section will summarize British colonial policy towards the Bedouin. Colonial policies 
on nomad land use, sovereignty and allegiance would have a devastating impact on 
Bedouin nomads. The British territorial system of administration would also have a deep 
and lasting effect on the makeup of the Kuwaiti state. Most importantly, the alliance 
between the British Crown and the Emir of Kuwait would centralize power in the hands of 
the urban Al-Sabah family and bisect Bedouin lands by hard borders. These events would 
come to have enormous repercussions for Bedouin nationality at the time of 
decolonization. While in the 1920s and 1930s, the Kuwaiti government would “go out of its 
way” to facilitate Bedouin trade, 264F265 by the 1960s, Bedouin movement was viewed as a 
security threat and a problem for Kuwait’s sovereignty. 
In the 1930s, according to Toth, there were approximately 10,000 Bedouin in Kuwait.265F266 
Many more Bedouin groups migrated across what would become Kuwaiti territory or lived 
in oasis towns in the interior.266F267 As the proceeding sections explored, there was always a 
distinction in Kuwait between the Bedouin, or Bedu, peoples of the desert and the settled 
merchants of Kuwait City. By the mid-twentieth century, however, this distinction had 
become so entrenched in Kuwaiti society and politics that it became the defining feature of 
Kuwaiti nationality. Why this happened can only be explained by looking at the creation of 
the Kuwaiti territorial state and the discovery of oil during the British Protected State 
period. During the period of British influence, the territorial concept of statehood that had 
developed in Europe, described above, was imposed on the Middle East. But most crucially, 
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it was imposed in a way that divided the Bedouin between different states and centralized 
power in Kuwait Town. 
In particular, this section will explore how the drive to set borders and exclusively claim 
the Arabian desert, would dominate British policy in the Gulf. 267F268 As Toth points out, “the 
appearance of modern states was an important factor in the decline of Bedouin power and 
independence.”268F269 The creation of Kuwait is best seen as only part of a much larger story 
involving the dividing up of the Arabian Peninsula and the mass settlement of, and 
movement restrictions on, Bedouin nomads, two events that were intimately entwined. The 
establishment of the borders of Kuwait coincided with the carving up of “greater Syria” in 
1920 during the Mandate period, which resulted in the large-scale division of Bedouin kin 
groups across the peninsula. 269F270 As Chatty puts it, “(w)ith the consolidation of state power 
and authority in the ‘state’...most of the nations of the Middle East turned to their pastoral 
populations with a view to settling them in one place...(to)...assure control over them.” 270F271 
Controlling the Bedouin was important to the colonial powers and, increasingly, local 
sheiks of the Gulf because it led to the control of Bedouin territories.  
The British Protectorate period saw the creation of borders as key to protecting the 
sovereignty of Kuwait and its control over the desert regions outside of Kuwait Town. 
These entwined goals, settling the Bedouin and setting borders in the desert, would be 
adopted by the Kuwaiti government after the British left. 
The fight for exclusive sovereignty over the desert would only intensify with the discovery 
of oil in 1938. 271F272 In 1890, the population of Kuwait Town was around only about 20,000, 
excluding seasonal Bedouins. Over the next sixty years, however, Kuwait would explode in 
size and economic importance as it became a major oil supplier. 272F273 The discovery of oil 
under the desert would greatly raise the stakes for control of the desert beyond mere 
strategic importance. 
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The sedentarization projects for pastoral nomads undertaken in the Middle East 
between 1950 and 1970 did not mark a departure from policies carried out 
during the Mandate period or in Wahhabite Arabia. Then, as earlier, the solution 
suggested for the nomad ‘problem’ was the same: sedentarization. 273F274 
The scramble for territory also influenced the actions of local rulers, none more than Ibn 
Saud in what would become Saudi Arabia. Ibn Saud in particular, used alliances with 
Bedouin rulers as part of his expansionist strategy to claim territory for his empire. 274F275 The 
British become both willing participants and pawns in these state-building exercises, which 
brought the European concept of statehood, with exclusive allegiance, territorial 
sovereignty and hard borders, to Gulf politics. This meant that alliances with the Bedouin 
came to be crucial to exerting sovereignty over the desert. At the same time, however, the 
British and many local leaders came to see the Bedouin as a “problem,” hindering attempts 
to set borders and establish clear zones of influence in the desert. 
The “problem” of the Bedouin began under the Ottoman Empire, which had established a 
foothold in the region at Basra at the end of the 18th century. Kuwait Town, however, 
remained almost entirely independent during the Ottoman period. 275F276 Nevertheless, the 
Ottoman Empire established administrative and military outposts to the north, particularly 
at Basra, as well as a system of tax collection, policies to promote agriculture and other 
attempts to create sovereignty in the region. 276F277 While the Bedouin enjoyed a great deal of 
autonomy during the Ottoman period, they began to feel the influence of the colonial 
struggle for territory. 277F278 This period would usher in the beginning of a “great historical 
transformation” that would culminate in the creation of modern states in the region. 278F279 
“(T)he long period of Bedouin hegemony in the desert and the steppe diminished, probably 
forever.”279F280 
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In general, the Ottoman authorities viewed nomadism as a “problem” to nation-building in 
their Arabian colonies. 280F281 Nomads were “bandits,” attacking Ottoman caravans and towns 
and leading to instability, making it difficult to secure borders and territory. 281F282 They were a 
“disease that needed to be cured,” as one Ottoman official put it. 282F283 According to many 
Ottoman administrators, the Bedouin frequently refused to pay Ottoman taxes, did not 
acknowledge the authority of the Empire, raided their settled farmer neighbours and were 
seen as an obstacle to agricultural development and making the region “self-sufficient,” by 
which the Ottoman government really meant the opposite; dependent on Ottoman 
control.283F284 The Ottomans employed what would become a familiar strategy for territorial 
empires against the Bedouin: forced settlement, military reprisals and the promotion of 
agriculture.284F285 For example, Fazil Mustafa Pasa, who became Grand Vizier in 1689, ordered 
the settlement and registration of nomads in order to promote farming, despite the 
unsuitability of many parts of the Gulf for a large-scale expansion of agriculture. 
In the end, Ottoman policies brought few changes to Kuwait as the Ottomans were 
overstretched. In general, as long as the Bedouin paid taxes, the local Ottoman 
administrations often failed to carry through on settlement programs. Camel-herding 
Bedouin from the desert interior were frequently left alone by Ottoman administrators, 
who tended to focus on smaller, sheep herding groups living closer to settled areas. 285F286 
Ottoman administrators were often reduced to paying off Bedouin leaders in order to 
maintain security. 286F287 By the 19th century, the Ottomans were still struggling to control 
even coastal areas around Basra, register plots of land and establish a land tenure 
system.287F288  
Meanwhile, the Arabian interior remained primarily under nomadic Bedouin control, its 
markings and orientation points entirely a matter of Bedouin rules and customs. At the 
dawn of the 20th century, while Kuwait’s northern border was “relatively well-defined,” 
though “disputed,” its southern border was a “shifting line between tribes loyal to the Al-
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Sabah and those loyal to whichever ruler controlled Najd...” 288F289 The struggles to control the 
Bedouin, establish sovereignty and set borders would later be taken up by the British and 
the Al-Sabah family.289F290 
By 1899, Sheikh Mubarak of the ruling Al-Sabah family in Kuwait Town, sensing Ottoman 
weakness and distrustful of their intentions as well as worried about attack by hostile 
Bedouin groups, entered into a treaty with Britain for protection. 290F291 The Sheikh, with his 
position as the head of the powerful Al-Sabah family in Kuwait town, had already been 
recognized as the authority over Kuwait Town by the Ottomans. The British would further 
elevate the Sheikh as the recognized authority not only in Kuwait Town, but over Kuwait as 
a territorial state. The Sheikh and Britain were natural allies, since the Sheikh could 
provide the British with access to Kuwait’s harbour. Control of Kuwait’s port was not only 
important economically, it provided a foothold for British territorial expansion on the 
Peninsula.291F292 
Until the discovery of oil, Britain’s interest in Arabia was focused on the coastal areas and 
shipping. The desert interior was valuable primarily for strategic reasons. Kuwait was 
dependent on freshwater supplies from Basra, its economy based on pearl fishing and 
cross-desert trade for which the Bedouin were crucial. 292F293 For the Kuwaiti Emir, the 
Bedouin were important allies. 293F294 Unlike in Jordan and Saudi Arabia, which in the early 
20th century remained majority Bedouin, Kuwait’s Bedouin were only one seventh of the 
total Kuwaiti population and in a constantly moving into and out of the region throughout 
the seasons. 294F295 The Sheikh would call upon friendly tribes for defence, and tribes would 
migrate to Kuwait Town and other towns to trade, but Al-Sabah sovereignty did not extend 
much further than Kuwait Town’s walls. 295F296 
Over the next few decades, Kuwait would became a British Protected State under the 
authority of the Sheikh. 296F297 The agreement with Sheikh placed the might of the British 
military in service of protecting Kuwait’s “independence” as an exclusive client of 
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Britain.297F298 For both the British and the Al-Sabah family, the loyalty of the Bedouin and the 
need for a hard border would emerge as major, and closely related, security issues. 
In 1912, the protectorate agreement between Britain and Kuwait was finally formally 
recognized by the Ottomans. The British began their aggressive push to fix not only 
Kuwait’s border, but borders throughout the Gulf. 298F299 The issue of borders had long worried 
the British, who during the Ottoman period had been eager to demarcate the “‘line between 
the two empires,’ or spheres of influence." 299F300 Following the logic of territorial sovereignty 
described in the proceeding section on the European system of statehood, Britain wished to 
set a border through the desert to prevent attacks on their allies and foil expansion by 
other European empires.300F301  
The border was also of growing concern to the Sheikh, who was mainly worried about 
Kuwait’s independence from his inland neighbours, such as Ibn Rashid and Ibn Saud. 301F302 As 
the region developed into territorial units along the European model, the allegiance of the 
Bedouin and, by proxy, control of the desert would come to be a major issue. At the same 
time, however, as power centralized in the hands of urban rulers, border lines would be 
drawn through Bedouin areas, slicing through the heart of Bedouin society. While the 
border began as a semi-circle drawn on a map, in time, it would weaken Bedouin society, 
harm trade and shift political power away from Bedouin leaders.  
The border was finally set down by the Anglo-Ottoman agreement. Critically, this 
agreement included a clause placing the “tribes within the territory” of Kuwait as 
“subordinate” to the Kuwaiti Sheikh. 302F303 This clause may have represented an effort to 
create a ruler-subject arrangement between the Emir and the Bedouin groups living within 
an arbitrary circle created for the first time by this very agreement. If so, it ignored the 
complex relationship between many Bedouin and the Sheikh. It is not clear to what extent 
the various Bedouin groups with ties to Kuwait were consulted on either the position of the 
border or their relationship to the Sheikh now that Kuwait was being set up as a territorial 
state, though the sources cited in this section imply that little outreach and consultation 
with the Bedouin was undertaken. What is clear from research, however, is that 
subsequent attempts to secure the border in practice were met with widespread Bedouin 
resistance. 
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As Slot puts it, “(n)obody seems to have envisaged how this geometric circle might be 
applied to daily desert practice.” 303F304 In particular, the border would inevitably cut through 
long-distance trade routes, as well as Bedouin territories and pastures, disrupting the 
region’s economy. This was of little concern to the British, who saw Bedouin trade as 
competition for ocean trade routes. In fact, the creation of a hard border would transform 
Bedouin trade into a state regulated activity, as trade must now take place subject to 
government regulation, not Bedouin rules.  
The border also created a question as to the loyalty of many Bedouin tribes, who were now 
expected not only to choose sides between various urban power centres, but to express 
these loyalties spatially through adhering to certain artificially drawn, invisible boundaries 
in the desert. 
In a situation where there was a general scarcity of funds, the colonial 
administrations in Syria and Iraq, much like their predecessors, the Ottomans, 
treated tribes as groups with rights and responsibilities who would guarantee 
some measure of order in a peripheral territory and would help in the 
outsourcing of some administrative functions such as public security and 
taxation.304F305 
Yet right from the start, the British struggled with their project to pacify the Bedouin in 
order to use them to support the border. Because Bedouin groups often travelled long 
distances and owed allegiance to several sheikhs depending on the time of year or shifting 
political alliances, they were viewed by the British as unreliable allies. 305F306  
The Al-Sabah family had long relied on the support of loyal Bedouin for military protection, 
but many Bedouin and former Bedouin were now allies of Ibn Saud, including the powerful 
Ikhwan.306F307 Meanwhile, the Saudis began to look to make their own deal with the British,307F308 
and Kuwait Town, with its access to one of the best ports in the region, was a prize worth 
taking. 
In 1920, the Sheikh’s concerns over the growing power of Ibn Saud proved justified. In an 
attempt to absorb Kuwait Town into the emerging Saudi empire, thousands of Bedouin 
fighters under Faisal al-Dawish, allied to Ibn Saud, attacked the oasis town of Jahra not far 
from Kuwait Town. 308F309 The town pushed the invasion back with British support. Families 
from Kuwait Town worked nonstop for two months to build a wall around the town, 
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helping to repel the invasion. 309F310 Both the Al-Sabah family and British government, 
however, feared future attack. This moment, the foiled invasion and the construction of the 
border wall around Jahra, would become the founding story of Kuwaiti national identity 
and would influence Kuwaiti nationality law in the decades to come. 
Following the attempted invasion, the British and Emir again tried to establish a firm 
border around Kuwait Town with the Uqair Protocol, centralizing the Kuwaiti state on 
Kuwait City. The line drawn by the Uqair Protocol was based on previous treaties, including 
the Anglo-Ottoman agreement mentioned above. 310F311 The extension of the Sheikh’s territory 
into the desert would provide a “buffer zone” around the city, taking into account what the 
British believed to be Al-Sabah’s sphere of influence, including neighbouring towns like 
Jahra. The agreement was a clear attempt to elevate the legitimacy of the Emir and weaken 
the claims of Bedouin rulers to Kuwaiti territory. 
For the time being, the new border would have little practical effect, though the British 
made many attempts to secure the border areas of Kuwait using a combination of treaties 
and military force. 311F312  At this point, there were no border posts and nothing to prevent 
Bedouin migration, which continued in spite of the lines drawn by the British on maps. The 
creation of a hard border, however, would begin to have an effect on how mobility was 
viewed by the governments of the region. 312F313 Now there was a Saudi side of the desert, an 
Iraqi side, and a Kuwaiti side. In the scramble for control of the Arabian Peninsula, not only 
the Al-Sabah family, but also Ibn Saud and others were intent on claiming as much territory 
as possible.313F314 As a result, by the early 20th century, the territorial conception of statehood 
had been entirely adopted by leaders in the region. Increasingly, Gulf leaders began using 
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the word watan to describe the state, a word associated with territory, rather than the 
traditional term umma, with its emphasis on the Muslim community. 314F315 
Kuwait was not the only place where the British attempted to control the Bedouin 
territorially in order to support their newly drawn borders. Governments across the 
region, many with the cooperation and encouragement of Britain and France, tried a 
combination of “carrot and stick” approaches to restrict the movement of Bedouin, 
including financial rewards and penalties, inter-tribal marriages, formal recognition of 
smaller tribes, and forced emigration of certain individuals and groups. 315F316 In Iraq, for 
example, the British offered land to Syrian Bedouin to entice them to settle in Iraqi 
territory. The French in Syria were also trying to force the Bedouin to settle.316F317 Forced 
settlement became a major government goal even in countries with majority Bedouin 
populations like Jordan. 317F318 Settlement programs for the Bedouin in the desert regions was 
part of larger economic development schemes increasingly undertaken by local, as well as 
colonial, administrators. 318F319 
Beginning in the 1920s and 1930s, the borders of Kuwait would become facts on the 
ground for many Bedouin as Ibn Saud began a blockade of caravans to Kuwait City. 319F320 Ibn 
Saud made many exceptions to the blockade when politically necessary, but the blockade 
did much to reduce the power of Bedouin groups to move freely across the border. To 
weaken Kuwait’s economy and raise money, Iraq also instituted border controls in the 
1930s, labelling Bedouin trade that did not comply with the new laws and taxes as 
“smuggling.”320F321 While many Bedouin continued to cross the border clandestinely, these 
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border controls began to have an impact on Bedouin economics, pushing yet more nomads 
to settle. 
This marked the beginning of the treatment of traditional Bedouin movement as “illegal” 
border crossings, a theme which will reoccur during the post-protectorate period. The 
blockade, and subsequent border restrictions, along with drought and famine, would take a 
great toll on the Bedouin during this period, reducing Bedouin movement and fuelling 
urban settlement. 321F322 While “smuggling,” as it was now called, became big business for some 
Bedouin and was tacitly supported by the Al-Sabah family in some cases,322F323 the overall 
effect of the border was to decrease movement and encourage settlement in towns.  
Nevertheless, Bedouin families continued to come to Kuwait City to take part in seasonal 
pearl diving before returning to their herds, maintaining close connections between certain 
tribes and Kuwaiti merchants. The Al-Sabah family still relied on its Bedouin allies for 
economic and political support.323F324 The status of the Bedouin in regional politics, however, 
was beginning to decline rapidly due to the discovery of oil. 
Oil would elevate the problem of the Kuwaiti border to an issue of paramount importance. 
It would make the desert zone surrounding Kuwait City incredibly valuable to all 
governments in the region and external actors as far away as the United States. The 
extreme wealth it generated would catapult the ruling families of the region like the Al-
Sabah family into competition for territory. 324F325 Crucially for the Bedouin, the discovery of 
oil would also shift the economy away from Bedouin trade, as well as weakening the 
merchant families in Kuwait Town, breaking down their historical economic inter-
dependency. 325F326 The Bedouin would increasingly find themselves less valuable as trade and 
military allies. 
The oil economy would accelerate Bedouin settlement in urban areas as Bedouin began to 
migrate to cities to take part in the emerging wage economy. While the imposition of 
borders and the shift to the oil economy encouraged settlement, state actors also actively 
coerced Bedouin settlement. Local administrators, as well as agents of the British and 
French, used land grants and subsidies to tribes to settle the population. As Toth points out, 
states like Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and Iraq often employed the same methods as the British 
in order to solidify their sovereignty and control the Bedouin. 326F327 Many Bedouin families 
settled in shanty towns outside Kuwait’s urban areas.  
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The idea that the Bedouin were a “problem” for which settlement and relocation to urban 
areas was the “solution” was now firmly entrenched in government policy. Though no 
longer as important to the economy, by the 1960s, both the Saudis and the Al-Sabah family 
still relied on the Bedouin for military troops, meaning that claiming loyal Bedouin groups 
would become vitally important for the protection of the state. In the case of Kuwait, this 
meant settling and assimilating those Bedouin families who were loyal to the Emir while 
excluding groups seen as problematic.327F328 Certain nomadic Bedouin were now seen as 
disloyal and, potentially, criminal.  
“Nomadic tribes were armed, mobile and flexible in their political allegiances, making them 
an often menacing and unpredictable quantity in the eyes of rulers in the settled zone.” 328F329 
On the eve of the termination of the protectorate agreement and the withdrawal of British 
administrators, both local and foreign administrators were united in a desire to secure 
regional borders, establish exclusive sovereignty, cut down on what they termed smuggling 
and, to accomplish all of these goals, restrict Bedouin movement and settle the Bedouin. 
At the termination of the protectorate agreement, Kuwait would inherit the borders 
established by the Uqair Protocol alongside concerns over ownership of the oil against the 
claims of neighbouring states, worries over the arbitrary border and, most importantly for 
this dissertation, concerns over the suitability of Bedouin as nationals and ongoing 
questions over their loyalty. “In the 1960s, modernity, in the form of national borders and 
oil explorations, forced (the Bedouin) to give up their traditional law of life.” 329F330  
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The Tuareg in French Soudan 
 
West Africa, 1887-1889 
Arguably even more than the Bedouin, colonial views on the ability of the Tuareg to help 
establish French sovereignty over the Sahel would prompt French administrators to divide 
Tuareg lands with borders and to push aggressively to settle the Tuareg. Like the British in 
Kuwait, the French in the Soudan would centralize economic and political power in cities 
with urban rulers.  
The Sahel came under nominal French control when Colonels Joffre and Bonnier entered 
the fabled city of Timbuktu in 1894 under dubious authority, against orders from the 
French government, and encountering stiff local resistance. The French had secured 
European recognition for their sovereignty over West Africa at the Conference of Berlin in 
1884-1885, but French presence on the ground was for many years limited to a few 
military outposts. 330F331 As in the Arabian Peninsula, the Sahel was mainly important to the 
French during the early colonial period for strategic reasons. France needed to occupy the 
desert and sign treaties with local rulers, in order to protect from incursions by other 
colonial powers. Yet establishing sovereignty in desert areas would prove difficult. 
French estimates put the number of Tuareg in norther French Soudan at around 60,000 in 
1906, with an additional 24,000 nomads of Arab descent. 331F332 Like in Kuwait, the push to 
establish French territorial sovereignty would dominate French-Tuareg relations. Though 
far less important than oil in the Gulf, however, the possibility of mineral wealth would also 
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come to influence French policy. As with the British in Kuwait, the French struggled to 
administer the nomadic population. Colonial administrators came to work most closely 
with urban and agricultural communities, even as they romanticized Tuareg culture. Right 
from the start, French administrators would treat the Tuareg as antithetical to the running 
of the French empire in the Sahara and would adopt settlement as the solution. This section 
will look at how French territorial ambitions shaped the status of the Tuareg during the 
colonial period in ways that would have a profound effect on how the Tuareg were treated 
at decolonization. 
The incorporation of French Soudan into the French Empire began as a tactical move by the 
French military, who were intent on connecting France’s holdings in north Africa with 
those in west Africa. 332F333 In this way, French goals were somewhat different from those of 
the British in the Gulf region, where the presence of a natural harbour made Kuwait a 
valuable target in its own right and the later discovery of oil made the desert the subject of 
intense economic competition. While consisting of vast areas of territory, 333F334 France’s 
holdings in West and Central Africa were never as important to France as its north African 
colonies, particularly Algeria. 334F335 The “scramble for Africa” had led France to invade the 
Sahara and northern Sahel more for prestige and territorial continuity than material 
benefit.335F336  
By the end of the colonial period, however, minerals and mining would emerge as a major, 
secondary cause of concern for territorial control of the Sahel. The French never 
determined how to fully economically exploit the Sahel, however, and they continued to 
occupy it militarily for strategic reasons, 336F337 establishing quasi-military rule over the 
Tuareg while expanding civil administration in settled and urban areas, including, as the 
next sections will discuss, civil registration. The differences between what this dissertation 
terms French military rule versus administrative rule will be discussed in more detail 
below. 
The borders of France’s African holdings were determined completely arbitrarily, with the 
border between Algeria and the AOF originating at the place where French troops met 
coming from opposite directions near the wells of Timiaouine, in present-day Algeria. 
During the early colonial period, Tuareg seasonal migration was relatively unaffected by 
French borders, though they divided Tuareg territories. At the end of the colonial period, 
however, lines that had been drawn on maps were destined to become international 
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boundaries and barriers to Tuareg movement. 337F338 The administrative regions and borders 
were created by the French with almost no Tuareg input, and would be handed to the post-
colonial governments with almost no revisions, applying the doctrine of uti possidetis, 
which says that territory remains with its possessor at the end of a conflict, unless 
otherwise provided by treaty.338F339  
Unlike in the Gulf, however, the vast federation of French colonies of the AOF (which 
included French Soudan), and its proximity to Algeria, another French colony, meant that 
during the French colonial period, the Tuareg could move relatively freely between 
colonies. French Soudan was also insulated from incursions by rival colonial powers. 339F340 As 
a result, boundaries between colonies controlled by a single European power, like the AOF, 
were “somewhat fluid.”340F341 Nevertheless, the French administration viewed the settlement 
of the Tuareg as a major goal. 
French influence would bring momentous change to the region and to the lives of the 
Tuareg.341F342 The French began a long reorientation of the trade economy towards the coasts, 
sapping the relevance of the trans-Saharan routes and beginning to weaken the importance 
of the Tuareg to the economy. 342F343 Bamako, far to the south of Tuareg areas, was made the 
capital of French Soudan in 1920. 343F344 Landlocked Niger and French Soudan remained 
poorer than the coastal colonies of Senegal and Ivory Coast throughout the colonial period.  
Much of the French effort in the Niger Bend was directed towards “pacification” and forced 
settlement of the Tuareg. While pockets of Tuareg resistance continued until the 1930s, the 
French slowly allied themselves with friendly Tuareg leaders and eliminated rivals. 344F345 
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Ultimately, the French did not have the resources to police the Sahel, so they instead sought 
to control the Tuareg through treaties and agreements, including letters of cooperation 
signed with various Tuareg leaders. These letters had dubious value to the Tuareg 
themselves, who would ignore these treaties when it suited them. 345F346 
The French got intimately involved in the selection of Tuareg leaders. 346F347 They encouraged, 
or sometimes forced, the Tuareg to settle the land for agriculture and to access schools. 347F348 
As well, the promoted the end of slavery, liberating the agricultural class and empowering 
agriculturalists over the nomadic nobility. 348F349 Many of these efforts were designed to keep 
the Tuareg within local administrative limits and reduce nomadism. 349F350 
The French administration began a series of programs designed to limit Tuareg mobility 
and “develop” the region, by which they meant settlement and the promotion of 
agriculture. For the French, a settled population living in towns or practicing agriculture 
would facilitate French control, particularly through the establishment of a clear land 
tenure and taxation program. 350F351 Treaties or no, Tuareg who did not cooperate with these 
programs would be treated as hostile. Unlike in Kuwait, with Kuwait’s harbour of regional 
importance to British shipping, the French lacked a clear economic strategy for the region 
apart from the goal of promoting agriculture in the desert and eliminating resistance to 
French sovereignty. 351F352 The extreme difficulties in creating a settled, agricultural society in 
the Sahel among a nomadic population were simply ignored. Meanwhile, any Tuareg 
resistance to French “development” was cast as a dangerous security threat. 
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Commander Betrix, head of the Gao region, heavily favoured settlement for the Tuareg and 
their conversion to agriculture in his plan to administer the Tuareg.352F353 French 
administrative goals, however, could not have been more at odds with the functioning of 
the nomadic Tuareg noble class. As described above, the nobility relied on mobility, 
pastoralism, fluid control of territory, traditional forms of education and the 
vassalage/slavery system. 
In reality, the French instituted only a fraction of the changes envisioned by administrators 
like Commander Betrix, but their attempts to transform Tuareg society in line with the 
European administrative model would have a lasting effect on the Tuareg and would be 
taken up by the Malian government at independence. 353F354 French power was mostly 
concentrated in military posts in cities like Gao and Timbuktu, far from the areas occupied 
by the nomadic Tuareg. 354F355 These bases would later become the headquarters of French 
administrative regions, called cercles around which the various colonial departments 
would form, cutting the Tuareg’s pastures into units centred around towns.355F356 The local 
administrators, chosen by the French rather than according to Tuareg law, were often 
viewed as illegitimate in the eyes of the Tuareg. 
In part as a result of these factors, the French administrators struggled to retain a 
relationship with nomadic Tuareg leaders, which led to a “double administration” with a 
more hands-on approach to the sedentary population and a more hands-off approach for 
the Tuareg.356F357 As Bourgeot points out, racial theories also guided the way the French 
divided nomadic and settled populations. Skin tone was often invoked by the French to 
justify the hands-off approach of local French military administrators. 357F358 This may have 
created the illusion of independence for the Tuareg at the time, but while in theory, the 
Tuareg retained some independence, the French administration began to consolidate 
administrative functions in urban areas to the detriment of the nomadic population, 
including civil registration.358F359 Over time, this separate administration distanced the Tuareg 
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from the French administrative system and placed their leaders outside a developing 
system of government that would form the basis of the Malian state.  
Meanwhile, the colonial period saw the gradual decline of Tuareg economic importance as 
the focus of economic activity shifted to the coasts and away from Sahara trade. 359F360 Like the 
Bedouin, the Tuareg would become less and less crucial to the Sahel economy and would 
watch their political importance decline over the course of the colonial period. In 
particular, the division of Tuareg regions into administrative divisions oriented towards 
the south, the decrease in the caravan trade and the settlement policies of the French 
would not only decrease Tuareg economic and political power, it would influence their 
perceived status and usefulness to the state in ways that would have a profound effect on 
their later status during decolonization. 360F361 
During the early 1900s, the fluid borders of the AOF slowly solidified, bringing increased 
movement restrictions. 361F362 For the Tuareg, the introduction of arbitrary borders in the 
hitherto limitless Sahara would mark the beginning of restrictions on their traditional 
movement, the decline of Saharan trade, and convert the nobility to a more sedentary 
life.362F363 At first, the imposition of borders and a centralized administration did little to 
change the Tuareg way of life. Tuareg families could simply move from one region to 
another to evade the census taker and tax collector. 363F364 To keep the Tuareg within their 
designated areas, the military was frequently employed to force Tuareg families to stay 
within their regions. 364F365 The Tuareg complained bitterly that such restrictions prevented 
them from adjusting their movements according to the rains and seasons. Controller-
General Barba, a French administrator, stated that the Tuareg on the border with Algeria 
seemed “not to understand” the difference between the two colonies.365F366 
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The French also used borders to adjust the social hierarchy in northern Soudan and 
decrease the power of Tuareg nobles. Ending slavery had become a goal of the empire as a 
whole,366F367 but freeing the slaves also served to decrease nomadism. The French created 
separate administrative regions for settled and pastoral groups, attempting to keep the 
Tuareg away from villages and towns, in order to end the domination of the Tuareg over 
the settled villages and their agriculturalists. 367F368 As the Tuareg became confined to limited 
administrative areas, their migrations became more conscribed. 368F369  
Along with other aspects of the western state, the French brought the concept of 
registration and identity documents to the Soudan, services that were centralized in urban 
areas. The French also changed the systems of taxation, basing everything on 
administrative regions. 369F370 Tax collection was divided into two categories, taxes on the 
sedentary population, including Tuareg slaves and vassals, and taxes on the nomads, with 
the two groups often paying different rates. Over time, the French put tax collection under 
the control of settled, rather than nomadic, chiefs, greatly strengthening the authority of 
settled rulers and placing the Tuareg at a severe disadvantage. 370F371 Tax collection and the 
census both relied on territorial administrative regions but also reinforced them, 
decreasing not only Tuareg mobility, but all mobility while also increasing the 
marginalization of the entire region. French Soudan was now one of the most marginalized 
regions in French colonial Africa. The imposition of taxes based on centralized, 
administrative regions would most negatively affect the Tuareg, who relied on their own, 
contradictory, system of allegiance and taxation. 
The Tuareg opposed French taxation and often left the area to avoid paying. The French 
response, however, was to forcibly return nomad groups to their assigned territories. 371F372  
Jean-Marie Payen, head of administration in Niger, admitted that the Tuareg got little in 
return for their taxes, as what services the French provided were located in towns and 
oriented towards the settled population. 372F373 Payen called taxes and the census a way to 
reduce Tuareg mobility and liberty; a form of “administrative confinement” for the 
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Tuareg.373F374 As a result, registration became entwined with abusive taxation and movement 
restrictions in the minds of many Tuareg. 
The Tuareg resisted the census, which would later cause problems for them when it came 
to voter registration. 374F375 In the Soudan, the French attempts to establish electoral lists, take 
a census and issue family cards became limited to the sedentary population. 375F376 Registering 
the Tuareg was so difficult it was often not completed, leaving many Tuareg without 
documents.376F377 Towards the end of the colonial period, Badi, the chief of the Kounta Tuareg, 
offered to travel around northern Soudan to educate the Tuareg about the importance of 
registering with the French before independence so that they could vote, but reported that 
many Tuareg did not appear to understand the need. 377F378 This would greatly affect the roll-
out of nationality among the Tuareg, as the next section will explore. 
Throughout their tenure, French investment in the Sahel and Sahara regions was poor, as 
the area was thought to be of greater strategic than economic value. 378F379 Uranium mining 
was still decades away. Nevertheless, settlement for agriculture was the main economic 
goal and the French actively promoted agriculture in the fertile areas around the Niger 
Bend. In particular, the French disliked what they saw as the destructive habit of the 
Tuareg nobles of raiding the farming communities of Songhai living close to the Niger river. 
While the French eventually came to accept pastoralism as a necessary part of the Sahel 
economy, they encouraged agriculture throughout their tenure, 379F380 and many French 
administrators saw the Songhai as struggling under the “yoke” of Tuareg dominance. 380F381  
French agricultural policy would encourage both settlement and overgrazing, as the French 
pursued their goal of turning the Sahel into a second “fertile crescent.”381F382 Despite the 
environmental and economic benefits of nomadism in desert regions, the French 
increasingly came to see the Tuareg as a menace to the environment and as a hindrance to 
the economy.382F383 Ironically, the imposition of borders restricting Tuareg movement and the 
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encouragement of settlement and overgrazing would overtax the fragile ecosystem of the 
Sahel, worsening subsequent droughts while limiting the Tuareg’s ability to cope through 
nomadism.383F384  
The process of settlement, along with the concentration of the Tuareg into smaller areas 
and over-grazing would culminate in the devastating droughts of the 1960s and 1970s, 
discussed below. The French promotion of agriculture and ban on slavery, however 
ineffectual, contributed to the decline of the noble class and the settlement of nomadic 
Tuareg.384F385 It also shifted the balance of power in the region, as many French policies 
favoured the settled population. 
As part of their efforts to mould Tuareg society along European lines, including by 
promoting land ownership, the French attempted to apply a land tenure system, already in 
use by the Songhai, to the Tuareg. They settled the lesser Tuareg vassal families, who were 
already engaged in some agriculture, and assigned them land. 385F386 The French also promoted 
land ownership by Tuareg chiefs, sometimes taking prime land from Songhai chiefs to 
entice the Tuareg nobles to settle. 386F387  
Pastoral groups often ignored the edicts to remain within their designated areas, giving rise 
to complaints by the Songhai of “illegal" Tuareg grazing. 387F388 The French also limited 
pastoral access to the river in response to Songhai complaints. 388F389 French land grants to the 
Tuareg were in many cases never viewed as legitimate by the Songhai, who came to see 
themselves as the original owners of the land. 389F390 French agriculture promotion led to 
conflict between the Tuareg and the Songhai, as well as between Songhai clans, as 
unoccupied agricultural land became scarce and the Tuareg nobles lost their dominance 
and, therefore, the ability to enforce their grazing rights.390F391 The land policies of the French 
increased tensions with the Songhai agricultural class, a process that would continue under 
Malian administration. 
By the 1920s, the Tuareg had lost control of much of the Sahel and needed to adapt to the 
way of life imposed by the French in order to survive, a way of life that was hostile to 
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nomadism.391F392 The promotion of settlement increased in the 1920s and 1930s as the French 
looked for ways to increase economic output. 392F393 Unlike in the Gulf, much of the Sahel’s 
mineral riches, particularly lucrative uranium mining and the possibility of oil beneath the 
Taoudeni basin, had not yet been discovered. The French instead began infrastructure 
development designed to encourage settlement and agriculture. They introduced irrigation 
and began building roads. 393F394 The promotion of agriculture in particular would later be 
aggressively adopted by the Malian government. 394F395 
The French also tried to bring education and health care in line with their ideas of 
centralized control and settlement on land. Health projects like the Assistance médicale 
indigène, created in 1926, were mostly located in cities like Timbuktu and Gao. Because 
most Tuareg lived far from the urban centres where health services are located, this meant 
that only urban populations could access such services.395F396 Schools were also used as a tool 
to encourage settlement, and, as such, were viewed with suspicion and hostility by many 
Tuareg. As Michel de Geyer d’Orth, administrator of the Agadez region, put it, nomadism 
presented an “‘insurmountable handicap” to development and required an “evolution 
towards settlement.”396F397 
In order to encourage “modernization” among the Tuareg, the French decided to educate 
the sons of the Tuareg noble class, seeing them as the logical future administrators of the 
Sahel, but this program, like so many others, was mostly unsuccessful. Education in Tuareg 
areas lagged far behind other parts of French Soudan. In 1912, the system in southern 
French Soudan was reorganized in line with the system in France, with primary schools, 
professional schools and normal schools. In the Sahel, however, what few schools existed 
were reserved for the sons of chiefs until as late as 1947. 397F398 Even in the 1940s, there were 
only two schools in the entire administrative cercle of Gao for nomads. 398F399 Once again, this 
placed the Tuareg at a disadvantage at decolonization.  
Schooling emerged as a contentious issue for the Tuareg. The Tuareg resisted French 
schooling as a plot to transform their children into foreigners and eradicate their 
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knowledge of nomadism. 399F400 To attend school, Tuareg children had to be separated from 
their parents. This separation was not only hard on families, but it prevented the children 
from learning vital skills related to nomadism, such as raising and caring for animals. 400F401 As 
a result, many Tuareg fought bitterly to keep their children out of French schools. The 
French only ended forced recruitment for schools in the late 1950s, because at that time 
enough Tuareg had settled to make schooling voluntary. 401F402 At the end of their rule, the 
French administration began to consider the idea of mobile schools that would travel with 
the Tuareg families and incorporate more traditional skills, but independence came before 
this idea could be implemented. 402F403 In the end, as stated by Ibrahim Ag Litny, former 
student of a “nomad school” in Kidal, French schools amongst the Tuareg were mostly a 
failure.403F404 After independence, all ideas of nomadic or traditional schools were abandoned 
as the new government sought to unify the Malian nation, and saw western style schools as 
key to this effort. Ag Litny states that while this effort would “democratize” teaching in 
Kidal, the new schools were also primarily unsuccessful as they did not allow the nomads 
to follow their lifestyle. 404F405 
Over time, the French began to recognize that their attempts to limit Tuareg migrations and 
promote agriculture were ineffective and causing a great deal of tension between Tuareg 
leaders and French administrators, as well as increasing tensions between the nomadic and 
settled populations. French administrators began allowing the Tuareg to apply for special 
permits to leave their areas to find better pasturage. To apply for such permits, families had 
to register with the French authorities and obtain identity documents, such as family cards. 
The French signed also agreements with Tuareg leaders, called “Conventions for 
Nomadism", in an attempt to legalize and control the movements that were already taking 
place, while limiting their scope. 405F406 In this way, registration became linked to movement 
restrictions in the eyes of many Tuareg.  
Ultimately, French attempts to control the movement of the Tuareg were limited by the fact 
that the French did not have the manpower, or the interest, to police such vast areas, the 
environment simply could not support such a rapid expansion of farming, and local 
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political conditions were against such meddling in land rights. 406F407 The Tuareg continued 
their seasonal migrations despite fines and deportations. 407F408 This would change when the 
Malian government came into being, as controlling the Sahel would be a primary goal of the 
new government, as opposed to a minor side issue in the governing of a vast empire. In 
particular, movement restrictions would become vital to enforcing what were now borders 
between sovereign states and the discovery of uranium in Niger would fuel new interest in 
the Sahel as a money-generator.  
While the French presence ultimately lead to greater sedentarisation, by the end of French 
rule, many Tuareg remained nomadic. 408F409 Nevertheless, French policies would begin the 
slow process of the transformation of the Tuareg nobility from regional elites to 
discriminated-against minority. 409F410 French programs to promote agriculture, settlement 
and the imposition of territorial, administrative regions took their toll on nomadism. 410F411 
French policies created tensions between nomads and settled communities and associated 
registration in the minds of many Tuareg with movement restrictions and taxation. 
By the 1950s, independence loomed and some Tuareg leaders began to push for their own 
state. The concepts of territoriality and sovereignty had crept into the Tuareg discourse 
with the French in their negotiations over the possibility of an independent Tuareg 
state.411F412 Some Tuareg leaders saw independence as an opportunity to unite the Sahara 
region as a single, political unit: a Sahara français.412F413 Many educated Tuareg feared 
independence as bringing the “real colonization” of northern Mali by the south. 413F414 In 1958, 
Mohamed El Mehdi, the chief of the Kel Antassar and Territorial Advisor for Goundam, near 
Timbuktu, told the French government of his desire to create a “Republic of the Veiled” in 
the Sahel. Muhammad Ali ag Attaher, a leading Tuareg noble, wrote to Charles de Gaulle to 
protest dividing the Malian Tuareg from their relatives in Niger. 414F415 He organized a trip 
through Saudi Arabia and Libya to promote combining the Tuareg areas of Niger and Mali 
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with Morocco.415F416 Tuareg chiefs sent petitions to France expressing their desire to separate 
from the rest of French Soudan. 416F417 
In 1951, concerned over losing the potential mineral wealth of the Sahara and leaving 
unstable states with nomadic minorities, the French considered setting up a new colony in 
the Saharan and Sahel regions called Afrique saharienne français.417F418 The idea of shifting 
boundaries in the Sahara was not without precedent, as the French had moved boundaries 
and transferred territory throughout their tenure in West Africa. 418F419  
It should be noted that there is some historical debate over the extent to which these 
efforts were really organized and promoted by the French, rather than by Tuareg leaders, 
though it is clear that many Tuareg leaders were involved in this effort. 419F420 According to 
Marnham, some Tuareg leaders wanted to be included in Algeria and asked that the border 
be moved south to reflect this. 420F421  
News of the desire to separate the Niger Bend and the Kidal region from the rest of what 
would become Mali reached the south, causing great concern. Prominent southern 
politicians visited the north throughout the late 1950s and early 1960s to campaign against 
partition and in favour of Malian unity.421F422 Neither the UN nor the Organization of African 
Unity took up the question of self-determination for the Tuareg, instead allowing 
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decolonization, for the most part, to fall along existing borders.422F423 During decolonization, 
the principle of uti possidetis was used to resist any changes in the makeup of the 
territories of the colonies. 423F424 Decolonization would show “no consideration for the social, 
political and territorial integrity of the Tuareg and other (nomadic) societies like the Peul 
(Fulbe, Wodabee) or Berber (Imaziŕen), but in fact established their marginalization.” 424F425  
The question of Tuareg self-determination would greatly influence Tuareg nationality at 
decolonization. There was considerable support for self-determination in international 
law,425F426 yet during decolonization, the right to self-determination was invoked as a 
rationale for ending colonial rule, but not for reordering the colonial system. 426F427 In 1945, 
the United Nations placed eleven states under the Trusteeship system to facilitate their 
progress towards independence, but the breakup of colonial empires would eventually take 
place along the borders that had been already established by Europeans. 427F428  
In 1960, the United Nations General Assembly passed resolution 1514 on the Granting of 
Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples as existing political groups, enshrining 
what Weller calls the territorial approach to decolonization. 428F429 Though the right to self-
determination was a motivating factor for decolonization, the supposed stability of the 
post-colonial system was a major concern for all of the parties involved in the process and 
ultimately outweighed other concerns. 429F430 Resolution 1514, for example, expressly applied 
self-determination only to former colonies as a whole; “(t)rust and Non-self-governing 
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territories or all other territories which have not yet attained independence." 430F431 Self-
determination was therefore limited to existing political and territorial units. 431F432 As a result, 
the decolonization process left many ethnic and indigenous groups, both nomadic and non-
nomadic, without states of their own. 432F433  
In 1970, the UN General Assembly passed the Declaration on Friendly Relations and 
Cooperation Among States preventing self-determination claims that would 
“dismember...sovereign and independent states conducting themselves in compliance with 
the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples.”433F434 The International Court 
of Justice affirmed the right to independence from colonization for former colonies in the 
Namibia Opinion of 1971. 434F435 As a result, while the right to self-determination from 
European colonization is arguably jus cogens, the right to self-determination by minorities 
and indigenous peoples within post-colonial states does not find similar support. 
The 1975 Western Sahara case, however, provided something of an exception to the 
general focus only on European colonization and provides a limited example of a nomadic 
group successfully advocating for self-determination. The case provided nomadic groups in 
the western Sahara region with independence from both European states and earlier 
colonization by Morocco. The decision recognized that nomadic peoples were “socially and 
politically organized” as grounds for their claims to self-determination both from European 
colonization, but also the near colonization of a pre-colonial entity, Morocco. 435F436 While 
Western Sahara could have provided a blueprint to granting political independence to 
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more nomads, it has not been followed by a wave of nomad, or even indigenous, 
independence and state formation. 436F437 Quite the opposite. 437F438  
Ultimately, the proposal of a Tuareg state would be set aside due to the strenuous 
objections of the new colonies, including Mali, in favour of an economic organization, the 
Organization Commune des Regions Sahariennes (OCRS).438F439 Discussions around the creation 
of this new economic block would only increase the mistrust between what would become 
the Malian government and the Tuareg.439F440 Mali and Niger, in particular, saw this as Tuareg 
collusion with French imperialism. The long shadow of the Sahara français and the OCRS 
would darken future relations between the Tuareg and the Malian government, which 
would always present Tuareg independence as veiled French imperialism. 440F441 Once again, 
like in Kuwait, nomadic communities were presented as potential allies of foreign 
governments and disloyal to the state. All parties were concerned over the possible mineral 
and oil wealth hidden beneath the Sahara, and the new governments in the region viewed 
any sign of separatism by the Tuareg with extreme suspicion. 441F442 
Various Tamasheq and Bidân leaders in Soudan Français actively supported 
either the French or the Moroccan and Mauritanian claims, or all at the same time. 
Their support for these ‘foreign’ claims made them highly suspect in the eyes of 
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the Malian nationalists. After independence they were regarded as enemies of the 
Malian state and ‘vassals’ to the ‘French neo-imperialist cause’. 442F443 
The OCRS ended in 1962, but the concerns of some Tuareg leaders over their future as part 
of what would become Mali, would long outlast it. 443F444 Disappointment over the failure of a 
Tuareg state and anger at Mali’s southern dominated post-colonial government were 
factors in the first Tuareg rebellion of 1962, the rebellion that would end Tuareg 
integration into Mali before it had even begun. 444F445 Badi, the chief of the Kounta Tuareg, is 
quoted by Gabriel Féral as saying, 
Quand vous (les français) partirez, c’est Bamako qui va commander, ce sont les 
sédentaires, les nègres... maintenant, les choses ne se font plus avec le fusil, avec 
la takoba, tout cela c’est fini, cela se fait avec le vote, avec les élections. Or nous, 
nous, les nomades, nous sommes en minorité... (When you (the French) leave, it’s 
Bamako who will rule, the settled peoples, the blacks...now, things are no longer 
done with the gun, with the takoba (sword), all that is finished, it will be done with 
the vote, with the elections. But we, the nomads, are in the minority...) 445F446 
The departure of the French brought breathtakingly swift changes to northern Mali, 
discussed below, as the new Malian government moved aggressively to settle the nomads, 
free the Tuareg slaves and promote agriculture. Meanwhile, the administrative structure 
created by the French would persist into the post-colonial period, with power centralized 
in the hands of urban and southern rulers and international borders dividing the Tuareg 
and placing them at the periphery of political power. 
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The Sama Dilaut in British North Borneo 
 
Like the Bedouin and Tuareg, the Sama Dilaut would suffer from colonial attitudes about 
the ability to nomads to participate in states, their ability to own their territories and their 
alleged backwardness. Like the Bedouin and Tuareg, the Sama Dilaut would be subjected to 
forced and coercive settlement practices which went hand in hand with registration and 
taxation. And like the Bedouin and Tuareg, the Sama Dilaut would find their territories split 
by colonial borders. 
The Spanish had come to the Sulu Sultanate in 1578, conquering the Sultanate in the early 
1600s and signing a series of treaties with the Sultan in the mid-1600s and early 1700s.446F447 
Spanish influence over the Sultanate was weak, however, and large-scale changes to the 
way of life in North Borneo did not begin until the arrival of the British. Invasive British 
policies would begin the forced settlement of the Sama Dilaut. As Warren puts it, 
Sama/Bajau “mobility and independence from the land gave them a practical immunity 
from government authority...”, a fact which made their settlement by the British, 
“imperative.”447F448 As this section will show, however, Sama Dilaut mobility didn’t simply 
threaten colonial control over individual Sama Dilaut families, it also implied a lack of 
control over the oceans at a time when the British government was trying to establish its 
dominance over ocean trade.  
The colonial period began the marginalization of northern Borneo in the region, as it had 
resulted in the marginalization of northern French Soudan. The British focused mainly on 
their colonies in the Malay Peninsula, which was of enormous regional trade 
importance.448F449 Meanwhile, northern Borneo with its dense jungles, was seen as less 
 
447 N. Saleeby, Studies in Moro History, Law and Religion (Department of the Interior, Philippines, 1905) 164 
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448 J. Warren, Chartered, 1971, 77. 
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economically useful at the time. With its unknown and uncharted potential, it came to the 
attention of various British adventurers looking to make money in southeast Asia.449F450 For 
the early part of the colonial period, it was under the exclusive sovereignty of the British 
North Borneo Chartered Company (BNBC), a quasi-sovereign, private entity with little 
oversight from London. 450F451 While there was technically a formal charter governing the 
terms of North Borneo’s governance, in reality, North Borneo operated in a legal vacuum. 
North Borneo officially became a Protected State in 1888, but remained under the 
administration of the BNBC. 451F452 North Borneo was converted to a Crown Colony after WWII. 
The BNBC claimed sovereignty over north Borneo in an agreement with the Sultan of Sulu 
in 1877.452F453 A Chartered Company, the BNBC typified the public-private, semi-military 
nature of British expansionism of an earlier era, and was an anachronism in the late 
1800s.453F454 The Company had sovereign powers like those of a state, but was unofficial and 
lacked resources and accountability. 454F455 
Next door, James Brooke of England became Rajah of Sarawak in 1839, taking over much of 
the former Brunei Sultanate, which his family ruled as their personal kingdom until the end 
of World War Two. 455F456 Despite their sweeping claims on maps from the period, neither 
Brooke nor the BNBC had much control over their supposed territory. 456F457 What control the 
BNBC and Brooke family did have was based almost exclusively on the coasts. 
As in the Gulf, the late 19th and early 20th centuries in North Borneo saw a succession of 
shifting and unclear borders as various European powers struggled for supremacy. North 
Borneo (Sabah, Malaysia) began the colonial period as a semi-autonomous area 
sandwiched between Dutch-controlled Borneo territories and the Spanish-controlled 
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Philippines. In 1824, with the Spanish in decline, the British and Dutch 457F458 signed the Anglo-
Dutch Treaty dividing Southeast Asia into spheres, with the Malay Peninsula in the British 
sphere and the islands of the East Indies in the Dutch sphere. 458F459 No mention was made of 
Borneo in this Treaty. The maritime border between Sabah and the Philippines was set 
down in Article III of the Treaty of Paris of 1898. 459F460  
Over a period from 1891 to 1915, the Dutch and British officially established the border 
between their colonies in Borneo, which became the modern-day border between Malaysia 
and Indonesia. 460F461 In 1930, the boundary between north Borneo and the Philippines was 
fixed by the British and the United States (who succeeded the Spanish in the Southern 
Philippines).461F462 One result of this period was the division of northern Borneo from both 
southern Borneo and the rest of the Sulu Sultanate. 462F463 Southern Borneo remained under 
Dutch control, dividing the island, while Jolo, Sulu and other parts of the former Sulu 
Sultanate were now under Spanish control. 463F464  
As with other colonial treaties described in the previous sections, little regard was given to 
local political organizations or the needs and realities of the local trade-based economy. 
Instead, these treaties set aside centuries of trade and political unity between the islands of 
the East Indies, including Sumatra, and the Malay Peninsula, where a web of trade and 
alliances had united diverse peoples for centuries. 464F465 These treaties would lay the 
foundation for the modern maritime borders in the region and the breakup of the region 
into discrete, territorial units.465F466  
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In particular, these treaties marked the beginning of the division of the Sultanate of Sulu, 
laying the foundation for later arguments over ownership of North Borneo. 466F467 These 
agreements between colonial powers took no account of the outlines of the Sulu Sultanate 
or the social and trade links between peoples on the ground. Today, there are multiple 
border disputes between Malaysia, the Philippines and Indonesia due to the complex 
history of shifting borders and the multitude of historical documents establishing 
sovereignty by one or another power at different points in time. 467F468 Crucially for this 
dissertation, Sama Dilaut territories would end up being at the epicentre of some of the 
most acute of these border disputes. 
As in French Soudan and, to a lesser extent, Kuwait, British policy in North Borneo focused 
on the settlement of the nomadic population. The British North Borneo Company was 
anxious to clearly establish its sovereignty over Northern Borneo. Unlike in French Sudan, 
however, but more like in Kuwait, the region around North Borneo was one of intense 
competition by colonial powers anxious to control regional shipping and trade. As a result, 
the key goals of the BNBC were similar to those of the British government in the Gulf: to set 
borders against the claims of other colonial powers in the region and protect British 
shipping from “piracy.” What the British called “piracy” in Borneo was often attacks by 
rival, local traders, to some extent sponsored by the Sulu Sultanate, whose income 
depended on trade that was now being supplanted by the British. 468F469 
The BNBC were alarmed by what they perceived as the lack of centralized authority in 
Borneo, which they viewed as being left to its own devises by the weakening Sultanates of 
Sulu and Brunei. 469F470 The crackdown on piracy and the introduction of a police force were 
BNBC goals to make the area safer for settlement and increased trade. 470F471 Brooke launched 
a violent military offensive against what they labelled piracy in the region,471F472 and, in the 
early twentieth century, the BNBC began an anti-piracy program targeting the Sama 
Dilaut.472F473 
Brooke and the BNBC viewed nomadism as practically synonymous with piracy, which they 
saw as harming trade and creating insecurity.473F474 It is not clear, however, to what extent the 
Sama Dilaut were actually involved in piracy and raiding as opposed to fishing and 
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trade.474F475 Nevertheless, by the beginning of the 20th century, boat nomadism and the Sama 
Dilaut had become synonymous with piracy, lawlessness, the weakness of the maritime 
border and lack of sovereignty.  
The Sama Dilaut and Orang Suku Laut were particularly targeted by anti-piracy 
programs.475F476  The British North Borneo Chartered Company (BNBC) considered the Sama 
Dilaut to be a “martial,” “rebellious” people who could not be governed except by their 
conversion to a settled way of life. 476F477 Forced settlement and the eradication of nomadism 
therefore became among the most important goals of the BNBC administrators. Warren 
continues: 
(e)ssential to the establishment of thorough control in the region would be a 
reorientation of the Bajau toward a surplus productivity involving them in a cash 
economy and in more sedentary habits. 477F478 
Arguably, this negative attitude was even more extreme than the one held by British and 
French administrators towards the pastoral nomads of the Niger Bend and the Gulf. By the 
1840s, the colonial powers had come to dominate the South China Sea, reducing non-
colonial trade, with disastrous results for the local economy. 478F479 The reduction in “piracy”, 
or non-European trade, led to a sharp decline in the Sulu Sultanate and a breakdown of the 
patronage system that has sustained the Sama Dilaut for centuries. 479F480  
Sama Dilaut/Bajau Laut migrations also appeared to threaten the establishment of the 
border between US and British interests. The BNBC and the American authorities in Jolo 
claimed “roving bands of Bajau”, or “bad hat Bajaus”, as one administrator called them, 
plied the seas and islands between the two powers, supposedly attacking outposts and 
raiding shops.480F481 The Sama Dilaut were quickly characterized not only as “pirates,” but also 
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as “rebels,” a threat to British sovereignty in the region. 481F482 Across the region, including in 
what would become Indonesia, the colonizing powers labelled boat nomads a “disgrace”.482F483  
The Sama Dilaut were seen as too involved with the Sulu Sultanate, centred around Jolo, 
loyal to the Sultan and not to the British. 483F484 Settlement of “sea nomads” was a universally 
adopted solution to the “problem” of uncontrolled mobility and links to the territory of 
what would become the Philippines. The colonial powers worked to limit the areas in 
which the “sea nomads” could travel to keep them within agreed upon spheres of 
influence.484F485 The BNBC began to put into place various restrictions on Sama Dilaut 
movement, including a system of boat licenses. 485F486 This helped bring to an end the Sama 
Dilaut long distance migrations to what is now the southern Philippines and Indonesia. 486F487 
A large part of ending Sama Dilaut/Bajau Laut movement involved relocating supposedly 
far-flung or nomadic, families to villages on the coast. Starting in 1909, the BNBC began 
relocating Sama/Bajau villages to more central locations near big towns to bring them 
under centralized control. 487F488 This brought many nomadic Sama Dilaut groups into contact 
with British administration for the first time. 488F489  
At the beginning of the twentieth century, the BNBC had begun to gain enough control over 
the local population that they could begin to put into place a system of indirect rule similar 
to that in other British colonies. In 1898, the BNBC began to appoint of local leaders, 
usually drawn from the shore-based elite. Unlike in the Gulf and the Sahel, however, the 
Sama Dilaut were used to a patronage relationship with powerful, shore-based rulers, so 
this hierarchy was not necessarily a big change for them. Nevertheless, a centralized 
administrative structure was as foreign to the Sama Dilaut as it was for other nomads. 
To justify the settlement of sea nomads and other sea faring groups, colonial 
administrators described the nomad’s way of life as “wretched”, implying that any change 
would be an improvement for the nomads themselves. 489F490 They cast the shift from a 
maritime-based lifestyle to agriculture as part of their development from a “primitive” way 
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of life to a “modern” one.490F491 Settlement and centralization therefore came to be associated 
with modernization and economic growth, despite the clear unsuitability of many colonial 
agricultural efforts from an environmental and economic perspective. 
The BNBC faced challenges in making a profit in North Borneo. The trade-based economy 
could be taxed, but the Sama Dilaut in particular were in the habit of decamping to Jolo 
whenever they were confronted by BNBC tax collectors. This cut off one of the main ways 
the colony sought to make money: taxing local trade. To end piracy and promote more 
controllable economic activity, both the BNBC and the Brooke family forced the local 
communities to settle and take up agriculture despite the unsuitability of the Borneo 
terrain for large-scale agriculture.491F492  
The BNBC also began to make inroads into the interior, opening up land to some 
agricultural production, a shift in the local economy that would have huge repercussions 
for the Sama Dilaut. 492F493 The first crop the BNBC attempted in Borneo was the coconut tree, 
which provided the justification for their first attempt at mass relocation and settlement of 
the Bajau peoples, including Sama Dilaut. The BNBC relocated Bajau peoples, both nomadic 
and sedentary, from remote islands to mainland Borneo for this project. 493F494 Settlement of 
the “roving” Sama Dilaut was not really necessary to obtain workers for the new 
plantations, as the BNBC also imported Chinese workers for this task. 494F495 Rather, it was key 
to shifting the Sama Dilaut and other seafaring peoples away from nomadism and “piracy” 
to a mode of life that was easier for the colonial administrators to control and would 
protect British trade. 495F496 
Importantly, such projects were not side issues for British administrators, they were a 
major part of their empire-building strategy. Carol Warren calls the efforts by the British to 
settle the Sama Dilaut as “strenuous”.496F497 It involved massive manpower and policing to 
round up scattered villages and flotillas of Bajau peoples, both nomadic and semi-nomadic, 
and train them to grow coconuts. At first, the Sama Dilaut ignored British efforts to settle 
them for agriculture, but when the United States took over in the Philippines from the weak 
Spanish administration in 1898, the Sama Dilaut could no longer easily relocate to the 
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southern Philippines to escape British policies. As a result, Sama Dilaut settlement 
accelerated.497F498 
Despite their steady promotion of agriculture, the BNBC struggled to make a profit in 
Borneo. Like in the Sahel, the topography and climate was simply unsuited to large-scale 
agriculture.498F499 The BNBC tried various cash crops such as tobacco and rubber, eventually 
turning to timber, beginning the devastation of Borneo’s forests. 499F500 By independence, 
Borneo’s timber, its most successful export, was already running out. 500F501 The British 
replaced the traditional system of land tenure to bring more acres under cultivation, but 
still struggled with low productivity. 501F502 
In a further attempt to crack down on Sama Dilaut migration and raise revenue, the BNBC 
introduced a system of boat registration.502F503 British agents travelled the islands issuing and 
checking licenses. 503F504 While not expensive, many families might have been unable to pay. It 
was also, however, viewed by many Bajau communities as an impermissible attempt to 
restrict freedom of movement.504F505 As Sather explains, for most of the first decade of the 
twentieth century, the BNBC was almost wholly occupied with enforcing boat registration 
as a means to collect revenue, restrict mobility, and get the local communities to provide 
“acknowledgment of Company sovereignty”.505F506  
After considerable resistance, boat registration was finally, grudgingly, accepted by the 
Sama Dilaut, which lead to the sharp reduction in long distance boat travel. 506F507 A similar 
system of boat registration was introduced by the United States in the Philippines, but the 
systems were not integrated, meaning that boats registered in Borneo could not easily 
travel to what was now the Philippines. Boat registration was not relaxed until after 
independence, but by that point most Sama Dilaut families had settled in “water villages” 
near urban centres like Semporna.507F508 
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In addition to programs settling the Sama Dilaut and restrict their movement, the BNBC 
also encouraged settlement through more indirect means. The British granted pardon to 
Bajau and Sama peoples who broke the law, including convicted pirates, in exchange for 
their settlement. 508F509 The rise of agriculture and logging in Borneo also contributed 
indirectly to Sama Dilaut settlement in a number of ways, by introducing the cash economy, 
wage labour and modern technology.  
As the Sama Dilaut began to settle on pile houses in villages near shore, the old barter 
system was replaced with a cash economy, and the introduction of the engine and nets gave 
the Sama Dilaut something to buy in the face of growing competition from commercial 
fishing.509F510 The founding of Semporna Town, for example, was a key moment in the 
settlement of the Sama Dilaut. The town provided a centre for what had been dispersed 
trade, a central market for trading all ocean products in one place, and provided security in 
the form of the police and, eventually, a navy, the role that had been formally played by the 
Sama Dilaut’s wealthy, settled patrons. 510F511  
Such indirect means of promoting settlement were part of Britain’s “development” and 
“civilizing” programs in the region. As one Company official put it, 
under British rule, the Bajau is proving himself a good workman, and is building 
up a permanent home, in place of leading the roving piratical life he was formerly 
accustomed to. 511F512 
The Sama Dilaut were not the only nomads encouraged or forced to settle in the rush to 
claim sovereignty over Borneo. Crop raising and timber cutting placed pressure on 
Borneo’s nomadic groups living in the interior. Their settlement was also actively 
encouraged by the BNBC as they slowly began to penetrate the mountainous interior of 
Borneo and began to stake a claim against the Dutch in Indonesia. 512F513 In Sarawak, the 
Brookes granted extensive logging contracts over the objections of nomadic groups and 
implemented policies to encourage the nomads to settle and work in the timber industry. 
The Brooks also encouraged large-scale Chinese migration and settlement in Sarawak, 
greatly increasing the population and clearing and claiming so-called empty land owned by 
nomads.513F514  
 
509 J. Warren, Chartered, 1971, 83. 
510 Sather, Commodity, 2002, 32, 38-39. See also Sather, Adaptation, 1997, 67. 
511 Sather, Commodity, 2002, 38-39. Hooker, 142. See also J. Warren, Chartered, 1971, 66-67. 
512 L. Lovegrove, British North Borneo, 60 J. of the Royal Society of Arts 545 (1912) quoted in Warren, 
Chartered, 1971, 86. 
513 Andaya 225. For information on the setting of the land boundary with Indonesia, see F. Durand and R. 
Curtis, Maps of Malaysia and Borneo: Discovery, Statehood and Progress (Editions Didier Millet 2014) 243. 
514 Andaya, 224-225. 
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As in Kuwait and Mali, the goals of exclusive territorial sovereignty, hard borders and 
exclusive allegiance among the population would be passed on to post-colonial 
governments. The goal of hard borders and exclusive sovereignty over land and contiguous 
waters in North Borneo would only grow in importance to the government of Malaysia 
after independence. 514F515 Like in Kuwait, the discovery of oil off the coast of Borneo would 
drastically raise the stakes for borders and sovereignty over the oceans in the region. It 
would create a number of maritime boundary disputes throughout the region. 515F516 It would 
also begin a gradual shift of the economy away from trade and towards oil exploration, just 
as it did in Kuwait and, to a lesser extent, Mali.  
By 1919, the British administrations in Singapore and Kuala Lumpur were increasingly 
looking at uniting the Malay Peninsula with their Borneo territories in preparation for 
independence. The British and many of the Sultans wished to unite North Borneo with the 
colonies of Peninsular Malaysia. 516F517 The vulnerability of Borneo as a political entity on its 
own was exposed during the Japanese invasion during World War II, when the poorly 
defended Borneo territories quickly fell to the Japanese, a target because of their recently 
discovered oil and proximity to shipping lanes. 517F518 The allied bombing campaign had 
destroyed most of the infrastructure in Borneo, and the return of British rule was now cast 
as a rebuilding period as a Crown Colony followed by a transition to a unity state 
comprised of all the former British colonies in the region.  
Creating the Federation of Malaysia would not be an easy task. 518F519 Uniting British holdings 
in the region would require unifying many different, diverse territories under a central 
government. While North Borneo under the Sulu Sultanate had had relations with the 
kingdoms of the Malay peninsula dating from the pre-colonial period and the common 
experience of British rule had led to administrative and political ties, these relations would 
not easily form the basis of a new political unit along the lines of what the British and some 
Sultans envisioned. 519F520 The unification of many former British colonies into the Federation 
of Malaysia would leave the Sama Dilaut on the periphery of two states, divided by an 
international border, their lands now a disputed border zone containing vast oil reserves. 
 
515 C. Warren, Consciousness, 1980, 228. 
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519 Hooker, 181-186. 
520 E. Fernandez, ‘Philippine-Malaysia Dispute over Sabah: A Bibliographic Survey’ 7 Asia Pacific Social Science 
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Conclusion 
As the examples showed, it is not an overstatement to say that European colonization was a 
disaster for nomads. In particular, colonization would impose on nomads a set of extremely 
negative views on nomadism. These negative opinions included the view that nomads 
neither formed states nor participated in them, that nomads merely “wandered” over land 
without owning or improving upon it, and that nomads were unreliable allies whose way of 
life needed to be eliminated in order for the colonial project to succeed. 
Anti-nomad bias was reflected in almost every aspect of colonial policy, from the 
establishment of urban schools to the issuance of identity documents, licenses and other 
paperwork to keep nomads within administrative areas. This bias against nomads during 
the colonial period had an important impact on their status. Nomads ended up at the 
bottom of the colonial hierarchy, their lands split by borders, their leaders marginalized 
while power vested in urban rulers. Nomads now lived long distances away from state 
structures and were left out of important decisions.  
Negative views of nomadism would fuel strenuous projects to eliminate it in places like the 
Gulf, the Sahel and the Sulu Sea. Eliminating nomadism through forced or coercive 
settlement became a major project of the colonial era, despite how feasible, practical or 
economically desirable it might be. The treatment of nomads by colonial administrators 
stands in stark contrast to the important role nomads played in the local and regional 
economies at the time of colonization, as described in the first section, above. While treaties 
were sometimes signed with nomadic leaders, colonial administers saw their true partners 
in the powerful Sultans and Emirs in the great capitals of the Gulf, Sahel and Sulu Sea. 
During the colonial period, nomadic leaders became increasingly marginalized and nomad 
societies were often governed by military, rather than civilian, administrations. 
As colonization moved into the 19th and early 20th century, early treaties with nomads 
were often invalidated or ignored. Instead, colonial administrators granted vast authority 
to urban rulers in ways that did not actually reflect their authority over nomadic societies. 
The centralization of power in urban areas was a key part of colonization. Far flung trade 
relationships, the bond created by Islam and the web of family and clan allegiances 
described in the first section were overlooked in the establishment of an administrative 
system of government based on centralization, borders, agriculture and urban living.  
The French and British would use various strategies to settled nomad areas, including the 
promotion of agriculture as part of so-called development, the imposition of movement 
restrictions, military force, taxation, centralized schooling and other methods. In North 
Borneo, nomads were forcibly settled in water villages, away from their fishing regions, 
and attempts were made to convert them to agriculture. In other cases, like the Sahel and 
the Gulf, nomads were administered under a separate system designed to limit their 
movement and contain them within designated areas while subjected to coercive 
settlement policies and movement restrictions. Agriculture was often prioritized in order 
to settle nomads, even in places like the jungle or desert where agriculture was not 
desirable.  
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To justify forced settlement policies, nomadic trade was labelled as “piracy” or criminal 
activity. Border crossings were criminalized. Nomadic areas that could not be settled, like 
the ocean or the middle of the desert, were labelled as “remote” and often became the 
location off borders between colonial empires, dividing nomadic communities. These 
border zones were now areas of military, rather than civilian, rule. The fact that such 
borders severed trade routes and fishing zones was ignored as nomad territories were 
declared to be “empty.” Meanwhile, settled, urban Emirs and Sultans were happy to 
support such arrangements, which placed their cities at the centre of colonies and 
regulated nomadic communities to the periphery.  
Pastoralism, trade and fishing, which had occurred as part of normal life, were now recast 
as criminal activities, a threat to borders and the integrity of empire. This fed the view of 
nomadism as illegitimate, taking place outside of the activities of the administrative state, 
and cast nomads as inherently antithetical to the goals of colonial empires. This bias would 
also have devastating consequences for nomads at decolonization. 
The placement of borders through such “remote” areas divided nomad groups, making 
them into minorities and placing them at the edge of empires, rather than in the centre of 
political and economic life. Colonial administrators frequently placed nomads under 
military domination, rather than civil administration, placing nomads outside the bounds of 
the administrative state. While this may have appeared to give nomads more political 
independence, in reality it began a long period of political marginalization. 
All of the above factors led colonial administrators to treat the nomadic and settled 
portions of society very differently from one another, even when this was not justified by 
the reality of life on the ground. A system of tiers began to emerge, with nomads at the 
bottom of the colonial hierarchy, often in border zones and under military rule, subject to 
policies designed to eliminate their way of life. This trend can be seen in all three examples.  
In the case of the Tuareg, an explicitly separate, parallel system of governance emerged. 
This appeared to grant the Tuareg some independence from colonial rule, but in reality, 
state functions, including registration, slowly concentrated in urban areas. In other places, 
such as the Gulf, the British forged close ties with the Emir in Kuwait to the detriment of 
nomadic leaders. At the moment of crucial decisions, such as the setting of the border 
between Kuwait and Saudi Arabia, it appears that nomadic communities were left out. In 
North Borneo, the Sama Dilaut were often treated as pirates who existed outside of society 
and whose way of life needed to be eliminated.  
Such anti-nomad policies were not always driven by economics. Colonial administrations 
struggled to farm in desert or jungle areas and wasted huge resources cracking down on 
local trade. In Borneo, the BNBC attempted to forcibly settled nomadic Sama Dilaut 
fishermen to farm coconuts in what can be only termed a failure. In the Sahel, the French 
administrators promoted agriculture in the desert environment, risking increased draught. 
The reasons for such bad policies had less to do with the individual incompetence of 
colonial administrators in a given colony and more to do with the ways in which the 
settlement of nomads was seen not only as good economic policy, but as necessary to the 
establishment of the administrative state.  
101 
 
Finally, as the examples showed, the process of civil registration had already begun during 
colonization as part of the creation of the administrative state, which included the taking of 
the census, registration for schooling, the issuance of licenses and permits, and the 
collection of taxes. These administrative systems either excluded nomads or placed them 
under special registration or licensing schemes that were administrated separately from 
settled and urban populations. Registration often went hand in hand with coercive 
settlement policies and forced schooling, meaning that nomad societies came to view 
registration negatively, part of invasive state control, rather than as key to their belonging 
and inclusion. Such registration procedures also reinforced the centralization of 
administrative authority in urban and coastal areas. In some cases, like Kuwait, such 
systems were actually implemented by the Emir. 
The next section will focus on one particular aspect of colonial administration: the 
establishment of nationality. It will explore the development of nationality law under the 
colonial system and how these laws were implemented in Kuwait, Borneo and French 
Sudan.  
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Nationality and Empire 
Citizenship is the one human right whose meaning is bounded by territory and is 
thus tied invariably to claims of sovereignty. 520F521 
The above sections summarized colonial policy towards nomads. The next sections will 
focus on a particular aspect of colonial policy: the enactment of nationality laws and the 
registration of colonized populations. Like all aspects of colonial policy, nationality during 
colonization was heavily influenced by the overall goals of colonization. European theories 
on nomadism and the inability of nomads to form and participate in states would influence 
how nationality laws came to be applied to nomads. 
Belonging during the colonial period was dominated by the almost total lack of laws 
pertaining to the status of colonized peoples. This does not mean, however, that all 
colonized peoples were treated the same. Some colonized peoples received a nationality 
during the colonial period. Others were recognized as being in a position of authority in 
their regions. Others were entirely marginalized.  
The following sections will explore the development of nationality law in the British and 
French empires and how these laws were applied in Kuwait, French Soudan and North 
Borneo. In particular, it will discuss what is known about how these laws were applied, or 
not applied, to nomads. 
Nationality Law in the Colonies 
This section will provide a brief overview of nationality law under the colonial system. 
Nationality law developed beginning in the 17th century and in particular the 19th century 
in tandem with colonization. Nationality law was uniformly centred on a territorial 
approach, supporting both colonial sovereignty and colonial borders. In order for European 
sovereignty to be established on colonized territory, empires would often settle their own 
nationals on it, or, when this was impractical, they would sign treaties with local leaders to 
create jurisdiction through indirect rule.521F522 Colonial administrators often treated nomads 
as having no status beyond that of membership in their tribes. 522F523 Nomads were often 
governed separately and placed under military rule. As settled and urban peoples moved 
slowly towards the recognition of some sort of civil status during the final decades of the 
 
521 C. Odinkalu, ‘Natives, Subjects, and Wannabes: Internal Citizenship Problems in Postcolonial Nigeria’ in R. 
Howard-Hassmann and M. Walton-Roberts, The Human Right to Citizenship: A Slippery Concept (University of 
Pennsylvania Press 2015) 99.  
522 See generally C. Nine, ‘Colonialism, territory and pre-existing obligations’ Critical Review of International 
Social and Political Philosophy (2020). 
523 Maury, 17. 
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colonial period, many nomads were treated as entirely outside the realm of political 
membership and their status often worsened. 523F524 
To support territorial sovereignty, nationality law employed what Van Waas calls 
“variations on the same theme.”524F525 Common methods to establish nationality at birth or by 
naturalization were often based on a “link” between the individual and the territory of the 
state, such as birth in the territory of the state (jus soli), descent from a national (jus 
sanguinis) or residency in the state. 525F526 Different European empires adopted different 
combinations of these principles, 526F527 but in all cases, a primary function of nationality law 
was used to reinforce territorial sovereignty. 527F528 In England, courts established the 
principle of jus soli, while Germany, France and other continental nations developed the 
principle of jus sanguinis. 528F529 Each of these methods of establishing nationality supports a 
territorial approach to group membership in the state, based on a connection between 
people and land. 
While nationality by descent, or jus sanguinis, may on first observation lack a territorial 
element, the principle of jus sanguinis reinforces territoriality by excluding the offspring of 
immigrants and favouring those with family histories in the territory of the state. 
Nationality by descent may cut off when the link to the territory of the state becomes to 
tenuous, for example, upon the marriage of a woman to a non-national or multiple 
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generations born abroad.529F530 Jus sanguinis helps to build and retain close ties between 
populations and territories.530F531  
The territorial nature of nationality law is not an accident but reflects the political realities 
of Europe during the 17th, 18th and 19th centuries. It is, as Arendt put it, a key part of the 
“trinity of European statehood” 531F532 and closely linked to the theories of state formation 
described in the proceeding section. “The modern concept of nationality...is primarily 
related to power over territory.” 532F533 In this way, nationality law came to reinforce the 
theories of statehood described above. 
Reflecting this territorial approach, habitual residence emerged as a major means of 
establishing nationality. It became one of the most employed requirements for 
naturalization under both the British and French systems. 533F534 Under French law, the system 
of double birth meant that two generations of residence could create a nationality “link.” 
Residence also became crucial to establishing nationality for persons who had never before 
had a nationality status. Habitual residence in the territory of a state would also become 
the key way to create what this dissertation will call “the first body of nationals” of a new 
state during decolonization. As Brownlie points out, for cases where a state, “has no 
nationality legislation...(t)here is interesting evidence of reliance on settlement together 
with the existence of the political and diplomatic protection of a particular sovereign...” to 
create a presumption of nationality. 534F535  
Territoriality is therefore a key feature of nationality law. Another key feature of 
nationality law that is important to the nationality of nomads is the concept of an exclusive 
relationship, one of exclusive allegiance, between state and citizen. 535F536 Because, as the 
above sections established, one of the main goals of colonization was the establishment of 
exclusive territorial sovereignty in the colonies, particularly against the claims of other 
colonial empires,536F537 the exclusive allegiance of colonized peoples became a key issue in 
both the British and French empires.537F538 Britain and France had encouraged the settlement 
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of their colonies by Europeans. 538F539 The question of nationality for colonized peoples, 
however, remained under contention. Empires attempted to claim jurisdiction over 
colonized populations, often through systems of indirect rule, while limiting their rights. 
As nationality in Europe developed into a status affording important rights, such as voting, 
holding office and access to the courts, colonial empires like Britain and France began to 
face the question of whether or not these rights should be extended throughout their 
empires.539F540 The idea of nationality granting civil rights gained ground across the Europe, 
540F
541 but was totally at odds with the goals of the colonial project, chief of which was to claim 
colonized peoples for the purposes of creating territorial sovereignty, not to grant 
colonized peoples political rights. 541F542  
The question of the rights of colonized peoples would come to dominate the late colonial 
period in both British and French colonies. During this period, nationality developed to be 
more than a system of laws, it came to encompass a moral element. The 19th century saw 
the development of the philosophy of romantic nationalism, 542F543 which emphasized the 
natural link that developed between populations, governments and territories. A 
community based in a particular territory, a homeland, had the right to exclude 
outsiders.543F544 As Arendt puts it, in order for nations to function as states, they require 
“homogeneity of population and rootedness in the soil.” 544F545  
In this idealized, European model of the nation-state, the link between individual and 
homeland, a link of “blood and soil,” is a natural phenomenon. 545F546 As Miller puts it, a nation 
“...connects a group of people to a particular geographic place...a nation must have a 
homeland.”546F547 Under this theory of state legitimacy, as people grouped together on specific 
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areas of land, geographical features influenced their culture and development, binding 
them together in a common way of life that necessitate common government. 547F548 The nation 
nurtures a group of people over generations, imbuing them with their particular 
character.548F549  
The moral element of nationality would come to shape the development of nationality as a 
system of laws in the colonies. European philosophers such as John Stuart Mill believed 
that nations were best expressed as political states, and, conversely that states containing 
multiple nations were doomed to failure. 549F550 Natural law principles provided European 
states with a moral argument against extending full nationality rights to colonized 
persons.550F551 Yet, it also increasingly begged the question of whether and to what extent 
colonies should have their own nationalities. 
The concept of romantic nationalism, of nations expressed as states,  551F552 remained 
controversial in Europe, but perhaps even more so in the colonies. Numerous wars, colonial 
occupations and successions constantly shifted borders, both in Europe and abroad, 
confusing the issue of which nations supposedly lived in which homelands.552F553 As well, the 
question also became to what extent colonies should be their own states. While romantic 
nationalism helped to justify the exclusion of colonized peoples from colonial nationality, it 
also seemed to conflict with the concept of indirect rule and raised the question of the 
nationality status of colonized peoples. 553F554 The purpose of this section is not to argue the 
legitimacy of nationalism as a concept, but merely to point out its influence on nationality 
law during the crucial period when the question of nationality and rights in the colonies 
was most acute. 
By the early 20th century, the spread of nationality to the colonies would be plagued by 
contradictions. Was, for example, the British Empire an “extension of the nation state, a 
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separate entity in itself, or a type of ‘world state’?” 554F555 Confusion about the nature of the 
Empire versus the state led to confusion about nationality and the level of status of 
colonized peoples.  
(The) unofficial, rhetorical, and localized nature of citizenship gave rise to great 
discrepancies among imperial subjects in rights, benefits, and duties. 555F556  
Such philosophical tensions drove enormous changes in nationality law as it was applied in 
the colonies. In the early colonies, those who had a nationality were almost exclusively 
European settlers and their descendants. 556F557 By the end of the colonial period, many 
colonized peoples had also begun to receive a status, but this status was often not the same 
as that given to Europeans. Meanwhile, many colonized peoples receive no status. 
Nationality came to mean something very different in Europe than it did in many colonies 
and different statuses were granted to different classes of people within the colonies, 
creating a system of tiers. 
The colonial period also saw the mass introduction of paper identity documents in places 
where no such systems of identification had existed before. Registration and the issuance of 
identity documents are today used under the western model as vital evidence of nationality 
and can be the mechanism by which nationality is established in some cases. 557F558 The 
widespread use of documents as evidence of nationality also means that a lack of 
documents can be used as evidence of non-national status. Registration of nationality 
developed as an area of administrative law during the colonial period and came to be of 
vital importance in the colonies. The introduction of the registration of nationality would 
divide colonized populations by type of documentation. 
Registration of nationality included not only the issuance of national IDs, but of other forms 
of documentation like birth certificates and voter registration cards. 558F559 All of these forms of 
documentation would be issued during colonization to some colonized persons, alongside 
attempts to take a census and in other ways document the persons under colonial 
jurisdiction. The system of registration of nationality would come to be highly influential in 
the post-colonial period. The absence or presence of state issued personal identification 
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can be an important factor in proving nationality, particularly in places where it is 
contested.559F560 
During the colonial period, the standardization of identity documents also emerged, with 
the widespread use of birth certificates, nationality certificates and passports. In many 
systems of civil registration in Europe employing jus soli, the birth certificate became the 
key document for proving nationality. Proof of nationality in the French system came to 
require the acquisition of a certificat de nationalité française, which must be issued by a 
court or embassy of France. 560F561 Today, passports, birth certificates and ID cards may all be 
used as evidence in obtaining a certificat de nationalité, but they are not in and of 
themselves proof of nationality. 561F562  
Other documents, however, such as title to land, registration of the payment of taxes, 
licenses issued by the state, school registration and others may serve as evidence today in 
cases where an individual is trying to establish their long-term residence in a territory. 
During the colonial period, a variety of documents and forms of registration not related to 
nationality, but in some cases establishing jurisdiction, were available to some colonized 
persons during the colonial period. These documents would help to establish the legal 
identity of colonized persons during the colonial period and, as subsequent sections will 
show, at decolonization. The colonial administrative state, therefore, came to exercise 
enormous control over huge numbers of people, often delegating power to certain 
privileged, local rulers under systems of indirect rule. 
How was this emerging system of nationality in the colonies applied to nomads? First, 
enormous powers were vested with particular settled and urban rulers in regions under 
indirect rule, including the power to issue documents. As the above sections on colonial 
policy towards nomads demonstrated, colonial administrators believed nomads to be 
incapable of political allegiance outside of being members of their tribes, a fact which 
would greatly influence the registration, or non-registration, of nomads.562F563  
Civil and administrative functions were often based in towns and the power to issue 
documents often vested with settled and urban rulers, rather than nomadic leaders. 
Colonial administrators viewed nomads as a problem, as a source of criminality and the 
creators of a vacuum of state sovereignty. These views on nomadism, described in the 
previous section, would intersect with the system of nationality in the colonies, as 
described in this section. 
 
560 Weis, 204-236, discussing proof of nationality before international tribunals. See also Van Waas, 
Nationality, 2008, 153; De Groot and Vonk, 21; Bingham, Reddy and Kohn, 5. 
561 Weil, 265. 
562 See for example the Code de la nationalité française (1994) arts. 149-151. See also Weis, 216. Exchange 
with Bronwen Manby. 
563 Bloom discusses the effects of exclusive membership on colonized peoples. Bloom, Members, 2017, 160. 
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The next sections will explore in more detail how the development of European nationality  
played out in particular cases, looking at the particular laws and policies enacted by 
colonial governments in Kuwait, French Soudan and British North Borneo, and how these 
laws and policies were applied, or not applied, to nomads. When reading this section, it is 
important to keep in mind the negative views of nomads described in the previous section, 
which influenced how the laws were applied, or not applied, to nomads. 
Nationality in the British Empire: Kuwait and North Borneo 
 
Passport from the Aden Secretariat of the British Empire 
Gulf States have found themselves at odds with the normative language of the 
international community that has tended to territorialise citizenship. 563F564 
Today, there is a strong correlation between being related to certain Bedouin tribes and 
being stateless in Kuwait.. 564F565 While most local people in the Gulf lived without an official 
nationality status during this period under the colonial system, this did not mean that all 
local populations were afforded the same status or treated in the same way. The seeds of 
statelessness in Kuwait were sowed during this period. Similarly, many Sama Dilaut in 
Malaysia are now stateless, as there was a high correlation between civil registration in 
North Borneo and being settled in a coastal town or water village. This section will trace 
the origins of this exclusion by looking at how local populations were classified and 
afforded status during the British protected state period, when Kuwait and Malaysia were 
first configured as territorial states with civil registration regimes. 
The British had a wide variety of types of colonies, all of which employed the concept of 
“indirect rule” to varying extents. Both the Bedouin and the Sama Dilaut lived in a type of 
British colony called British Protected States, which in the case of Kuwait, more resembled 
a strategic alliance between the Emir and the British government than a colonization. 
 
564 Beaugrand, Stateless, 2018, 10. 
565 Conversations with an expert. 
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Under this system of indirect rule, local rulers like the Emir had jurisdiction over internal 
matters while the British administration dealt with matters of foreign policy, including 
consular affairs.565F566 British administrators could offer informal ‘advice’ on internal matters 
which could be taken or ignored, given the circumstances. 566F567 
The purpose of this system was to limit British responsibility for the local population while 
simultaneously ensuring British sovereignty over colonized territories. 567F568 Types of British 
territories included Crown Colonies, Protected States, Protectorates, Dominions and 
Dependencies. As Crawford points out; “the variety of dependent status in practice has 
been considerable: almost every permutation of rights and powers can be instanced from 
near-independence to practical absorption in another State.” 568F569 
In the dominions, the 1914 Nationality and Status of Aliens Act applied the principle of jus 
soli in the granting of nationality. 569F570 As decolonization progressed and many dominions 
became independent, the British Nationality Act of 1948 converted the status of British 
subject to that of “Citizen of the United Kingdom and Colonies,” and applied to colonies and 
to certain persons in the protectorates via naturalization or registration. This status 
maintained the right for citizens abroad to enter the UK until the law was changed in 1962, 
but this right was not extended to the holders of BPP status. 570F571  
Both Kuwait and North Borneo went through periods when they were administrated as 
Protected States. North Borneo also spent a short time as a Crown Colony, during which it 
had a nationality law based on jus soli, discussed below. British Protectorates and Protected 
States granted the colony the right of protection from outside aggressors while leaving 
nationality and local governance up to the traditional rules of the local leader, such as the 
 
566 This was not always the case for Protectorates. J. Harding, ‘Matters Colonial, Consular and Curious’ in P. 
Hinchcliffe, J. Ducker, and M. Holt (eds.) Without Glory in Arabia: The British Retreat from Aden (Tauris 2013) 
282. 
567 Harding, 280. 
568 Shachar, 113-115. 
569 Crawford, 284. See also Van Panhuys, 197; Maury, 30-31; Weis, 4-9; Verzijl, 1, 6-7, 13-14; Habermas 65; de 
Groot and Vonk, 12. 
570 British Nationality and Status of Aliens Act, 1914, 4 & 5 Geo. V, c. 17, s. 10(1). The term dominions was 
never defined in British law. For a discussion of how nationality law affected the indigenous population in 
North America, see Bloom, Members, 2017, 161-165. 
571 Weis, 13-14. See also Cole, 12; R. Hansen, Citizenship and Immigration in Post-war Britain (Oxford UP 
2000) 5-6, 29. After 1962, increased migration from its former colonies encouraged Britain to slowly restrict 
immigration. J. Hampshire, Citizenship and Belonging: Immigration and the Politics of Demographic 
Governance in Postwar Britain (Palgrave Macmillan 2005) 16-19. 
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Kuwaiti Emir.571F572 Protected States had supposedly internal administrations. 572F573 In colonies 
retaining internal sovereignty, such as Protectorates and Protected States, determinations 
of status for the non-British population were left up to the rules of the local authorities,573F574 
but they were also considered to be under British protection and, therefore, British 
sovereignty.574F575  
As Fransman notes, the Protectorate system was something of a fiction, as they were for 
practical purposes more like Crown Colonies than independent states. 575F576 But the 
Protectorate system allowed Britain to limit the application of British nationality, or British 
Subject status, to Britain and the crown colonies, while preserving jurisdiction over its 
protectorates and Protected States. The result of the Protectorate system was to create 
British territorial sovereignty while limiting the rights and status of colonized peoples. 
While there was no formal nationality law for most colonized peoples in the British Empire, 
the ways in which various colonized groups were treated arguably led to important 
differences in their status at decolonization. As the Empire developed, the British began to 
grapple with the question of nationality in their colonies, coming up with a variety of 
different levels of status for different classes of people living in different types colonies. In 
1774, Campbell v. Hall576F577 established that the inhabitants of a British Dominion or Crown 
Colony were automatically British subjects. Later, subject status was codified under the 
Nationality and Status of Aliens Act of 1914 and subsequent amendments. 577F578 Neither this 
principle of common law nor later statutes, however, applied to Protectorates or Protected 
States.  
Instead, as Protected States under the British Empire system, all inhabitants of Kuwait and 
North Borneo were technically under British “protection,” though they remained the 
subjects of their Emir or Sultan. 578F579 In this way, the status of local peoples in British 
Protectorates and Protected States remained vague and ill-defined, as the British Empire 
 
572 Crawford, 284, 317. 
573 British Protectorates had administrations established by the Crown. Shaw, 2008, 216-217. See also 
Fransman, 69-71. For an overview of Protected States, see Crawford, 292.  
574 Crawford, 284. 
575 Crawford, 317. 
576 Fransman, 69. 
577 Campbell v. Hall, 1 Cowp. 204, 98 ER 1045 (1774). 
578 Weis ,18-20. See also Shachar, 113-115. For details on the evolution of British Subject status, see British 
Home Office, ‘Historical background information on nationality, Version 1.0’ 21 July 2017. At this point, 
Britain used a system primarily based on jus soli. The switch in British law to a predominately jus sanguinis 
system of nationality would not fully occur until 1981. British Nationality Act, c. 61, 30 October 1981. See also 
Maury, 39-40; Stolcke, 71. 
579 Gorman, 19, 164. For example, see the British The Foreign Jurisdiction Act of 1890. 
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had not extended nationality to them, but their local rulers lacked the political 
independence to develop nationality systems of their own. 
By the early 20th century, the British had begun to develop a sort of pseudo-status for the 
occupants of British protectorates and protected states, that of British Protected Persons 
(BPP). This status, however, only offered diplomatic and consular protection abroad. It 
offered far fewer rights than that of British subject status afforded to other classes of 
persons under British rule. Nevertheless, BPP status was a type of personal status and it 
did provide some persons with an internationally recognized identity document. 
Originally, British Protected Persons status was determined on an ad hoc basis for people 
who needed travel outside of their protectorates or protected states, or for other specific 
reasons. In 1934, the British Protected Persons Order codified BPP status. The law replaced 
vague references to “indigenous persons” with jus soli.579F580 By 1949, BPP status had become 
a statutory status. BPP status now applied to all persons born in the Protectorate or 
Protected State or, if born outside, to a father born in the state. 
Crucially, however, BPP status only applied for international purposes. It allowed persons 
from Protectorates and Protected States to claim British protection while traveling abroad. 
This made BPP status for all intents and purposes a type of derivative status that did not 
confer rights to persons within their protectorates and protected states, where they 
remained under the jurisdiction of their local leaders, whatever that might mean. 580F581 In 
some cases, holders of BPP status could obtain the right to live and work in the UK more 
easily than other aliens, 581F582 but in practice, they were often prevented from doing so by 
local laws preventing them from leaving their colonies. 582F583 Meanwhile, most indigenous 
persons were without a formal status provided by their local rulers, meaning that they 
remained in a grey zone. As a result, BPP status fell well short of providing the rights 
usually associated with nationality, yet for some, it provided an identity and some rights vis 
a vis the British government. 583F584 
 
580 For an overview of BPP status, see Brownlie, Nationality, 318-319. See also Fransman, 60-70; Weis, 18-20. 
BPP status was only one of several alternate British types of status created to deal with colonized populations 
that in essence offered few of the benefits of British Subject status. 
581 Weis, 19-20. See also H. Lauterpacht, International Law (vol. 3 Longmans, Green and Co 1955) 30. In 
recognition of the fact that BPP status is not equivalent to full nationality, the 2002 UK Nationality, Asylum 
and Immigration Act resolved the issue for many of those without an alternative nationality. UK Nationality, 
Asylum and Immigration Act. BPP status was mostly replaced by the nationality of individual states at 
independence. 
582 Weis, 18-20. 
583 C. Parry, Commonwealth Citizenship with Special Reference to India (Indian Council of World Affairs 1954) 
4. 
584 For a discussion of whether or not BPP status qualifies as a nationality, see H. Alexander and J. Simon, No 
Port, No Passport: Why Submerged States Can Have No Nationals Wash. Int’l L.J. 26.2 (2017) (hereinafter, 
Alexander and Simon). In recognition of the fact that BPP status is not equivalent to full nationality, the 2002 
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As a result, BPP status was primarily for the purposes of identifying persons as under 
British jurisdiction for international purposes. It failed to offer the same rights as British 
subject status. Today, lesser forms of national status like BPP status are often viewed as 
inherently unjust, sometimes referred to as “second class citizenship.” 584F585 The effect of BPP 
status was to place people under British jurisdiction without giving them as many rights as 
persons of British descent.585F586 Most importantly, because BPP status was only used when 
traveling abroad, very few people ever actually obtained it. As a result, few local people 
were registered or received identity documents, creating yet more problems at 
decolonization. 586F587 
Essentially, this left the vast majority of people in Kuwait and North Borneo (during its 
period as a protected state in a grey zone. While in theory they had BPP status for 
international travel purposes, their nationality was to be determined by local laws. A BPP 
travel document was usually available from a consular officer, often located in a large, 
coastal trading city in places like Kuwait and North Borneo under the control of a Sultan or 
Emir. This meant that access to BPP status even for elite members of local society was 
limited to people who were in good standing with the Sultan, Emir or other favoured local 
authority.  
The process by which BPP status was verified by local authorities and travel documents 
were issued shows the extent to which it localized power in the hands of a few Sultans and 
Emirs. According to the memoir of a British consular officer in Aden, in what is now Yemen, 
the representative of the Sultan would verify the applicant’s identity for the British officer, 
who would simply issue the document. This meant that the Sultan essentially held the 
authority over who was granted this document. The Sultan’s office, however, was also 
issuing travel documents that could be used for travel to other states in the region, setting 
up a competing authority for travel documents. At the same time, a rival Sultan in Yemen 
was also issuing his own travel documents. 587F588 This example is illustrative of the deep flaws 
 
UK Nationality, Asylum and Immigration Act resolved statelessness for some of those who ended up British 
Protected Persons without another nationality. 
585 Kymlicka, 124. See also Fripp, 2016, 10. BPP status, however, should be distinguished from de facto 
statelessness, which is defined as persons outside of their country who lack diplomatic or consular 
protection. UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), Expert Meeting - The Concept of Stateless Persons 
under International Law (Prato Conclusions), May 2010. See also L. Bingham, J. Reddy and S. Kohn, ‘De Jure 
Statelessness in the Real World: Applying the Prato Summary Conclusion’ (Open Society Justice Initiative 
2011). More will be said on second-class citizenship and the human right to a nationality in Part 3. For more 
on tiers of nationality, see L. van Waas and S. Jaghai, ‘All Citizens are Created Equal, but Some are More Equal 
Than Others’ 65 Netherlands International L. R. 413 (2018). 
586 Crawford, 292. 
587 Weis, 4, 6, 19-20. See also Verzijl, 6-7, 14; Habermas, 65; Lauterpacht, 30. 
588 Harding, 283. Harding lists the BPP Passport, a one-time travel document, or an internal pass as 
documents he was empowered to issue. 
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with the protected state system, where the lack of a clear authority created a vacuum of 
state sovereignty and cases of overlapping sovereignty.  
It also shows one of the many ways in which the power over civil administration became 
vested in the person of the Emir or Sultan as the favoured local authority under the 
Protectorate system. In this way, the inhabitants of the protected states began to be divided 
by the British into two groups: those with standing and access to the colonial bureaucracy 
and those who existed outside the system. As well, rulers were divided between those who 
had standing with the British to issue documents and validate membership, whereas other 
rulers were left out, regardless of the political realities on the ground. 
In the Gulf, the tendency to favour some rulers over others would have long-standing 
consequences. In his memoir, the consular officer in Aden acknowledged that his role in 
issuing BPP passports was “problematic” because he relied almost entirely on the judgment 
of the local Sultans and Emirs whom the British had identified as the local authorities. 588F589 As 
the consular officer put it, determining who qualified for travel documents required a 
complex process of verification with these coastal authorities based on their pre-existing 
clan alliances. As few locals “had birth certificates... (and a)pplicants had to provide 
guarantors” from the local administration. This gave certain Sultans and Emirs the status of 
gatekeepers, determining who could access the British administration and who was 
excluded.589F590 
While BPP status enabled some elites to obtain a travel document, 590F591 such a document was 
wholly unnecessary to cross colonial borders within the Gulf region and this dissertation 
was unable to uncover any evidence that applications for BPP status were common 
amongst the Bedouin. The British made no effort to ensure that members of the general 
population in Kuwait were issued documents. As the consular officer put it, discussing the 
situation in what would become Yemen; 
(A) problem which was never satisfactorily settled was the issue of passports to 
British Protected Persons of the Mahra state (in Yemen.) ‘State’ in this case was a 
misnomer, for Mahra...inhabited by fiercely independent tribes, was under the 
control of neither the British nor its titular ruler, (the) Sultan..." 591F592 
In truth these Bedouin tribes were not independent from colonialism, or even if they could 
have been considered independent at this point, they would not long remain so. According 
to official British policy, the Bedouin were the inhabitants of a British Protected State being 
 
589 Harding, 280. 
590 Harding, 281-282. 
591 For an example of a travel document issued in Kuwait under the BPP system, see Passport Collector, 
‘Kuwaiti Travel documents’ (2012) at http://www.passport-collector.com/kuwaiti-travel-documents/ 
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administrated from Aden, or, in the case of Kuwait, from Kuwait City. This fact would come 
to be enormously important for the Bedouin in the decades to come. 
The creation of a nationality in former British Protected States brought about the automatic 
termination of BPP status for those who qualified for the new nationality. 592F593 Technically, 
those who did not gain a new nationality were entitled to continue to hold BPP status, 593F594 
but a lack of BPP documents by most Bedouin made this impossible. 
Meanwhile, under the protectorate system, local leaders began to pass their own 
nationality laws. In the Saudi desert, Ibn Saud granted a nationality to certain Bedouin 
tribes in order to assert his sovereignty over their lands. Ibn Saud’s consolidation of 
Bedouin support, in part accomplished through the granting of nationality, was viewed 
with hostility by both the British and the inhabitants of Kuwait Town. As Beaugrand puts it, 
This idea of the desert as a hostile environment subject to foreign influence and 
manipulation was deeply anchored in the minds of the Kuwaiti townspeople by 
the time of the definition of nationality. 594F595 
In Kuwait, the protectorate agreement between the British government and the Emir also 
invested the Emir of Kuwait with the authority to pass a nationality law. 595F596  Kuwait’s first 
nationality law took the form of an official decree in 1948. 596F597 It cemented in Kuwaiti law a 
distinction between original and naturalized citizens, a system of tiers of nationality that 
granted more rights to original Kuwaitis. This created a type of second-class citizenship. 597F598 
Kuwaiti law would also adopt a territorial-based approach. 598F599  
“Original" (asil) Kuwaitis were defined in the 1948 official decree as members of the ruling 
family, residents of Kuwait since 1899, the children of Kuwaiti fathers, or children born in 
Kuwait of an Arab or Muslim father. 599F600 Naturalization was granted in a separate decree for 
persons residing in Kuwait for at least ten years who could also speak Arabic and meet 
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certain other requirements. 600F601 As a result of this law, the authority to determine 
nationality in Kuwait was now vested in the hands of the Emir. 
Kuwait’s nationality law therefore complied with principles of Islamic law, as nationality 
flowing by descent from the father, but was also compatible with jus sanguinis. But in 
keeping with British legal principles, it also employed jus soli. These decrees were quite 
inclusive, in compliance with British law, while promoting Kuwait’s identity as a Muslim 
and Arab state. 601F602 Given the lack of clarity around Kuwait’s borders, however, this law 
must be seen as mainly favouring Kuwait’s urban centres, particularly Kuwait City, and 
members of the urban community. This fact would have a huge impact on nationality in 
Kuwait in the future. 
Naturalization in Kuwait would go through a number of important changes during the 
protectorate period. In 1959, the years needed for naturalization increased to fifteen years 
of residence for non-Arabs and ten years for Arabs. Naturalized citizens could not vote for 
twenty years following their naturalization, nor pass on nationality to their children. 602F603 In 
1960, the number of naturalizations was limited to 50 individual applications. As 
naturalization became more limited, the concept of being a resident of Kuwait became 
increasingly critical. 
Unlike Kuwait, North Borneo would eventually become a Crown Colony following World 
War II. Unlike in Kuwait, however, North Borneo would be incorporated into the larger 
Malaysia Federation, a process which would greatly affect the ways in which nationality 
law was applied during the late colonial period and decolonization. Ethnic and religious 
divisions between Britain’s Malay colonies meant the problem of a single nationality status 
became a pressing political issue during the colonial period. 
From the beginning of the process to create a unity state in Malaysia, both the British and 
the Sultans struggled with the configuration of the new federation and the nationality 
status of its members. 603F604 Until the 1930s, immigration to Malaysia was unrestricted and 
encouraged by the British. 604F605 In the 1840s and 1850s, the British brought large populations 
of foreign workers to the Malay colonies from India, China and Indonesia to work on the 
rubber plantations. 605F606 As a result, the British and the Sultans struggled to determine the 
eventual status of so-called immigrant populations in what would become Malaysia, 
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particularly the Chinese population. In 1909, the Manchu government in China had 
declared all overseas Chinese descended via the male line to be citizens of China unless 
they opted out, regardless of where they had been born. 606F607 This policy immediately called 
into question the status of overseas Chinese around the world, including the Malay 
colonies.607F608 North Borneo remained somewhat removed from these discussions, but would 
come to be affected by the question of nationality in Malaysia following Malaysian 
Federation. As a result, the development of nationality law in Peninsular Malaysia would 
come to have an indirect effect on nationality in the Borneo states. 
In 1867, the Straits Settlements, consisting of the larger city-states on the Malay Peninsula, 
now Crown Colonies, passed a Naturalization Act based on residence. 608F609 Persons born in 
the Straits Settlements were therefore British subjects. 609F610 In 1904, the Federated Malay 
States, which were Protected States on the Peninsula under separate British rule, 
introduced the Uniform Naturalization Laws based on jus soli or five years of residence. 610F611 
The remainder of the Peninsula was made up of the Unfederated Malay States, which were 
British Protected States, but which had no formal nationality law. 611F612 As a result, Malaysia 
would enter the post-colonial period with the urgent need for a single, unifying status for 
its population, but with great ethnic and political challenges as to who would qualify for 
that status. 
Several decades after these laws were passed on Peninsular Malaysia, the British passed a 
nationality law in North Borneo, the North Borneo Ordinance No. 1 of 1931.612F613 Nationality 
at birth was granted to, 
(a)ny person born within the State of North Borneo unless and until he 
proves that at the time of his birth he possessed under the law of some other 
State the nationality of such State, and…Any person born out of the State of 
North Borneo whose father was a citizen of the State at the time of that 
person’s birth and either was born within the State or was a person to whom 
a certificate of naturalization had been granted under the provisions of this 
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Ordinance, and…Any person born on board a ship registered in the State of 
North Borneo unless and until he proves at the time of his birth he possessed 
under the law of some other State the nationality of such State. 613F614 
Under this law, everyone born in North Borneo automatically acquired the nationality of 
British North Borneo. When North Borneo became a Crown Colony in July 1946, following 
three years of Japanese occupation, this nationality was automatically converted to British 
Subject status. According to the North Borneo Cession in Council of 1946, 
all persons who on the fifteenth day of July, 1946, are citizens of the State of North 
Borneo by virtue of the provisions of the North Borneo Naturalisation Ordinance, 
1931, shall, on that day become British subjects.614F615 
Unlike in Kuwait, the inhabitants of North Borneo entered the decolonization period with 
British subject status which later converted to Citizen of the UK and Colonies (CUKC) 
status.615F616 But the reality of implementation meant that few inhabitants of the Borneo 
colonies received documents or any official acknowledgement of their status. 616F617 The 
British had only begun issuing identity cards in Malaya in 1948, a process continued by the 
Malaysian government after independence. 617F618 The short period between Japanese 
occupation and political independence left no time for the proper registration of the 
population. While the passage of these laws meant that on paper, the CUKCs of North 
Borneo should have been automatically converted to Malaysian nationals at the creation of 
Malaysia’s nationality law, the lack of registration of North Borneo’s population during the 
colonial period meant that these laws were not implemented, with serious consequences at 
decolonization. 
Meanwhile, the territories that would become Malaysia were preparing for independence 
and a large amount of attention was devoted to the vexing question of a uniform Malaysian 
nationality. The British pushed for a uniform nationality law for all of their former colonies 
that would apply to all groups including the immigrant Chinese and Indian populations 
who had been brought to the region as workers, as well as indigenous, non-Malay groups, 
like the Bajau populations living in what was now Sabah.618F619 But the Sultans worried about 
Chinese dominance on the peninsula, while the question of Malay dominance would remain 
a concern in the Borneo states. The tension created over the inclusion of non-Malay 
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populations would greatly influence both Malaysia’s nationality laws and their 
implementation. Meanwhile, the lack of registration, particularly of rural and ocean-
dwelling communities in Borneo, would leave the status of those communities open to 
question. While discussions about Malaysian nationality were ongoing between the British 
and the Sultans both on the Peninsula and in Borneo, nomads were left entirely out of these 
discussions.  
Nationality in French Soudan 
 
Postage stamp from the Soudan Français 
Unlike for the majority of Bedouin in Kuwait and Sama Dilaut in Borneo, the registration 
and enfranchisement of the Tuareg began during the colonial period as the French moved 
towards establishing nationality and registering the population in their colonies, including 
French Soudan, the territory now called Mali. 619F620 The French would develop tiers of 
membership in the French Empire. But the French system suffered from arbitrary 
adjudication that left nationality and the issuance of identification documents up to the 
whims of individual administrators and a pernicious vagueness in the law that left critical 
categorizations open to interpretation and manipulation. 620F621 The application of nationality 
to many French colonies would never be properly implemented among nomadic groups 
like the Tuareg.  
Meanwhile, as in Borneo, despite an attempt at registration in colonies like French Soudan, 
many Africans living in French territory ended colonial rule as French nationals under the 
law, but the lack of registration, or état civil, meant that many of them could not access or 
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prove their nationality. This became most true for persons living in so-called “remote” 
areas away from the centralized bureaucracy created by French administrators and, in 
particular, many Tuareg. As colonization moved towards decolonization, issues in French 
Soudan like borders, exclusive sovereignty, nationality and the role of nationalism would 
preoccupy both colonial and post-colonial governments, influencing how nationality was 
applied. 
French nationality law developed into three separate systems, with one nationality law 
applicable in France, one in certain privileged colonies such as Algeria and cities in Senegal, 
and one in the rest of France’s colonies. This system of tiers somewhat resembled the 
British system, which distinguished between British subject status and BPP status. France’s 
first codified nationality laws were the Civil Code of 1804, during the post-revolutionary 
period, and the Napoleonic Code, which established French nationality by jus sanguinis.621F622 
Nationality in France had developed based on the concept of the citoyen holding important 
civil rights like voting, but this status was not extended to indigenous persons in the 
colonies.622F623 A redraft of French nationality law in 1851, partly to resolve the cases of 
statelessness that were arising out of the previous laws, introduced the principle of double-
birth whereby a person is French if born of a father himself born in France. 623F624 Double-birth 
provided nationality to the descendants of immigrants.624F625 The government benefited from 
the unity created by the idea of a common French homeland and common, uniform 
nationality in France. Nationality in the colonies, however, continued to develop along a 
separate track. 
Despite the supposed universality of citoyenneté the French created a system of tiered 
nationality, distinguishing between the holders of so-called “active” and “passive” 
nationality.625F626 By the 20th century, however, the fact of limited civic rights in the colonies 
came increasingly into conflict with the ideals of the revolutionary period and the supposed 
universal nature of the citoyen.626F627 Belonging in the colonies, including French Sudan, went 
through a drastic series of changes, culminating in the granting of French nationality to all. 
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At the heart of the conflict over identity in the French Empire was the lack of clarity over 
whether or not the colonies were to remain separate nations, distinct from France, with 
their own nationalities, or if the ultimate goal of French colonization was the incorporation 
of the colonies into a type of “greater France.” 627F628 Colonial nationality law would reflect this 
tension throughout the colonial period.628F629 
By about 1890, the inhabitants of French Soudan, the territories that are now Mali, were 
technically under the jurisdiction of France as French subjects, not as citizens. 629F630 French 
Soudan was governed as a protectorate, 630F631 but the French administrators welded an 
enormous level of control over the local population, including the Tuareg. Haut Sénégal was 
established as a protectorate in 1887 by a treaty between representatives of France and 
certain chiefs. Haut Sénégal, after many territorial changes, was later separated from Niger 
and renamed Soudan Français.631F632  
In 1833, the rights that attached to the French Civil Code had been granted to some French 
colonies, including certain cities in Senegal,632F633 but not to others. By 1905, however, the 
French government officially abandoned the goal of assimilating colonized peoples and 
adopted instead the policy of “association,” whereby the majority of French colonies would 
be part of the Empire, but not granted the same rights as Metropole France, or even the 
departments of Algeria. 633F634 “Association” was a form of indirect rule that in theory allowed 
colonies to maintain their pre-existing local government structures and rules of belonging 
and membership, including adherence to Islamic law.634F635 In reality, however, the French 
made all the important decisions in Africa regarding land use, government, the economy 
and military. Only personal relations like marriage and inheritance were governed by local 
law, including Islamic law. This was also true in French Soudan. What the policy of 
association really accomplished was to keep most Africans excluded from the rights 
associated with French citizenship, such as voting. 
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Importantly, some colonies had access to French nationality. The French created a system 
of tiers of belonging based mainly on location.  
The French by the end of 1945 had developed 6 distinct layers of 
sovereignty: 1) the metropole (European France), 2. Algeria, with Muslim 
non-nationals and non-Muslim nationals, 3. older colonies in the Caribbean 
and Senegal with a kind of French nationality, where slavery had been 
abolished in 1848, and new colonies in French Africa and the pacific islands, 
where most people were merely subjects. 635F636 
After World War One, France was accorded certain Mandate Territories and Protectorates 
and retained many of her other colonies. Under this sprawling and complex system, most of 
the inhabitants of French overseas departments and Algeria could not vote and were not 
officially French citizens, but were nevertheless considered to be French nationals. 636F637 
Meanwhile, the inhabitants of other French colonies like the French Soudan had few rights 
of any kind 637F638 and the French Civil Code did not apply to them as les indigènes.638F639 In 1887 
and 1928, decrees reaffirmed that indigenous persons in the colonies were excluded from 
French nationality. 639F640  
In 1912, however, the French government introduced laws by which certain persons in the 
colonies could become naturalized French citizens. 640F641 According to Coquery-Vidrovitch, an 
expert on French nationality law in the colonies, at this moment France had established a 
system that drew a distinction between French citizenship and French nationality. 641F642 
Naturalization took two forms, naturalization as a change of nationality and accession à la 
nationalité, for persons without another nationality. The Decree of 5 November 1928 
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reaffirmed that French nationality law was not applicable to indigenous persons in the 
colonies who lived in colonies like French Soudan, unless the person was naturalized. 642F643  
Colonized peoples were subject to forced labour, fines and punishments, often with 
recourse only to poorly implemented customary courts despite their lack of clear status, as 
the French government retained sovereignty over them and their territories. During this 
period, the French set up special courts or separate administrative bodies to deal with 
indigenous affairs. Personal status, such as it was, was regulated not by French nationality 
law, but by special laws and decrees, including the Code de l’Indigénat, which subjected 
indigenous people to forced labour and arbitrary punishment by special courts. 643F644 
Importantly, the term indigène was never defined. The indigénes were not subject to the 
French Civil Code, but rather to local law or custom, including Islamic law. 644F645 Africans were 
banned from politics 645F646 and under the jurisdiction of a French administrator. 646F647 French 
courts were for French nationals, primarily of European descent, and other immigrants and 
the adjudication of criminal offenses affecting the peace. All other matters were treated by 
customary law by local leaders, though African courts were subject to colonial oversight. 647F648  
Though there was an elected legislative body representing the colonies, Le Conseil 
Supérieur des Colonies, it represented only French nationals in the colonies, French 
nationals with holdings or businesses in the colonies, and those few Africans with French 
nationality or citizenship. 648F649 As a result (with a few exceptions) there was almost no 
African participation in government until after World War II. 649F650 Those Africans who were 
French nationals or holders of French citizenship, many of whom lived in Senegal, were 
called les évolués and were mostly African notables and urban, educated elites. 650F651 While 
some Africans in certain territories were citizens while also being exempt from the French 
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Civil Code, most had to abandon other forms of law, such as Islamic law, and adopt French 
marriage and inheritance law under the Civil Code in order to qualify for nationality. 651F652  
According to Coquery-Vidrovitch, naturalizations were deliberately difficult to obtain and 
arbitrary, as the law vested great powers in the whims of colonial administrators to decide 
when an African person had achieved mastery of the French language, or to what extent 
that person had good morals. 652F653 In the 1940s in French West Africa, (Afrique occidentale 
française - AOF), out of a total population of fifteen million people, there were 15,000 
Europeans with full French citizenship, but only 5,000 Africans. 653F654 In French Soudan, the 
number of naturalized French citizens or persons who had achieved French nationality 
between 1946 and 1949 was only four. 654F655 
Throughout this period, the état civil remained almost non-existent in most parts of Africa. 
As Ruth Dickens describes it: 
(r)egistration of births, marriages, and deaths on the état civil was so routine 
in France that metropolitan officials though it a perfectly reasonable 
expectation for the colonies. 655F656 
Though civil registration had been provided by law since the 1930s, prior to 1945, it had 
not been compulsory for the African population and few saw the need of it. Certain events, 
such as traditional marriages, were often seen as outside the scope of French 
administration and were not recorded. Only those few individuals holding French 
citizenship were required to register. In 1944, the French had made only about 100,000 
entries in the état civil for indigenous persons in the AOF, mostly for births. 
This system of tiers of nationality proved unsustainable, particularly given that many 
Africans had fought for France in two World Wars. In the early 1900s, the demand for 
African nationality with full citizenship rights in the French empire was considered to be 
revolutionary; by the 1950s it had begun to look inevitable.656F657 Over the next few years, the 
French government and African notables like Léopold Sédar Senghor and Félix Houphouët-
Boigny would attempt to bring greater representation to the colonies while keeping the 
 
652 Coquery-Vidrovitch, 291. See also Cooper, 5, 16-18; Chipman, 57. Numerous differences also existed 
between the rights of nationals in Algeria and the departments like Guadeloupe, Martinique or Reunion and 
citizens in the Metropole, including the fact that the principle of “double-birth” did not apply in the 
departments, even though the departments were considered to be part of France. Décret du 7 février 1897, 
referenced in Jault-Seseke, 102. See also Maury, 87-90; Weil, 225-227. 
653 Coquery-Vidrovitch, 293. For example, Coquery-Vidrovitch points to at least one case where an African 
family was allowed to naturalize despite being in a polygamous union. Coquery-Vidrovitch, 291. 
654 Cooper, 27, 46; Chipman, 88. 
655 Coquery-Vidrovitch, 300. 
656 R. Dickens, Defining French Citizenship Policy in West Africa (doctoral thesis, Emory U. 2001) 255. 
657 Chipman, 59, 72. See also Young, 7; Cooper, 7. 
125 
 
relationship with France intact. 657F658 The process of enfranchisement in the AOF came in 
stages: in the period before 1945, the vast majority of Africans were French subjects but 
not nationals; 1946-1955 was the period of the application of the 1946 Constitution and 
the creation of the French Union with limited voting rights for many Africans; 1956 and 
after saw the implementation of the Loi Cadre granting universal suffrage, though not 
necessarily equal representation, and the creation of the French Community, a type of 
federation, and 1958-1962 was the transition to full independence. 658F659 
After WWII, the French attempted to expand nationality status throughout the Empire. 659F660 
Despite these attempts at what Coquery-Vidrovitch calls “imperial nationality,” however, 
confusion over the status of different colonized peoples would plague the French 
government until colonial independence and would influence the ways in which nationality 
was applied during decolonization. 660F661 Beginning with the Brazzaville Conference in 1944, 
this process eventually produced a new Constitution in 1946 creating the French Union, 661F662 
but the Constitution only passed because the issue of nationality in the colonies was left 
somewhat vague. 662F663 The Loi Lamine Guèye of 1946, named after a prominent African 
politician, gave universal suffrage and French citizenship, in theory, to all the ressortissants 
of France’s overseas colonies. 663F664 The group to whom this law would apply was not clear as 
the term ressortissant may refer to citizens, nationals or inhabitants depending on the 
context.  
The 1946 Constitution would be used as the basis for the nationality law of many of the 
newly independent colonial states. Under it, all subjects of the French empire now 
automatically had French nationality, but the question of who qualified as a subject was not 
answered by the law. 664F665 The Constitution read: 
Tous les ressortissants des territoires d'outre-mer ont la qualité de citoyen, au 
même titre que les nationaux français de la métropole ou des territoires d'outre-
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mer. Des lois particulières établiront les conditions dans lesquelles ils exercent 
leurs droits de citoyens. (All ‘ressortissants’ (nationals) of the overseas territories 
have the quality of a citizen on the same basis as French citizens of the metropole 
or of the overseas territories. Specific laws will establish the conditions under 
which they will exercise their rights as citizens.)665F666 
It was not clear under the Constitution who qualified as a ressortissant. This term is usually 
translated as “national,” or sometimes “subject,” depending on the context, but here, it is 
not clear if the law was meant to apply to all persons who had French nationality or all 
persons under French jurisdiction, regardless of whether or not they had received an 
official status. It is not likely to have meant all inhabitants or residents, leaving the status of 
those persons somewhat unclear. It is also not clear what was meant by having the quality 
of a citizen as opposed to simply being a citizen. 
Article 82 allowed Africans to exercise some of their rights without adopting French Civil 
Code, but the Constitution did not resolve the issue of how polygamous marriages or other 
conflicts between the French civil code and local practices were to be treated by French 
institutions. 666F667 The Constitution also limited the political rights of African citizens. It split 
the French General Assembly into two bodies, the double college, with Africans able to vote 
only for the second, consultative body. As a result, the Constitution inserted more 
vagueness into a system of laws that already suffered from excessive vagueness. 
The new Constitution did accomplish some things, including immediately voiding 
discriminatory legislation for the indigènes in the colonies, as this class of people no longer 
existed.667F668 Nevertheless, the structural problems with the Union became apparent almost 
immediately. The French government faced the monumental task of registering millions of 
new nationals under the état civil, each living under different local systems of government 
with different customary practices. 668F669 The French had realized they urgently required an 
état civil indigène, but there was not time to register persons before the next election. 669F670 
The first elections reflected the limited electorate. In French Soudan from 1945-1957, 
writer and influential politician Fily Dabo Sissoko and his Parti Progressiste Soudanais 
(PSP) represented French Soudan on a traditional, conservative and pro-French platform, 
also showing the dominance of non-Tuareg politicians at that time.670F671 France’s colonies in 
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Africa were being split between a francophone, urban elite and the rural population, which 
included many nomads, who remained unregistered and unable to vote.  
Eventually, the French Union proved unsustainable and the Empire moved inexorably 
towards decolonization. 671F672 This period was dominated by a confusing series of laws that 
attempted to identify persons who qualified for French nationality and expand their civil 
rights. Article 81 of the Constitution states: 
All French nationals (nationaux français) and nationals/subjects (les 
ressortissants) of the French Union have the quality of citizenship of the French 
Union. 
It is clear that the French government meant to expand citizenship beyond the narrow class 
of persons who had previously been so defined but the grounds on which one qualifies as a 
ressortissant under the law remained extremely vague. Would a nomadic family who only 
spent a few months out of the year in French territory qualify as a ressortissant of France? 
Once again, it is not clear what was meant by having “the quality of citizenship.” Meanwhile, 
the voting rights of Africans continued to be difficult to enforce, due to poor registration 
and the dismal state of the état civil, particularly in so-called remote areas where the 
Tuareg lived.672F673 
A new law also cemented the individual colonies as separate territories with their primary 
ties to France, rather than federated with each other. 673F674 In Cooper’s view, this was the 
beginning of the separation of West Africa into separate states. 674F675 Léopold Sédar Senghor 
lamented what he called the “balkanization” of Africa 675F676 and the ability of some persons to 
cross internal borders that typified the colonial period began to come to an end. Africans 
accustomed to move easily between colonies now found themselves facing international 
borders.676F677 Perhaps no group would be more affected by the so-called balkanization of 
Africa than the Tuareg. 
Changes to France’s nationality laws in the colonies came rapidly in the 1950s. The decree 
of 1953 applied a single status to all French nationals regardless of their previous status as 
citizens or nationals by extending the application of the French Code of Nationality to the 
 
672 Diarrah, 28. See also Cooper, 75-80. 
673 Lecocq, Desert, 2002, 42. 
674 Loi n. 56-619 du 23 juin 1956 autorisant le gouvernement à mettre en œuvre les réformes et à prendre les 
mesures propres à assurer l'évolution des territoires relevant du ministère de la France d'outre-mer (Arrêté 
de promulgation n° 1059 APA du 10 août 1957). See also Chipman, 100; Diarrah, 26, 30; Gaudio, 1988, 98; 
Cooper, 215.  
675 Cooper, 215. 
676 Quoted in Cooper, 279. 
677 Cooper, 74, 333-338, 352. 
128 
 
outre-mer, simplifying the confusing rules under the 1946 Constitution. 677F678 Once again, the 
exact population to whom this law applied remained vague due to the lack of civil 
registration in many parts of the outre-mer. In 1956, the Loi-Cadre Defferre, named for 
French politician Gaston Defferre, created a new administrative structure that devolved 
more authority to the colonies, elected by universal suffrage. Finally, after much politicking 
by all sides, the French Constitution of 1958 created the French Community, which granted 
limited independence to the colonies in a federated system. 678F679 According to most French 
jurists, there was now only one nationality, that of the Community. 679F680  
But questions remained both over the content of Community nationality and over its 
territorial scope. Some African leaders saw French nationality operating for Africans’ 
relations external to their states, but a sort of local, common patrie, as Senghor put it, for 
internal matters, particularly social and cultural matters. 680F681 As well, it was not clear how 
Community nationality should be determined for those who had never qualified for, or 
received, a status of any kind before. Ultimately, the French Community failed to solve the 
issues of nationality and belonging for Africans, just as the Union had failed. 681F682 
Nevertheless, the move towards greater autonomy was well received in Africa among those 
who could vote. In French Soudan, over 800,000 people voted in the referendum for the 
Constitution, with an overwhelming vote in favour of the creation of the Community. 682F683 
In the struggle to register people and issue identity documents, the same issues came up 
again and again, among them polygamy, Islamic customary law and discrimination against 
women, reflecting the difficulties in registering people to vote without universal 
application of a Civil Code. 683F684 As well, registration was left up to local administrators and 
varied widely by region. 684F685 The lack of clarity around who qualified as a national, given that 
huge numbers of people had no official status at all prior to 1946, remained a serious 
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problem. The French government began to focus on one particular aspect of nationality 
registration: voter registration. The efforts to register voters give a window into the 
challenges of issuing nationality documents to all eligible people in France’s African 
colonies. In particular, voting records clearly demonstrate that many Tuareg had received 
French nationality and were now voting, while many others likely remained unregistered. 
In 2018, the International Criminal Court prepared a report on documentation in Mali, 
finding: 
The civil status registration was introduced in Mali by the French colonial 
administration in the late 19th century and beginning 20th century. During 
that period, the registration and documentation system was generally poor 
and access was limited to large cities. There was a lack of means and of 
verification/control by the civil registry officers as well. 685F686 
Despite the slow start and continuing problems with voter registration, voting greatly 
increased in the AOF during the 1950s, particularly after the Loi Cadre.686F687 Voting was 
limited, however, by the lack of registration and failure to issue civil documents. 687F688 
Registration remained up to the whims of local administrators and many people lacked the 
necessary documents. 
How did these developments in access to nationality and voting in the French Soudan affect 
the Tuareg? Despite the momentous changes taking place in French Soudan and in West 
Africa more generally, northern Soudan and the Tuareg remained largely uninvolved, 
though there is evidence that many Tuareg were registered and participated in 
elections.688F689  
As the above sections have shown, the territorial organization of the AOF meant that it was 
far easier for sedentary farmers to register, as they were organized in cantons and districts 
headed by a chef de canton or district chief, while pastoralists were organized into non-
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territorial family groups or fractions subjected to a separate taxation system. 689F690 This 
system of separate administration allowed for a more hands-off approach to the nomadic 
population, but meant that it was harder for nomads to access registration and obtain 
documents. Registration was more common in urban and coastal areas, becoming less 
common in the interior and away from towns in areas like the Sahel. The preferences for an 
urban, francophone elite, particularly in coastal cities, meant that registration and voting 
came to disfavour rural and nomadic populations like the Tuareg, who became increasingly 
marginalized and excluded from political participation during the late colonial period. 
Pierre Boilley provides extensive information on the voting patterns of the Tuareg during 
this critical period. Voter registration in the French Soudan increased from one million to 
two million between 1958 and 1959, even in the northern Kidal province. But voter 
turnout among the Tuareg in Soudan’s first elections was low, 690F691 and the rate of 
participation in elections by the nomadic population, Tuareg and Arab, decreased as time 
went on.691F692 1956 was the year of the Loi Cadre and the setting up of a more representative 
government in the colonies, a watershed year for elections in French Africa, but the Tuareg 
mostly sat it out.692F693 In 1958, during the vote that created the French Community, more 
than 90% of the nomadic population in Adagh abstained from voting in a decline from 
earlier elections.693F694 Nomad political participation therefore declined right at the moment 
when African participation overall was increasing. While more research is needed, it is 
likely that a lack of participation in voting was closely related to a lack of registration. 
Nevertheless, it is important to note that some Tuareg were registered and did vote during 
this period. Clearly, some Tuareg had begun to exercise their nationality rights. 
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691 Boilley, Les Touaregs, 1999, 272, 279. See also Benetti, 53-54. 
692 In the 1946 election, only persons considered to be sedentary and of sufficient note in the community, 
such as persons in the French administration and shop owners, were eligible to vote, amounting to less than 
1% of the total population. By 1951, the number of nomads registered to vote had increased to 4,599, and the 
number of sedentary voters to 287. This represented about 29% of the total sedentary population and 33% of 
the nomadic population. While the number of sedentary voters would continue to increase with time, this was 
to be the high point of Tuareg participation. By 1956, Tuareg participation in elections had fallen off sharply, 
with only 28 persons voting out of those registered as nomadic, or less than .6% of the voters in northern 
Soudan.  
Boilley takes this as evidence that by this point the Tuareg had become “totally disinterested” in colony-wide 
political life in the Soudan. The most complete numbers on Tuareg voting in northern Soudan come from 
Pierre Boilley’s book on the Kel Adagh Tuareg in Kidal. The French kept records of voting in northern Soudan, 
dividing the electorate into sedentary voters, including sedentary Tuareg, Songhai and others, and nomadic 
voters, including Tuareg and Arabs. Boilley, Les Touaregs, 276. Lack of interest in voting was not limited to 
the Tuareg in Soudan. Féral reports that the nomads in Agadez in Niger were similarly uninvolved in the 
elections. Féral, 110. 
693 Boilley, Les Touaregs, 1999, 278. 
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If the rest of West Africa was slowly beginning to vote, why did turnout among the Tuareg 
decrease? Low turnout among Tuareg voters was due to a number of factors, including 
ongoing problems with the état civil and registration in remote areas, as well as lack of 
awareness among the Tuareg of the importance of both voting and registration. 694F695 The 
French did not make an effort to bring voting to the nomadic Tuareg; polling stations were 
located in distant cities and registration was done by residence in an administrative 
region.695F696 But perhaps most importantly, the Tuareg arguably did not feel a sense of 
common purpose with the rest of the Soudan, a point made by Foltz in his book on the 
period.696F697 The French made no effort to create a common national identity in French 
Soudan, in fact, they had administrated the nomadic Tuareg separately and under military 
rule.697F698  
Yet it is important to note that the colonial system had made civil registration a fraught 
experience for the Tuareg, who were divided by borders, transformed into a minority in the 
colonies, and discouraged from registration. Colonial registration for the Tuareg had 
usually meant unfair taxation, forced schooling and coercive settlement policies. Under 
such circumstances, this dissertation does adopts the view that the Tuareg did not so much 
reject civic participation, but were rather placed by the French administration in an 
impossible situation with only bad options. 
Registration was done mostly for the sedentary population. According to the governor of 
French Soudan; “such tasks (registration)...could be accomplished only for the sedentary 
part of his population, step by step, and at high cost.” 698F699 Boilley argues as well that the 
nomads in Kidal felt that the political options presented to them under the French 
Community were unpalatable and favoured the sedentary population. 699F700 Lecocq argues 
that the Tuareg were initially very interested in voting, but were only interested in voting 
for French, Tuareg and Arab candidates, distrusting the other candidates. 700F701 As a result of 
all of these factors, French nationality was mostly granted to the settled, urban population 
and voting was oriented towards these groups.  
But even though political participation by the Tuareg in the French Community was low, 
some Tuareg were registering and voting nonetheless and, importantly, the French began 
appointing Tuareg into key posts in the military, police and administration as part of 
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699 Cooper, 154, quoting the Governor. 
700 Boilley, Les Touaregs, 1999, 277-278. 
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Africanization.701F702 All this would change with independence, when hostility between the 
new government and the Tuareg would break out into armed conflict. According to Lecocq, 
for many Tuareg, colonization merely continued during the formation of Mali. 702F703 
Conclusion 
Territory, both socially and legally, is not to be regarded as an empty plot: 
territory...connotes population, ethnic groupings loyalty patters, national 
aspirations, a part of humanity, or, if one is tolerant of the metaphor, an 
organism.703F704 
This section explored how nationality was applied, or not applied, to colonized peoples in 
the Sheikdom of Kuwait, French Soudan and North Borneo. While many colonized peoples 
received no nationality status during the colonial period, some nomads did obtain a 
nationality, while others were eligible for BPP status that did not grant the same rights as 
other  nationality statuses and others may have been registered by colonial 
administrations, but not as nationals.704F705 As a result, nomads entered decolonization with a 
patchwork of different types of status. 
It is no accident that nationality as an area of law developed in tandem with colonial 
expansion, a time when European empires were scrambling to claim territory both in 
Europe and abroad. Nationality came to reflect a territorial conception of the world, where 
place of birth, long-term residence and historic ties to land were prioritized over other, 
non-territorial relationships and attachments. Place of birth and habitual residence became 
crucial to determining status under the colonial system, but colonial sovereignty remained 
fuzzy in the border zones where many nomads lived.  
But while residence and place of birth became increasingly crucial to determining status 
during the colonial period, a lack of civil registration left the matter of individual cases, 
particularly in border regions, left the question of nationality for many nomads up for 
debate. There were particular problems with the vagueness of key terms like ressortissant 
and habitual residence in the colonial context. Even for laws based on place of birth, where 
the category of eligible persons was clearer cut, the lack of civil registration created a 
significant gap. While rural villagers might rely on a presumption of birth and residence in 
a particular place, nomads could not necessarily establish such a presumption. 
Under the British system, Kuwait and North Borneo were Protected states and, in the case 
of North Borneo, a Crown Colony. As protectorates, nationality was determined by local 
rulers, but with much input from the British. Under this system, the determination of 
belonging and membership was taken away from nomadic leaders. In the case of Kuwait, 
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the British established a relationship with the Emir in Kuwait Town and, as a result, the 
power to determine nationality largely vested in the hands of the Al-Sabah family. In North 
Borneo, the British were preoccupied by unifying their Malay colonies. The inhabitants of 
North Borneo were eligible under the law for nationality, at least on paper, towards the 
close of the British colonial period, but a severe lack of civil registration meant that this 
nationality was not applied. In both cases, the British had also created British Protected 
Person (BPP) status, which granted a type of non-nationality, personal status to some 
persons without actually granting nationality itself.  
The French government created multiple tiers of nationality in the colonies, differentiating 
between active and passive nationals. Nationality heavily favoured persons in urban areas 
and near the coast, particularly those who adopted French culture and civil law. In French 
Soudan, holders of French subject status were eventually transformed into nationals 
through a long and complex process that favoured settled persons living in urban areas.  
Just as importantly, the colonial period imposed a worldview on post-colonial states that 
would deeply affect nomad-state relations. The colonial period created tiers of 
membership, with some persons receiving more rights than others. 705F706 It favoured settled 
and urban peoples. Finally, colonization entrenched the nation-state system in colonized 
regions, bringing hard borders and zones of exclusive sovereignty, which required 
exclusive nationality. These changes would hit nomads very hard. In all three locations, the 
lack of fixed borders, particularly within colonies, made the application of concepts like 
residence, ressortissant and even place of birth very difficult to apply. 
As a result, while urban and settled communities benefited from increased access to 
documents, registration and even some rights as nationals of empire, nomads were often 
completely excluded from these developments. While this may have appeared as quasi-
independence at the time, in reality, state systems were growing up around nomads 
without their participation or input. As European-style states began to develop in urban 
and coastal areas, nomads were often not included in this system, or came to reject it as 
irrelevant or even harmful to their way of life. This mis-match, the mis-match between 
nomadism and the needs and requirements of the nation-state system, would only worsen 
during decolonization. 
Once crucial point seen in all three examples is that under systems of indirect rule, 
Europeans often signed agreements and imbued with administrative authority local 
leaders with little regard to the complex political systems existing on the ground. Often, 
 
706 “The modern concept of nationality... is primarily related to power over territory.” De Groot and Vonk, 7, 
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inhabitants of colonized territories. See for example L. Kerber, ‘Toward a History of Statelessness’ 57 
American Quarterly 727 (2005) 734, for a discussion of lesser forms of nationality used by the United States. 
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nomadic rulers were overlooked in favour of settled, urban rulers. These leaders then 
became the governments of post-colonial states and the arbitrators of nationality policy. 
This fact can be seen in Kuwait, with the elevation of the Al-Sabah family over Bedouin 
leaders of interior tribes. It can also be seen in the privileging of non-Tuareg leaders in Mali 
and the Malay kingdoms in Malaysia. While some groups, like the Tuareg, pushed for a 
reconsideration of colonial borders and state authority at decolonization, these efforts 
were mostly ignored. Colonialism therefore created a shift of power away from nomad 
leaders and into the hands of urban elites. This shift would have an enormous effect on the 
status of nomads at decolonization and beyond. 
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2.2 Nationality Law and Nomads During Decolonization 
Introduction 
It can sometimes be difficult for theorists in the liberal tradition to examine 
citizenship divorced from the mythology of emancipation surrounding its 
development…The new forms of political membership in France, for example, 
have been described as born of nationality, blood, family and land, and so in direct 
rejection of serfdom. The Indigenous peoples discussed here did not share this 
history.706F707 
The proceeding section, above, identified the origins of a bias against nomads that formed 
during the colonial period. It also explored how this bias created a mismatch between the 
requirements to establish nationality, including civil registration and habitual residence, 
and the practice of nomadism. This bias would place nomads at a severe disadvantage in 
establishing their nationality in three important ways. First, it meant that the nomads who 
survived the colonial period were often divided by fuzzy and disputed borders and lived in 
zones of disputed sovereignty. Second, nomads were often cast as the source of disputed 
sovereignty, labelled as criminals and problems. Third, nomads were often administered 
separately under military, rather than civilian, rule and their nationality status was decided 
by laws and procedures written by urban outsiders, rather than nomad leaders. 
The policies of colonialism towards nomads would mostly be continued and enlarged upon 
by post-colonial governments in Kuwait, Mali and Malaysia. But the process of state 
formation and the development and implementation of nationality would take centre stage 
during decolonization as weak colonial structures became post-colonial states. Meanwhile, 
colonial nationality was extinguished and, in theory, replaced by post-colonial nationality. 
Yet the roll-over of nationality that should have occurred was hampered by poor civil 
registration, discrimination against minority groups and a lack of attention paid to the 
problem of statelessness by the international community, post-colonial states and former 
colonial powers. 
This section will look at how the nationality regimes established during colonization were 
continued, altered and expanded during decolonization. This section begins as a work of 
legal analysis, charting the changes and developments made to the nationality laws in 
Kuwait, Mali and Malaysia and the ways in which these laws were applied to nomads by the 
administrative state through civil registration.  
This section will also look at the context surrounding the enactment of nationality laws in 
Kuwait, Mali and Malaysia and how these laws were applied, or not applied, to nomads. As 
UNHCR explains in the Handbook on the Protection of Stateless Persons, it is important to 
look at “not just legislation but also...practice” when analysing the creation of 
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statelessness.707F708 The UNHCR Handbook goes on to say, “a state may not in practice follow 
the letter of the law, even going so far as to ignore its substance.” 708F709 This section will look 
therefore not only at nationality laws, but also at how they were implemented, both in the 
immediate post-colonial period and in the decades following.  
An analysis of how states applied nationality to nomads, however, cannot be fully 
understood without the larger context of the decolonization period. In many ways, for 
nomads, decolonization would simply mark a continuation and worsening of their 
exclusion. This section will next look at how concerns over identity, immigration and state 
control of territory and natural resources influenced the development and implementation 
of nationality laws in the three new states, particularly in relation to nomads. Finally, this 
section will end with a summary of the current status of nomads as nationals, stateless 
persons or persons of undetermined nationality in their states.  
Nomads and Nationality during Decolonization 
Decolonization, a long process sometimes taking decades, was sometimes begun by treaty 
and these treaties often contained provisions on nationality. 709F710 While each former colony 
went through a slightly different process, in the former British Protectorates and Protected 
States, a Royal Proclamation or Order in Council usually stipulated nationality provisions 
which were mirrored in the Constitutions of many of the new states. 710F711  
Post-colonial states like Kuwait, Mali and Malaysia adopted laws based on principles of 
European nationality law described above. As this section will discuss, statelessness may 
result from both deliberately discriminatory nationality laws, but also from the 
discriminatory application of facially neutral nationality laws, which employed fuzzy 
concepts where nomads were concerned, easing the path of discriminatory treatment, and 
from the widespread lack of civil registration, which made transitional laws impossible to 
apply.711F712 One important question in many post-colonial states was the extent to which 
colonial-era nationality, such as it was, should roll-over into post-colonial nationality. To 
solve this problem, many states drafted transitional laws based on residence and birth in 
the territory of the state712F713 to establish what this dissertation will call the state’s “first body 
of nationals.” 
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But concepts like ressortissant, “habitual resident” and “domicile” were ill defined under 
colonization and hard to apply in border areas and zones of fuzzy or disputed 
sovereignty.713F714 This was particularly true for nomads, who frequently found themselves in 
border zones and whose migrations made concepts like habitual residence hard to apply. 
While nationality laws were enacted based on supposedly hard borders and robust civil 
registration, the reality for many nomads was quite different.714F715 The lack of civil 
registration during the colonial period meant that post-colonial states had to accomplish 
large-scale registration exercises in these zones, yet it was difficult to register nomads or 
prove they qualified under nationality laws. As Conklin puts it, 
members of nomadic and travelling groups generally lack fixed addresses, which 
are needed to qualify for nationality documentation. 715F716 
As well, colonial-era anti-nomad policies had often blamed nomads for the problem of 
unclear borders and fuzzy sovereignty. Nomads were perceived as having ties to multiple 
states, loyal only to their tribes and lacking the exclusive allegiance needed for nationality. 
Arendt highlighted the particular vulnerability to statelessness of peoples who are 
perceived as lacking fixed ties to any country. 716F717 
This section will also explore the increasing important of documents, something that was 
mostly unimportant during the pre-colonial period and of middling importance to nomads 
during the colonial period. The post-colonial period would see an explosion in the 
importance of ID. Passports, ID cards, and birth certificate are all relatively recent 
inventions, dating to the 19th and 20th centuries, yet they have quickly become vital in the 
post-colonial period to proving nationality, legitimacy and belonging. 717F718  
Finally, this section will also highlight how the international community and the former 
colonial powers mostly ignored the problem of statelessness at decolonization, with 
catastrophic results. Even as the problem of statelessness came to be viewed with 
increasing seriousness in Europe, few decolonized states ratified the Convention on the 
Reduction of Statelessness of 1961. Article 10 provides that no one should become stateless 
as a result of a transfer of territory, which is highly relevant to the status of nomads at 
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decolonization, 718F719 yet statelessness was extremely low on the decolonization agenda. The 
extent to which the ratification of this treaty might have provided a solution to nomad 
statelessness at the time will be discussed at greater length in Part 3, below. 
The next sections will explore the decolonization period, looking at the nationality of the 
Bedouin in Kuwait, the Tuareg Mali and the Sama Dilaut Malaysia as transitional nationality 
laws were enacted and rolled out, then replaced by permanent nationality laws. It was 
during this critical period that many nomads became stateless.   
 
719 UN General Assembly, Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness, 30 August 1961, United Nations, Treaty 
Series, vol. 989, 175, Article 10 (hereinafter Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness). 
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The Bedouin Under Kuwait’s Nationality Law 
Statelessness in the MENA (Middle East and North Africa) can be seen to 
have initially arisen following the creation of the modern states in the 
region.719F720 
This section will discuss nationality during the creation of Kuwait’s “first body of nationals" 
and the drafting of Kuwait’s nationality law. Many stateless people in Kuwait, labelled the 
bidoon jinsiya, or those without status, can trace their family history back to a Bedouin 
grandparent or great-grandparent who, for reasons explored in this section, remained 
unregistered during the crucial post-colonial period. 720F721 As this section will show, the 
failure to register many Bedouin at decolonization opened the door to later 
statelessness. 721F722  
Kuwaiti independence was achieved by the termination of the protectorate agreement by 
the Kuwaiti Emir and Britain over a number of years ending in 1961. 722F723 One of the Kuwaiti 
government’s first tasks was to draft a nationality law in 1959. 723F724  This law drew on 
previous decrees, discussed above, and was influenced by the western concepts of 
nationality and sovereignty. The law also incorporated descent from a Kuwaiti father, a 
core principle of belonging under Islamic law.  
Original Kuwaiti nationals are those persons who were settled in Kuwait 
prior to 1920 and who maintained their normal residence there until the 
date of the publication of this Law. Ancestral residence shall be deemed 
complementary to the period of residence of descendants. A person is 
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deemed to have maintained his normal residence in Kuwait even if he resides 
in a foreign country if he has the intention of returning to Kuwait. 724F725 
The law adopted a clearly territorial approach. The law was considerably more restrictive 
than the 1948 decree, removing belonging based on religion and ethnicity. It got rid of the 
provision allowing the children of Muslim and Arab fathers born in Kuwait to be Kuwaiti 
nationals, centring Kuwaiti nationality even further around territoriality, rather than 
religion and ethnicity. It instead elevated settlement in Kuwait at the time of the Battle of 
Jahra (1920) to be a key determinant of Kuwaiti belonging.725F726 Under this law, the defence 
of Jahra and Kuwait Town from so-called Bedouin invaders was made central to Kuwaiti 
nationality. Most of the Hathar population clearly qualified as original Kuwaitis under the 
law.726F727 Tribal politics, however, would continue to play a role in Kuwaiti naturalization, as 
will be discussed, below. 
The increasing reliance on residence to determine Kuwaiti nationality was widely accepted 
at the time as a way to avoid statelessness. Weis, speaking of the example of Burma, states 
that by using residence, “statelessness is thus normally avoided although cases of 
statelessness have occurred...”727F728 In Kuwait, however, many persons became stateless as a 
result of gaps in this process of determining the first body of nationals because (1) serious 
gaps in civil registration in Kuwait meant that only a very few inhabitants of the colonies 
had ever obtained identity documents to prove their residence, (2) the power to determine 
nationality had been centralized under the authority of the Emir who did not regard some 
Bedouin clans in Kuwait as his allies and (3) the vague concept of residence and the fuzzy 
nature of Kuwait’s borders meant that determining who qualified under the transitional 
law was an arbitrary process rife with discrimination. This was particularly true of the 
Bedouin. 
The older system of clan and family alliances that determined belonging in Kuwait before 
1962 would come into play in how the new nationality law was implemented, however. 
This is because while Kuwait’s nationality law appeared neutral on its face, in reality it was 
vague when applied to the Bedouin. It would also play a large role in the process of 
naturalization, a process which would occur in stages over the next decade. Because the 
law was vague when it came to the Bedouin because it was not clear what it meant to be 
‘settled’ in the Bedouin context, this opened the door for discrimination. It is important to 
note the significance of the Battle of Jahra for some Bedouin, who were now framed as 
attackers of Kuwait, rather than as nationals. Beaugrand argues that Kuwait’s nationality 
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law has led to a nationality system that is based more on “networks of proximity” than the 
provisions in the law. 728F729  
Registration would be crucial for Bedouin attempting to prove Kuwaiti nationality under 
this vague, territorial law. As a result, the committees tasked with registering the 
population had enormous discretion to determine which Bedouin should qualify, leaving 
room for considerations of clan and family alliances that were not written into the law, but 
were suggested by the focus on the date 1920. Beaugrand highlights what she calls the 
“hyper-localized” process by which the committees made their decisions. 729F730  
Because the law appeared neutral on its face and complied with European norms, it did not 
trigger the sort of push-back that might have occurred had Kuwait adopted strictly tribal 
criteria in determining its first body of nationals. As the above sections explored, 
predicating nationality on settlement was not considered to be discriminatory under 
European law, but rather a natural expression of state formation. The idea that Kuwait’s 
law was inherently discriminatory against the Bedouin seems to not have been raised at all 
at the time, though more research is needed. 
To register Kuwaitis during the post-colonial, transitional period, the government created 
committees to asses who qualified under the law. The process, however, was very biased. 
Even when evidence of nationality was produced by Bedouin, it was often ignored. 730F731 Some 
Bedouin with documents showing, for example, that they owned property in what was now 
Kuwait were often prevented from registering. 731F732 As well, the work of these committees, 
based in Kuwait City, was probably unknown to many Bedouin.  
Many more Bedouin likely did not have any documentation to prove that they owned land 
in what was now Kuwait. 732F733 It was not clear what other forms of documentation might be 
used to prove residence. Beaugrand notes the committees often had “almost no 
documentary records to prove settlement before 1920” and sometimes may have 
discounted oral testimony. 733F734 Most committees were based in urban areas 734F735 and, as with 
Mali, registration was often performed by members of the urban population. Beaugrand 
notes that “(s)imilarity of culture, traditions, appearance, dialect and costume” may have 
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confused committees trying to determine the legitimacy of Bedouin claims. 735F736 Failure to 
register the Bedouin was therefore likely a mixture of deliberate exclusion, ignorance and 
the total mismatch between Bedouin forms of belonging, discussed above, and the paper-
based, territorial system introduced during colonization. 
The registration of the Bedouin was also complicated by the location of the border. The 
division of nomad lands had left many clans divided between what were now separate 
nation states, giving further cause for the Kuwaiti government to exclude them as non-
residents. No mechanism was put in place during decolonization to force adjacent states 
like Kuwait and Saudi Arabia to negotiate to find a solution for the nationality of cross-
border populations. In this way, the lack of compatibility between nomadism and the 
requirements of territorial nationality allowed for rampant discrimination, despite the law 
appearing neutral on its face.  
More research on the process of registering the Bedouin during this crucial period is 
needed to fully understand this process, but it is clear that a system based on settlement 
and habitual residence and reliant on documentation was not helpful for Bedouin 
attempting to establish Kuwaiti nationality. As well, a long history of problems between the 
Bedouin and the British administration left many Bedouin with lacklustre views about 
participating in registration activities. Some Bedouin may have seen no need for official 
Kuwaiti nationality, though the Bedouin point of view of this registration process is 
somewhat lacking. 736F737 Once again, the perspectives of the Bedouin are lacking. It is possible 
that some Bedouin misunderstood the importance of the decisions being made by the 
Kuwaiti government regarding their nationality status, or what these decisions would 
mean for their children and grandchildren.  
As one descendant of a Bedouin family explained; 
The appellant believes his paternal grandfather would have applied for 
citizenship under the 1959 Citizenship Law. However, as there was a limited 
period in which to do so and the grandfather was an illiterate nomad, 
possibly with little appreciation of the significance of such legal 
requirements, he cannot be certain of the actual situation. 737F738 
In short, the registration process favoured the urban population, those with 
documentation, those who owned land or had settled, and those with family connections or 
who came from certain tribes. 
In Kuwait, however, lacking a nationality did not mean the Bedouin were to remain 
unregistered. Quite to the contrary. Between 1960 and 1987, Bedouin in Kuwait who had 
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no nationality papers from another country were issued identity documents with the 
official status of bidoon jinsiyya, or “without nationality” under a special administrative 
process.738F739 Importantly, this status did not fall under Kuwait’s nationality law, but was 
instead an administrative designation. The registration process for issuing these 
documents, those establishing bidoon status, appears to have been a great deal more 
successful than the registration of nationality and many former Bedouin, now frequently 
settled in shanty towns near urban areas, receiving these documents. The next section will 
explore in greater detail the settlement of the Bedouin and how their settlement interacted 
with their nationality status. 
The decades following the enactment of Kuwait’s nationality law would see a steady 
tightening in registration procedures. In 1965, the government made issuance of a birth 
certificate compulsory, meaning that it became almost impossible to avoid the bidoon 
designation. 739F740 Bedouin children were now issued birth certificates certifying their birth in 
Kuwait and, if applicable, their bidoon status. These documents would become their only 
form of identification. 740F741 Meanwhile, in 1965, Kuwait conducted a census, but some bidoon 
were excluded and, as a result, missed out on an opportunity to prove their ties to Kuwait 
by showing birth or residence in Kuwait’s territory. 741F742  
According to Beaugrand, however, some bidoon were registered in the census, though this 
has not resulted in their recognition as nationals. 742F743 Nevertheless, registration as part of a 
census may be key to establishing nationality for some bidoon in the future. For the most 
part, however, these registration processes began the transformation of the unregistered 
population of now-settled Bedouin into the bidoon, as people received identity documents 
establishing not their nationality, but their statelessness. 
Until the 1970s, the government of Kuwait was not overly concerned with the non-
naturalized Bedouin living in shanty towns outside of urban areas. They were mostly 
outside Kuwait City and, where employed, were usually used as low-level members of the 
military, police force, and as border guards or guards at the oil fields. As government jobs 
became increasingly restricted to naturalized persons, the bidoon population was 
increasingly restricted to the informal employment sector. In keeping with the creation of 
tiers of nationality that had been so central to the colonial period, the Kuwaiti government 
did not make all Bedouin bidoon. Bedouin fighters from certain tribes continued to serve in 
the Kuwaiti military and, increasingly, as guards in the oil fields. The next two decades 
would see a steady erosion in the rights and status of the bidoon. 
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During the 1960s, the Emir and his advisers decided to “naturalize” a certain number of 
Bedouin from friendly tribes. Naturalization was done on an ad-hoc basis, making it a type 
of extra-legal process with no appeals process or judicial review. 743F744 The selected Bedouin 
received naturalization (bi-l-tajannus) by decree, as opposed to the status of “Kuwaitis at 
birth” (bi-l-asl) under the nationality law. 744F745 There was no question that naturalization was 
inferior to being an “original” Kuwaiti, a fact which would perpetuate the idea that Bedouin 
were not really Kuwaiti in some fundamental way. Naturalized citizens could not vote for 
15 years, they could not pass on their nationality to their children, and naturalization could 
be revoked by the government at any time. 745F746 For the government, selecting which 
Bedouin to make Kuwaiti nationals was a delicate decision, highly political at the time, and 
remaining so today.746F747 The political, cultural and historical factors that influenced the 
implementation of this law will be discussed in the next section. 
In 1965, the process of registering as an “original Kuwaiti” was closed. 747F748 As a result, 
naturalization became the key process by which Bedouin in Kuwait could obtain a 
nationality. In 1968, the government passed a law that all police officers had to be 
nationals, shutting out all bidoon who did not have a Kuwaiti birth certificate. 748F749 In 1969, 
the committee in charge of registrations was dismantled and registration would now occur 
on an ad-hoc basis. At the same time, the rules for naturalization became more and more 
restrictive; the law was amended seven times adding additional restrictions. 749F750  
In 1974, the government created a new police college that would not admit bidoon except 
on a case by case basis. One of the few avenues for employment for bidoon was quickly 
closing.750F751 Many only had birth certificates but no other documentation. 751F752 As the bidoon 
did not in any way agitate for greater representation, this status quo suited the 
government. As a result of these factors, holders of the status of bidoon have transformed 
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into a separate, distinct community, no longer primarily identified by their nomadic past, 
but rather by their outsider status. 
The naturalization program came to an end in 1980. Any families who had not been 
included would now remain without a nationality. 752F753 Also in 1980, a rarely used provision 
providing nationality to children who would otherwise be stateless was removed, ending 
the only protection against statelessness in Kuwaiti law. This provision had only benefited 
a small handful of people, but it coincided with the gradual reduction in bidoon rights.753F754 
Two new classifications were introduced into Kuwaiti law: that of “non-Kuwaitis” and that 
of “undetermined nationality.”754F755 In 1981, naturalization was limited to Muslims. 755F756 This 
legacy of increasingly exclusionary laws would lead to the creation of a permanently 
stateless population of former Bedouin and, in much smaller numbers, migrants, living on 
the margins of Kuwaiti society. 
In the 1980s, the toleration of the bidoon in Kuwait began to change. The regional security 
situation and the constant threat Kuwait was under from its larger neighbours began to 
rival the problem of internal power balances. As was described above, many bidoon in 
Kuwait had long standing connections and loyalties to Saudi Arabia, Iraq and even Syria 
and Jordan, but perhaps more importantly, were perceived as having these connections. 756F757 
In fact, these ties were part of the reason some Bedouin tribes had been excluded from 
naturalization in the first place. Yet now, the failure of the Kuwaiti government to 
regularize the status of its bidoon population had become a security threat. Meanwhile, the 
question of the status of the bidoon became increasingly political as activists agitated for 
change. 
By 1985, during the Iran-Iraq war, the government declared all bidoon illegal residents, 
cutting them off from all legal employment, schooling and welfare. 757F758 The government 
expelled all remaining bidoon from the police force and military. 758F759 As Beaugrand puts it, 
“the fact that the biduns stemmed from tribes, stretching into Iraq, that included both 
Sunnis and Shiites...made the government particularly worried...”759F760 Thousands of bidoon 
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were fired from their jobs in the army and oil fields. When bidoon attempted to apply for 
naturalization, the Minister of the Interior stated that “90%” of bidoon applicants were 
lying about qualifying. The government would sometimes deport individual bidoon by 
dropping them off at the Iraqi border, evoking the Alien Residence Act. 760F761 In 1986, the 
government restricted bidoon access to passports, then made it a federal offense not to 
have a passport. Hostility against naturalization for the bidoon now rivals that of the 
hostility against naturalizing immigrants. 761F762 
The role of documentation and its power to legitimize, or de-legitimize, nationality claims 
cannot be understated in the case of the bidoon.762F763 Kuwait has issued security cards 
granting five years of residence to registered bidoon, but though these cards prevent 
deportation, they require that the individual state a “true nationality,” such as Saudi Arabia. 
Most bidoon refuse to do so as this can lead to being branded as a foreigner for the 
purposes of gaining birth certificates and other documents. 763F764 The government has even, 
allegedly, taken to issuing fake foreign passports to bidoon.764F765 Recently, the Kuwaiti 
government has begun issuing all bidoon with a “security ID” dividing bidoons into those 
considered to be security risks and those who may have their nationality status reviewed at 
some unspecified point in the future. 765F766 
Kuwait has not ratified the Statelessness Conventions, but in 1993 it set up a procedure for 
the adjudication of cases of statelessness called the Central Committee. 766F767 This Committee 
has decreased the bidoon population by about half, mostly through deportation to Iraq. 767F768 
Some bidoon have been granted residency, while others have been given documents which 
label them as foreign. Meanwhile, the Kuwaiti government has recently proposed a solution 
for the bidoon to purchase a nationality for the bidoon in the Comoros or Sudan. 768F769 
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As this section has shown, many bidoon missed the window of registration following the 
enactment of Kuwait’s nationality law because they were not able to prove residence in 
Kuwait before the 1920 Battle of Jahra. Those who were not granted naturalization were 
subsequently locked out of a nationality by jus sanguinis. There is evidence of widespread 
discrimination against certain Bedouin tribes, combined with a lack of clarity by what is 
meant by “residence” for the Bedouin population at the time of decolonization. Below, this 
dissertation will explore the political and social forces that drove Kuwait’s increasingly 
restrictive nationality laws and the exclusion of some Bedouin tribes. The next section, 
however, will look at Mali’s nationality law and how it was applied to the Tuareg. 
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The Tuareg Under Mali’s Nationality Law 
The Committee wishes to particularly stress the risk of becoming stateless 
for unregistered children of nomadic indigenous parents who frequently 
move across the borders of different countries. 769F770 
In 1960, French Soudan, renamed Mali, became fully independent under the socialist 
Modibo Keïta.770F771 Mali became independent by proclamation. 771F772 Nationality was not 
transferred by treaty provisions in Mali, 772F773 but were instead set by a transitional law. 773F774 
Like in Kuwait, decolonization and the drafting of nationality laws took place over a 
relatively short period of time. Malian nationality law was heavily influenced by French 
nationality law.774F775 This section will explore how Mali’s nationality laws developed and 
were applied, or not applied, to the Tuareg. As the above section showed, many Tuareg 
entered the decolonization period as nationals of French Soudan. Yet, as this section will 
discuss, this nationality did not roll over into Malian nationality. In particular, this section 
will show how Mali’s law came to contain powerful protections against statelessness, 
including the principle of double birth, where some children born in Mali to non-nationals 
also born in Mali are eligible for nationality. Yet, as this section will discuss, the law has not 
protected the Tuareg from statelessness. 
Unlike in Kuwait, most West Africans entered decolonization as nationals of France, at least 
on paper, but due to the weakness of the French état civil, most did not have proof of 
nationality. As well, the laws on the état civil had not been applied equally to all Africans, so 
while many urban and coastal groups had registered and begun voting, some rural 
populations, including many Tuareg, had not. All ressortissants of French Soudan were now 
eligible to become Malian nationals under the transitional laws. But this meant that even 
 
770 African Committee of Experts on the Rights and Welfare of the Child, ‘General Comment on Article 6 of the 
African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child’ ACERWC/GC/02 (2014) adopted by the Committee at 
its twenty-third Ordinary Session (07 - 16 April, 2014) 6, 29-30. 
771 Diarrah, 37. See also Gaudio, 1988, 107; Crawford, 330. It should be noted that for 2 months in 1960, Mali 
was to be part of a Federation with what would become Senegal. The Federation dissolved in August of 1960 
under the Constitutional Law of 4 June. See also Decheix, 302. 
772 Loi n. 60-14 du 20 juin 1960 « proclamant solennellement l’indépendance nationale de la fédération du 
Mali » Journal Officiel de la Fédération du Mali (22 juin 1960) 383. 
773 Donner, 281. 
774 Ordonnance n. 55 du 24 novembre 1960 « relative à l’attribution de la nationalité malienne à tous les 
ressortissants de la République du Mali » Journal Officiel de la République du Mali (J.O.R.M.) 15 décembre 1960 
p.986. Decheix, 302. 
775 As Christophe Wondji puts it, “the first generations (of African leaders) were...inspired by the principles 
and the methods of the European political philosophy,” including the philosophy of nationality and national 
belonging. C. Wondji, Symbolismes Culturels Traditionnels et Indépendances Africaines (Institut d’histoire du 
temps présent 1990) 1. 
149 
 
where registration been carried out, it was not clear who would qualify in border areas or 
amongst nomadic and mobile populations, leaving the door open, as in Kuwait, to 
discrimination.  
Mali’s nationality law adopted many principles from French law, including the principle of 
double birth, by which qualifying children born in Mali to parents who were themselves 
born in Mali were automatically attributed nationality.775F776 Nevertheless, it was not possible 
to automatically transfer French nationality to Malian nationality without a major 
registration program by the state. Even for those certain classes of nationals under 
colonial-era laws who qualified for automatic transfer under the transitional laws, 776F777 
registration in Tuareg areas was interrupted almost before it began by civil war. As stated 
above, many Tuareg leaders entered the decolonization process intent on political 
independence. Yet, despite the push by some Tuareg nobles and French politicians to 
create a Sahara Français, many African governments supported existing borders during 
decolonization under the doctrine of uti possidetis.777F778 The political situation would come to 
a head shortly after colonial independence, all but preventing large scale civil registration 
in Tuareg areas. 
One of the first tasks of the Malian government was to replace French Community 
nationality with Malian nationality. 778F779 Drafting a nationality law would be a critical part of 
defining Mali’s “first body of nationals” and who would now be the nationals of foreign 
states, including ones with close ties to Mali, such as Senegal. As the African Commission 
put it, states at independence had to determine who would make up their “human capital” 
and who would not. 779F780 Temporary provisions to create Mali’s first body of nationals were 
passed in 1960. 780F781 Article 1 of the temporary Ordinance stated that all ressortissants of Mali 
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were now Malian nationals, 781F782 excepting French citizens and those with “French civil 
status,” meaning those who had opted into the French civil code, and their spouses and 
descendants. 782F783 It was not clear, however, what it meant to be a ressortissant of Mali, a 
country that had only begun to exist months before and had been originally conceived of as 
being in a federation with Senegal. Article 1 of the Ordinance went on to state that the exact 
class of people to whom Article 1 would apply would be determined by a future law based 
on descent or place of birth.  
The law then went on to automatically grant Malian nationality to various specific classes 
of persons holding French colonial nationality, unless Malian nationality was refused. 783F784 
Qualifying persons included those holding French nationality under various colonial-era 
laws, including under the Constitution of 1946. The law also covered the holders of French 
nationality from the four communes in Senegal. The status of many other in Mali, however, 
remained somewhat unclear. 784F785 Finally, under this Ordinance, the Malian government 
could grant nationality to individuals who had been residents in Mali for two years. The 
term “resident” was not clearly defined. 
Registration should have been the process by which the Tuareg would be sorted into 
Malian Tuareg and foreign Tuareg. Those Tuareg who held a nationality in French Soudan 
should have received Malian nationality automatically, but Mali failed to put into place a 
widespread civil registration process. The authorities in charge of what was now northern 
Mali had been elevated by the French administrative system and were often not Tuareg 
themselves. The centralization of the administrative state, with its focus on urban centres 
and the settled population, made registration difficult among the Tuareg, who had been 
used to separate administration by the French. 
As Odinkalu puts it, “(t)he African political, educated and urban elite emerged as a new 
class ripe with economic and social mobility, while uneducated, rural peoples remained 
locked in extended postcolonial exclusion.”785F786 Many Tuareg families, used to weak French 
administrative structures and the relative lack of importance of internal colonial borders, 
were accustomed to migrating and traveling back and forth across what were now 
international borders, complicating the question of their residence. At the same time, 
registration and nationality were associated with oppressive French rule, and now, with 
rule from distant Bamako. Most importantly, however, Tuareg leaders found themselves 
targeted as enemies of the state due to fears over Tuareg separatism. The question of 
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Tuareg nationality would soon become subsumed into the larger question of Tuareg 
political independence. 
Mali enacted a permanent nationality code in 1962. 786F787 It was updated in 1995 and replaced 
by the Code des Personnes et de la Famille in 2011.787F788 Article 68 of the 1962 Code contained 
the following transitional provision: 
(a)ll persons resident in Mali at the time of the enactment of the nationality code 
are presumed nationals of Mali unless proven otherwise. Nationality certificates 
should not be issued unless residence can be proven or local public officials such 
as the chef d’arrondissement attest that the individual has the de facto status of 
being Malian.788F789 
Critically, the law relied heavily on the concept of residence, just as Kuwait’s nationality 
law had done. Zatzepine argues that “residence” in article 68 meant habitual residence. 789F790 
What this meant for nomadic Tuareg, however, was not clear. While many slaves and 
haratin had settled and been granted land during the colonial period, as discussed above in 
the section on the Tuareg in French Soudan, noble Tuareg remained largely nomadic and 
split across borders, greatly complicating the question of their residence and/or their 
treatment as nationals. 
This presumption in favour of nationality is more liberal than the laws of some other 
African states though, in principle, the nationality laws of post-colonial Francophone Africa 
commonly favoured recognition of nationality for those who had always behaved as 
nationals and been accepted as nationals.790F791 The Malian Circulaire d’application n. 331 
defines “possession of the state of being Malian” as anyone who is constantly considered to 
be Malian and was constantly treated as such by the authorities and public opinion. 791F792 It is 
not clear how this clause might have been interpreted in the case of the Tuareg. 
It is important to note that the chef d’arrondissement had been a middle-level functionary 
under the French system and was often not Tuareg. The French administrative structure, 
centralized, urban and agricultural-focused, had now been adopted by the Malian 
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Constitution as the administrative system of Mali. While some functionaries in northern 
Mali were drawn from the local population, it was not uncommon for southerners to be 
sent to northern Mali as administrators. It is not at all clear to what extent the chef 
d’arrondissement was the proper authority to determine Tuareg residence.  
As it was, the question of Tuareg registration would be all but forgotten in coming armed 
conflict over Tuareg independence. 1962 was the year that war broke out in northern Mali 
between the Tuareg and the government, the effects of which were devastating on every 
aspect of Tuareg life and which will be discussed at length below. It is likely that widescale 
registration for many nomadic Tuareg was never attempted. 792F793  
Meanwhile, Tuareg leaders who had received a nationality from the French were to be 
intensively persecuted by the Malian government during the civil war, rendering their 
nationality largely ineffective and preventing a transfer of nationality for many noble 
Tuareg. The government’s concerns over separatism is reflected in Art. 43(bis) of the 
Malian nationality code, which provided for the denationalization by decree of “any Malian 
national serving in or helping a foreign army or foreign public service provided the host 
country is, with his help, engaged in hostilities against Mali.”793F794 The extent to which noble 
Tuareg were stripped of their French documents during the 1963 war is unknown and 
awaits further study. 
Following the transitional provisions establishing Mali’s first body of nationals, the new 
law adopted the principle of jus sanguinis and double birth for the future establishment of 
Malian nationality. Article 8 of the 1962 Code begins: “Malians are all persons born in Mali 
or abroad who...are legitimately born of a Malian father...”794F795 The Malian Code contained 
several important exceptions to jus sanguinis that made the law more liberal than many 
nationality laws of the time, 795F796 including Kuwait or, as will be discussed below, Malaysia. 
For example, Article 12 of the Malian Code provided nationality to “natural or legitimate 
children born in Mali to a father or mother of African origin also born in Mali...;” limited 
double birth that would extend Malian nationality to any families of African origin who had 
not registered under the transitional provisions. 796F797 
According to Decheix, an expert on Mali’s early nationality laws, the provision on double 
birth was retained over some objections because of questions over the nationality of 
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communities in border areas. 797F798 While racially discriminatory, this provision might have 
provided protection against statelessness for some border communities. Nevertheless, in 
addition to discriminating based on gender, the double jus soli provision granting 
nationality to children “of African origin” was clearly racially discriminatory in keeping 
with the pan-Africanism of the day. 798F799 This discrimination is not irrelevant to the Tuareg, 
who as the next section will explore, below, have often been labelled as white by Malian 
government officials and, as well, by members of their community. 799F800 As Lecocq notes, 
even “the name of the new republic reflected the dominance of its core populations: the 
Mande and Bambara.”800F801 African origin is not defined, leaving it vague and open to political 
interpretation.  
While this dissertation could uncover no evidence of a Tuareg person being refused 
nationality because of this provision in the law, its inclusion shows the importance of race 
to the concept of being Malian. The concept of being of African origin, as opposed to being 
of foreign origin, would come to play a large role in the Malian government’s general 
policies towards the Tuareg and may be seen as a reflection of their thinking of who 
belongs in the Malian state. 801F802 The issue of race would become a dominate feature of 
inclusion and exclusion in northern Mali in the decades following independence, as will be 
discussed at length below. 
The 1962 law also contained several provisions specifically to prevent statelessness, 
provisions which remain in force today.802F803 The law provided automatic nationality to 
children born to unknown parents (foundlings). 803F804 The law also allowed children born to 
foreigners to naturalize after five years under certain conditions. 804F805 As well, persons born 
in Mali who had their habitual residence in Mali may, at the time of their majority, have 
opted for Malian nationality. 805F806 As Decheix concluded, they were “modern law(s) 
conforming to the principles of international human rights law inspired by the profound 
 
798 Decheix, 305. 
799 Decheix, 300. See also African Commission, paras. 110-113, 147. 
800 For a general exploration of the issue of race in northern Mali, see Hall. Cooper, 414. 
801 Lecocq, Desert, 2002, 73. 
802 Cooper, 419. See also Decheix ,305. 
803 The Code de la Nationalité Malienne Loi No. 6218 of 3 February 1962 as modified by the Loi No. 9570 of 25 
August 1995 and replaced by the Loi 2011-087 of 30 December 2011. Also relevant are the Ordonnance No 
02-062/P.RM of 7 June 2002 of the Code of the Protection of the Child, and the Loi No. 06-024 of 28 June 2006 
on Civil Registration. 
804 Zatzepine, 54. 
805 The Code de la Nationalité Malienne Loi No. 6218 of 3 February 1962 as modified by the Loi No. 9570 of 25 
August 1995 and replaced by the Loi 2011-087 of 30 December 2011, art. 27. 
806 Zatzepine, 56. 
154 
 
sentiments of the African and informed by the political concerns of the hour to realize the 
union of the continent.” 806F807 
Following amendments in 1995, 807F808 the Malian government passed a new nationality code 
in 2011, the Code des personnes et de la famille.808F809 Among other changes, the Code replaced 
the provision granting Malian nationality to children born to a parent “of African origin’ 
with a provision granting Malian nationality to children born to a parent with nationality in 
another African country. 809F810 Arguably, this change, which occurred just prior to the 
renewed conflict between the Tuareg and the Malian government, discussed below, 
removed racially motivated language from Mali’s nationality law and reflected an 
acknowledgement of the diversity of ethnicity that made up Mali, including the Tuareg. It 
replaced racial language with language based on nationality.  
Under Malian law, the Certificate of Nationality is the foundation of Malian nationality 
documentation. The Malian Nationality code of 1962 dedicated three articles to the 
certificates of nationality and an entire title to the issue of adjudication. 810F811 As a matter of 
daily use, the identity card, the Carte Nationale d’Identité (CNI), issued pursuant to a decree 
in 1988, 811F812 is usually sufficient to establish nationality in most cases and it, or a carte 
consulaire if abroad, is now obligatory. 812F813 In 2006, Mali rolled out a new law providing for a 
universal ID number, called the “NINA" and obligatory for all Malian citizens, residents and 
others on Malian territory and under its legal jurisdiction. 813F814 Some changes to help nomads 
were also part of reformed to the laws on civil registration that were made in 2006. Article 
1 of the 2006 law on civil registration specifically provided for mobile clinics to register 
nomads.814F815 NINA cards began to be issued in the period preceding the 2013 election and 
 
807 Decheix, 304, 314. The Malian nationality code was drafted by a group of judges, government officials, 
union leaders and an adviser from Europe. 
808 Among other liberalizing amendments, the 1995 law made it more difficult for persons residing abroad to 
lose their Malian nationality. Law No. 95-098, Portant modification code de la nationalité (1995). 
809 Loi n. 11-080 portant code des personnes et de la famille, Journal Officiel de la République du Mali (J.O.R.M.) 
Spécial (31 Jan 2012) Titres IV, V (2011 Code). 
810 Loi n. 11-080 portant code des personnes et de la famille, Journal Officiel de la République du Mali (J.O.R.M.) 
Spécial (31 Jan 2012) Titres IV, V (2011 Code). 
811 Zatzepine, 101. Title V regulates the issuance of nationality documents. See also Decheix, 309. 
812 Décret n. 014/PG- RM du 09 janvier 1988 portant institution et règlementation de la délivrance de la carte 
d’identité et de la carte consulaire. 
813 Mali Décret N. 55-014/PG-RM du 9 Janvier 1988. 
814 Loi no 06-040 du 11 août 2006 portant institution du numéro d’identification nationale des personnes 
physiques et morales (2006). 
815 Loi No. 06-024 du 28 juin 2006 régissant l’État civil (2006). 
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required a National ID Card. 815F816 Other forms of ID in Mali that are relevant to proving 
nationality include the birth certificate, the Jugement supplétif d’acte de naissance, and the 
Family Book, issued to the head of household. 
Despite these developments in the law, however, problems with civil registration would 
continue into the post-colonial period to this day. In particular, ongoing cycles of conflict in 
northern Mali meant that many Tuareg continued to be administered under military rule 
and continue to be unregistered. Time spent in refugee camps abroad has not improved 
Tuareg registration. According to the government, nomads are now registered using mobile 
registration teams, though there is not much information on this project. 816F817  
The Committee on the Rights of the Child urged the government to go further by setting up 
mobile registration clinics, noting there remained a large gap between registration of urban 
children and children in rural areas. 817F818 As of yet, these recommendations have not been 
implemented, though the 2011 law does allow for the creation of special birth registration 
centres in nomadic areas. 818F819 According to interviews conducted as part of a recent study by 
UNHCR, most registration centres in Tuareg regions in northern Mali are not 
functioning. 819F820 In 2014, a UNICEF study showed that over 120,000 children in Gao and 
Timbuktu regions had not been registered. 820F821 
An argument may be made that the Tuareg are not de jure stateless, but are rather at risk of 
statelessness, or of unknown nationality. Lack of civil registration is common in Africa, 
particularly among rural populations. A report by the African Commission on Human and 
Peoples’ Rights has shown that lack of registration is common throughout rural Africa, with 
nomads like the Tuareg particularly at risk.821F822 This lack of registration may amount to 
statelessness in some cases.822F823 African nations more generally tend to suffer from low birth 
 
816 Canada: Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, Mali: ‘NINA card, including date and circumstances of 
its introduction; method used to collect data on future cardholders, including data collection period; 
opportunity to correct or update card information, such as place of residence and occupation; procedure to 
correct or update card information’ (2009-September 2016), 26 August 2016. 
817 M. Offermann, « Les risques d'apatridie au Mali et pour les Maliens vivant à l’étranger en application des 
législations et pratiques relatives à la nationalité, au Mali et dans les pays d’accueil de Maliens » (UNHCR 
2020) 14, 33 (hereinafter Offermann). 
818 Committee on the Rights of the Child, Consideration of the Reports Submitted by States Parties under 
Article 44 of the Convention: Concluding Observations: Mali, CRC/C/MLI/CO/2 3 May 2007. 
819 Loi n. 11-080 portant code des personnes et de la famille, Journal Officiel de la République du Mali (J.O.R.M.) 
Spécial (31 Jan 2012) Art. 84. 
820 Offermann, 28. 
821 Offermann, 29. 
822 See generally African Commission. 
823 In the West Africa region, as Manby points out, “(a)mong the undocumented and partially documented 
there is an undoubtedly large number of people who would fit the definition of stateless person under 
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registration, particularly in rural areas. As Manby has argued, there is a “crisis of 
nationality” in Africa.823F824 
In Africa, those most affected by statelessness include the descendants of 
colonial-era migrants, nomadic pastoralists, populations divided by arbitrary 
colonial borders or affected by more recent transfers of sovereignty, and 
those displaced by conflict.824F825 
According to research compiled by various United Nations agencies, up to 90% of children 
are not registered in rural areas in many parts of Africa. 825F826 According to UNICEF, Mali has a 
50% birth registration rate, fairly average for African countries. 826F827 In Mali, UNICEF 
estimates that only 50% of children are registered immediately, and only 80% of Malian 
children are registered at all. 827F828 The Malian government conducted a mass registration 
exercise in 2015 targeting returning refugees and IDPs with the assistance of international 
organization PLAN, 828F829 yet nomads and rural populations in particular face real challenges 
with registration in Mali.  
Poverty, illiteracy and weak government structures all play a role in the lack of civil 
registration among the Tuareg. Zatzepine, writing at the time, pointed out the problems 
with providing proof amongst an illiterate population where much of the population does 
not follow a formal calendar. 829F830 As well, cultural aspects of life in rural Africa, like the 
Tuareg system of naming, makes registration difficult, as the Tuareg did not traditionally 
use a family name. 830F831 Meanwhile, fraud and fake Malian documents continue to be a real 
problem across Mali.831F832  
Yet the statelessness of the Tuareg goes beyond a lack of documents. As Manby puts it, 
writing of Africa more generally, “an undocumented person who is a member of the 
 
international law.” B. Manby, ‘Who Belongs? Statelessness and Nationality in West Africa’ Migration Policy 
Institute (7 April 2016) (hereinafter Manby, Belongs).  
824 Manby, Belongs, 1-2, 18. See also Manby, Citizenship, 2018, 330. 
825 Manby, Belongs, 1-2. See also Manby, Citizenship, 2018, 330. 
826 African Commission para 186. The Commission estimates that as many as 20 million children in African 
lack birth; registration. African Commission para. 4. 
827 UNICEF, ‘Strengthening Birth Registration in Africa: Opportunities and Partnerships Technical Paper’ 
(2010) 3, 7. 
828 UNICEF Mali, ‘Child Protection’ http://www.unicef.org/mali/3934_4097.html. 
829 Reliefweb, ‘Thousands to receive birth certificates in Mali’ (18 Feb. 2015). See also OHCHR, ‘Birth 
registration and the right of everyone to recognition everywhere as a person before the law’ (2013). 
830 Zatzepine, 30. 
831 Zatzepine, 32. See also Keenan, Resistance, 69. 
832 Offermann, 32. 
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dominant ethnic or religious group and comes from a settled community and stable family 
is far less likely to be refused when applying for a nationality document.”832F833 The Tuareg 
were also subjected to discriminatory policies during the colonial period and during the 
decolonization period which arguably impacted their registration.  
Perhaps most importantly, however, the civil war that broke out in northern Mali in 1962 
became an enormous factor, perhaps the key factor, in the statelessness of the Tuareg. 
1962 began a continuous cycle of war, draught and state persecution that has left Tuareg 
communities shattered and huge numbers of people living abroad. This dissertation argues 
that lack of documents combined with civil war and widespread persecution have left many 
Tuareg stateless or at risk of statelessness. 
To understand why northern Mali devolved into civil war so soon after independence, it is 
necessary to look at Malian government policies from the time and how they impacted the 
Tuareg, which this dissertation will do, below. Before discussing the political and social 
factors that lead the Tuareg into a military conflict with their government, however, the 
next section will first analyse the nationality laws of Sabah, Malaysia. 
  
 
833 Manby, Belongs, 1-2. See also Manby, Citizenship, 2018, 314; Fripp, 2016, 320. 
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The Sama Dilaut Under the Nationality Laws of Sabah, Malaysia 
Like both Kuwait and Mali, the Federation of Malaysia, and Sabah as a Federal State within 
that Federation, needed to draft a nationality law at independence. Like in Kuwait and Mali, 
the Malaysian government had inherited a patchwork of laws from the colonial period. As 
in Kuwait, the process of drafting a law was heavily influenced by the British government. 
Once again, a poor to non-existent civil registration meant that many local people entered 
the decolonization period with no status even though they had technically qualified as 
nationals under colonial law. This section will draw on academic and non-academic sources 
to explore how Malaysia’s nationality laws were applied, or not applied, to the Sama Dilaut. 
In 1946, in anticipation of independence and during the formation of the Federation of 
Malaya (which at that time did not include the Borneo states), 833F834 the British proposed a 
nationality law based on jus soli and 15 years of residence. 834F835 This proposal was rejected 
by the Sultans because it would have automatically granted nationality to the Chinese 
population, who the Sultans and many Malays considered to be foreign immigrants. 835F836 The 
British did not want to leave the Chinese population without Malaysian nationality and the 
Chinese population themselves wished to have the option. 836F837 Right from the start, 
therefore, the issue of who would be nationals of the federation proved contentious. The 
struggle to balance Malaysia’s various ethnicities, an important context to Malaysian 
nationality that will be discussed at length below, would come to dominate Malaysian 
politics and nationality policy. 
The resulting compromise nationality law created a complex, layered nationality. As in 
Kuwait, Malaysia would adopt the principle of tiers of nationality to grant different statuses 
to different persons born in Malaysia. Instead of universal nationality, the 1948 Federation 
of Malaya Agreement837F838 created federal citizenship as a status derived from being a subject 
of a Sultan of each particular state, making Malaysian citizenship a derivative status that 
was dependent upon state nationality. Under the Agreement, most non-Malays would not 
automatically be counted as the subjects of their Sultans but instead had to apply to be 
 
834 Sinnadurai, 313. See also Fernandez, 55; Lim Hong Hai, 101. The Federation of Malaya came into existence 
in 1948. 
835 Ting, 42. See also Clark and Pietsch, 161. 
836 Sinnadurai, 313. See also K. Young, W. Bussink, P. Hasan, 14; Lim Hong Hai, 103. 
837 K. Young, W. Bussink, P. Hasan, 14. See also Lim Hong Hai, 103. 
838 Federation of Malaya Agreement, 1948, made between His late Majesty King George VI and Their 
Highnesses the Rulers of the Malay States. 
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naturalized.838F839 In this way, Malaya would come to have two tiers of nationality, similar to 
Kuwait, that of subjects of the Sultan and that of naturalized citizens.  
This left the Chinese and Indian populations on the peninsula in a precarious and 
somewhat unclear position as to nationality. 839F840 In 1952, a committee was set up to address 
the issue of nationality of non-Malays in the new federation, particularly the Chinese. 840F841 
The eventual Federation of Malaya Agreement,841F842 passed in 1952, opened up the 
possibility of federal citizenship for non-Malays.842F843 But the law was complicated and 
poorly implemented. According to one historian, at the end of 1953, almost two million 
non-Malays were still without nationality in the new Federation, including many 
Chinese.843F844 
As well as discrimination in the nationality law itself, non-Malays faced discrimination by 
other laws.844F845 These favourable laws and status for Malays would lead to riots in 1969 and 
continue to be a bone of contention for ethnically Chinese and Indian Malaysians up to the 
present day, contributing, among other things, to statelessness for Malaysians of Indian 
descent.845F846 Thus began a long history of statelessness and disputed nationality for those 
labelled as immigrant populations in Malaysia, context to Malaysia’s nationality laws that 
will be discussed at length below. 846F847 In this way, statelessness and exclusion from 
nationality became embedded in Malaysian civic life. 847F848 The link between statelessness and 
 
839 Ko Swan Sik, 314-316. See also Ting, 43; Z. Cowen, ‘The Emergence of a New Federation in Malaya’ 1 
Tasmanian U. L.R. 53 (1958). 
840 As Ko Swan Sik puts it, “(t)here was a constant need for reference to other laws, particularly the state 
nationality laws, to determine whether a person was a citizen or not.” Ko Swan Sik, 316. See also Ting, 43; 
Sinnadurai, 315; Hooker, 223. 
841 Ting, 43. See also Sinnadurai, 314. 
842 Federation of Malaya Agreement (Amendment) Ordinance (1952). 
843 Ko Swan Sik, 317. See also Ting, 43; Sinnadurai, 314; K. Young, W. Bussink, P. Hasan, 16. 
844 Ting, 51. 
845 Clark and Pietsch, 160. See also F. Holst, Ethnicization and Identity Construction in Malaysia (Routledge 
2012) 45. 
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R. Nordin and T. Duraisingam, ‘Migration and Statelessness: Turning the Spotlight on Malaysia’ 23 Pertanika J. 
Soc. Sci. and Hum. 19 (2015). 
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Report - Universal Periodic Review: Malaysia’ (March 2013). 
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the “immigrant” label would become a common one in Malaysia, including, later, in Sabah, 
as civil society organizations have documented.848F849 
In 1957, the new Federal Constitution finally created a federal nationality at birth, 
removing the requirement that federal citizenship be derived from state nationality. 849F850 
Article 14(1) contains the transitional provisions for the Peninsula. Like in Kuwait and 
Mali, though less inclusive, these provisions creating Malaysia’s “first body of nationals” 
were territorial and based on jus soli. They granted nationality to all persons born in 
Malaysia before Malaysia Day (16 September 1963) who qualified as nationals under the 
1948 Agreement. Also, nationality was granted to all persons born in Malaysia after Mereka 
Day (31 August 1957) and before October 1962.  
For persons born after September 1962, nationality would be granted via jus sanguinis to 
those with one parent who was either a national, a stateless person, or a legal permanent 
resident.850F851 Unlike in Kuwait and Mali, establishing nationality in Malaysia was dependent 
on place of birth, not residence. As in Kuwait and Mali, however, determining place of birth 
would prove difficult due to the lack of civil registration in rural Malaysia. Also, like Kuwait 
and Mali, nationality thereafter is passed via jus sanguinis.851F852  
As in Kuwait and Mali, Malaysian nationality law was influenced both by western 
nationality law, but also by Islamic principles. 852F853 Unlike Kuwait, however, there were 
strong protections against statelessness written into the law, providing Malaysian 
nationality to every person born on Malaysian territory who “is not born a citizen of any 
other country...”853F854 This stop-gap provision to prevent statelessness is arguably stronger 
than the laws of either Kuwait or Mali, though Malaysia lacks the double jus soli provisions 
of Mali’s law. The Malaysian Constitution also provided for a nationality for persons born in 
 
in Malaysia’ Statelessness Working Paper Series No. 2016/07, Institute on Statelessness and Inclusion 
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849 See generally Development of Human Resources in Rural Areas (DHRRA) ‘Citizenship and Statelessness 
Fact Sheet 2’ (January 2015). 
850 Constitution of Malaysia, Art. 14, Second Schedule (1957). See also Immigration and Refugee Board of 
Canada, Malaysian nationality law, and the case of M. Navin, Goh Siu Lin, ‘In the Case of M. Navin, the Guiding 
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851 Constitution of Malaysia, Art. 14, Second Schedule (1957). 
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854 Constitution of Malaysia, Second Schedule, Part II (1957). 
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Malaysia who would otherwise be stateless, but this provision has never been successfully 
invoked.854F855  
As in many countries, including Mali and Kuwait, the issue of nationality registration in the 
decades following decolonization would become closely linked to the issue of voting. On the 
advice of the Reid Commission, an independent, international commission tasked with 
advising the new government on the Constitution, the first elections in Malaysia were 
delayed two years to 1959 to give non-Malays who had not gained a nationality until the 
enactment of the Constitution the chance to register. 855F856 Despite this precaution, many non-
Malays were not registered as nationals by the time of elections and would remain 
unregistered into the future. 856F857 
During this formative period, the Borneo territories were joined with the rest of the 
Malaysian Federation. The Cobbold Commission, a commission of inquiry, surveyed public 
opinion in north Borneo and concluded that the majority of the population favoured joining 
Malaysia.857F858 In 1963, the Malaysia Act amended the Constitution to include Sabah, 
Sarawak858F859 and separate transitional laws were written to establish nationality in the 
newly added states. 859F860 To preserve their semi-autonomy and prevent immigration from 
what was now known as West, or Peninsular, Malaysia, Sabah and Sarawak were given 
independent control over immigration from other states. 860F861 This power over immigration 
was the result of the Borneo states’ concerns over Malay domination. Such fears would 
continue to colour the debate over nationality in Sabah, creating a complex debate over 
ethnicity that will be discussed below. 
The laws creating the first body of nationals in Sabah and Sarawak, however, were different 
than those of Peninsular Malaysia. Most importantly, nationality in the Borneo states was 
based, initially, on residence as well as on place of birth. Under the 1957 Constitution, 
persons “ordinarily resident” for seven years prior to Malaysia Day in Sabah and Sarawak 
were nationals of Malaysia if they were either born, registered or naturalized in the Borneo 
territories and satisfied certain other requirements, including knowledge of Malay, English 
 
855 Constitution of Malaysia, Second Schedule, Part 2I (1957). See also R. Razali, ‘Addressing Statelessness in 
Malaysia: New Hopes and Remaining Challenges’ Statelessness Working Paper Series No. 2017/9 (Institute 
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856 See also Lim Hong Hai, 107. 
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858 ‘Report of the Commission of Enquiry, North Borneo and Sarawak’ (1962) (Cobbold Commission) (1962).  
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860 See also Lim Hong Hai, 109. The Constitution was later amended to remove reference to Singapore.  
861 See generally Cheah Boon Kheng, Malaysia: The Making of a Nation (Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 
2002). See also Asia Pacific Refugee Rights Network, ‘The Vulnerability of Sama Dilaut (Sama Dilaut) Children 
in Sabah, Malaysia’ Asia Pacific Refugee Rights Network (2015) 3. 
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or “any native language currently in use in Sarawak.”861F862 The provision was clearly intended 
to ease registration in the Borneo territories, a region with less of a history with formal 
registration in comparison to the Peninsular states.  
Once again, this law adopts a territorial approach based on “ordinary residence,” a concept 
that is arguably vaguer than place of birth. While place of birth is a clearly defined event, 
residence is a slippery concept that can be hard to prove, particularly for a nomadic or 
mobile population like the Sama Dilaut. As with Kuwait and Mali, proving birth and/or 
residence could be made difficult or easy, depending on who was applying. 862F863  
Under the Constitution, Sabahans had ten years within which to register as Malaysian 
nationals.863F864 The Federal Constitution provided for the creation of a national registration 
department (NRD) to issue birth certificates and other documentation. 864F865 As in Kuwait and 
Mali, however, while the laws for Sabah were facially inclusive, the vague language around 
residence in Sabah left a great deal of room for interpretation in the application of the law 
when it came to nomadic and border populations. According to Sather, and expert on the 
Sama Dilaut, many Sama Dilaut could not prove they qualified for nationality under the 
law.865F866  
Of particular relevance to the Sama Dilaut has been the sponsorship program for non-
citizens in Sabah, initiated at colonial independence, whereby temporary workers have to 
obtain a Malaysian national as a sponsor in order to remain in Sabah. 866F867 While today this 
program applies to any non-national working in Sabah, when the program began, many 
Sama Dilaut were defined as enemy aliens, meaning that they had to register as temporary 
workers in order to remain legally in the area. As a result, many Sama Dilaut were required 
to find a guarantor from among the settled population, often Bajau peoples themselves, and 
pay their guarantor a tax.867F868 Carol Warren calls the modern version of this work permit 
system, which is descended from the traditional patronage arrangements dating from the 
pre-colonial period described in Part 2, to a type of indentured labour for the Sama Dilaut, 
 
862 Malaysia Constitution, Art. 16(a) and Second Schedule Parts I-III (1957). See also Sinnadurai, 317; Asia 
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(2015) 3. 
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864 Sinnadurai, 317. See also Sather, Adaptation, 1997, 87; Mathews, 474. 
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former Filipino refugees and other marginalized undocumented persons, who must work 
for their settled neighbours or face arrest. 868F869  
This program could be said to mark the beginning of formal statelessness for many Sama 
Dilaut families because it was the beginning of their official classification as aliens rather 
than as nationals. 869F870 The work permit system is yet another example of lack of 
documentation being used as evidence of foreign status, a practice common in both Kuwait 
and Mali, as shown above. In particular, it resembles the bidoon status given to many 
former Bedouin in Kuwait, though it is not strictly a nationality status. 
Sather’s work provides what might be the clearest picture of Sama Dilaut registration. He 
argues that the failure to register the Sama Dilaut in the region of Semporna town was due 
to the “arbitrary” exclusion of nomadic families from registration. 870F871 A divide appears to 
have emerged between more land-based populations and groups pursuing boat nomadism, 
though more research is needed on this point. As with other nomads, the problems with 
Sama Dilaut registration were clearly linked to their mobility and perceptions of that 
mobility. While Sather labelled this division as “arbitrary” it clearly reflected a continuation 
of colonial policies towards mobility and mobile peoples. 
Lack of registration created a “major division” at independence in Semporna between those 
who were now nationals of Malaysia and those who were not, a division that corresponded 
to a great degree with who remained nomadic as opposed to who were now settled and 
had a fixed residence. 871F872 As with other nomads like the Bedouin and the Tuareg, other 
factors likely contributed to the lack of registration among the Sama Dilaut. The Sama 
Dilaut had mostly negative experiences with government registration, as seen by the efforts 
of the BNBC to institute a boat licensing program. 872F873 At the same time, however, Sather 
points out that the Sama Dilaut had become “accustomed to travel...across national 
boundaries” and that they were not unfamiliar with the importance of registration to 
facilitate this travel. 873F874 It is probably therefore incorrect to say the Sama Dilaut had no idea 
of the importance of registration.  
Unlike many rural, land-based Sabahans, the Sama Dilaut did not have a recognized village 
headman who could vouch for their residence. In other words, existing Sama Dilaut 
 
869 C. Warren, Consciousness, 1980, 228. 
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documentation and ties to northern Borneo were apparently discounted during the 
registration process, though more research is needed into this period in Sama Dilaut 
history. As in Kuwait and Mali, registration of the Sama Dilaut appears to have been 
approached in an exclusionary and discriminatory manor. 
Like in Kuwait and Mali, lack of identity documents would emerge as a major issue for 
nomads, border populations and rural peoples, with many Sama Dilaut failing to register or 
receive ID.874F875 Over subsequent decades, as in Kuwait, registration procedures in Malaysia 
have been tightened. 875F876 Many of those who did not register in the decade following 
independence found themselves locked out by jus sanguinis.876F877 Unlike in Kuwait and Mali, 
there were few substantive changes to Malaysian or Sabahan nationality law during this 
period, but the tightening of registration procedures would shut many out of a nationality. 
Concerns over immigration, particularly from the Philippines, led to increasingly restrictive 
enforcement of the law around the registration of nationality in Sabah, including an 
increased focus on the use of IDs. Strict registration procedures have led to 
intergenerational statelessness. 877F878  
Starting in 1972, under the new National Registration Rules, nationals of Sabah were issued 
a blue card with a number and an “H” to signify Sabah. At the same time, local chiefs were 
empowered to issue “status” certificates as evidence towards nationality for those who did 
not previously have ID cards. This allowed people from rural villages to prove their identity 
by having someone in a position of authority vouch for their long term residence. 878F879 This 
procedure, which resolved the nationality status of many rural Sabahans who were not 
registered in the decade following independence, was ended in 1987. 879F880 This placed 
registration in the hands of village chiefs, usually from the settled, coastal population. This 
option was not available to most Sama Dilaut as in many cases they neither had a 
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Enquiry on Immigrants in Sabah,’ Royal Commission of Inquiry (2012) 302 (hereinafter Royal Commission).  
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recognized village chief nor a recognized fixed residence in Sabah. 880F881 Once again, 
registration favoured the settled, rural population who were treated as presumptive 
nationals while nomads remained excluded. 
In 1990, the registration process was tightened again. The government began issuing 
updated ICs with the code “12” for Sabah. Under the new procedures, applicants had to 
produce both a birth certificate for themselves, as well as their parents’ ICs. 881F882 This made it 
virtually impossible for the children of undocumented persons to obtain cards. In 2002, 
these earlier cards were replaced with the MyKad, a so-called smart card containing 
biometric data.882F883 At this point, Malaysia’s documentation regime and reliance on jus 
sanguinis locked any unregistered Sabahan families out of a nationality, including 
unregistered Sama Dilaut. 
Today, registration and issuance of identity documents, such as the MyKad, continues to be 
handled by the National Registration Department (NRD) of Malaysia under the National 
Registration Regulation of 1990. The identity documents to prove nationality in Malaysia 
today are the MyKad and the birth certificate. A birth certificate is necessary to register as a 
national with NRD. 883F884 But the current MyKad is much more than simply proof of 
nationality; it combines a national identity card, a driver’s license, passport information, 
health information, banking features and other functions. 884F885 The chip contains information 
on the holder’s race, status as a Muslim, gender, voting status, thumbprints, criminal and 
driving record, and health information. 885F886 Today, the application for a MyKad requires a 
birth, adoption, or citizenship certificate, or the passport of the applicant, in addition to 
identity documents of at least one parent or guardian. As a result, Malaysia now has one of 
the most sophisticated and restrictive personal identity systems in the world. Lack of 
documents is now itself viewed as evidence not only of foreign status, but of criminality. 
Previously, Sabah did not require rural people living in villages to prove their nationality in 
order to access government services because they were assumed to be nationals, 886F887 so 
 
881 More research is needed on the implementation of this program as it pertains to marginalized minorities 
like the Sama Dilaut. 
882 Royal Commission, 303. 
883 Royal Commission, 303. 
884 See generally the website of the Malaysian NRD at http://www.jpn.gov.my/en/perkhidmatan/kanak-
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many rural people did not need to be registered. 887F888 Today, the Malaysian government 
recognizes the problem among rural communities, particularly since the introduction of the 
MyKad and increased police scrutiny of the undocumented community, and has been 
taking steps to improve documentation among rural people. The recent outreach of NRD 
towards the rural, land-based highlights the extent to which the Sama Dilaut are actively 
excluded by the Malaysian government, rather than being simply passively unregistered.888F889 
For example, NRD has set up mobile documentation clinics in rural areas, but such efforts 
do not include the Sama Dilaut. 889F890 According to testimony given during the Royal 
Commission of Inquiry, a registration exercise for the Sama Dilaut was last conducted in 
the 1960s.890F891 Some settled Sama/Bajau families were issued documents in the small village 
of Banga-Banga at that time. Today, only about 3,000 out of the 5,000 current inhabitants of 
Banga-Banga have documents. According to the Commission, the 2,000 Sama/Bajau 
without documents in Banga-Banga consider themselves to be Malaysian, yet have been 
unable to regularize their status. Meanwhile, in 2008, the government issued identity 
documents to some stateless persons in Sabah, but this program made no attempt to assist 
the Sama Dilaut. 891F892 
Accurate statistics of documentation among the Sama Dilaut community are unavailable, 
but civil society groups have noted that the Sama Dilaut generally suffer from low levels of 
documentation. 892F893 The Right 2 Identity Working Group stated that the Sama Dilaut are 
often unregistered because their parents lack documentation, leading to inter-generational 
statelessness. 893F894 The lack of identity documents has serious repercussions for the Sama 
Dilaut (as it does for other stateless people in Sabah.) For example, Sama Dilaut children 
cannot attend Malaysian government schools. 894F895  
 
888 Sadiq, 114. 
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(2012) 219. 
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As in other parts of Malaysia and in Kuwait, lack of registration is often conflated with 
foreign status in Sabah. A recent Al Jazeera documentary pointed out that stateless Sama 
Dilaut are frequently deported to the Philippines, even though many Sama Dilaut families 
settled in Sabah decades ago and have not been to the Philippines since seasonal 
migrations ended during the colonial period, while others visit only infrequently for 
extended family events like weddings and funerals. 895F896 As the issue of documentation and 
statelessness in Sabah has been taken up as a human rights issue by civil society, the 
government has begun promising to address it. 896F897 Yet Sabah continues rounding up 
undocumented persons for detention or deportation and issuing different identity 
documents to non-citizens (for example, red certificates to “non-citizens” as opposed to the 
green certificates given to Malaysian citizens.) 897F898  
In this way, the current documentation regime in Sabah has increasingly come to resemble 
that in Kuwait, where certain classes of stateless persons are granted documents labelling 
them as such. These measures are often equally applied to the children of Filipino migrants 
and the Sama Dilaut. Meanwhile, lack of nationality registration for minority groups 
throughout Malaysia quickly become part of a larger political debate over national identity, 
borders and immigration, factors which will be discussed in detail in the next section. 898F899 
Yet, while registration as Malaysian has slowly been tightened, producing statelessness for 
many Sama Dilaut, Malaysia continues to have protections against statelessness written 
into its nationality law, including a provision guaranteeing nationality at birth to persons 
born in Malaysia who would be otherwise stateless. 899F900 Recent events, however, have 
shown why this provision is not being used more effectively to prevent statelessness in 
Malaysia. Beginning in 2010, a number of court cases have been brought to establish 
Malaysian nationality for stateless children adopted by Malaysian parents. 900F901 Yet, the 
procedures for establishing statelessness under Malaysian law are unclear. 901F902  
In 2017, a Federal Court in Malaysia granted the right of appeal to five stateless, adopted 
children, including two stateless foundlings, who were petitioning for Malaysian nationality 
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899 Barlocco, 70. 
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9 (2017). 
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under Article 15(a) of the Constitution. The court rejected the applications of the stateless 
foundlings on the grounds that while they had proven they were born in Malaysia, they had 
not proven they were stateless.902F903 Some of the children were later granted citizenship 
because they were able to furnish documents demonstrating that they did not have access 
to another nationality. 903F904 Though it is difficult to speculate how such a precedent might be 
applied in other cases, these cases show the potential pitfalls of applying Malaysian 
nationality law to the problem of resolving statelessness. Such a solution will likely turn on 
the ability to furnish proofs that nomadic groups like the Sama Dilaut do not have. 
Meanwhile, Malaysia has not created a clear, national procedure by which cases of 
contested nationality can be easily resolved, though the problem of statelessness in Sabah 
continues to be much in the news and the government appears to be working towards a 
solution. Though Malaysia’s law provides for nationality to be granted in “special 
circumstances” where nationality is unclear or contested, this vague provision does 
nothing to specify a mechanism or a set of standards by which Sama Dilaut families could 
successfully navigate an established and fair process to obtain a nationality.904F905  
Events in Sabah are evolving quickly, however, and calls for a resolution to statelessness in 
Sabah keep getting louder and NRD has taken up several programs, including the 
registration of children and people in rural areas, alongside attempts to resolve the status 
of Sama Dilaut in the neighbouring Philippines as part of the Philippines National Action 
Plan to end statelessness. 905F906 There is also talk of a tripartite agreement between Malaysia, 
the Philippines and Indonesia to resolve the issue. 906F907 A recent Memorandum of 
Understanding between Malaysia and Indonesia may help to resolve the status of border 
populations in Sabah. 907F908 This exercise may finally provide a resolution to stateless Sama 
Dilaut. 
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Conclusion 
Statehood in itself might appear as a static concept antonymous with 
nomadism... 908F909 
This section looked at the creation of nationality regimes, including laws and civil 
registration procedures, in Kuwait, Mali and Malaysia. This section uncovered a number of 
important gaps in the nationality regimes in Kuwait, Mali and Malaysia, including the 
implementation of nationality, for nomads. For many, “(t)he achievement of independence 
did not automatically bring birth citizenship...” 909F910 As this section showed, while 
statelessness may occur as the accidental or negligent result of badly drafted nationality 
laws or gaps between nationality laws, it often contains at least an element of 
deliberateness and/or discrimination. 910F911 This was clearly the case for many nomads. 
During decolonization, the entire system of colonial law and registration was replaced, yet 
discrimination against nomadic communities simply continued and, in some places, 
arguably worsened. 
This section has identified several serious gaps in both the nationality laws and their 
application to nomads during the decolonization process and in the decades following. 
First, borders divided nomads and transformed them into minorities. Decolonization 
presented an opportunity to revisit colonial borders, but this opportunity was, in most 
cases, not taken. Second, discrimination against nomads that began under colonization was 
extended into the decolonization period, aided by a bias against nomadism inherent in 
European nationality norms. The power to determine nationality often vested in the hands 
of settled, urban rulers and not with nomad leaders. Third, jus sanguinis was often adopted, 
locking many nomads out of a nationality and creating inter-generational statelessness. 
Finally, the international community ignored the risk of statelessness as a result of the 
decolonization process, instead focusing on consolidating states around colonial borders. 
Nomads were Divided by Borders, Transforming them into Marginalized Minorities  
As the Tuareg example showed most clearly, decolonization presented an opportunity to 
revisit colonial-era borders, yet this opportunity was not taken. Instead, decolonization 
entrenched existing borders, requiring nomads to establish their nationality in one state, 
even when they had ties to multiple states. Many nomads were left as minorities living in 
contested border zones. Often, they were seen as part of the problem with the border, 
weakening state sovereignty.  
 
909 Gilbert, Nomadic, 2014, 63.  
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Porous administrative boundaries that had allowed nomadism to continue in places like 
the Gulf, the Sulu Sea and Sahel became hard borders between sovereign, and sometimes 
hostile, states. These states now had separate nationalities which put nomadic 
communities in a position of having to choose. 
Exclusive allegiance, a concept adopted from European nationality law, was difficult for 
nomadic communities to satisfy. It imposed a requirement on cross-border populations 
that they demonstrate their allegiance to one state to the exclusion of all others. This was 
simply impossible for many nomads to do. 
Binarity in questions of membership and citizenship is problematic because of the 
complicated range of ways in which (indigenous) individuals in fact relate with 
existing States, not least in navigating the effects of colonization.911F912 
Border zones were often contested at decolonization and nomads had a history of shifting 
allegiances or multiple allegiances that were viewed askance by government officials 
anxious to solidify their territorial claims. The spectre of dual, multiple or even shifting 
allegiances would plague questions of nomad legitimacy and belonging. The fact that 
individuals can maintain a nationality while simultaneously also holding other allegiances, 
including tribal or social allegiances, was treated, in the case of nomads, as a major problem 
to determining their nationality. 
Nationality Laws Based on Residence Discriminated Against Nomads 
As this section described, there remains a serious conflict between nomadism as it is lived 
and practiced and the requirements of European nationality, with its emphasis on fixed 
residence, exclusivity and paper documents. European nationality laws, while appearing 
neutral on their face, are actually biased against mobility and in favour of settlement. The 
requirement that one must register as a national ran contrary to the ways in which many 
nomads saw their alliances, as discussed in proceeding sections. 912F913  
While in some cases, there was genuine confusion over how to apply concepts like 
residence to nomadic populations who were now crossing international borders, historical 
claims by nomads to territory appear to have been largely ignored during decolonization. 
For example, Tuareg drum groups were often associated with specific regions inside what 
was now Mali, but Tuareg history was not employed to determine their nationality. Instead, 
residence and place of birth were employed. The creation of new nation-states failed to 
take into account how the system of European nationality law might not perfectly map onto 
non-European communities.  
The issuance of personal identification proving nationality was part of a system of 
documents that was utterly foreign to many nomadic communities. Colonization had linked 
land registration, title documents and nationality law together. Documents, which had been 
 
912 Bloom, Members, 2017, 166. 
913 Scott, 2009, x-xi.  
172 
 
unimportant in many nomad societies, now became critical. Older forms of proof described 
in Part 2, like oral agreements, patronage agreements, the maintenance of water points or 
grazing rights, were often ignored as insufficient to prove a nationality “link.” Proving 
nationality therefore required proving settlement on land, either through title documents, 
birth certificates, leases or other documentation that nomads often did not have. Few 
efforts were made to take an accommodating position with regards to nomads. Even 
nomads with documentary proof of residence were sometimes excluded, as the Bedouin 
example showed. Other forms of proof that may have been easier for nomads to provide, 
including oral testimony, were not used.  
It is critical to note that there emerged a major difference in how states treated rural, 
settled, unregistered populations and how they treated unregistered nomads. 913F914 Rural, 
settled populations were usually granted the presumption of nationality in Kuwait, Mali 
and Malaysia and often given the chance to register at a later date, as happened in Sabah 
with many rural peoples under NRD. They were presumed nationals and their loyalty and 
belonging were not questioned. Rather, their lack of registration was treated as a technical 
matter and a problem of state capacity. For those who remained nomadic or settled at a 
later period, the application of jus sanguinis nationality regimes in Kuwait and Malaysia 
would mean they had missed the window of registration and were locked out of a 
nationality.  
The initial registration period was followed by the slow transformation of many nomads 
from unregistered persons with undetermined or contested nationality to active exclusion 
and statelessness. While the post-colonial experience of many settled, rural people 
included gradual registration as governments claimed the power of the rural vote, nomads 
were actively excluded from this process. A closer look at the experience of nomads shows 
that successive governments missed multiple opportunities to rectify nomadic 
statelessness, taking a harder and harder line against nomad inclusion as the decades wore 
on. 
Negative colonial policies towards nomads affected registration in other ways as well 
during the post-colonial period. Sometimes nomads themselves did not wish to register, 
either because they did not see themselves as part of the post-colonial state that was now 
being run by urban or settled rulers, often from a capital located far away, or because of the 
history of violence and assimilation during the colonial period when registration was used 
as a tool of assimilation and forced settlement.  
The Power to Draft Laws, Register the Population and Issue Documents Had Vested with Urban 
Elites, Opening the Door to Discrimination 
Far from presenting post-colonial states with a blank slate, the patchwork and unequal 
colonial system meant that colonized peoples entered the post-colonial period with very 
different statuses and levels of political and economic power. For many nomads, the 
 
914 This became true even in some jus soli countries. See for example Open Society Justice Initiative, ‘Born in 
the Americas: The Promise and Practice of Nationality Laws in Brazil, Chile and Colombia’ (2017). 
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colonial period had been marked by a long decline in status and economic power that 
would leave them in a poor position to assert their rights at decolonization. Vast powers to 
include or exclude were handed to urban rulers with little accountability to nomadic or 
other minority groups.  
Registration was done quickly, with little input from nomadic groups, prioritizing settled 
and urban populations, as colonial administrations had done in the past. While the goal of 
decolonization did involve the enfranchisement and self-determination of many colonized 
peoples, in many ways, colonial structures and processes were continued into the post-
colonial period for nomads. 
The vesting of power over nomads with settled, rather than nomadic, leaders opened the 
door for discrimination. As Batchelor puts it, “(w)herever an administrative procedure 
allows for discretionary granting of citizenship, such applicants cannot be considered 
citizens until the application has been approved...”914F915 As Gilbert points out, nomads often 
face a very high burden of proof when registering with the government. 915F916 Kuwait adopted 
tiers of nationality that allowed rulers to claim populations as subjects without granting 
them many rights, a common strategy during the colonial period.  
In Mali, discrimination meant that otherwise inclusive nationality laws were not used to 
resolve Tuareg statelessness. Many Tuareg should have qualified for Malian nationality 
automatically under transitional laws. Double jus soli for those “of African origin” provided 
an ongoing, possible solution. Yet the outbreak of civil war combined with the targeting of 
Tuareg leaders meant that many did not receive a nationality, but were instead forced into 
exile or imprisoned.  
Registration and Nationality Laws Became Steadily More Restrictive Over Time, Locking Nomads 
in jus sanguinis Countries Out of a Nationality  
Following the transitional laws to create the first body of nationals, Kuwait and Malaysia 
adopted jus sanguinis. The adoption of jus sanguinis occurred even though the registration 
process was far from complete in either country. While in many ways jus sanguinis was a 
logical choice for many Muslim-majority countries, when imposed suddenly following a 
highly discriminatory transitional period, it served to lock many unregistered minorities, 
including many nomads, out of a nationality.  
Rather than working to resolve the problem, discrimination against minorities, including 
nomads, continued into a self-reinforcing cycle, where lack of registration was used as 
evidence of foreign status. Access to nationality became ever more restrictive. Safeguards 
against statelessness in Malaysia’s law were not applied, with Malaysia rather adopting the 
view that lack of documents is proof of foreign status, not of statelessness. In Kuwait, 
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increasingly restrictive laws created a legal category of stateless persons, the bidoon, and 
then slowly restricted their rights, even as access to naturalization was slowly cut off. 
The International Community Ignored the Problem of Nomad Inclusion 
The United Nations and the former colonial powers were not concerned with nationality 
and statelessness during decolonization, but were instead very focused on preventing 
separatism and the breakup of existing colonial units. While much attention was played to 
avoiding conflict over borders, somewhat remarkably given its importance, there was a 
curious lack of attention placed on the possible creation of statelessness during 
decolonization among the Bedouin, the Tuareg and the Sama Dilaut.  
In hindsight, the lack of attention on statelessness is surprising, as statelessness had been a 
major problem in Europe in the early part of the 20th century. It appears to have been 
widely assumed that transitional provisions based on residence and place of birth would 
solve the problem, though more research on this critical period is needed. Documents from 
the British administration in the Gulf region shows that the administration was aware that 
transitional laws in some Gulf states may lead to statelessness and some nationality 
questions received enormous attention, like the nationality of ethnic Chinese in Malaysia. 
The question of nomad nationality, however, was often entirely overlooked by departing 
colonial administrations. It may be that colonial beliefs that nomads cannot form states or 
hold a nationality apart from membership in their tribes played a role in the lack of 
attention paid to the chance of nomad statelessness, but more research is needed. 
Importantly, as this section showed, colonial structures had clearly favoured settled and 
urban populations and rulers, meaning that nomads already entered the post-colonial 
period at a severe political disadvantage, divided by borders and lacking international 
representation and clout. Even in the Tuareg example, colonial policy had split the Tuareg 
amongst different states, weakened the noble class and greatly centralized power in the 
urban and agricultural south of Mali, meaning that the recognition and naturalization of a 
few Tuareg leaders ultimately did little to afford the Tuareg with a strong voice during 
decolonization. Whatever the reason, the political aspirations of nomads were almost 
entirely overlooked during decolonization. 
In conclusion, in many ways, decolonization marked a deterioration, not an improvement, 
in the status of nomads. It may be tempting to see the exclusion of many nomads as simply 
an accident of the registration process due to understandable difficulties in the logistics of 
registering large numbers of people, particularly mobile peoples in so-called remote areas 
that were newly divided among sovereign states. This section weighs heavily against this 
interpretation, though negligence, lack of interest from the nomadic population and 
difficulties in accessing rural and mobile populations played their roles. While the 
examination of how nationality laws in Kuwait, Mali and Malaysia exposes rampant 
discrimination against nomads, in some cases, however, the term discrimination is frankly 
inadequate to describe the depths of the rights violations against nomads. The case of the 
175 
 
Tuareg goes far beyond what could reasonably be described as discrimination and crosses 
into active persecution. 916F917 
What is missing from this section is an examination of the underlying factors that drove 
many governments to leave their nomadic populations unregistered. While statelessness is 
often undesirable for states, this is not always the case. In some cases, statelessness may be 
a tool used by governments to exclude individuals or groups deemed undesirable to the 
state in some way. 917F918 The next section will discuss the forces that drive statelessness and 
exclusion for nomads in more detail, including an examination of how both nationality and 
statelessness have been used by states to accomplish certain goals with respect to nomads. 
The next section will look at the economic, social and political context surrounding the 
inclusion of nomads to show how larger forces shaped the implementation of nationality 
law in Kuwait, Mali and Malaysia. This context is critical to understanding why nomad 
statelessness was not resolved in the decades following decolonization, even though 
methods were available under the law to do so. 
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2.3 State-building and the Exclusion of Nomads 
The desire of new territorial states to control and sedentarise (nomads) took 
different ideological forms, from coercive administration to more lenient 
incorporation.918F919 
Introduction 
The last section explored the nationality laws and policies of colonial and post-colonial 
states, explaining how many nomads ended up unregistered and often stateless under the 
laws and policies of Kuwait, Mali and Malaysia. It also documented how registration and 
nationality were tightened to create inter-generational statelessness in some nomad 
communities. But while the legal analysis of the last section touched upon the 
discrimination and sometimes persecution suffered by many nomads during the post-
colonial period, it did not explore the deeper drivers of this exclusion. It did not explore the 
political, social and economic factors that drove the creation and implementation of more 
restrictive nationality polices from decolonization to the present day. 
The contested status of nomads and cases of statelessness among nomadic peoples could 
have been resolved over the decades. Yet, for many nomads, this did not occur. Rather, 
their statelessness became entrenched over multiple generations. Given that statelessness 
is usually understood to be destabilizing and undesirable for states, 919F920 the question 
becomes, why didn’t successive post-colonial administrations take steps to resolve the 
status of nomads in the decades to follow? 
As this section will show, the reasons why nomad statelessness was not resolved can be 
grouped into two interrelated post-colonial goals. The first goal was the perceived need to 
unify post-colonial states around a founding myth and shared history. This was difficult to 
do in the post-colonial context of multi-ethnic populations with diverse histories and 
recently fixed, disputed borders. As minorities, many nomads found themselves the target 
of discrimination. Yet discrimination against minorities is not the only factor at play. 
Second, important economic transformations overtook many post-colonial states during 
the 20th century. The ongoing statelessness of the Bedouin, Tuareg and Sama Dilaut is 
closely linked to the discovery of natural resources and the growth of tourist parks in lands 
occupied by nomads and the measures taken by states to exclusively control these 
resources and parks. Forced settlement and the removal of nomads from their lands 
therefore continued to be important goals during the post-colonial period. 
 
919 Beaugrand, Stateless, 2018, 44-45. 
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To accomplish these goals, post-colonial governments would adopt the rhetoric and 
policies towards nomads of the colonial period. As anthropologist Dawn Chatty put it: 
Administrators regard pastoral populations as sources of trouble, backward entities 
that stand in the way of national progress. The only overall solution then suggested 
is the enforced settlement of the pastoral populations... 920F921 
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National Unity and the Exclusion of Minorities as Drivers of Nomad Exclusion 
All of us relate to states, the political units into which the world is divided, by 
means of both law and emotion. 921F922 
This section will explore how the nationality laws describe in the last section were used by 
the governments of Kuwait, Mali and Malaysia to achieve national unity, a major problem 
for post-colonial states, and the need in many states to balance power between different 
political and ethnic groups. While as Part 2 explored, unifying the population in the 
colonies was decidedly not a goal of colonization, it would become a major goal of post-
colonial governments.  
Many post-independence political leaders have consequently been faced with 
the hard task of welding into a nation peoples diverse in language, ethnicity 
and religion.922F923 
This section explores some of the underlying factors that led to the drafting and 
implementation of nationality laws. It accepts that crucial to understanding statelessness is 
moving beyond an examination of, 
strictly legal responses to...statelessness in the light of state resistance to 
legal reform, discrimination, or other political factors (for example 
institutional weakness, conflict, or political instability). 923F924 
During decolonization, the governments of newly formed states like Kuwait, Mali and 
Malaysia began ambitious programs of state-building. Forging a common national identity 
around a unified nationality was a key part of this project. As a result, places where colonial 
administrators had used a more hands-off approach towards nomads would now be 
subjected to aggressive centralization and assimilation. This section will explore how the 
goal of national unity influenced ongoing discrimination against nomads in the granting of 
nationality and the resolution of statelessness.  
The status of nomads would also continue to be influenced by scholarship on nomadism.924F925 
Where relevant, this section will mention how scholarship on nomads and statehood also 
influence nationality laws and policies. 
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925 For a summary of some of these views, see E. Isin and P. Wood, ‘Citizenship and Identity’ in H. Gulalp, 
Citizenship and Ethnic Conflict: Challenging the state (Routledge 2009) 64. 
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National Identity in Kuwait 
 
The Red Fort at Jahra 
 
(T)he history of the biduns is closely intertwined with that of the nascent 
state...925F926 
An aim, if never explicitly stated, of all Gulf governments in the years 
following independence has been to forge a national identity and shared 
history.926F927 
The proceeding section outlined the exclusion of certain Bedouin tribes from Kuwaiti 
nationality following the termination of the protectorate agreement, focusing on an 
analysis of the law and its application to the Bedouin. But the above section did not explore 
the root causes of this exclusion. While it touched upon some of the factors that 
preoccupied the Kuwaiti government during this time, legal analysis of Kuwait’s laws and 
an overview of its nationality policies cannot explain the discrimination that drove much of 
this exclusion. This section will explore political, sociological and economic forces that 
drove the implementation of Kuwait’s nationality laws. This section relies on both 
academic sources and some non-academic sources, which are used to illuminate public 
debate and government positions. 
Forging a unified national identity was an urgent goal for the Al-Sabah family in light of 
Kuwait’s precarious security situation. The divide between Kuwaiti nationals and non-
nationals has become a driving force in Kuwaiti politics. 927F928 At the end of the protectorate 
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agreement, security from external invasion would become one of the most important issues 
for the Kuwaiti government. The issue of borders would plague Kuwait throughout the 
20th century and complicate the question of Kuwaiti belonging. The legitimacy of the Al-
Sabah family as the rulers of Kuwait would be frequently called into question now that they 
could no longer rely on overt British support.  
Part 2 highlighted the importance of the military abilities of the Bedouin in late 19th and 
early 20th century Gulf politics. In particular, it looked at the role of the Bedouin in 
supporting inland rulers like Ibn Saud. 928F929 The question of Bedouin loyalty would continue 
to plague Gulf state rulers, even as the Emir of Kuwait continued to rely on Bedouin troops 
to serve in Kuwait’s army. During this period, the perceived ties of many Bedouin to what 
were now the governments of neighbouring states continued to call their loyalty into 
question. It should be noted that the integration of the Bedouin into the current system of 
territorial states in the Gulf has been a problem for governments across the region. 
Speaking of the Bedouin in the region today more generally, Chatty explains that, 
(i)n spite of a lingering sentimentality toward the Bedouin that has deep historic 
roots, the popular consensus over the past few decades has been that these tribes 
are a major obstacle to social and economic development. 929F930 
Influencing the issue of Bedouin inclusion was the issue of Kuwait’s recently created 
borders and its territorial expansion beyond Kuwait Town to include areas of desert 
dominated by the Bedouin. 930F931 Ibn Saud in Saudi Arabia had begun aggressively courting 
the disaffected Bedouin populations, arguably in an attempt to concentrate Bedouin tribes, 
and Bedouin power, in Saudi Arabia. 931F932 The existence of Kuwait seemed to be under threat. 
With Kuwait’s borders little more than lines drawn on maps by the British, the nationality 
of the Bedouin was deeply implicated in Kuwait’s security situation. 932F933 The supposed 
militarism of the Bedouin, however, was also linked to perceived cultural differences been 
Bedouin society and that of urban areas. 
The idea of Kuwait had long meant Kuwait Town and its urban, merchant population. 
Lund-Johansen calls this the “urban-centred" conception of nationality.933F934 Post-
independence, this conception of Kuwait, the conception of a city-state, would have to 
change. “Until independence in 1961, the term Kuwaitis was used to refer exclusively to the 
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inhabitants of the town of Kuwait.” 934F935 Now, Kuwaiti identity as a territorial state 
encompassing both desert and town needed to be created at decolonization, constructed 
around an “imagined community located within a specific territory and with a specific 
common history.”935F936  
Kuwaiti identity would come to be deeply influenced by a division in Kuwaiti society 
between people of urban, settled descent, the Hathar, and people of Bedouin descent, the 
Bedu. This section will explore how Kuwaiti nationality law and policy both grew out of the 
Bedu/Hathar divide, but also reinforced it. As Part 2 showed, ideas about the supposed 
tribal nature of nomadic societies permeate the distinction between Bedu and Hathar. 
Wilkinson cites to Ibn Khaldun, a noted 18th century historian of the region:  
Hadar is the organization of a central government system...(while) badw is not 
Bedouin (nomads) but tribally organized society whose elite operates from oasis 
settlement... 936F937  
In general, the term Bedu is now used across the Gulf region to refer to people who are 
from the desert, whether or not they are settled (or are technically descended from 
nomadic Bedouin tribes), versus the urban-dwelling Hathar. 937F938 Today, the term Bedu has 
become a cultural identifier, rather than a reference to nomadism, but the association with 
the nomadic Bedouin tribes of history remains strong. 938F939 As a result, the fact that all 
Bedouin in Kuwait are now settled has not affected their identity as Bedu. 
The term badu designates a socio-cultural category that refers less to an 
economic, nomadic or sedentarised dimension than social values and behaviors: 
badu share a set of images of themselves with regard to their active or real 
common lineage, values and attributes, including commonality of interests, the 
reciprocity of obligations, common residence that continues once settled and the 
importance placed on marriages and alliances. 939F940 
“Bedu...conveys a sense of otherness...”940F941 It distils certain common assumptions that tribal 
societies, like nomadic societies, are naturally stateless, a view widely shared by European 
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colonizers, as Part 2 discussed. Speaking of the Middle East, anthropologist Dawn Chatty 
puts it thus:  
Central governments, particularly in the Middle East, generally regard non-
sedentary populations as tribes, forming states within a state, and constituting a 
national problem. 941F942 
The association between Bedu and so-called tribalism has arguably influenced the 
perception of the Bedu as somehow unsuited for nationality and the responsibilities of 
voting. The Bedu vote has become increasingly associated with opposition to the 
government and social and cultural backwardness. 942F943 The Hathar have opposed any 
discussion of further naturalization. 943F944 The voting choices of the naturalized Bedu 
population came under increased criticism and the idea of including more Bedu was now 
an anathema to many Kuwaiti nationals. 944F945 Though being bidoon entitled the individual to 
many of the same rights as naturalized Kuwaitis in the 1960s, this would change over the 
decades as the entitlements of the bidoon were gradually reduced. 945F946 The tension between 
the Bedu and Hathar elements of Kuwaiti society is now a prominent part of Kuwaiti life 
and arguably impacts the views of the bidoon held by many Kuwaiti nationals.  
Meanwhile, Bedouin history has long been romantically celebrated in many Gulf states, 
even as the descendants of the Bedouin have been excluded from nationality in places like 
Kuwait. Ibn Khaldun himself advocated for the superiority of the Bedouin lifestyle over that 
of town dwelling. 946F947 A certain nostalgia therefore permeates Kuwaiti views of the Bedouin 
today, even as the Bedu are looked upon as a social and political problem. The 
administrative implementation of nationality in Kuwait therefore perpetuated and 
reinforced a divide between Bedu and Hathar, a division implicit in Kuwait’s nationality 
law, as discussed above, and a divide which continued long after the settlement of the 
Bedouin and their assimilation into urban life. 947F948 
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In an attempt to create a founding myth around which Kuwaiti identity could coalesce, the 
Kuwaiti government embraced the Battle of Jahra as the founding myth of Kuwaiti identity. 
According to al-Nakib, the Battle of Jahra has been broadly recast in modern Kuwait as the 
Hathar defending Kuwait Town against invading Bedouin, though not all Bedouin are 
viewed by the government as playing the same role in this event. 948F949 Some tribes helped to 
defend the town. It became crucial to Kuwaiti politics to provide these Bedouin with some 
sort of official status. 
Today, however, this interdependence between Kuwait’s pre-oil sedentary and 
nomadic worlds has been replaced with a popular rhetoric that identifies the badu 
as antagonistic outsiders. The building of a fortified town wall (sur) in 1920 has 
become emblematic of this supposed conflict between town and desert. 949F950 
The first body of Kuwaiti nationals were therefore defined by their settlement in Kuwait 
Town and other coastal, urban areas before the Battle of Jahra, thereby granting full 
membership only those families who had taken part in this foundation event, a group that 
would come to be known as the Hathar population. 950F951 The Hathar now saw themselves as 
“the people from within the wall,” while the Bedouin were from “beyond the wall.”951F952 
Kuwait’s nationality law both reflected the identity of Kuwait as a Hathar nation, while also 
reinforcing that identity. But the increasingly educated and political Hathar population 
would come to pose a threat to the Kuwaiti monarchy and drive the push to naturalize 
some Bedouin. 
In 1938, the Al-Sabah family created a parliament to represent the other powerful 
merchant families that made up Kuwait’s Hathar elite. 952F953 While political parties in Kuwait 
were banned, Parliament had some authority, particularly a say over legislation and the 
appointment of ministers, and would play some role in the drafting and enacting of laws in 
Kuwait.953F954 Keeping a favourable balance of factions in Parliament would come to dominate 
the Al-Sabah family’s policies for the coming decades. The ruling Al-Sabah family would 
struggle to balance the influence of various populations within Kuwait, including internal 
divisions between various religious and economic factions, between the Bedu and Hathar 
population, and between nationals and immigrants. This balancing act would drive Kuwaiti 
nationality policy. In the 1960s, the merchant elite in Kuwait City became increasingly 
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liberal and westernized, attending universities abroad and agitating for a more democratic 
government with a stronger parliament.  
Nevertheless, the Al-Sabahs looked to their desert Bedouin allies with their so-called 
traditional values to balance the educated, urban Hathar. An immediate goal of the Al-
Sabah family was therefore to select a group of Bedouin, headed by sheikhs chosen for their 
loyalty to the Emir, who would be assimilated into Kuwait to help balance the Hathar 
population and serve in Kuwait’s military as naturalized Kuwaitis. 954F955 The Al-Sabah family 
decided to naturalize one hundred thousand Kuwaiti Bedouin in exchange for their political 
support.955F956 These Bedouin were granted a second-tier status of naturalized Kuwaitis. 956F957 
Naturalization would allow the Bedouin to vote and the Al-Sabah family assumed that the 
Bedouin, who were politically conservative, would view their allegiance as being to the 
person of the Emir and not to the Parliament. 957F958 They were not, however, recognized as 
original Kuwaitis under the law, but were instead naturalized, as described above.  
Naturalization favoured those Bedouin who had settled and joined the army and those with 
established ties to the Al-Sabah family.958F959 Naturalization would provide only limited rights 
and access to services for these Bedouin without placing them on the same footing as 
original Kuwaitis. 959F960 During the 1960s and 1970s, Bedouin in the military who were not 
naturalized often qualified for many state benefits, meaning that their lack of naturalization 
was not an issue beyond their lack of enfranchisement. 960F961 This lessened the value of 
nationality to many Bedouin in the post-colonial period as social benefits were available 
them. As the above section described, the process of naturalization was discriminatory, 
extra-legal and arguably done in contravention of Kuwait’s nationality law. Meanwhile, 
though often employed in low level jobs, many other Bedouin ended up without a 
nationality status at all, excluded from Kuwait’s national identity even as they lived and 
worked in Kuwait. This population, though similar to the naturalized Bedu in many 
respects, became the bidoon. 
 
955 Longva, Citizenship, 187. See also Parolin 116; S. Yanai, The Political Transformation of Gulf Tribal States: 
Elitism and the Social Contract in Kuwait, Bahrain and Dubai: 1918-1970s (Sussex 2014) 223-225, 234. 
956 G. Power, ‘The Difficult Development of Parliamentary Politics in the Gulf,’ in D. Held and K. Ulrichsen, The 
Transformation of the Gulf: Politics, Economics and the Global Order (Routledge 2012) 33. See also Ismael, 125. 
 
957 Salih, 144. 
958 Longva, Citizenship, 180. See also Power, 33; H. al-Mughni and M. A. Tetreault, ‘Political Actors without the 
Franchise,’ in P. Dresch and J. Piscatori (eds.) Monarchies and Nations: Globalisation and Identity in the Arab 
States of the Gulf (Tauris 2005) 218; Al-Nakib 7; Beaugrand, Transnationalism, 2010, 137; Neighboring 
countries Saudia Arabia and Iraq also attempted to settle and assimilate their Bedouin populations around 
this time. See Chatty, Pastoralists, 19-20. 
959 Al-Nakib, 12. 
960 Longva, Citizenship, 188. 
961 Longva, Citizenship, 188. See also Al-Nakib, 12-13. 
186 
 
To many Hathar, the Bedouin were incapable of understanding modern nationality and 
civic participation. The Bedu were “something less than Kuwaiti” and not deserving of full 
membership in the state. 961F962 Naturalization appeared to be a government handout and 
political ploy, rather than the resolution of the status of a large section of Kuwait’s 
population.962F963 Many Hathar saw the newly naturalized Bedouin as having pledged 
allegiance to the Al-Sabah family in exchange for handouts from the state, rather than as 
loyal nationals.963F964 Many members of the military, however, remained bidoon, a fact which 
has caused what Longva called a “constant headache” for the government. 964F965 Yet, at the 
same time, naturalization became increasingly untenable politically. As a result, Kuwait 
ended up with a large number of bidoon serving in the military, but naturalizing too many 
Bedouin was not politically possible and became less so over time.965F966  
Attractive pay generated by the oil industry meant that some Bedouin living in Saudi 
Arabia also went to work in Kuwait in the post-independence period. 966F967 These Bedouin 
often had family connections to the recently settled Bedouin of Kuwait and were in some 
cases invited to Kuwait by the government. As a result, the bidoon population became a 
mixture of Bedouin who had settled near urban areas in Kuwait at different periods. During 
this time, many of the social services available to bidoon began to be removed and the 
bidoon were excluded from all but the lowest level jobs, often working in the informal 
sector, and had limited access to education and welfare. 967F968 Because the bidoon were not 
nationals, they could not own businesses, so jobs in the military became the main 
employment option for the Bedouin, particularly those who were not naturalized. 968F969 
Meanwhile, Bedouin settling in urban areas to work in the military or oil fields were soon 
joined by large numbers of immigrants. In the decades following the end of the 
protectorate agreement with Britain, oil wealth began to bring a huge influx of foreigners to 
Kuwait, both from within and without the region. This immigration happened throughout 
all occupations, from educated professionals to domestic workers. 969F970 By 1965, Kuwaiti 
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nationals were a minority in their own country. 970F971 Migrant workers came first from 
Palestine and, later, from Southeast Asia.  
The immigrant label was also extended to Bedouin tribes who had not been naturalized, 
even though they originated within the region.971F972 At this point, Kuwait began to turn away 
from pan-Arab nationalism that sought to unify all tribes in favour of a policy including 
some tribes while labelling others as foreign. 972F973 Nomadism was now conflated with 
immigration.973F974 They Hathar increasingly viewed the bidoon as “trespassers” and 
“foreigners.”974F975 Beaugrand refers to those Bedouin families who would one day make the 
bidoon population “near foreigners," 975F976 capturing their fuzzy status as somehow both 
closely connected to Kuwait yet the residents of elsewhere. Today, in popular Kuwaiti 
discourse, the term bidoon means simply foreigner, even when applied to bidoon of 
Bedouin descent. 976F977 This has been aided by the fact that the category bidoon also includes a 
small population of the children of foreign fathers and Kuwaiti mothers, as Kuwaiti women 
cannot pass their nationality to their children. This latter category, however, is probably 
less than 5% of the total bidoon population.977F978 Nevertheless, it adds to the perception that 
bidoon equals “foreign.” 
In this way, the Bedouin would come to occupy a space somewhere between Kuwaiti and 
foreigner, a vagueness in status that the Kuwaiti government would never resolve. The 
question of the exclusive allegiance of the Bedouin to the Kuwaiti government would 
remain the subject of debate in Kuwait to the present day. Bedouin belonging is now 
predicated almost entirely on the perceived loyalty to the Al-Sabah family of one’s tribe. 
(I)t is only through the aid of tribalism that people can earn their ‘citizenship’, 
residency, and jobs. Currently a sizable number of Bedouins have been denied the 
right to citizenship. Without citizenship, they do not have free access to such basic 
services as education, medical care and housing. It is only through the mediation 
of tribal sheiks that citizenship can be earned. 978F979 
 
971 Ismael 117. Between 1965 and 1970, the Kuwaiti population increased by 62,000 and between 1970 and 
1975 it increased by 38,000. 
972 Longva, Citizenship, 183. 
973 Ismael, 121-124. See also Longva, Citizenship, 183. 
974 Longva, Citizenship, 182. 
975 Longva, Citizenship, 187. 
976 Beaugrand, Stateless, 2018 4. 
977 Longva, Citizenship, 188. See also Lund-Johansen 1. I am indebted to Professor Alwuhaib for his insights 
on this point. 
978 Beaugrand, Transnationalism, 2010, 140; Conversations with bidoon activists. Lund-Johansen, 1-2. 
979 Salih, 143. 
188 
 
Bedouin were chosen for naturalization based on a combination of factors including 
perceived tribal loyalty to the Al-Sabah family and the time and manner in which they 
settled in the territory that is now Kuwait. 979F980 Yet it is important to note that many Bedouin 
who would later come to serve in the military were not naturalized. Many Bedouin who 
joined the military in later decades would remain bidoon, despite their service. 980F981 Rather, 
historical ties to the Al-Sabah family, past military service at key moments in Kuwait’s 
history, and ties to Kuwait’s territory were the most important factors driving 
naturalization: 
There are eight major tribal groups in Kuwait: al-‘Awazim (al-Awazems), al-
Mutayri (al-Mutair), al-‘Ajman, al-Rashayda (al-Rashaida), al-‘Utaybi, al-‘Inzi, al-
Zufayri, and al-Shammari. Al-‘Awazim is one of the oldest tribal groups that 
settled in Kuwait. Its members live mostly along the coastal strip which extends to 
Saudi Arabia, from where its parliamentary representatives come...Like al-‘Ajman, 
al-Rashayda is also a famous tribal group in the Arabian Peninsula, due to the 
fierce battles it fought with the Ottomans at the end of the nineteenth century. As 
a result, many members of this tribe migrated to Egypt and Sudan...Al ‘Utaybi 
tribe has played a dominant role in the Wahabi movement and in the conflicts 
which erupted in the Peninsula during the formation of the third Saudi state...Al-
Zufayri is one of the most influential tribes in the north western part of Kuwait, 
and, in particular, they are located on the border areas between Iraq, Kuwait and 
Saudi Arabia (Hofrat al-Batin). Unlike other tribes, the settlement of al-Zufayri in 
Kuwait’s urbanised areas came late and that is why many members of the tribe do 
not have Kuwaiti citizenship...Al-Shammari was forced to migrate to Kuwait 
following political conflicts in the Najd area... 981F982 
Certain tribes who are claimed to have played a role in defending Kuwait Town from Iraqi 
and Saudi invaders are now prominent in Kuwaiti politics, including the al-Awazems, the 
al-Mutair, the al-Ajman and the al-Rashaida.982F983 By contrast, according to Human Rights 
Watch, many stateless Bedouin who now hold the status of bidoon, or being without a 
status in Kuwait, come from the al-Shammari and Aneza tribes. 983F984 Beaugrand claims that 
the majority of the bidoon populations comes from what are sometimes referred to as the 
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“northern Arabian tribes,” specifically the “Shammar, Dhatir and Anaza.”984F985 As Beaugrand 
puts it; 
Biduns claim their entitlement to first degree Kuwaiti nationality on the basis of a 
pre-state understanding of sovereignty and territoriality, when political power 
was associated with the control of inland tribes, together with the trade routes 
they commanded and far-flung military resources they could mobilize so that 
their immemorial roaming patterns and seasonal musabila (Bedouin’s seasonal 
visits to the town markets for the sale and purchase of goods) is as good a proof of 
their presence in the North Arabian region.985F986 
Therefore, in addition to past service in the protection of Kuwait’s towns, the time at which 
various tribes settled near urban areas and took up wage employment was also a key factor 
in the extent to which they received a nationality. Over time, the identity of individual 
Bedouin tribes settled in Kuwait but without nationality became subsumed into that of the 
bidoon, a population of poor people living on the margins of Kuwaiti society. By the 1990s, 
naturalized Bedouin made up 60% of Kuwaiti nationals. 986F987 
It should be noted that much of what is cited above continues to be contested history. The 
intent of this section is not to plunge into the debate of where various Bedouin tribes come 
from, or to provide a definitive history of Kuwait’s Bedouin tribes, but rather to explain 
how the issue of Bedouin allegiance and origins came to be the deciding factor for their 
nationality status. There appears to be some general agreement among sources that the al-
Shammari, who are a powerful tribe in Iraq, the Al-Aneza, a powerful Syrian tribe with 
connections to Iraq, and the Al-Zufayri tribe from northern Kuwait most frequently found 
themselves without Kuwaiti nationality, though the government of Kuwait also claims that 
many of the bidoon are actually faking their tribal origins, a fact which complicates efforts 
to summarize Bedouin history. 987F988  
Some sources point to the fact that some bidoon have family origins in Syria and came to 
Kuwait more recently, though it is not the purpose of this dissertation to take a view on the 
extent to which individual bidoon families had ties to Kuwait Town before decolonization 
or migrated to Kuwait in the post-independence period. 988F989 Beaugrand argues that many 
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Bedouin who later came to settle in what is now Kuwait had what she calls “transnational” 
ties to the region 989F990 including ties to Saudi Arabia, 990F991 but it is not clear what this means in 
light of the recent nature of Kuwait’s colonial borders in the desert. Citing Rania Maktabi, 
Beaugrand notes that some naturalized Bedouin were “Saudi and Iraqi.”991F992 More 
independent research would need to be done to establish the historical claims of individual 
Bedouin families to Kuwaiti nationality under the laws at the time. Crucial would be an 
interpretation of the term “settlement” under Kuwaiti law.  
In the 1980s, the Kuwaiti government became increasingly concerned that the bidoon 
population was being infiltrated by what they called outside agitators, particularly agents 
from Iraq.992F993 This view was accompanied by new documentation requirements for the 
bidoon, now for security reasons, and was accompanied by the termination of the 
naturalization program, as discussed above.993F994 The war in Iraq would be devastating for 
the status of the bidoon, cementing the association between them and Iraq and elevating 
them as a security risk to the state. Because many settled Bedu lived to the north of Kuwaiti 
City near Al-Jahra, they were the first to flee during the invasion, further adding to the 
perception that they were disloyal to Kuwait. 994F995 During the Iraqi occupation, the 
Provisional Government contained many bidoon and the Iraqi authorities forced all bidoon 
to register for the army or face execution. Many Bedu families who lived on the outskirts of 
towns fled to Saudi Arabia where they had relatives. These facts combined to paint a 
devastating picture of bidoon “loyalty.”995F996 The invasion was the last straw for many Hathar 
Kuwaitis, who now equated the bidoon with Iraqi supporters and other dangerous 
foreigners.996F997 After the restoration of the Al-Sabah family and the Kuwaiti government, 
those bidoon who had fled abroad were prohibited from returning, 997F998 and many others 
were fired from their jobs or required to inform on their neighbours. This occurred despite 
 
990 Beaugrand, Stateless, 2018, 62. 
991 Beaugrand, Stateless, 2018, 193-194. 
992 Beaugrand, Stateless, 2018, 86, citing R. Maktabi, ‘The Gulf Crisis (1990-91) and the Kuwaiti regime – 
Legitimacy and Stability in a Rentier state’ (Master’s thesis, U. Oslo 1992).  
993 Longva, Citizenship, 188. 
994 Beaugrand, Transnationalism, 2010, 150. 
995 Longva, Citizenship, 188-191. Longva argues that this debate represents a continuation of the different 
views of nationality by the Bedu and Hathar, where the Bedu see nationality as based on allegiance to the Al-
Sabah family, while the Hathar see it as allegiance to the nation and territory of Kuwait. Longva, 192-193. 
996 Longva, Citizenship, 189. 
997 Longva, Citizenship, 188. See also Lund-Johansen 33. 
998 Beaugrand, Stateless, 2018, 17. 
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a court ruling in 1998 that bidoon were stateless people and not aliens. 998F999 Being bidoon had 
for many become synonymous with being Iraqi. 999F1000 These events would produce a toxic 
situation for the bidoon, who were now issued papers claiming their origin as Iraqi.1000F1001 
The problem of the bidoon, whose statelessness was wholly created by the Kuwaiti 
government, would be recast as an issue of national security.  1001F1002 The so-called solution, 
however, did not involve naturalization but rather involved increasingly extreme schemes 
to deport the bidoon. While Beaugrand points out that in actual fact, neither Iraq nor Saudi 
Arabia have made direct claims of nationality on Kuwaiti bidoon, it was undeniable that 
during the Iraq wars, the question of the status of Kuwaiti bidoon became a highly 
politicized pressure point on Kuwait. 1002F1003 During the war, some Iraqis may have entered the 
bidoon population, possibility doubling it in size and further linking the concept of bidoon 
to being from Iraq. 1003F1004  
With time, many naturalized Bedouin have achieved a lifestyle and standard of living 
similar to the Hathar. 1004F1005 For the bidoon, however, life had only gotten more difficult. 1005F1006 
As time went on, assistance programs for the bidoon began to be seen as expensive and fell 
out of favour.1006F1007 As well, the Bedu stopped being such dependable allies for the Al-Sabah 
family and now often vote with the opposition. 1007F1008 At the same time, the government 
increasingly equated the bidoon with migrants from other parts of Arabia, blurring the 
distinction between nomads and economic migrants. Recasting the bidoon as immigrants 
helped to legitimize their continued statelessness while political, economic and social 
factors lessened the appeal of the resolution of their status. 1008F1009 Recently, the government 
has used denationalization as a way to punish naturalized former Bedouin (Bedu) accused 
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of forgery during naturalization. 1009F1010 Beaugrand hypothesizes that such acts are linked to 
the modern tendency of what is often called tribal political groups to vote in opposition to 
the government. 1010F1011 
For the purposes of the argument over the registration of the bidoon as without a status, 
the existence of Kuwait’s borders is treated as an unchanging fact rather than something 
that developed over time, during a period of external influence, and overlaid an earlier 
system of belonging and membership that was not exclusively territorial in nature. The 
complexities and fluid nature of the relationship between town and desert described in 
Part 2 were reduced to a dichotomy of territorial insiders and outsiders that has now 
ossified. Ironically, in adopting and defending the territorial concept of the state, the so-
called foreign status of the bidoon is now used as a moral justification for itself, part of what 
defines Kuwaiti nationality. 1011F1012 
As the next section will discuss, below, while the question of national unity and the 
inclusion of minority groups, including the Bedouin, was a major factor driving Kuwait’s 
nationality policy, other important factors were at work that are crucial to understanding 
Bedouin exclusion. The statelessness of the bidoon was taking place against the backdrop of 
a dramatic regional struggle for oil that would dramatically raise the importance of the 
question of the loyalty and belonging of the so-called Bedu population and control over 
what had been Bedouin lands. First, the next section will turn back to the Mali example to 
explore how nationality identity and the push for national unity influenced Malian 
nationality law and the status of the Tuareg. 
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National Identity in Mali 
 
Mali’s original flag with the Kanaga figure of the Dogon people, associated with the Négritude 
movement. 
 
Exclusion can be a way of affirming the boundaries of the nation when 
loyalty or unity is most needed by political elites. 1012F1013 
As the above section showed, Mali’s nationality law contained considerable protections 
against inter-generational statelessness, including the use of double-birth. Yet, many 
Malian Tuareg today lack documents to prove their nationality. This section will look at the 
civil war in northern Mali to help explain why Mali’s nationality law has not prevented 
Tuareg statelessness. This section will look at how the Malian government pursued the goal 
of national unity in northern Mali in order to fend of what it perceived as a serious threat of 
Tuareg separatism. The sources for this section are primarily academic, but U.N. and World 
Bank reports are used where needed to provide current information. In person interviews 
were also conducted with experts to provide information that is otherwise lacking. 
For the Malian government, national unity would come to be one of the major goals of 
the post-independence period. 1013F1014 As in many Sahel countries, the fight to prevent 
Tuareg succession would have an impact on how Mali’s nationality law was applied to 
the Tuareg.  
(In Africa, p)olitical elites have battled over nationality as a specific tool to restrict 
the scope of contestation and render powerful opponents illegitimate by virtue of 
non-national status. 1014F1015 
Like Kuwait, Mali was a diverse region without a common religion, culture or history, a 
creation of colonial borders. Like with the Bedouin, concerns over territorial sovereignty 
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would fuel Tuareg exclusion. 1015F1016 As this section will show, the inclusion of the Tuareg into 
the Malian state would present the biggest challenge to Mali’s post-colonial integrity. The 
experience of the Tuareg in Mali is an example of how statelessness can be both the cause, 
and the result, of conflicts over colonial-era borders.1016F1017 In particular, this section will 
focus on how forced settlement and assimilation of the Tuareg minority fuelled separatism 
and a debate over Tuareg nationality. Ryser calls decolonization a “failure” in Africa 
because it created conflict between indigenous groups and their states over land and 
resources.1017F1018 
Since independence from France, there have been four major Tuareg uprisings resulting in 
the mass expulsion and repression of the Tuareg: the first in the early 1960s, the second in 
the early 1990s, the third in 2006 and most recently in 2012, which has led to the current 
vacuum of Malian state authority in northern Mali. The conflicts have involved the three 
northern provinces of Gao, Kidal and Timbuktu, close to 500,000 km squared. 1018F1019  
As the above section explained, as in Kuwait, the colonial powers had elevated settled, 
urban rulers over nomadic leaders in Mali. At independence, the new government, located 
in Bamako far to the south, had to find solutions for the “problem” of their nomadic, Sahel 
populations. 1019F1020 The Malian government in many ways inherited the struggles of the 
French administration to bring nomadism in line with the needs of the territorial state. The 
need to integrate northern Mali would dominate Malian politics to the present day.  
Like Kuwait, the belonging of the Tuareg would come to be reframed as an issue not of 
nationality and belonging, but of national security, with devastating consequences. 
(T)he practice of African pastoralism...has always transcended State borders but 
must now take into account of constraints linked to migrations, terrorism, organized 
crime, insecurity... 1020F1021  
In Kuwait, the “problem” of nomadic populations was solved through the nationality law, 
by creating a series of tiers of belonging and a special class of stateless persons. As this 
section will show, the Tuareg qualified for nationality under Malian law, either 
automatically at independence, or subsequently through double birth, yet persecution has 
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led to their statelessness.1021F1022 Instead of being registered as nationals, the Tuareg were 
subjected almost immediately following colonial independence with a period of violent 
repression and, in the case of the northern Kidal region, military rule. As Lecocq puts it, the 
outcome of independence: 
...was not a Malian state, but a state harbouring at least two nascent national 
ideas, if not more: the Malian nation and the Tamasheq nation. 1022F1023 
Unlike the bidoon, who hold an official, government-issued status of “no status,” most 
Tuareg qualified under Mali’s nationality law but remained unregistered.1023F1024 But unlike 
many other rural people in Mali who may lack documents but whose belonging as part of 
Mali is unquestioned, many Tuareg were not simply unregistered due to weak state 
structures, instead, their nationality became the subject of a bitter debate over the 
sovereignty of northern Mali and the place of the Tuareg in Malian society.  
Mali, like many young states in Africa, has a weak sense of national unity and 
national identity. Geography ...undermines (its) national unity...(p)olitical and 
economic power is strongly centered on the urban elites in (the) south of the 
country.1024F1025  
The fact that many Tuareg are unregistered does not, on its own, mean that the Tuareg are 
stateless. As Mark Manly points out, “lack of birth registration is not sufficient to render a 
person stateless.”1025F1026 Nor does economic and political marginalization, 1026F1027 nor minority 
status, on their own, necessarily produce statelessness. As this section will show, however, 
the violence directed against Tuareg communities by the Malian government, coupled with 
government rhetoric of Tuareg being foreigners, means that most Tuareg have lived in 
what is essentially a military sub-state in northern Mali, treated as alien occupiers and 
subversives. Tuareg exclusion therefore extends far beyond the lack of documents 
experienced by many rural Africans.  
 
1022 Based on expert interviews, September 2018 M. Bado of CERAP (available on request), it is likely that 
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The quest for Malian unity began even before the French left. Leopold Sédar Senghor had 
worried that what he called the myth of nationalism was being transmitted to Africa. 1027F1028 
Until relatively late in the colonial game, the proposition that there was a 
Nigerian, Algerian or Congolese ‘nation’ would have been treated as utterly 
ludicrous.1028F1029 
Needing to unify disparate and diverse regions, African leaders in the 1960s were 
incentivized to formulate a cohesive national identity, a process that often led to the 
exclusion of minority groups. But Senghor saw a single national identity as at odds with the 
African sense of a local patrie and the diversity that marked many post-colonial African 
states.1029F1030 As noted in Part 2, the French had done nothing to construct a sense of national 
identity in French Soudan, opting instead to create further divisions by administrating 
separately the nomadic and settled portions of Sahel society. National identity therefore 
had to be constructed at independence by the Mali government, which favoured a southern, 
black African identity, often expressed through the writings of the Négritude 
movement.1030F1031  
Already, as Part 2 discussed, the policies of the French had heavily favoured the settled 
population.1031F1032 The Malian state inherited the colonial structures of the French, including 
the centralized, urban-based administrative divisions of territory and French policies on 
schooling, voting, registration and other aspects of civic life, policies that, as Part 2 showed, 
favoured the sedentary population. 1032F1033 As Part 2 showed, the French had also reoriented 
economic and political power in the region towards the south of the country and away from 
the Sahara caravan trade. 
Mali also faced several new problems with which the French had been wholly unconcerned, 
including the need to shore up its new borders and to develop national unity and a unified 
national identity, as well as an independent economy. 1033F1034 As Part 2 showed, none of these 
issues were of importance to the French, but they would assume primary importance in 
Mali. Race and culture would play a large part in the construction of this unified Malian 
identity. Branding minorities as foreign colonizers would become a way to exclude so-
called problematic individuals or groups, including the Tuareg. The Malian government has 
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often presented the Tuareg as being too closely connected to the French government, as 
being white and as being foreign.1034F1035 
The process of registration of the Tuareg first began as the AOF was being dissolved into 
individual states, with borders being drawn through the heart of the Tuareg region. The 
failure of the Sahara français and the OCRS struck a blow against a separate, or quasi-
independent Tuareg state. The fact that the Tuareg were split across multiple states meant 
that they would now be a tiny minority not only in Mali as a whole, but also in northern 
Mali. Less than 5 percent of the total Malian population today is of Tuareg descent. 1035F1036 As a 
result, government policies on the Tuareg would now be decided by non-Tuareg. 
Malian politics after independence can be divided into two very distinct periods: the 
socialist policies of Modibo Keïta from 1960-1968 and the dictatorship of General Moussa 
Traore from 1968-1991.1036F1037 The early stages of creating the Malian state took place from 
1958 to 1960. 1037F1038 1958 saw the proclamation of the Soudanese republic, which was to 
become Mali. The rapidity of events took many Tuareg by surprise. Instead of a separate, 
Tuareg state, all of northern Mali now became part of the VIth administrative region of 
Mali, which encompassed the Sahara, Sahel and all points north, with the capital at Gao. By 
1959, all of the French administrators had been replaced by Malians. 
At the start, it seemed as if northern Mali was to take part in its own governance. The first 
civil servants appointed were familiar with the north. 1038F1039 In 1960, the first Malian military 
units posted in the north were made up of a mixture of men from the south and the 
north.1039F1040 It seemed as though the Malian state were making an effort to incorporate the 
Tuareg into Mali, in spite of their resistance to Keïta’s one party state. 1040F1041  
Yet these moves papered over the deep divisions between the government and the Tuareg. 
As Hama Ag Sid Ahmed, representative to Europe of the Mouvement Populaire de l’Azawad, 
put it, 
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the ex-French Sudan became independent under the name of Republic of Mali. Its 
borders were drawn since the beginning of colonization as we know, the new 
Malian state extended her sovereignty into our territory by the simple logic of the 
colonial system. 1041F1042 
The Tuareg region was now divided between five separate sovereign states, each 
demanding exclusive loyalty to a distant power centre controlled by others. The centre of 
power for the Tuareg was now located not in Timbuktu or Agadez, but far to the south in 
Bamako.1042F1043 The separated sovereign states would come to have increasingly difficult 
relationships to one another and their borders would become potential sources of conflict. 
The need to control territory defines many African conflicts between minority groups and 
the state.1043F1044 
(T)he geography and politics of the greater colonial project led to states that have 
persistent border disputes with neighbors...and human refugee and migration 
flows.1044F1045 
The “nationalist leadership” of the new states sought legitimacy and security; 
strengthening their borders was a priority.1045F1046 Neighbouring Algeria was also employing 
forced settlement of the Tuareg as a means to control their disputed southern border, 
further cutting Malian Tuareg off from their extended families. 1046F1047 In Mali, according to the 
African Commission; 
the principle of the sanctity of borders is used by all the nation states to deny the 
nomads the right to associate with their kin who find themselves in different 
nation states. One example is that of people who live in Kidal in Mali, which is 
1,500 kilometers from the capital city of Bamako. The nearest city for the 
residents of Kidal is the town of Tinzawaren in Algeria. But because of the sanctity 
of borders, nomads who have no identity cards or travel documents suffer 
harassment when they cross borders to acquire the basic necessities. They are 
often searched, beaten, imprisoned and bribes are often solicited from them, and 
failure to pay leads to the loss of resources purchased. 1047F1048 
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Armed conflict, however, was not the first reaction of the Malian government to the Tuareg. 
Like the French before them, the Keïta government put in place policies of assimilation to 
settle the Tuareg, which it saw as key to economic development, stability and the 
conversion of the Tuareg from a problem to productive members of the Malian state. 
Keïta’s government wanted to solidify Mali’s borders by limiting cross border grazing, 
emancipating the Tuareg slave classes, giving land to the sedentary population, and 
developing agriculture in the region. 1048F1049 In short, they wished to finish the project begun 
by the French. 
In the north, the Keïta regime was “convinced” that agriculture was possible in the Sahel, 
but that the Tuareg were too “lazy” and the French too apathetic to make it work. 1049F1050 The 
Malian government officially adopted a policy of assimilation towards the Tuareg. Diby 
Sillas Diarra, Mali’s administrator in the north, is quoted by Boilley as saying, 
“sedentarisation of the nomad is our objective (in the north).”1050F1051  
Settlement of the Tuareg was explicitly encouraged by the Malian government, but it was 
also a side effect of its broader economic programs. Borders split grazing areas and 
restricted seasonal migration, encouraging settlement, and Mali’s agricultural development 
schemes led to overgrazing, contributing to drought and making pastoralism more 
difficult.1051F1052 Like the French before them, the Malian government also used schooling and 
access to services as tools of assimilation. Education under the Keïta regime became an 
obligation for all Tuareg children, following the French system already so unpopular with 
the Tuareg, and was used as a way to promote socialist ideas. 1052F1053  
The Tamasheq language was banned and children were taught songs and stories that 
focused exclusively on southern Malian culture. 1053F1054 Tuareg culture was presented as 
backward and children were encouraged to reject nomadism. Many children were 
completely cut off from their parents, unable to return home even during vacation because 
of the distances involved. Tuareg children who had been traumatized by the events of the 
rebellion would not forget these early experiences with the Malian state. 1054F1055 Throughout 
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the 1960s, the Tuareg would resist government schooling.1055F1056  In 1967, for example, three 
Tuareg chiefs were executed in Kidal for failing to bring the children of their clans to 
school.  
In this way, the conversion of the local economy to agriculture may be seen less as an 
attempt to transform the economy to something more “productive,” but rather an attempt 
to assimilate the Tuareg into the majority lifestyle of the region, which was settled, 
subsistence agriculture employing a traditional system of land tenure. While Diarra made 
some progress in promoting agriculture, however, ultimately, he would be frustrated in his 
efforts by the economic realities of the Sahel environment, as the French had been before 
him.1056F1057 The drive to assimilate the Tuareg, however, would continue long after Diarra’s 
departure. 
Another way the Keïta government encouraged assimilation was by breaking the authority 
of the Tuareg nomadic noble class, as the French had tried to do before them. As discussed 
above in Part 2, Tuareg society was based around a class system that allowed the noble 
class to focus on nomadism and military protection. Camels had been used by the Tuareg 
nobility to fight Malian troops and conduct the caravan trade, activities that the 
government wished to discourage. 1057F1058 The Tuareg nobility were associated in the minds of 
many Malians with slavery and devastating raids on crops and villages.  
The socialist government rejected the traditional hierarchy of the Tuareg chiefs and sought 
to abolish the Tuareg class structure, employing much more aggressive policies than the 
relatively hands-off approached developed by the French. 1058F1059 Settlement became more and 
more necessary to the noble class, as those noble families who settled in towns had greater 
access to political power and became more wealthy, while those pursing pastoralism 
became more and more impoverished and cut off from any say in their affairs. 1059F1060 
Administrators were appointed without consulting the local population and were chosen 
almost exclusively from among the southern population. 1060F1061  
Freeing the slaves was also a major priority for the Keïta regime, one that would greatly 
increase the size and, therefore, political power of the sedentary population. Both Malian 
political parties vigorously sought the support of the Tuareg slave population following 
independence. 1061F1062 Former slaves were granted land and cattle from their former masters’ 
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herds. In the first elections following independence, the newly liberated population 
enthusiastically embraced voting. 1062F1063 Like the French before them, the Malian government 
saw freeing the slaves both as a humanitarian project of liberation and as part of an effort 
to transform Tuareg society and weaken the power of the nomadic nobility, further 
accelerating the assimilation of the Tuareg. 
This program of assimilation was met with stiff resistance by the Tuareg, as had previous 
programs by the French. But the Keïta regime was far more focused on incorporating and 
assimilating its northern territories into the Malian state than the French had been. As 
Lecocq points out, speaking of Tuareg treatment by the Malian government: 
(A) lack of understanding of nomad social and political organization from the 
side of sedentary peoples leads to the belief that nomads are by definition 
unruly anarchists averse to organization and control. 1063F1064 
The first post-independence elections were scheduled for 1964, but the project of 
assimilating the Tuareg into the Malian state would not last that long. 1064F1065 
Even as it was attempting to assimilate the Tuareg, the new Malian state saw sedition 
everywhere in the north. Persons suspected of sedition could be placed in prison without 
trial for acts against the public order. 1065F1066 The Milice populaire and Brigades de vigilance, 
volunteer cadres mainly of Songhai people, were used to uncover supposed Tuareg sedition 
and subversive activities. Arab and Tuareg groups came under state surveillance.  
Influential Tuaregs who had supported independence of the northern regions came under 
government suspicion, such as Mohammed Makhmoud ould Cheikh, M. Wafy, the founder 
of the Arab-Berber association, and the chief of the Kel Antsar, Mohammed Ali ag Attaher, 
who fled to Morocco. 1066F1067 Keïta justified these laws by saying that the Malian state was 
young and diverse, and “the idea of the State is not yet formed.” 1067F1068 Nation building, 
economic development and humanitarian concerns therefore justified the use of draconian 
measures against the Tuareg. 
The Tuareg developed a “profound resentment” towards southern leaders.1068F1069 Malian 
nationalism and anti-colonialism were seen by the Tuareg as southern chauvinism. For the 
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Malian government, the Tuareg were seen as “troublemakers,” distinct from the national 
identity of Mali, which was black African and engaged in slavery and pseudo-
colonialism.1069F1070 In Mali and Niger, the Tuareg were increasingly treated as outsiders in 
their own country due to the growing perception, often promoted by Tuareg leaders 
themselves, of a sharp cultural and racial divide between “white, northern” nomads and 
“black, southern” agriculturalists.1070F1071 As anthropologist Baz Lecocq put it, 
The Tuareg were thought of (by the government) as white, feudal, racist, pro-
slavery, bellicose and lazy savage nomads, who were used as the vanguard of 
French neo-colonialist and neo-imperialist projects in the mineral-rich 
Sahara.1071F1072 
As a result, there developed a racial and ethnic nature to the Malian conflict, as well as 
discrimination against the Tuareg’s mobile way of life. Today, the government continues to 
classify people from northern Mali according to lifestyle first, (nomadic or sedentary) and 
ethnicity or religion second. 1072F1073  
At first, the Tuareg tried to work within the Malian state. Some Tuareg leaders joined the 
Malian government. 1073F1074 They argued for greater representation of Tuareg at both the 
regional and national level. But Tuareg were largely overlooked for posts in the 
government, despite the existence of an educated elite with a long history of governing 
alongside the French. 1074F1075 Malian officials evidenced a long-running antipathy to nomads in 
general and the Tuareg in particular. 1075F1076 Lecocq describes the Malian government’s 
attitude towards the Tuareg during this period as “paranoid” over separatism and 
revolt.1076F1077  
Like the French before them, the Malian government got involved in the appointment of the 
new Amanokal of the Kel Adagh Tuareg, appointing a member of the ruling family who 
promised to be pro-Mali, echoing French meddling in the Tuareg leadership. 1077F1078 Quickly, 
the relationship between prominent Tuareg and the Malian government deteriorated. 
Those Tuareg arguing for autonomy or independence, such as Muhammad ‘Ali and Ould al-
 
1070 Pezard and Shurkin, 9. See also Lecocq, Desert, 2002, 89. 
1071 Bourgeot, Résistances, 406. See also Lecocq, Desert, 2002 89. 
1072 Lecocq, Desert, 89. 
1073 M. Tiessa-Farma Maiga, Le Mali : de la sècheresse a la rébellion nomade : Chronique et analyse d’un double 
phénomène du contre-développement en Afrique sahélienne (L’Harmattan 1997) 98-108. 
1074 Hall, 311-313. 
1075 Lecocq, Desert, 2002, 138-139. 
1076 Hall, 318. 
1077 Lecocq, Desert, 2002, 173-174. 
1078 Lecocq, Desert, 2002, 146-149. 
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Shaykh, were imprisoned. 1078F1079 The “problem of the north” was presented as a security 
issue, rather than an issue of state legitimacy, minority rights or civic participation. 1079F1080 
In the first years of independence, during the socialist regime, sedentarization 
policies were part of the nation building process through which all Malian 
‘citizens’ had to be assimilated... 1080F1081 
In 1962, an incident between a Tuareg noble and two Malian soldiers in the Kidal region 
would become the catalyst for a local uprising. 1081F1082 The brutal government response would 
engulf the entire Kidal province in violence, which the Tuareg called the Alfellaga, causing 
an exodus of thousands of Tuareg and the end to any real cooperation between nomadic 
Tuareg and the Malian state during the Keïta regime.1082F1083 As many as 5,000 Tuareg from 
Kidal left for Algeria to escape this scorched earth campaign. 1083F1084 Tuareg rebels were put to 
death and the civilian population was treated with cruelty. 1084F1085  
Eventually, the government replaced the Arab, Songhai and Tuareg troops in Kidal with 
soldiers from the south who had no ties to the region, mostly Bambara who had never been 
north before. These forces were under the control of captains who had fought throughout 
the French Empire, equipped with modern weapons and used to dealing with much more 
serious uprisings. 1085F1086 During the conflict, the government declared the border with Algeria 
to be a “no-go” zone, and every person found there was automatically considered to be a 
rebel.1086F1087 To starve out the Tuareg fighters, wells were poisoned, herds killed and Tuareg 
civilians killed or forcibly removed from the area. 1087F1088 Tuareg notables and leaders were 
 
1079 Hall, 314. 
1080 Stewart, 25. 
1081 Randall and Giuffrida, 436. 
1082 Diarrah 86. See also Stewart 32; Bourgeot, Résistances, 233. Two Malian soldiers (a Songhai and a 
Tuareg) attempted to arrest one of the sons of Alla, a famous Tuareg noble who had fought the French. The 
Tuareg youth escaped. The police reacted strongly to this incident, canvassing the area to arrest Alla’s son 
and his friends, targeting the civilian population. In response to this, a small, fractured band of rebels formed, 
mostly Arabs, but with some Tuareg. Boilley, Les Touaregs, 1999, 318-334. 
1083 Lecocq, Desert, 2002, 1. Lecocq notes the use of “(m)igration as a passive form of resistance” to describe 
Tuareg departures both before the during the Alfellaga. Lecocq, Desert, 2002, 82. 
1084 Lecocq, Desert, 2002, 210. 
1085 Boilley, Les Touaregs, 1999, 340. 
1086 Boilley, Les Touaregs, 1999, 329. 
1087 Lecocq, Desert, 2002, 209-211. 
1088 Boilley, Les Touaregs, 1999, 330. See also Lecocq, Desert, 2002, 217. 
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executed.1088F1089 Tuareg rebels were tortured and publicly humiliated, led through the streets 
as captives with their veils removed. 1089F1090  
While effective in smothering the rebellion, these tactics alienated the nomadic population 
and caused a great deal of civilian suffering. 1090F1091 The conflict also ended what little 
cooperation there had been between the Tuareg and the Malian government. Both sides 
now saw the other as an enemy. 1091F1092 
The government declared the conflict over in 1964 as Tuareg resistance collapsed. 1092F1093 But 
for the northern population of Tuareg in Kel Adagh in particular, the consequences of the 
rebellion were severe and long lasting. The brutal government response caused the exodus 
of thousands of Malian Tuareg to neighbouring Algeria and Libya, where many had 
relatives.1093F1094 The social structure of Tuareg life in Kidal had been destroyed and almost a 
thousand people had been killed, as well as a million pastoral animals. 1094F1095 The Kidal region 
was proclaimed a “military zone” under military rule and banned to outsiders until the end 
of the 1980s. 1095F1096  
The experience of being refugees abroad permanently changed the Tuareg, particularly 
those who would be born abroad with no Malian identity documents or ties to the Malian 
state.1096F1097 Young men moved to larger towns in Algeria, or even travelled further afield 
looking for paid work, abandoning pastoralism. Other Tuareg were confined to refugee 
camps, ending their seasonal migration. 1097F1098 Captain Diby Sillas Diarra was appointed as the 
 
1089 Stewart, 33. 
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1096 Boilley, Les Touaregs, 1999, 307, 345, 352-355. 
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Bermudez, ‘Accessing documents, preventing statelessness’ in Institute on Statelessness and Inclusion, The 
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statelessness among refugee children. 
1098 Bourgeot, Résistances, 267. 
205 
 
head of the military, administration, and political party Union Soudanaise-RDA in Kidal. 
The government closed the borders to seasonal migration further limited Tuareg mobility, 
particularly long-distance mobility.1098F1099  
Since 1964, successive Malian governments have consistently portrayed the northern 
conflict as one over national unity and territorial sovereignty, rather than of discrimination. 
The Malian government has consistently held the view that Tuareg succession is a threat to 
the Malian state such that it justifies the treatment of the Tuareg as a security risk, rather 
than as nationals of Mali with rights. As the government put it, 
This problem (the conflict between the government and the Tuareg) is 
extremely complex and touches the very essence of national unity and 
territorial integrity, but it is poorly understood abroad, where it is 
misinterpreted as a war between Whites and Blacks, between Muslims and 
non-Muslims, or between sedentary and nomadic populations. Needless to 
say, this is an oversimplified view, which betrays great ignorance of Mali’s 
situation, with some critics going so far as to talk of attempted genocide of 
one community by the other. 1099F1100 
In 1968, the Keïta government was overthrown in a coup, replaced by the military 
dictatorship of Moussa Traoré.1100F1101 The coup was “enthusiastically” celebrated by many 
Tuareg.1101F1102 Initially, relations between the Tuareg and the Malian state improved, as 
Traoré proclaimed a time of “national reconciliation” and promised to improve relations. 
The socialist program was abandoned, including forced settlement and the government’s 
program to abolish the Tuareg class system. 1102F1103 The Amanokals were restored to power 
and influence within the local government. Some Tuaregs again took part in the political 
life of the country, claiming posts in the National Assembly. 1103F1104  
But while the repression of the north relaxed, true reform did not occur. The region of Kidal 
remained under military rule, outsiders were banned, and the majority of administrative 
posts continued to be occupied by southerners. The surveillance of nomads continued and 
no Tuaregs were appointed to the military. Over time, the regime of Traoré became 
increasingly dictatorial throughout Mali, bringing an end to political participation across 
 
1099 Azarya, 260. The Algerian government also closed its borders. 
1100 Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, Consideration of Reports Submitted by States 
Parties Under Article 9 of the Convention, Fourteenth periodic reports of States parties due in 2001, 
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the country. In 1974, the new Malian Constitution retained one party rule in Mali under the 
Union démocratique du peuple malien (UDPM).1104F1105 
But most importantly for the Tuareg, the dictatorship of Traoré coincided with one of the 
worst droughts to hit the Sahel in modern times. Drought would drive many Tuareg to 
relocate to areas that were now in other countries, greatly increasing the risk of 
statelessness even for those families who were registered with the state. While cyclical 
drought was a part of life in the Sahel, and the 1910-1915 drought had been arguably 
worse than that of the early 1970s, never had the Tuareg been so ill prepared. Years of 
harmful government policies, poor land management and overgrazing combined with 
natural fluctuations in rainfall to decimate the region, killing thousands of Tuareg and 
driving thousands more abroad. International assistance for the drought mostly ended up 
diverted into the pockets of politicians. 1105F1106  
The government saw pastoralism as to blame for the drought and introduced measures to 
further restrict nomadism, including limiting nomad access to water and parcelling land for 
agriculture.1106F1107 Many nomads responded to the drought by settling in camps, where they 
were provided with assistance but unable to practice nomadism. Once again, international 
organizations encouraged settlement and agriculture, believing that pastoralism was 
unsustainable.1107F1108 
The above history of the post-colonial period demonstrates that while most Tuareg likely 
qualified for Malian nationality, widespread discrimination and persecution, coupled with 
mass displacement, made civil registration all but impossible for many Tuareg families. 
Many others may have seen registering as Malian nationals in a negative light. It may be 
tempting to see the lack of registration among the Tuareg in Mali as simply a symptom of 
weak state structures and lack of registration, but as the above sequence of events 
demonstrates, the exclusion of the Tuareg extends far beyond mere lack of registration. 
While many rural Africans may lack documentation, they are often presumed to be 
nationals by their governments. In the case of the Tuareg, they were treated not as 
nationals, but as a security threat, almost from the moment of independence. Today, Tuareg 
who lack documents and were displaced to camps have no way to prove their origins in 
Mali.  
The experience of living settled in refugee and displaced persons camps also forever 
changed Tuareg society in very consequential ways. First, it meant a generation of Tuareg 
 
1105 Boilley, Les Touaregs, 1999, 367. 
1106 Bernus, 172. See also Diarrah, 86-87; Gaudio, 1988, 188; Boilley, Les Touaregs, 1999, 368, 376, 379. 
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215; Gremont, 138. 
1108 Khazanov, Pastoralists, 7, 13. See also Bemus 174-175; Azarya, 262. Boilley argues this was misguided, as 
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drought. Boilley, Les Touaregs, 1999, 27, 377. It is beyond the scope of this dissertation to debate whether or 
not pastoralism causes drought, but it should be noted that many experts now agree it does not. 
207 
 
were growing up abroad without exposure to nomadism. Second, the exodus of Tuareg 
abroad from both conflict and drought created a diaspora of Tuareg in other countries. 
Many were likely without Malian identity documents. 1108F1109 Tuareg children born Algerian 
camps were not only unable to register as Malian nationals, but learned other languages 
and become adapted to sedentary ways. This and other diasporas in Libya and beyond 
would become the root of the modern Tuareg independence movement, linking Tuareg 
separatism in the mind of successive Malian governments with Mali’s neighbours to the 
north.1109F1110 
Beginning in the 1980s and continuing through the 1990s, many Tuareg sought to return to 
northern Mali in the hopes of a fresh start. 1110F1111 The issue of return for Malian and Nigerien 
Tuareg became more and more important during the 1980s, as Tuareg in camps in Libya 
and Algeria agitated to return. But the framing of the time the Tuareg had spent in areas 
that were now other countries only fuelled the view that they were not Malian. As the cycle 
of drought continued to drive the Tuareg to spend periods of time abroad, the Malian 
government continued to treat them as foreigners. A less serious drought occurred from 
1984-1986, and again thousands of Tuareg left northern Mali for camps and cities in 
Algeria. Over this period, continued contact between Malian Tuareg and the Algerian and 
Libyan governments fuelled security concerns in Bamako. The cross-border movements 
and increasing militarization of the Tuareg seemed to justify Bamako’s concerns of 
separatism.  
Yet the Malian Tuareg were not universally welcomed in Algeria. In 1986, the Algerian 
government, fed up with the constant stream of Malian Tuaregs into Algeria, expelled 
thousands of Tuareg back to Mali. 1111F1112 Forced into trucks and driven to the border by the 
Algerian government, the Tuareg were stopped by the Malian authorities who refused to let 
any Tuareg enter Mali who could not prove his or her Malian nationality. Without papers to 
prove their Malian nationality, the forcibly returned Tuareg settled in towns at the border 
or in the “no man’s land” between the two countries. 1112F1113 In 1987, the new president of 
Niger offered an “amnesty” and allowed some Tuareg with ties to what had become 
northern Niger to return from Libya and Algeria, but there was no similar offer from Traoré 
in Mali.1113F1114 This is one example of the effect that a chronic lack of registration was having 
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on the Tuareg, who were increasingly being treated as a stateless population by both 
governments. 
In 1990, 300 Tuareg families were repatriated to Mali from Algeria, fed by promises of 
reintegration. Instead, they were placed in squalid camps controlled by the army with no 
possibility of leaving or moving around the countryside. Men and boys from the camps 
were regularly arrested and tortured by the Malian security forces, mistrusted because of 
their time in Algeria and Libya, where some Tuareg fighters had been granted Libyan 
nationality.1114F1115 The military rounded up Tuareg men and boys in villages and beat them in 
public.1115F1116 Caravans of Tuaregs returning from Niger were turned back or attacked. The 
returning Tuareg also faced a dismal economic climate, as the returning Tuareg had no 
access to land for agriculture and few other job prospects in northern Mali.  
The decimation of the pastoral lifestyle had also decimated the Tuareg economy. During 
this time, a new challenge appeared for the Malian government: the drug trade. The Tuareg, 
who continued to trade across what was now the Algerian border, trade that was now 
illegal, increasingly became seen as the cause of drug trafficking. 1116F1117 By the early 1990s, 
many Tuareg in Mali remained in camps, cut off from their traditional migrations and 
prohibited from legally crossing into Algeria, targeted by the police and facing few viable 
job prospects. The situation that the Tuareg found themselves in at the beginning of the 
1990s was one of exclusion, expulsion, disenfranchisement, forced settlement and poverty.  
Once again, Tuareg grievances would erupt into violence against the Malian government, 
but this time, the rebellion would be much better organized and armed. In 1991, Traoré 
was overthrown after demonstrations and political unrest, replaced first by a transitional 
government headed by Amadou Toumani Touré, then by an elected, civilian government in 
1992.1117F1118 For the first time since 1967, it seemed like meaningful change for Mali’s Tuareg 
was possible. When change did not occur, the Tuareg once again took up arms, led by a 
younger generation who had been trained by the Algerian and Libyan military. In 1991, the 
Front de Liberation de l’Azaouad (FLA) was formed by unhappy Tuareg, many of whom had 
fought for Gaddafi against Chad and had military training, and some of whom had Libyan 
nationality.1118F1119 This generation of Tuareg had grown up with the stories of the 1962-1963 
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rebellion and aftermath. Once again, the rebellion began in Kidal, the province most 
subjected to government repression and closest to the Tuareg refugee camps in Algeria, 
Niger and Libya. The Tuareg diaspora, unable to gain any acceptance in Mali or even the 
promise of return, now dreamed of a national, independent homeland, to be called the 
Azawad.1119F1120 
This war was far better organized and armed than the 1962 conflict. 1120F1121 The goal was an 
independent state that would encompass the entire Tuareg region. “By the 1990s, the 
Tuareg image of their state had gone from one based on blood ties to one based on 
bounded territory. The Tuareg have adopted the western conception of the nation 
state.”1121F1122 At the root of the independence movement was the feeling among many Tuareg 
that the Malian government had been treating them not only as foreigners but as enemies 
for decades, that incorporation within Mali had failed, and that independence was the only 
way to gain their rights. 1122F1123 As Hama Ag Sid Ahmed, representative to Europe of the 
Mouvement Populaire de l’Azawad, put it, “the ex-French Sudan became independent under 
the name of Republic of Mali. Its borders were drawn since the beginning of colonization as 
we know, the new Malian state extended her sovereignty into our territory by the simple 
logic of the colonial system.”1123F1124 
Once again, the government response was swift and indiscriminate, attacking civilians and 
rebels alike.1124F1125 Ironically, due to an entire generation of Tuareg growing up in camps and 
cities abroad, many Tuareg fighters now had real, tangible ties to Algeria and Libya, fueling 
Malian government concerns over an invasion from the north. The chronic lack of 
documentation among the Tuareg was now weaponized against them. The Malian 
government arrested Tuareg civilians for lacking identity cards, which was used as proof of 
their foreign status. 1125F1126 
In Bamako, the government employed familiar rhetoric to label the Tuareg, rebels and 
civilians alike, as outsiders and un-Malian and characterized the war as one between white 
slavers and black former slaves in rhetoric designed to incite hatred against the Tuareg and 
Arabs.1126F1127 The Songhai civilian population once again formed civilian militias, such as the 
Ganda Koy movement, to protect their villages from Tuareg rebels. Increasingly, the conflict 
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became a local civil war between agriculturalists and former and existing nomadic Tuareg, 
many of whom had returned from abroad. 1127F1128 The Malian government capitalized on the 
rhetoric of foreign, “white,” nomadic invaders attacking villages. 
Once again, the conflict led to widespread displacement. During the 1990s, more than 
20,000 refugees, both nomadic and sedentary, fled northern Mali. 1128F1129 By the end of the 
conflict, there were more than 60,000 refugees in Algeria, Burkina Faso, Cote d’Ivoire and 
Niger.1129F1130 By the mid-1990s, parts of the Niger Bend in the Sahel had been entirely cleared 
of Tuareg.1130F1131  
This time, the war got global media attention and pressure was put on all sides to negotiate. 
The war ended with the Tamanrasset Accords in January 1991, where the government 
promised greater autonomy and better development projects for the north. The Accords 
stipulated the immediate cessation of hostilities, the demilitarization of the regions of Gao, 
Kidal and Timbuktu, semi-independence with increased autonomy in the administration, 
economy and culture with elections at the Préfet, Sous-préfet and Maire levels, and greater 
government investment in northern Mali. 1131F1132 
But the Accords did not address the underlying problems that led to the conflict, such as 
lack of genuine development in the region, particularly development that could 
accommodate pastoralism, discrimination against the Tuareg, particularly those returned 
from abroad, anti-pastoralist programs and environmental degradation. 1132F1133 Perhaps most 
importantly, the Accords also did not address the problem of the border and the question 
of Tuareg sovereignty and land ownership, though it did provide for more regional 
cooperation and for greater political and social contact across the Sahara. 1133F1134  
The agreement that followed the Accords, the National Pact of 1992, provided a roadmap to 
incorporation of the Tuareg within Mali, but did not address the underlying problem of the 
division of the Tuareg between countries and their historical claims to their lands. Efforts 
were made towards semi-independence for the north, however. Most importantly, the Pact 
made “internal security,” meaning the police, the responsibility of the regional, instead of 
national, administration. Of vital importance, the northern regions could also enact their 
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own bilateral agreements with neighbouring states to facilitate cross border movement 
and more interaction with Tuareg in Niger and Algeria. The newly created assemblies 
would be “democratically elected” and represent the commune, the arrondissement, the 
cercle and the region, as well as an assembly for the three northern regions together, 
reflecting their commonalities. 1134F1135  
To outside observers like the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights, the 
National Pact to implement the peace accords was a positive development: “(s)een in the 
light of the previous massive suppression of the human rights of the Tuareg, the National 
Pact is a positive development that gives the Tuareg areas decentralized powers and allows 
for Tuareg participation and representation." 1135F1136 It ultimately failed, however, in part 
because it was not fully implemented, 1136F1137 but also because it refused to grapple with the 
deep problems of Tuareg belonging and the history of forced settlement and political and 
cultural fragmentation that had left deep scars on northern communities. The Pact took few 
steps cultural unification of the Tuareg across borders. Possible solutions that would 
weaken the primacy of nation-state integrity, such as through specially created, semi-
autonomous zone, were ignored. 
Today, the Tuareg have not received an official designation of being without Malian 
nationality, as the bidoon in Kuwait have, but many Tuareg are treated as an undocumented 
population that poses a security risk to Mali, despite their extensive history in northern 
Mali that was documented in Part 2. A lack of registration and decades of living in refugee 
camps have left many Tuareg stateless or at risk. Behind the hostility between the Tuareg 
and the Malian government lies the simmering and unresolved issue of Tuareg self-
determination, the history of colonial borders and contested territory and the potential 
devolution of some sovereignty to a semi-independent state. The question of ownership of 
the Sahara, which had been of only strategic importance to the French, has become an issue 
of control of potentially valuable mineral and oil resources. The possibility of succession 
has led successive Malian governments to regard the Tuareg as a security threat and a 
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1137 Gaudio, 1988, 192-193. 
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threat to Mali’s territorial sovereignty and the issue of separatism has only grown more 
contentious with the passage of time. 
As the next sections will show, the debate over Tuareg inclusion would be impacted by the 
potential for mineral wealth in northern Mali and, in particular, the discovery of oil and 
uranium in neighbouring countries. These discoveries would transform the Sahara and 
Sahel from areas useful to the French colonialists mainly for strategic reasons to valuable 
regions in their own right, elevating the importance of Tuareg claims to their lands. The 
next section will examine these factors in more detail and how they affect Tuareg 
nationality and registration, but first, the next section will look at national unity in Malaysia 
and how it affected Sama Dilaut inclusion and registration during decolonization. 
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National Identity in Sabah, Malaysia 
 
The Sultan of Sulu, with representative of the BNBC, 1899 
 
(I)n Malaysia, statelessness as an issue is always embroiled in wider moral 
and political arguments...in many contexts, statelessness is not just an issue 
of legal identification but is embroiled in contentious politics of national and 
regional belonging. 1137F1138 
This section will look at how the push for nationality unity in Malaysia affected the 
implementation of Malaysian nationality law. Forging a single, national identity in Malaysia 
has not been helped by its diverse geography, where different groups live long distances 
from one another in a federation spanning territorial non-contiguous states 1138F1139 with very 
different histories 1139F1140 that were united mostly by their trade ties and intermittent and 
uneven domination by Britain. 1140F1141 Several former colonies, like Hong Kong, Singapore and 
Brunei, are not included in Malaysia. 1141F1142  
Like the Tuareg, the Sama Dilaut found themselves divided by an international border in a 
contested border zone, where their mobility appears to tie them to the Philippines. Unlike 
in Kuwait and Mali, the Sama Dilaut are a small part of a larger debate over ethnicity and 
nationality in Sabah. Like in Kuwait and Mali, however, concerns over nationality unity and 
ethnic balance would greatly influence how the Sama Dilaut are perceived. This section 
 
1138 C. Allerton, ‘Contested Statelessness in Sabah, Malaysia: Irregularity and the Politics of Recognition’ 15 J. 
of Imm. and Ref. Studies 250 (2017). 
1139 Clark and Pietsch, 160. 
1140 Sinnadurai, 309-310. See also South Asia Defence And Strategic Year Book, Colonel Harjeet Singh 219. 
1141 K. Young, W. Bussink, P. Hasan 11. 
1142 Singapore was originally included in the Federation, but left in 1956. 
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uses primarily academic sources, but non-profit reports and news articles are occasionally 
used to provide more information or to highlight public debate. 
In the decades following Malaysian federation, as the Sama Dilaut found themselves 
unregistered and subjected to exclusionary government policies, including deportation, the 
border between the Philippines and Sabah remained a sensitive point of contention 
between the two states. The linked issues of nationality and borders has only gained in 
prominence in Southeast Asia over the decades, as evidenced by what Alice Nah calls, 
...the remarkable steadfastness of ASEAN states in holding onto a Westphalian 
notion of state sovereignty, in particular, when constructing immigration control 
regimes.1142F1143 
In order to understand how the Sama Dilaut fit into the larger political and social debate 
over nationality in Sabah, it is important to understand how national identity and 
nationality in Malaysia are entwined. It is also important to show how these 
preoccupations are linked to the issue of territorial sovereignty and borders. Malaysia 
today is usually described as being made up of three ethnic groups: Malays and other 
“indigenous” peoples, and two “immigrant” populations: Chinese and Indians. 1143F1144 Yet, as 
this section will show, this division does not reflect the complexity of identity in Sabah, 
where non-Malay groups worry about Malay dominance in politics and cultural life. 1144F1145 
The categorization of the Malaysian population as being made up of Malays, other 
indigenous groups and so-called immigrant populations is something of an 
oversimplification and obscures the very real differences between the Borneo states and 
Peninsular Malaysia. 1145F1146  
The question of Malaysian national identity would come to be of the first importance for 
successive Malaysian governments, a key part of holding the federation together. In this 
way, Malaysia closely resembles Mali, where colonial borders have bound vastly different 
cultures together, while separating groups with historical affinity, making the forging of a 
unified national identity a big challenge for the government. As in Mali, the spectre of the 
 
1143 A. Nah, ‘Globalisation, Sovereignty and Immigration Control: The Hierarchy of Rights for Migrant Workers 
in Malaysia’ 40 Asian J. of Social Science 486 (2012) 487 (hereinafter Nah). See also J. Clifton, G. Acciaioli, H. 
Brunt, W. Dressler, M. Fabinyi, and S. Singh, ‘Statelessness and Conservation: Exploring the Implications of an 
International Governance Agenda’ 19 Tilburg L.R. 81 (2014) 85 (hereinafter Clifton, Acciaioli, Brunt, Dressler, 
Fabinyi and Singh). 
1144 Lim Hong Hai, 102. 
1145 Saleeby, 158. See also Sinnadurai, 312; see generally Cheah Boon Kheng. 
1146 Malay as an ethnic group is defined by law. “‘Malay’ is defined by law as a person who professes the 
religion of Islam, habitually speaks the Malay language, conforms to Malay custom and; (a) was before 
Merdeka Day born in the Federation or in Singapore or born of parents one of whom was born in the 
Federation or in Singapore, or is on that day domiciled in the Federation or in Singapore; or; (b) is the issue of 
such a person...” Constitution of Malaysia art. 160(2). See also W. Guinee, ‘Race, Ethnicity, and Ethnic 
Relations: A Malaysian Case Study: A Curriculum Project for the Fulbright-Hays Seminar Abroad: Malaysia 
and Singapore’ Westminster College (2005). 
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breakup of the Federation hangs over the question of nationality. As Young, Bussink and 
Hasan put it, “(t)he common status of the myriad peoples of the country is Malaysian 
citizenship, but it takes more than this shared status to transcend the separate identities of 
diverse cultures.” 1146F1147 Immigration, Islamification and relations with neighbouring states, 
particularly the Philippines, would therefore become intertwined preoccupations for both 
the governments of Sabah and Malaysia. 1147F1148 
As this section will show, the statelessness of the Sama Dilaut must be seen in part through 
the lens of the wider context of the struggle to forge a unified, Malaysian identity. Unlike 
the Tuareg, the contested nationality of the Sama Dilaut is not by itself a major political 
issue in Sabah, but is rather part of a larger debate over national integration and the 
relationship between Malaysia and the Philippines. This section explores how Malaysia, 
and Sabah within Malaysia, sought to forge a unified national identity, and how this goal 
influenced nationality law and policy, to explain why a country with protections against 
statelessness written into its Constitution could contain such a large population of stateless 
people.1148F1149 
It should be noted that unlike in Kuwait, the statelessness of the Sama Dilaut is part of a 
much larger problem of statelessness in Malaysia. UNHCR estimates that there may be as 
many as 40,000 stateless people in Malaysia. 1149F1150 Much of the debate over national unity in 
Malaysia has centred on Peninsular Malaysia and the incorporation of the ethnic-Chinese 
population. But while this debate may seem remote from the Sama Dilaut, it has indirectly 
influenced nationality policy in Sabah and, as this section will show, the inclusion and 
exclusion of the Sama Dilaut. Most importantly, the struggle to end statelessness in 
Malaysia is closely tied to the issue of Malay ethnic dominance and the identity of Malaysia 
as an ethnic nation. Today, the main debate over national identity in Sabah revolves around 
the problem of immigration from the Philippines and the dominance of Malays in politics. 
The issues of national unity and territorial unity would become entwined, with serious 
implications for the Sama Dilaut. 
 
1147 Young, Bussink and Hasan, 11. 
1148 Donner, 32-33. See also Verzijl, 23; Brownlie, Principles, 388-394; Van Waas, Nationality, 2008, 33, 50; I. 
Kerno, ‘Nationality, including Statelessness: Analysis of Changes in Nationality Legislation of States since 
1930’ International Law Commission, A/CN.4/67 (1953); Handbook 2014 11. For a discussion of the 
intersection between immigration and statelessness in Malaysia, see R. Razali, R. Nordin and T. Duraisingam 
‘Migration and Statelessness: Turning the Spotlight on Malaysia’ 23 Pertanika J. Soc. Sci. and Hum. 19 (2015). 
See also Maury, 51. 
1149 UNHCR, ‘Submission by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees for the Office of the High 
Commissioner for Human Rights’ Compilation Report - Universal Periodic Review: Malaysia’ 3rd cycle (July 
2018) 2. 
1150 UNHCR, ‘Global Appeal 2014-2015: Malaysia’ (2013). See also the Institute on Statelessness and Inclusion, 
‘The World’s Stateless’ (December 2014). It should be noted that this number includes only Malaysians of 
Indian descent and does not count many other populations, including the Sama Dilaut. The actual number is 
probably therefore higher. 
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Like in many post-colonial states, including Kuwait and Mali, issues of sovereignty and 
national identity would come to be linked together in the eyes of many Malaysian 
politicians and government agencies. 1150F1151 These concerns would influence how Malaysia’s 
nationality laws were drafted, but also how they were applied. As described above in Part 
2, Malaysia went through a series of federal groupings, entering into its present form in 
1965 with the addition of the Borneo States of Sabah and Sarawak to the peninsular states, 
and subtracting Singapore. 1151F1152 Brunei has remained independent.  
The departure of the British Empire as a unifying force brought to the forefront the 
sensitive and related issues of Malaysian nationality and the inclusion of the Borneo 
territories. Their inclusion in Malaysia in 1963 was the result of political negotiations very 
much tied to Malay concerns over nationality and ethnic balance.1152F1153 Worsening fears of 
the breakup of the Federation, both Indonesia and the Philippines claim the former British 
North Borneo (Sabah) based on claims of sovereignty described in Part 2, above, and based 
on the region’s history, including the zone of influence of the Sultanate of Sulu.  
Islamification, the dominance of Malay, and border security in a way which would greatly 
influence the belonging and perceived legitimacy of the Sama Dilaut. The current 
complexities of ethnicity in Malaysia, including in Sabah, can be seen in the ongoing 
struggles over the census, introduced by the British in 1871 in what was then known as the 
“Straits Settlements” of Peninsular Malaysia and subsequently used across Peninsular 
Malaysia and the Borneo territories. 1153F1154 The concept of classification by race in the sense of 
physical characteristics or ethnic groupings was arguably brought to Malaysia by the 
British and did not fit the societal and cultural divisions in Malaysia, complicating later 
government efforts to define the concept of “Malay" and that of other indigenous 
groups.1154F1155 Originally, the census classified peoples by nationality, but later the British 
started employing the term “race” in line with their own thinking about the classification of 
peoples.1155F1156 Early censuses included the indigenous peoples of Borneo in the category of 
“Malay”.1156F1157 These categories, however, did not reflect the enormous diversity of the pre-
 
1151 See generally Lim Hong Hai. 
1152 Sinnadurai, 309-310. 
1153 Hirschman, 559. See also Sinnadurai, 311. 
1154 Over the course of the late 19th century and early 20th century, the British expanded census taking to 
include all the territories in Peninsular Malaysia. By the 1930s, the census had expanded to include the 
Borneo territories. Hirschman, 559. 
1155 Chea Boon Kheng, ‘Malaysia: The Making of a Nation’ (Institute of Southeast Asian Studies 2002). The 
issue of race and ethnicity is extremely sensitive and contested in Malaysia. This section simply attempts to 
summarize the views held on the subject by experts. 
1156 Hirschman, 566-568. 
1157 Hirschman, 563. See also Y. Maunati, ‘Networking the Pan-Dayak’ in W. Mee and J. Mee Questioning 
Modernity in Indonesia and Malaysia (Nus Press 2012) 97, discussing the use of the term Dayak to apply to 
Borneo’s “non-Malay natives.” 
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colonial population, which had already incorporated various peoples from all over the 
region, including previous immigrants from China and Arabia. Classifications of people by 
race ignored the fact that Malaysians themselves thought more in terms of religious 
affiliation.1157F1158  
Like in many British colonies, the census created ethnic classifications in Malaysia, 
introducing ethnicity as a vital feature of politics. While nationality remained undefined 
during the colonial period in North Borneo, the census provides important information on 
the number of people under British jurisdiction at that time and their supposed ethnicities. 
Since the 1891 census, the term Bajau had been applied by the British to the inhabitants 
occupying the coastal areas of North Borneo and Sarawak, though details on the 
breakdown of the population are not available.1158F1159 Malaysian identity became based on the 
creation of a majority-Malay nation, or bangsa, yet defining the concept of being Malay 
would prove contentious. 1159F1160 As with northern Mali, the inclusion of Sabah in the 
Malaysian Federation raised issues of ethnic minority status for Sabah’s religions and 
ethnicities. 
The inclusion of the Borneo states in Malaysia was done, in part, to balance the ethnic 
makeup of the country. To balance the majority Chinese population of Singapore, which 
was originally to be included in Malaysia, the resulting Federation of Malaysia incorporated 
the Borneo territories in 1963. 1160F1161 The addition of Sabah and Sarawak was therefore 
always couched in terms of increasing the so-called “non-immigrant” population of 
Malaysia. This political compromise glossed over the very real ethnic, historical and 
cultural difference between the Peninsula and northern Borneo. While most Malays are 
Muslim, non-Malay groups in Sabah and Sarawak are frequently Christian or animist.  
Before the establishment of the Sultanate of Brunei and the spread of Islam, the peoples 
living in Borneo did not appear to classify themselves along anything that could be 
described as ethnic lines, nor did all indigenous peoples in Borneo adopt Islam. 1161F1162 During 
the late colonial period, Kadazan, Dusun and Murut nationalism in Borneo emerged and the 
Borneo states have periodically pushed for more independence from Kuala Lumpur, citing 
how their histories and cultures are very different from that of Peninsular Malaysia. 1162F1163 As 
Part 2 showed, many of the peoples of coastal Sabah share a common history, way of life 
and ethnicity with those of the southern Philippines, part of the ancient Sultanate of Sulu. 
In this way, the border region in the Sulu Sea resembles post-colonial border regions in 
 
1158 Hooker, 21. See also Hirschman, 565. 
1159 Nagatsu and Kazufumi, Pirates, Sea Nomads or Protectors of Islam? A Note on ‘Bajau’ Identifications in the 
Malaysian Context (Kyoto University 2001) 216. 
1160 Nagatsu and Kazufumi, 218-219. 
1161 Singapore would depart the Federation in 1965. 
1162 Barlocco, 35. It should be noted that the origins of the concept of race in Malaysia are contested. 
1163 Barlocco, 43. 
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places like Kuwait and northern Mali in that it has been very difficult to draw a hard, firm 
line between overlapping, diverse and mobile communities.  
Tunku Abdul Rahman, Malaysia’s first Prime Minister, saw western-style nationality laws 
as the key to forging a common national identity in a country where 50 percent of the 
population was non-Malay. Yet he simultaneously sought to preserve Malay identity as the 
core of Malaysian identity. 1163F1164 In 1969, Malaysia began a policy of granting special 
privileges to a class of nationals called the bumiputra, or “sons of the soil." 1164F1165 These 
special provisions, enacted under the New Economic Policy of Prime Minister Mahathir, 
included favourable educational and trade quotas, areas of reserved land, and special 
licenses, all designed to raise the standard of living of Malays and other so-called 
indigenous groups. The creation of the bumiputera category was specifically designed to 
bond Malays with the so-called “native” populations of the Borneo territories. 1165F1166 Many 
Sabahans have come to associate closely with Malays and often still consider themselves to 
be bumiputra. 
But the grouping of some groups living in the Borneo states with Malays has been 
contentious. This is in part due to the history of ethnicity in the region, which was 
complicated by multiple cycles of immigration and emigration in an area dominated by the 
long-distance, seafaring trade by Arab, European and Chinese traders, as described in Part 
2.1166F1167 Despite the border, there remains a great deal of continuity between the peoples of 
what are now Sabah, Sarawak, Kalimantan and the southern Philippines. 1167F1168 Immigrants to 
Sabah and Sarawak from the Philippines in particular are often ethnically similar to 
Malaysia’s Malay population. 1168F1169 As a result, any increase in the Bajau/Sama population is 
perceived as increasing the Muslim population of Sabah.  
As Young puts it, 
 
1164 See generally Cheah Boon Kheng. 
1165 A History of Malaysia 341. See also Clark and Pietsch 162. Programs included quotas, promotion of Malay 
language education and a special bank for bumiputera, as well as land reform. See Goh Beng Lan, ‘Dilemma of 
Progressive Politics in Malaysia: Islamic Orthodoxy versus Human Rights’ in W. Mee and J. Kahn, Questioning 
Modernity in Indonesia and Malaysia (Nus Press 2012) 302-306, 342. 
1166 Hooker, 227. 
1167 Sinnadurai, 311. See also T. Harrisson, ‘The Prehistory of Borneo’ 13 Asian Perspectives 17 (1970) 38. 
Indonesia also contains a large Malay population. J. Kahn, ‘Islam and Capitalism in the Frontiers and 
Borderlands’ in W. Mee and J. Kahn, Questioning Modernity in Indonesia and Malaysia (Nus Press 2012) 49. 
See also K. Young, ‘Malay Social Imaginaries: Nationalist and Other Collective Identities in Indonesia’ in W. 
Mee and J. Kahn, Questioning Modernity in Indonesia and Malaysia (Nus Press 2012) 61. 
1168 Sather, Adaptation, 1997, 21-23. 
1169 Barlocco, 50. 
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the Malay nationalist project came to rely on the idea of the Malay bangsa, or 
‘race-nation’, as a foundation of its political and territorial claims. 1169F1170 
The effects of Malaysia’s attempts to build a legal system on the concept of an ethno-state 
created considerable tensions throughout the country. In 1969, riots broke out in 
Peninsular Malaysia over special privileges given to holders of the bumiputra category.1170F1171 
Elections in Sabah were postponed due to the violence on the Peninsula. 1171F1172 As a result of 
the contradictions of the bumiputra category and the difficulties in creating a Malaysian 
ethno-state, modern Malaysian governments have attempted to recreate Malaysian 
nationality as based on nationalism and a common experience with British laws and system 
of government.  
The application of the term bumiputra to various groups in Malaysia would never really be 
resolved. For example, aboriginal, non-Malay peoples of Peninsular Malaysia were not 
included in the bumiputra category.1172F1173 Meanwhile, non-Malays in the Borneo states, such 
as the Bajau/Sama, Kadazan and Dusun groups, were included in the bumiputra 
category.1173F1174 As a result, the “aboriginal” peoples of peninsular Malaysia are treated under 
a different set of laws from the “indigenous” peoples of Borneo. This came to have real 
implications under Malaysia’s laws.  
For example, bumiputra and aboriginal peoples, defined under the law, were counted 
separately in the census. 1174F1175 Aboriginal groups, as distinct from the rights of bumiputra, are 
protected by the Aboriginal Peoples’ Act of 1954. 1175F1176 The Act provides for the recognition 
of aboriginal sovereignty over land and for compensation for any takings by the 
government. It also ensures the right of aboriginal children to an education. This Act and 
various judicial decisions have helped to protect the rights of aboriginal peoples in 
Peninsular Malaysia, particularly their land rights. 1176F1177 
 
1170 Young, 61. 
1171 Cheah Boon Kheng, 102. See also Holst, 45. 
1172 Goh Beng Lan, 298. 
1173 Hirschman, 563. See also Hooker, 23. Aboriginal peoples in Malaysia and are .5% of the population. 
1174 Barlocco, 34. See also Holst, 33; Lim Hong Hai, 102. In Sabah and Sarawak, non-Malay ethnicities, such as 
the Kadazan/Dusan and Iban peoples, make up about 30% of the population. R. Bulan, ‘Native Title in 
Malaysia: A “Complementary” Sui Generis Proprietary Right under the Federal Constitution’ 11 Australian 
Indigenous L. R. 54 (2007) 55. 
 
1175 Young, Bussin and Hasan, 17. See also Clark and Pietsch, 162; Hirschman, 562-564. 
1176 Malaysia Aboriginal Peoples Act (1954) (revised 1974), Malaysia Act, 134. Aboriginal is defined in 
Malaysia’s Constitution as limited to Aboriginal peoples of the Malay Peninsula. Constitution of Malaysia 
(1957) art. 160(2). 
1177 For a general overview, see generally Minority Rights Group International, World Directory of Minorities 
and Indigenous Peoples at http://minorityrights.org/minorities/orang-asli/ (accessed July 2020). 
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In Sabah and Sarawak, by contrast, the rights of indigenous minorities were instead 
protected in theory by their inclusion in the bumiputra category during the period it was in 
effect, but these protections are often not actualized for non-Malay minorities like the Sama 
Dilaut. 
In Sabah, there is no enumeration of the native groups in the Constitution, 
although there are at least 38 known groups...A native community is defined as 
any group or body of persons the majority of who are natives, and who live under 
the jurisdiction of the local authority or under the jurisdiction of a native chief or 
headman.1177F1178 
“Native” rights in Malaysia are also protected under the common law and the state laws of 
Sabah and Sarawak. Courts in Malaysia have cited indigenous rights cases in Australia, 
Canada and the United States when upholding the land rights of the Iban, for example, as a 
“native” group.1178F1179 A recognition of native title has given certain indigenous groups in the 
Borneo territories the ability to claim ownership of their lands in the courts. Establishing 
itself as a native group of Borneo under the law, therefore, arguably brings certain rights, 
including the right to claim native title to land. The process of qualifying as a “native” 
group, however, is unclear and has never, as far as this dissertation could ascertain, been 
applied to the Sama Dilaut, though more research is needed. 
The government banned discussion of ethnic classifications in Malaysia following violent 
riots in the 1960s, but the sensitivity over the subject continues. 1179F1180 In 2000, the census 
listed over 65 percent of the population as bumiputera, whereas the rest fell into immigrant 
categories, raising the question of whether Malaysia would become a majority-immigrant 
country, a concern that is not dissimilar from those described in the Kuwait example, 
above.1180F1181 According to the Malaysian government, in 2010, the Malay population was a 
little over 50% of Malaysia’s total population, while non-Malay bumiputra made up an 
additional 11%.1181F1182  
The above history of ethnicity in Malaysia is an important factor in Malaysia’s immigration 
policies and the current debate over immigration to Sabah. The issue of immigration is 
critical for the Sama Dilaut, as they have come to be classed as an immigrant group, due to 
their association with the border and the Philippines. Until the 1930s, immigration to 
 
1178 Bulan, 55. See also Interpretation (Definition of Native) Ordinance (1958). 
1179 For example, in Nyawai v Borneo Pulp Plantation Sdn Bhd, the Sarawak government recognized native 
land rights against the rights of logging companies in Sarawak. See generally D. Sanders, ‘Indigenous Land 
Rights in Malaysia: Nor Nyawai & 3 Ors v Borneo Pulp Plantation Sdn Bhd & 2 Ors’ 5(14) Indigenous Law 
Bulletin 21 (2002). 
1180 Hooker, 234. 
1181 Daniel Goh, Matilda Gabrielpillai, Philip Holden, Gaik Cheng Khoo, Race and Multiculturalism in Malaysia 
and Singapore (Routledge 2009) 10. See generally Cheah Boon Kheng. See also Clark and Pietsch, 162 . 
1182 The aboriginal population totals less than one percent of the population. 
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Malaysia was unrestricted by law. The British encouraged it to provide labour for the 
timber industry. 1182F1183 Seasonal migration and trade were transformed into immigration by 
the enforcement of borders, with immigrants now relocating to Sabah for wage 
employment, rather than taking part in a fluid trade economy.  
As in Kuwait and Mali, cross-border mobility began to be regarded not as an economic 
good, but as a threat. The discovery of oil off the coast of Sabah also transformed the nature 
of the economy away from one based on trade into one based on a fixed resource. 
Economic migration would continue through the 20th century, as Malaysia, and 
particularly Sabah, remained stable and relatively prosperous whilst the Philippines and 
Indonesia went through several periods of civil unrest. But migration now took the form of 
migrant workers who came to fill lower level jobs in the economy. While ethnically similar 
to people living in coastal Sabah, both migrants and boat nomads like the Sama Dilaut were 
now reclassified as immigrants. 
Most irregular migrants come to Sabah by boat, traversing clandestinely the maritime 
border between Sabah and the Philippines, which is made up of numerous small and 
difficult to police islands. 1183F1184 As a result, migration is now linked to clandestine border 
crossings and boat migration, which are also associated with the Sama Dilaut. Irregular 
migration to Sabah from the Philippines therefore exacerbates the climate of tension 
between Malaysia and the Philippines, 1184F1185 and makes the resolution of the status of 
stateless persons in Sabah more difficult. 
In the middle of the twentieth century, immigration to Sabah also increased following the 
armed insurrection of Moro rebels in what was now the southern Philippines. 1185F1186 During 
the Philippine civil war, “large numbers” of Bajau, Sama, Tausug and Suluk refugees, 
including sea nomads, fled to Sabah. 1186F1187 These groups had always been accustomed to 
relocating in times of strife, but now this relocation occurred across and international 
border, rather than within the loose, diffuse zone controlled by the Sulu Sultanate. 1187F1188  
In general, Filipino immigrant and refugee families in Sabah lack documents and are locked 
out of Malaysian nationality by jus sanguinis, making their status in Sabah similar to that of 
 
1183 Clark and Pietsch, 168. 
1184 A. Kassim and R. Haji Mat Zin, ‘Policy on Irregular Migrants in Malaysia: An Analysis of its Implementation 
and Effectiveness’ (Philippine Institute for Development Studies 2011) 53 (hereinafter Kassim and Zin).  
1185 Razali, Nordin and Duraisingam, 27. 
1186 Fernandez, 54. See also Razali, Nordin and Duraisingam, 24. 
1187 Sather, Commodity, 2002, 38. Malaysia is not a party to the 1951 Refugee Convention or Protocol. 
1188 Sather, Adaptation, 1997, 54. See also J. Warren, Chartered, 1971, 67, 83, 87. 
222 
 
the Sama Dilaut. 1188F1189 Filipino immigrants to Sabah are now often spoken of in the same 
terms as the stateless members of the ethnic Indian population and stateless sea nomads. 
All three are categorized as part of the problem of so-called “stateless immigrants” in 
Malaysia.1189F1190  
The refugees were accepted into Malaysia under a negotiated agreement whereby they 
were not formally recognized or granted permanent asylum, 1190F1191 but instead granted a 
special pass by UNHCR and a temporary work visa, with the understanding that they would 
later return to the Philippines. 1191F1192 Instead, this population would remain in Malaysia long 
term, creating tension between the two countries and increasing in the Sama-Bajau 
population in Sabah. Despite recent economic troubles, Malaysia remains a destination 
country for migrant workers, fuelled by the gap in wealth and political stability between 
Malaysia and its less developed neighbours.1192F1193 These workers were not driving a lucrative 
trade economy, as the migrants of the Sulu Sultanate had been, but were instead filling low-
level jobs, often in the informal economy. 1193F1194  
In the mid-1980s, there were as many as 500,000 immigrants in Sabah performing a range 
of wage-earning jobs across the economy. 1194F1195 Armed conflict and poverty in neighbouring 
states would also fuel immigration to Sabah, increasing the perception of immigration as a 
burden. The public perception in Sabah is that certain coastal towns are “overwhelmingly” 
made up of irregular immigrants from the Philippines and Indonesia of similar ethnicity as 
Peninsular Malays, increasing the Malay and Muslim population of Sabah. 1195F1196 In 1991, the 
 
1189 UNHCR ‘Submission by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees for the Office of the High 
Commissioner for Human Rights’ Compilation Report - Universal Periodic Review: Malaysia’ (March 2009) 7-
8. 
1190 Sadiq, 106. 
1191 The children of many refugees from the Philippines are stateless in Malaysia today as their parents had 
only a temporary refugee card, many of which were not eligible for renewal as of 1986. Brunt Vulnerability 
28, footnote 35. Refugee status for people from the Philippines was revoked in 2001.  
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government introduced the Comprehensive Policy on the Recruitment of Foreign Workers 
to regulate immigration. 1196F1197  
In the 1980s, the government also sought to change the ethnic classifications in the Borneo 
States. It began to employ the term pribumi in the census for all indigenous groups in Sabah 
and Sarawak, a term also used in Indonesia. This prompted a backlash in Sabah, as it 
appeared to include Indonesian and Filipino immigrants. 1197F1198 In 1991, the government 
introduced the Comprehensive Policy on the Recruitment of Foreign Workers to regulate 
immigration.1198F1199 
Meanwhile, as Nagatsu notes in a review of Malaysian textbooks in the 1980s and 1990s, 
Sama/Bajau peoples began to be presented by politicians as an immigrant group from 
Johor, though they were still included as bumiputra under the law. This appears to have left 
the Sama Dilaut in a grey zone of identity, sometimes classed as foreigners and sometimes 
as indigenous peoples. Today, Malaysia, and Sabah in particular, have tight immigration 
regimes and the concept of “infiltration” by foreigners is a cornerstone of media 
reports.1199F1200  
In the 1990s, the Malaysia government attempted to do away with racial classifications and 
instead introduced the national identity of “Bangsa Malaysia”1200F1201 and in 2010, “1Malaysia,” 
asking Malaysian nationals to see themselves first as Malaysian nationals and only secondly 
as members of a racial, ethnic or religious group. 1201F1202 Malaysia also adopted “Vision 2020” 
in 1991, with nine national challenges for transforming Malaysia into a “self-sufficient” 
economy; challenge number one was to establish a unified Malaysian national identity. 1202F1203 
This program, however, has not been popular with Malays, who fear a decline of Malay 
culture.1203F1204  
As in Mali, some of the security functions of the state have been deputized to civil groups. In 
an echo of the Ganda Koy movement in Mali, in 1972, the Malaysian government authorized 
a paramilitary force, the Malaysian Volunteer Corps (RELA), to crackdown on 
 
1197 Nah, 491. 
1198 Barlocco, 56-57. 
1199 Nah, 491. 
1200 Clark and Pietsch, 170. 
1201 Hirschman, 566. See also Hooker, 233. 
1202 Barlocco, 53, 79. 
1203 Hooker, 260.  
1204 Cheah Boon Kheng, 240. See also Goh Gabrielpillai Holden, Gaik Cheng Khoo 10. See also Hwok-Aun Le, 
‘Affirmative Action in Malaysia and South Africa: Contrasting Structures, Continuing Pursuits’ 50 Journal of 
Asian and African Studies 615, 616 (2015) for a discussion of the current state of Malay and bumiputra 
affirmative action policy. 
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undocumented persons and introduced corporal punishment for unauthorized entry into 
Malaysia.1204F1205 These measures have not decreased the number of migrants to Malaysia, but 
have made life extremely difficult for irregular migrants, asylum-seekers, undocumented 
persons and those who overstay their visas. 
Yet, like Kuwait, Malaysia still requires a certain amount of managed immigration for its 
growing economy. Malaysia today has the highest dependency on foreign labour in the 
region, an issue which on its own has increasingly come to be seen as a security threat by 
the government, as it has been in Kuwait. In this way, Malaysia resembles Kuwait, where an 
influx of low wage workers has changed mobility from a social good to an unfortunate and 
mistrusted necessity. Malaysia is therefore caught between the “competing policy 
objectives” of controlling their borders, fostering economic growth, and managing 
demographic change. 1205F1206 As a result, “(n)arratives of Malaysia being infiltrated by aliens, or 
uninvited guests, within the territorial borders of the sovereign states are common in 
Malaysia’s government-controlled media...” 1206F1207 
The competing interests of cheap labour and national security have led the government in 
Sabah to alternately fast-track temporary work visas, while at the same time conducting 
mass deportations, leading to a complex and contradictory immigration policy. 1207F1208 On the 
one hand, the government conducted several exercises to regularize immigrants, beginning 
in 1985 and conducted every few years. 1208F1209 These have been followed by crackdowns and 
deportations. The goal of this policy appears to be maintaining a cheap labour force of the 
right size without permanently affecting Sabah’s demographics. Foreign workers are now 
routinely deported during economic downturns, such as in 1997 and 2009, or in response 
to security incidents. 1209F1210 With time, these exercises have become increasingly linked to 
maritime security and border control. In 1992, the government of Malaysia instituted an 
operation, Ops Nyah 2, or "Op. Get Rid 2", to track down and deport irregular migrants. 1210F1211 
This program was conducted in conjunction with increased border monitoring as part of 
Ops Nyah 1. Irregular migrants caught under the program were sent to immigration 
detention, where men were sometimes punished by, for example, caning, in preparation for 
 
1205 Nah, 499-500. 
1206 A. Frank, ‘Negotiation Borders: Everyday Corruption and Immigration Policing in Malaysia’ (International 
Students Association Working Paper 2014) 2. 
1207 Clark and Pietsch, 170. 
1208 Holst, 133. 
1209 Kassim and Zin, 21. 
1210 Nah, 491-492, 498-499. See also Kassim and Zin, 16. Recently, the crackdowns have taken place as part of 
Esscom operations, discussed below. See for example, Borneo Post, ‘Esscom ops against illegal immigrants in 
Kudat’ (15 May 2015) (accessed July 2020). 
1211 Kassim and Zin, 21. 
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being deported. 1211F1212 The militarization of the maritime border in Sabah is similar in many 
ways to that of the Kidal province in northern Mali. 
Concerns over national identity, immigration and voting is also related to religion. 
Immigration from the Philippines and Indonesia is often viewed by non-Malays in Sabah as 
increasing the Muslim population at their expense, particularly immigration of Muslim 
Moro peoples.1212F1213 As well, despite immigration controls, Sabah receives internal migration 
from the Peninsula, leading to concerns over a perceived “Malay-ification” or “Islam-
ification” of Sabah. 1213F1214 Immigration from the Philippines includes a large number of 
Sama/Bajau and Suluk peoples, groups who also live in coastal Sabah. This mirrors the 
migration that has been occurring in the region for hundreds of years, as described in Part 
2, but in modern Sabah, such migration has been re-categorized as dangerous immigration. 
As in Mali and Kuwait, the issue of voting and the issue of national identity are intimately 
entwined. The issue of “phantom voters” and persons improperly removed from the rolls 
became a periodic political issue in Malaysia. 1214F1215 In Sabah, the problem of irregular 
migration is blamed for demographic change and “rigged” voting due to the issuance of fake 
and fraudulent documents to immigrants. So contentious has the situation become that the 
Malaysian Royal Commission of Inquiry tasked with looking into the question of fraudulent 
documents issued to irregular migrants called it “an all-consuming nightmare.” 1215F1216 As a 
result, the issuance of ID documents in Sabah is extremely political, complicating attempts 
to resolve statelessness, including among the Sama Dilaut, who are viewed as an immigrant 
community. 
In this way, the conflation with nomadism and immigration resembles the rhetoric in 
Kuwait against the bidoon, where previously nomadic populations are unable to prove their 
indigenous status because of more recent immigration and a lack of documents with which 
to establish their claims. In Sabah, statelessness itself has therefore become a reinforcing 
cycle, both fuelling and resulting from the conflation of immigration, nomadism and 
regional, historical migration. 
Like in Kuwait and Mali, the government has also pushed assimilation of the Sama Dilaut. 
Since independence, many Sama Dilaut have settled as part of coercive settlement 
programs, which include linking government services and access, including the right to a 
nationality, to settlement. For example, when Sama Dilaut began settling near Semporna 
 
1212 Kassim and Zin, 22. See also K. Navallo, Filipino Migrants in Sabah: Marginalized Citizens in the Midst of 
Interstate Disputes (Kyoto U. Masters Thesis 2013) 10 (hereinafter Navallo). 
1213 Hooker, 23. 
1214 Barlocco, 52. 
1215 For example, as many as 300,000 non-Malays may have been removed from the electoral rolls during the 
1974 and 1990 elections. See also Lim Hong Hai, 115-116. 
1216 Tan Sri Datuk Amar Steve Shim Lip Kiong (Chairman) and Commissioners, ‘Report of the Commission of 
Enquiry on Immigrants in Sabah,’ Royal Commission of Enquiry (2012) 3. 
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Town around independence, the “water village" was connected to the mainland by a 
government-built bridge, encouraging further settlement. By 1969 the sedentary 
population of this settlement had doubled. 1216F1217  
The Sabah government also pursued deliberate settlement programs, for example, 
relocating Bajau families from outer islands to the mainland and concentrating them in 
towns.1217F1218 Settlement since independence, therefore, has simply been a continuation of 
colonial policy regarding sea nomads, with settlement and economic development seen as 
dependent upon one another. Development schemes have been instrumental in moving the 
Sama Dilaut into a more settled way of life, assimilating them into the larger population of 
settled Bajau peoples. 
Conversion to Islam has been a part of assimilation as well. 1218F1219 For example, settled Sama 
Dilaut communities sometimes construct village prayer houses, visual markers of their 
conversion.1219F1220 As in Mali, settlement has helped many Sama Dilaut establish a fixed 
residence, which was vital in the decade following independence to gaining a nationality. 
Because of the law’s reliance on jus sanguinis and the need to produce one’s parents’ 
identity documents, however, settlement is no longer the path to a nationality that it once 
was. 
This section has outlined some of the ways in which the quest to forge a unified national 
identity has driven nomad statelessness, even in places where nomads should qualify for a 
nationality under the law. The next section will discuss another factor driving the failure of 
Kuwait, Mali and Malaysia to resolve nomad statelessness: the discovery of natural 
resources on nomad lands and the development of nomad lands for tourism. The next 
section will explore how the concept of terra nullius has been re-purposed for modern use, 
by linking the perceived natural statelessness of nomads to their inability to claim land, 
leaving their lands open to seizure by the government. The extreme wealth now located 
under many nomad territories means that granting a nationality to nomads risks 
empowering them to claim their lands away from the government. 
  
 
1217 C. Warren, Consciousness, 1980, 228. 
1218 Sather, Adaptation, 1997, 27. 
1219 Sather, Commodity, 2002, 40. 
1220 Sather, Commodity, 2002, 40. Sama Dilaut were banned from Islam until independence. See also Sather, 
Adaptation, 1997, 76. 
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Natural Resources as a Driver of Nomad Exclusion 
Indigenous communities have in so many cases been pushed out of their 
traditional areas to give way for the economic interests of other more dominant 
groups and to large scale development initiatives that tend to destroy their lives 
and cultures rather than improve their situation. 1220F1221 
This section will explore how the discovery of oil, natural gas, minerals and other natural 
resources has fuelled the unwillingness of states to resolve nomad statelessness in Kuwait, 
Mali and Malaysia. While not originally a topic of concern for this dissertation, a strong 
correlation was noted during the research phase of this project between nomad 
statelessness, the seizure of nomad lands by the state and natural resource extraction in all 
three examples. Experts on nomads have also noted that natural resource extraction and 
the creation of national parks requires exclusive control of land that is incompatible with 
potential ownership claims by nomads and former nomads, leading to the clearing of 
nomads from their lands. 1221F1222 This section will rely on a mixture of academic sources 
alongside non-academic sources that provide factual information on natural resource 
extraction, or that illuminate the opinions of government, media and other key actors. 
 
1221 Centre for Minority Rights Development (Kenya) and Minority Rights Group International on behalf of 
Endorois Welfare Council v. Kenya, 276/2003, African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights, 4 
February 2010, para. 247, quoting Report of the African Commission’s Working Group on Indigenous 
Populations/Committees (2005) 20 (hereinafter Endorois). 
1222 See generally Gilbert and Begbie-Clench, 2018, 3, discussing the problems nomads often face in proving 
exclusive occupation of land. 
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Kuwait, Oil and Bedouin Land Rights 
 
Approximate location of Kuwait oil fields in relation to its borders (author’s map) 
 
The sovereign state is now busy projecting its power to its outermost territorial 
borders and mopping up zones of weak or no sovereignty. The need for the 
natural resources of the ‘tribal zone’ and the desire to ensure the security and the 
productivity of the periphery has led, everywhere, to strategies of 
‘engulfment’... 1222F1223 
This section will look at the ways in which oil extraction fuelled Bedouin statelessness in 
Kuwait. As this section will explore, Kuwait’s nationality laws were enacted and enforced in 
an age of massive oil development in the desert. In particular, this section will describe 
how the Kuwait government came to claim the desert for its exclusive use. It will also 
examine how oil transformed the regional economy from one based on trade and, in part, 
on nomadism to one based on oil extraction by the central government, located in Kuwait 
City, in areas that were once the domain of Bedouin tribes. This shift, it is argued, 
encouraged the settlement of the Bedouin in urban areas and turned mobility from an asset 
into a “problem” for the Kuwaiti government. As Toth puts it; 
 
1223 Scott, 2009, xxi, 6. Scott discusses the threat posed by nomads in the “periphery” to the settled, 
centralized governments in Asia and Europe since their founding days, noting that nomads and other peoples 
in the periphery often opted out of state control and, with it, taxation and forced labor. Scott, 2009, 5-6. 
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Bedouin have had to deal with droughts and economic fluctuations for centuries. 
However, the rise of states in the region, with their need to regularize such things 
as borders, laws, the monopoly on power, economic control and the allegiance of 
its citizens, brought new challenges to nomadic populations. 1223F1224 
When oil was first discovered in Kuwait, it was treated as the exclusive domain of the 
Kuwaiti government. Even though the desert was most closely associated with Bedouin 
groups during the colonial period when oil was discovered, the centralization of power in 
the hands of the Al-Sabah family meant that under the logic of territorial sovereignty, the 
oil now belonged to the Kuwaiti government. The shift to an oil economy also drove the 
decline of pastoralism as a key part of the economy, as well as the decline in long-distance 
trade, while exploding the wealth of Kuwait City to unimaginable heights. 1224F1225 Maintaining 
the integrity of the border and eliminating competing claims to the deserts around Kuwait 
City was therefore a key goal of the Kuwaiti government. The drive to exclusively control 
oil production was a major factor behind the Kuwait government’s push to relocate the 
Bedouin off their lands and settle them in urban areas, as described above. 
Once oil was discovered, the wealth of the Arabian Peninsula went from being based on a 
movable resource, camels, to a fixed resource, oil. This increased the need for hard borders 
and decreased the usefulness of nomadism to the governments of both Kuwait and 
Iraq.1225F1226 The goal of setting hard borders to establish exclusive and total control over 
Kuwait’s oil reserves would also push government settlement policies to end nomadism 
and remove nomads from their lands.1226F1227 It would encourage the government to move 
former nomads away from the desert and into urban areas, often employing them as 
guards for oil wells. These policies would convert the Bedouin population to shanty 
dwellers on the margins of urban society. 1227F1228 At the same time, Kuwait became rentier 
state, where financial support from the proceeds of the oil was limited to nationals. This 
drove a conversation over who deserved Kuwait’s oil wealth. 
The historic relationship of the bidoon to land is highly contested. Unbiased information is 
difficult to obtain. The point of this section is not to make absolute statements about any 
historical claims to territory descendants of the Bedouin in Kuwait may have,1228F1229 but 
rather to explore the ways in which control of oil, like national unity, is a motivation behind 
Kuwait’s nationality policy. Instead of entering into a debate on disputed history as to who 
owns Kuwait’s deserts, this section will instead explore how the politicization of the origins 
 
1224 Toth, Tribes, 166. 
1225 Beaugrand, Stateless, 2018, 70. 
1226 Commins, 160. 
1227 Crystal, 175.  
1228 Beaugrand, Stateless, 2018, 91-93. 
1229 Maps drawn by European explorers show tribal areas, but as these cannot be evaluated for their accuracy, 
they are included in the Annex simply as approximations of where various tribes were located. 
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of the bidoon relates to the control of the source of the wealth that fuels the welfare state: 
the oil fields. 
As the above sections of this dissertation showed, solving the status of the bidoon in Kuwait 
is a matter of government will. Yet, there is very real resistance to expanding the Kuwaiti 
welfare state to include the bidoon, particularly in an age of declining oil revenues. 1229F1230 
Beaugrand estimates that the “cost” of naturalizing the bidoon population may be as high as 
600 million KD. 1230F1231 Underlying this debate is the assumption that former Bedouin who are 
now bidoon have no legitimate claims to Kuwait’s oil wealth. Their statelessness is 
therefore an important part of their perceived illegitimacy, despite the fact that Kuwait’s 
oil, unlike its pearls, originates not in Kuwait harbour, but in the desert. 
Oil was discovered in Kuwait during the colonial period, but would not become the linchpin 
of Kuwaiti politics until after WWII. In 1909, the Emir signed an exclusive agreement with 
Britain for oil exploration. 1231F1232 There appears to have been no Bedouin input or 
consultation with regards to this agreement. 1232F1233 Lands that the Bedouin had used for 
centuries were now being given to the British for oil exploration by the Emir of Kuwait City, 
thanks to his territorial sovereignty over the desert. The Bedouin were looked at not 
through the lens of their possible rights, but rather through the lens of their usefulness, or 
hindrance, in achieving the goal of centralized oil exploration.  
The claims of the Emir to the desert were helped by European theories on nomads, 
described above, whereby nomad lands were empty desert; terra nullius. The Kuwaiti 
government was not alone in this approach in the region, with Gulf governments adopting 
the logic of the territorial, centralized state to lay claim to vast oil fields under the desert. 
For example, Dawn Chatty discusses the concept of oil fields as terra nullius and how this 
affected the Bedouin in Oman. 1233F1234 In Kuwait, instead of being part of the oil exploration 
arrangements with the British, loyal Bedouin were settled in government housing in urban 
areas and employed by the state as Kuwaiti soldiers and as workers in the oil fields. 1234F1235 It 
was as low-level employees of the petro-state, not owners, that the former Bedouin would 
make themselves most useful to the state. 
 
1230 “The state provides such hefty welfare benefits to citizens that politicians have told me that giving 
citizenship rights to even a small proportion of the Bidun, in a country with around 1.2 million citizens, could 
bankrupt the government.” B. Wille, ‘Kuwait’s Plan to Pawn Off its “Stateless”’ Al Nahar/Human Rights Watch 
(March 26, 2015) (accessed July 2020). See also Beaugrand, Stateless, 2018, 160-166. 
1231 Beaugrand, Stateless, 2018, 165. 
1232 Casey, 21. 
1233 Information on Bedouin participation in this decision, if any, would be an important subject of future 
research. 
1234 Chatty, Negotiating, 138-141. See also Gilbert, Nomadic, 2014, 195. Gilbert notes that the development of 
oil often causes competition between nomads and governments. 
1235 Kasaba, 5-6. See also Carmichael, 122. 
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Beginning in the 1940s, and accelerating in the 1960s, Bedouin from the desert began to 
settle in shanty towns around Kuwait’s growing urban areas in order to access jobs in the 
military and police, often the only jobs available to them now that long distance trade was 
curtailed.1235F1236 At first, this settlement was informal and ad hoc, a response, in part, to the 
limits on nomadism created by the new borders, as well as to rapid modernization created 
by the discovery of oil. The government, however, also promoted the informal settlement of 
the Bedouin as a way to fill needed low level jobs in the police and military. Urban Hathar 
Kuwaitis were given posts in the new government in exchange for their loyalty to the ruling 
Al-Sabah family,1236F1237 but wealthy and middle-class Kuwaitis did not want low level jobs in 
the military or as border guards in remote areas, so these jobs were filled with 
Bedouin.1237F1238 
Many bidoon were relegated to temporary shanty towns on the outskirts of urban areas 
while naturalized Kuwaitis were settled in special neighbourhoods constructed by the 
government and continued to be given social benefits. 1238F1239 When the Kuwaiti government 
decided to naturalize a portion of the Bedouin population, it began a massive housing 
construction program, in place from the mid-1960s to 1980, razing informal shanty towns 
and semi-nomadic settlements and replacing them with western-style housing projects. 1239F1240 
These state-built housing projects came to resemble ghettos. 1240F1241 Today, many naturalized 
Bedu are associated with shanty towns and government housing. 1241F1242 Both the shanty-
towns and housing projects were located far from the wealthy inner cities where the 
Hathar lived. The government justified the segregation of the Bedouin population by 
claiming that the desert peoples needed to remain close to the desert. 1242F1243 A result of these 
housing projects and movement restrictions on the Bedouin has been the mass settlement 
of former Bedouin and, by consequence, their removal from their lands. 
Control of oil was also a major driver of the Iraq invasion of Kuwait, highlighting for the 
entire world the sensitive nature of Kuwait’s desert border. Kuwait also faces an ongoing 
border dispute with Saudi Arabia. 1243F1244 Oil production and transportation required exclusive 
 
1236 For an overview of what some have alluded was an influx of Bedouin during the 1950s and 1960s see 
Beaugrand, Stateless, 2018, 90-91. See also Al-Nakib, 16-17. Al-Dekhayel, 144. See also Beaugrand, 
Transnationalism, 2010, 23. 
1237 By the 1970s, over 70% of the urban Kuwaiti population was employed by the government. Ismael, 121. 
1238 Longva, Citizenship, 184. 
1239 Yanai, 234. Longva, Citizenship, 184. 
1240 Al-Dekhayel, 145. See also Beaugrand, Transnationalism, 162; Al-Nakib, 1. 
1241 Beaugrand, Transnationalism, 2010, 164-165. 
1242 Beaugrand, Stateless, 2018, 99-100. 
1243 Al-Nakib, 19. 
1244 U.S. Energy Information Administration, ‘Kuwait’ (July 8, 2013). 
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government control over large wells in the desert, as well as infrastructure to transport 
and ship the oil from the coast. At the end of the British period, Iraq ended up with limited 
access to the coast. This would become a constant source of strain between the two 
countries, as coastal access was now vital for oil export. 1244F1245 Kuwait would need to maintain 
both these things in order to continue to control its oil profits.  
As the above sections discussed, the migrations of the Bedouin and the resulting lack of 
clarity around the arbitrary border between the three countries became a source of anxiety 
for the Kuwaiti government. Bedouin loyalty and ongoing migrations were increasingly 
presented as a security issue. 1245F1246 In the 1960s, Kuwait’s borders were still somewhat fluid, 
border posts few and far between, and Bedouin could continue their traditional way of life, 
albeit with increasing difficulty.1246F1247 Shoring up the borders against Saudi and Iraqi 
expansionism became a major issue for the Kuwaiti government and settlement of the 
Bedouin, while claiming Bedouin lands, became a key facet of that effort. 1247F1248 As Toth puts 
it, writing of the region more generally, “areas where ownership of the land or sovereignty 
was in question became hotly contested.”1248F1249 Solving the so-called problem of the Bedouin 
became seen as key to maintaining Kuwaiti control over its oil fields. Settlement for 
employment in the army and oil industry was arguably seen as an ideal solution, both to fill 
those jobs, but also to decrease border crossings and marginalize the camel trade. This 
settlement and employment also took place during a period of drought, when pastoralism 
was particularly difficult. Beaugrand argues, however, that many Bedouin viewed these 
jobs as temporary and not indicative of a permanent abandonment of nomadism. 1249F1250 
Aggressive oil extraction in Kuwait coincided with the increasingly negative view of 
nomadism throughout the region as bad for the desert environment. 1250F1251 With Kuwait and 
 
1245 Carmichael 129. 
1246 Longva, Citizenship, 51. 
1247 Longva, Citizenship, 188. See also Fletcher, 59. 
1248 Casey, 21. G Power, ‘The Difficult Development of Parliamentary Politics in the Gulf,’ in D. Held and K. 
Ulrichsen, The Transformation of the Gulf: Politics, Economics and the Global Order (Routledge 2012) 32-33. 
Beaugrand Transnationalism 2010 110-111 (noting the influence of drought and modernization on 
settlement, while arguing that settlement was also a priority of the Kuwaiti government). 
1249 Toth, Control, 60. 
1250 Beaugrand, Stateless, 2018, 70-71. 
1251 Chatty, Pastoralists, 16, 228-240 (where she highlights the example of wild animal reintroduction 
programs in Oman and Syria). Chatty notes the link between policies applied in the Gulf region and those 
applied to African pastoralists, discussed below in the Tuareg case study. Chatty and Colchester also place the 
settlement of nomads as part of conservation in the wider context of the displacement of indigenous peoples 
for conservation. D. Chatty and M. Colchester, ‘Introduction’ in D. Chatty and M. Colchester (eds.) Conservation 
and Mobile Indigenous Peoples: Displacement, Forced Settlement and Sustainable Development (Berghan Books 
2002) 1-15.  
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other Arabian states now pumping millions of barrels of oil and building large 
infrastructure projects, including pipelines, 1251F1252 the international community and Gulf State 
governments focus on environmentalism must be questioned. But the views of outside 
experts about environmental harm provided another rationale to Gulf State governments 
to settle nomads. 1252F1253 While the extent to which Kuwaiti settlement policies were 
influenced by international anti-pastoralism policies is unknown, it was frequently evoked 
in other Gulf states.1253F1254 More research on the role of anti-pastoral policies in Kuwait is 
needed. 
The contested history of the bidoon makes it difficult to trace the history of seizure of 
Bedouin lands by the Kuwaiti government. As are result, much more research is needed 
into this issue. Yet, as this section has shown in general terms, the enormous importance of 
oil has led the Kuwaiti government to take aggressive measures to protect its borders and 
exclusively control its oil wells, centralizing control in the hands of the government. 
Adopting the principle of absolute territorial sovereignty and terra nullius in the desert has 
allowed the government to centralize control of both oil production and transportation. 
Once the domain of Bedouin tribes, oil producing regions around Kuwait City and Jahra are 
now under exclusive government control. Meanwhile, the wealth from oil extraction has 
made nomadism superfluous to Kuwait’s economy. Today, the former Bedouin population 
in Kuwait are regarded as a security threat and a potential burden to the state. Their 
ongoing statelessness, therefore, appears to serve important Kuwaiti government interests, 
though more research is needed. 
  
 
While agriculture was not a priority of the Gulf States for economic reasons, Dawn Chatty notes that in other 
Gulf states, forced settlement of Bedouin tribes was encouraged after independence in order to promote 
agriculture, despite the dubious environmental effects. Chatty, Persistance, 23. 
1252 Information on Kuwait’s oil infrastructure can be found at www.kpc.com.kw, the website of the Kuwaiti 
Petroleum Corporation. 
1253 Bocco, 302. Riccardo Bocco notes that the “Arab intelligentsia,” members of urban elites, who also pushed 
for settlement of the Bedouin were often as foreign to nomadism as western scholars and viewed it as 
backward. Bocco, 302-303. Government policy encouraging Bedouin settlement was therefore aligned with 
international development policy. 
1254 More research is needed on this issue. 
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Minerals, Agriculture and Tuareg Land Rights in Mali 
 
 
Possible locations of minerals in Mali in relation to its borders, author’s map 
 
It may well turn out that Europe’s most enduring legacy to Africa is the state. 1254F1255 
While the mineral wealth in Tuareg areas cannot be fully established due to the ongoing 
conflict, like in Kuwait, possible mineral wealth in the Sahara has long fuelled the Malian 
government’s intention to retain control over these areas. While not as much of a driving 
force in Malian politics as in Kuwaiti politics, natural resource extraction, particularly 
mining leases, play an important role in the Malian government’s drive to retain control 
over its Sahel territory. 
Malian land use policy in the north began as a continuation of colonial policy, with the 
promotion of agriculture the central focus. French attempts to retain some control of the 
region, particularly to establish mineral exploration rights, however, remained a 
consideration for the Malian government. As the above sections showed, following 
independence, Keïta’s government moved swiftly to consolidate territory and jump-start 
 
1255 A. Mazrui, ‘Francophone Nations and English-Speaking States: Imperial Ethnicity and African Political 
Formations’ in D. Rothchild and V. Olorunsola (eds.), State Versus Ethnic Claims: African Policy Dilemmas 
(Westview P. 1983) 25. 
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the economy according to socialist models. Unlike in Kuwait, the original focus of Malian 
government was on developing land in the fertile Niger Bend region for agriculture.  
The Sahara regions, however, had already been identified by the French as having potential 
mineral wealth that would attract the attention of future governments. At first, Keïta’s 
socialist agriculture programs targeted nomadism as a barrier to agriculture, expanding 
similar French efforts. 1255F1256  
The modernisation of the economy could only be successful if the mentality of the 
rural population could be transformed from a backward traditional outlook on 
production and society to a modern rational one. If this process was successful 
economic production would rise automatically, or so the regime thought. 1256F1257 
As the decades went by, however, lucrative mining contracts in neighbouring Niger and 
Algeria raised the stakes for ownership of the desert. As time passed, uranium mining and 
oil exploration in neighbouring countries renewed fears that potential Sahara wealth was 
at stake if Tuareg succession was successful. 
Land use policies in northern Mali adopted the principle that the nomadic Tuareg did not 
own their lands. The socialist Keïta government saw the Sahel territories as belonging 
collectively to the state with the Tuareg granted the right to use, not own, the land. 
Meanwhile, agricultural peoples were seen as the proper and natural owners of land and 
the holders of private, individual title. 1257F1258 As the above section discussed, Keïta put into 
place an ambitious program of modernization specifically favouring agriculture.1258F1259 The 
Malian government declared much non-agricultural land, which included pastoral land, to 
be of communal use. The administration set up agricultural collectives and “agricultural 
brigades.”1259F1260 In an instant, the Tuareg were told they had no right to lands they had 
occupied for generations.  
As the northern Kidal province remained under military rule due to the 1962 conflict, the 
region to the south near the Niger river, where the Tuareg were heavily mixed with settled 
Songhai and other groups, saw the aggressive introduction of programs to promote 
 
1256 For example, the regime reintroduced travel permits that had been used by the French to restrict 
migration. Lecocq, Desert, 2002, 81. 
1257 Lecocq, Desert, 2002, 78. 
1258 Gremont, 137. 
1259 C. Coquery-Vidrovitch, ‘The Transfer of Economic Power in French-Speaking West Africa’ in P. Gifford and 
W. Louis, Decolonization and African Independence: The Transfers of Power, 1960-1980 (Yale UP 1988) 105. 
1260 Lecocq, Desert, 2002, 160-162. “The successive obstacles brought about the formation of a ‘nomad 
commons’ that paradoxically evolved into a ‘nomad’s land’ without either nomads or land.” Bourgeot, 
Résistances, 407. 
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agriculture at the expense of pastoralism. 1260F1261 The state organized rural cooperatives. 1261F1262 
Government offices were created to supply rural farmers with credit and equipment. As in 
Kuwait, the Malian government, encouraged by international agencies, also sought to 
enforce several environmental preservation schemes that linked pastoralism to 
environmental decay.  
One of the ways in which the Keïta regime supported agriculture in the Niger Bend was by 
digging more wells. Between 1961 and 1969, sixteen new wells and pumping stations were 
established, mostly without input from the Tuareg as to their location or management. 
These wells were open to both the Tuareg and sedentary population, despite being located 
on the same sites as traditional water sources used by the Tuareg. New wells encouraged 
the spread of agriculture northward. In 1960, a law had been passed to limit agriculture 
from encroaching on Tuareg grazing in an attempt to preserve pastoral rights, but this law 
was not enforced and more and more land came under production during the Keïta 
period.1262F1263 The failure of the Malian government to support pastoralism would become one 
of the continuing flash-points in tensions between the Tuareg and the government. 
The Malian state also took an active role to encourage agriculture amongst the Tuareg. 
Toward the end of the Keïta regime, the government organized agricultural fairs for the 
Tuareg, though this project found success only amongst a small population of ex-slaves 
already accustomed to agriculture. The transport of cattle to Algeria and Niger for sale was 
banned if it did not take place as part of state sponsored programs. 1263F1264 The Tuareg did not 
understand the purpose of these controls and refused to cooperate. The main outcome of 
the Malian government’s attempts to “modernize” the economy of the north was to make 
seasonal migration and trade more difficult and clandestine. Such meddling by the state in 
their affairs further alienated the Tuareg, but the state did not give the Tuareg and outlet to 
air their complaints or participate in the process of setting policy or making decisions over 
resources and programs, seeing every attempt by the Tuareg to air their grievances as a 
sign of sedition. 1264F1265 
All of these policies had disastrous effects on the Tuareg’s ability to pursue pastoralism just 
at the time when the introduction of the Malian Franc led to an economic crisis throughout 
the country.1265F1266 Such policies brought suffering throughout Mali, but particularly to the 
pastoralists who were without government subsidies like other sectors. As a result of these 
 
1261 Boilley, Les Touaregs, 1999, 350. 
1262 Diarrah, 39-42. « La priorité était accordée à l’agriculture qui devait être le pilier de développement 
économique du Mali. » Diarrah, 42. 
1263 Bernus, 166-167. 
1264 Organizations like SOMIEX (the Malian society for imports and exports. Boilley, Les Touaregs, 1999, 361. 
The banning of the caravans also took place on the Algerian side of the border. Keenan, Resisting, 93. 
1265 Boilley, Les Touaregs, 1999, 310. 
1266 Diarrah, 39-42, 47-48. See also Gauido, 245-248; Boilley, Les Touaregs, 1999, 316. 
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policies, throughout the period following independence, settlement of the Tuareg 
accelerated.1266F1267 
Despite government support for agriculture across Mali, output remained frustratingly low, 
and eventually surpassed by mineral exploitation and manufacturing. 1267F1268 As agricultural 
output in the Niger Bend fell behind expectations, increasingly the Sahara revealed itself to 
contain a wealth of mineral riches. 1268F1269 Throughout the post-independence period, the 
Malian government would fight to retain control of the potentially lucrative Sahara, 
viewing Tuareg agitation for rights as dangerous separatism, French imperialism or 
collusion with Algeria and Libya. This cycle of mistrust continues to dominate Tuareg-Mali 
relations to this day and is arguably the biggest barrier to Tuareg inclusion within the 
Malian state. 
During the French period, however, there were already signs that the real wealth of the 
Sahel lay not in agriculture but in mining. Mining for salt and gold, as Part 2 showed, was 
always a major occupation of the Sahel and Sahara. As discussed above, civil war broke out 
in northern Mali in 1962, putting an end to many of the government’s programs in that 
region. The armed conflict and continued insecurity also inhibited the same sort of mineral 
exploration that was taking place in the Sahara in neighbouring countries like Niger. But if 
the vast resources discovered in neighbouring Algeria and Niger were any hint of what may 
be contained beneath the Malian Sahara, it is likely that Tuareg lands in northern Mali may 
turn out to be very valuable. 
(O)il was struck in Algeria, near the Libyan border, in the northernmost part of 
the Tamasheq world. Five months later, the largest oil well in Algeria until 
present started spouting its riches at Hassi Messaoud...Various metals and other 
minerals were discovered in the Hoggar Mountains of Southern Algeria, and 
phosphor and iron ore were located in Mauritania. 1269F1270 
Mineral riches like uranium 1270F1271 in Niger would soon be added to the Sahel’s output. 
While gold, cotton and livestock are currently Mali’s biggest exports, unproven oil and 
other mineral deposits in the north are increasingly attracting attention. 1271F1272 In 1987, the 
 
1267 Azarya, 260. See also Bernus, 168. Similar anti-nomad policies were put into place in southern Algeria. 
Keenan, Lesser Gods, 923. See also Bourgeot, Résistances, 166-168, 179-180 (discussing the effect of 
development projects on the Tuareg.) 
1268 Coquery-Vidrovitch, 111-112. 
1269 Claudot-Hawad, 673. 
1270 Lecocq, Desert, 2002, 49. 
1271 In Niger, uranium mining, and the government’s desire to maintain control over the mines, dominated the 
relationship between the Tuareg and government beginning in 1975. Claudot-Hawad, 665. 
1272 See for example USA International Business Publications ‘Mali Mineral & Mining Sector Investment and 
Business Guide’ (2007) 44 and J. Whaley, ‘Mali: A Country on the Cusp?’ 5 GeoExpro, 4 (2008). 
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UN and the Malian government did a study of minerals in the northern Sahel region. This 
report was not made public until 1991. According to the report, northern Mali contains 
large deposits of gold, iron, magnesium, copper, zinc, uranium, phosphates, salt, gypsum 
and oil and tar sands, 1272F1273 including the potentially lucrative Taoudeni Oil and Gas Basin in 
the far north of the country. 1273F1274 In next door Niger, near Agadez, the former location of the 
Ayar Sultanate discussed in Part 2, uranium mining has become a major source of wealth 
for the Nigerien government. 1274F1275  
Any potential mineral or oil wealth in northern Mali is speculative and it is not the purpose 
of this dissertation to make claims on whether or not there is mineral or oil wealth there, 
but only to point out that there is speculation in the natural resources industry about 
northern Mali’s potential, speculation that arguably fuels tensions over the sovereignty of 
northern Mali.1275F1276 The possibility of vast wealth in the Malian Sahel and Sahara has greatly 
raised the stakes for the Malian government to win the civil war against Tuareg separatists 
and retain control of the region. 
Meanwhile, land use in the Sahel has only become more contentious in the 1980s and 
1990s. The process of sedentarisation of the Tuareg has continued.1276F1277 The return of the 
Tuareg to Mali since the 1990s has led to increased pressure on available land. The 
repatriation of refugees was used to promote Tuareg settlement, but it exacerbated 
questions of land ownership for returned Tuareg. 1277F1278 The international community has 
also played a part in the settlement of these returnees, adding to the pressures on available 
land.1278F1279  
The exact number of refugee returns to Mali is unknown, but UNHCR estimated that 
between 1995 and 1996, between 50,000 and 80,000 refugees returned to Mali, increasing 
 
1273 Diarrah, 264. 
1274 OECD Sahel and West Africa Club, ‘Vulnerabilities and factors of insecurity in the Sahel’ (August 2010) 4. 
1275 See the World Nuclear Association, Uranium in Niger at http://www.world-nuclear.org/information-
library/country-profiles/countries-g-n/niger.aspx (accessed July 2020). 
1276 Kennan discusses the relationship between oil and uranium exploration, the Tuareg, and the government 
of Niger in Keenan, Resisting, 214-217. 
1277 “Increasingly forced to switch from nomadic to urban lifestyles over the last few decades, lots of Tuareg in 
the Sahara and Sahel are being squeezed into sedentarization.” Kohl and Fischer ‘Tuareg Moving Global: An 
Introduction’ in Kohl and Fischer (eds.) Tuareg Society within a Globalized World: Saharan Life in Transition 
(Tauris 2010). 
1278 Randall and Guiffrida, 438-439, 454. Whether this settlement would have occurred without displacement 
is unclear. 
1279 For example, UNHCR and the German Technical Cooperation Agency (GTZ) created 638 returnee 
settlements centered around wells and boreholes in northern Mali in the late 1990s. Randall and Guiffrida, 
439. In neighboring Niger, nomads were encouraged to settle in order to claim land. C. Oxby, ‘Will the 2010 
‘Code Pastoral’ Help Herders in Central Niger? Land Rights and Land Use Strategies in the Grasslands of 
Abalak and Dakoro Departments’ 15 Nomadic Peoples 53 (2011) 53. 
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the urban population and placing stress on land availability and employment 
prospects.1279F1280 Refugee returns brought out differences between the returned Tuareg, 
accustomed to living in camps and towns, and those who had remained in northern Mali in 
very difficult circumstances, continuing to practice seasonal migration when possible. 1280F1281 
Younger Tuareg often found themselves caught between the ideals of pastoral life and the 
allures of a more settled existence like that experienced abroad. The 1990s saw the effects 
of decades of Tuareg settlement, a change in lifestyle that would have wide-ranging 
environment, social and political affects. In particular, it continued to raise the stakes for 
land ownership in northern Mali. 
In the 1990s, settlement and land ownership would also be linked to registration and 
voting, meaning that returned and settled Tuareg, if registered, could influence Malian 
elections. Art 8 of the new Constitution, passed as part of the peace agreement, required 
that all voters have been resident in their arrondissement or commune for six months in 
order to vote.1281F1282 Land ownership was linked to residence and, therefore, to voter 
registration. A 1998 land apportionment exercise by the government heavily favoured 
settled communities, who could prove long standing tenure to the land, which in turn 
increased the electoral representation of the settled population.1282F1283 Settlement became 
increasingly the best way to claim territory in northern Mali and establish residence in 
order to register to vote.  
This created a strong link between settlement, land ownership and voting that would fuel 
Malian politics in the north until the present day. The linkage of residence to voting rights 
fuelled another wave of settlement amongst the nomads as they attempted to establish 
their right to Malian identity cards and land deeds. 1283F1284 The land registration program 
brought them into further conflict with the Songhai population, who had long-standing 
claims to much of the land in the Niger Bend. The cycle of voting based on registration, 
which was in turn based on land ownership or occupation, led to strain on the already poor 
relationship between the recently settled Tuareg and longer-settled communities. 
Meanwhile, the government’s policy of treating Tuareg lands as communal lands owned by 
the state continued throughout the 1980s, 1990s and 2000s. This idea, that Tuareg lands 
 
1280 United States Committee for Refugees and Immigrants, ‘U.S. Committee for Refugees World Refugee 
Survey 1997 - Mali,’ (1 January 1997). About 30,000 received assistance from UNHCR; the rest repatriated 
spontaneously. 
1281 Giuffrida, 32. 
1282 Diarrah, 159. 
1283 The rush to register land ownership in Mali was not confined to the north. The 1990s and 2000s saw a 
rapid increase in the number of land title documents filed with the government across Mali as people in rural 
areas scrambled to claim land. M. Djire, ‘Land Registration in Mali; No Land Ownership for Farmers?’ (144 
I.I.E.D. 2007). (Though this study focuses on land ownership near Bamako, the increase in ownership can be 
seen throughout Mali. 
1284 Gremont, 143. 
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were commons, or terra nullius, had a long history that could be traced to colonial 
scholarship, as was discussed in the above section on nationality law during colonization.. 
In addition to early policies claiming Tuareg lands as commons, the armed conflict caused 
Tuareg lands to revert to the state, meaning that pastoralism was now to be done on state 
owned or communal land over which the Tuareg would have little control. 1284F1285 This 
interpretation of Tuareg land use as being not one of ownership but of communal use on 
land owned by others was rooted in the philosophy of land use and statehood described 
above. 
In addition, even those land tenure systems recognizing pastoralists’ rights to 
natural resources (in Mali and the Niger), differently value agricultural and 
pastoralist land use. Accordingly, pastoralists only enjoy usufruct rights of 
pastoral resources under the condition that they respect private (agricultural) 
land. Pastoralists’ access to natural resources thus remains tenuous and subject to 
agricultural requirements. In several coastal States, in addition, ideas of 
indigeneity (autochtonie) have become virulent, posing indigenous against 
settlers or autochtones against allogènes. The indigenous are generally the local 
farming communities, while migrant farmers and all herders are considered as 
settlers or strangers. It has become a widespread practice to negate strangers any 
secure access to natural resources such as land, and in some cases even to jobs, 
education and infrastructure. These beliefs exacerbate the social and economic 
marginalization of pastoralists, and further restrict their access to resources. 1285F1286 
In 2001, the Malian government, like many others in the region, belatedly acknowledged 
the importance of pastoralism in Mali. The government enacted the Pastoral Charter to 
establish important rights of pastoral people to land, paving the way for a more nomadic-
friendly land policy in the north. But like many such Charters across the region, the policies 
would not lead to meaningful change in how land was owned and allotted in the Sahel. 1286F1287  
As in the Gulf region, the international community and development agencies played a role 
in the decline of pastoralism and the loss of Tuareg land rights. Settlement continued to be 
promoted by international and regional organizations, despite some initiatives to protect 
pastoralism, such as the ECOWAS Protocol on Transhumance (1998) and supporting 
Regulation (2003). 1287F1288 Support would include the creation of pastoral development 
programs and the inclusion of herders in regional and national policy making and conflict 
 
1285 Badi, 85. 
1286 Leonhardt, 8.  
1287 Boureima, 115-116. In 2003, various pastoral associations and NGOs in West Africa, including in Mali the 
Association des Organisations Professionnelles Paysannes, the Fédération des Éleveurs pour le Bétail et la 
Viande au Mali (also known as the Fédération Nationale Groupement Interprofessionnel de la Filière Bétail 
Viande au Mali), as well as the Federation Amadane and the peacebuilding organization Tassaght, and the 
regional organization Réseau Billital Maroobé, sought to improve conditions for pastoral nomads in West 
Africa.  
1288 ECOWAS Protocol on Transhumance (1998) and supporting Regulation (2003). 
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resolution mechanisms. The ECOWAS Protocol also provides some support to “facilitate” 
cross-border transhumance. 1288F1289 The ECOWAS Protocol also finds additional support from 
the N’Djamena Declaration on the contribution of pastoral livestock herding to the security 
and development of the Sahara-Sahelian areas and the African Union Commission, 
Department of Rural Economy and Agriculture, Policy Framework for Pastoralism in 
Africa.1289F1290 Mali and Niger also passed a protocol to regulate cross-border pastoralism. 1290F1291 
Such regional attempts to improve nomad rights, however, fall short of fully protecting 
their property rights.  
There has also been limited international attention on the link between pastoral land 
rights, civil registration and nationality. Importantly, the 1998 Protocol mandates that 
pastoralists have identity documents, but it does not provide a mechanism by which 
herders can prove their eligibility. 1291F1292 The enactment of these declarations and protocols, 
however, continues to treat pastoralists as wards of the state, rather than as nationals with 
rights. They have not led to changes in the behaviours of states like Mali towards their 
pastoral populations. Full political equality would remain elusive for the Tuareg during this 
time. The unresolved status of the Tuareg in Mali fuelled a new round of minor conflict in 
the 2000s, but increasingly, this violence was between local communities of herders and 
farmers.1292F1293 The war between the Malian government and the Tuareg was quickly turning 
into a war over land ownership.  
As in Kuwait, concerns over the environmental impact of pastoralism injected a new 
element of negativity into nomad-state relations. Throughout this period, the Malian 
government, international actors and the local, settled community continued to blame 
environmental degradation on pastoralism. The government’s support for agriculture and 
land ownership based on productive use of the land are in line with former French policy 
and with government policies concerning nomadic pastoralists all over the world. 1293F1294 In 
1987, a UN report stated that nomads should be forced to give up their traditional lifestyle 
and encouraged to pursue agriculture when pastoralism becomes a threat to the 
 
1289 ECOWAS Protocol on Transhumance (1998) and supporting Regulation (2003), Article 2. 
1290 S. Beyene, ‘Securing, Protecting and Improving the Lives, Livelihoods and Rights of Pastoralist 
Communities’ (Fort Hare U. October 2010). 
1291 Protocole d’accord en matière de transit du bétail entre la République du Niger et la République du Mali 
(Bamako 1988). 
1292 Twenty-first conference of heads of states, Decision A/DEC.5/10/98 Relating to the regulations on 
Transhumance between ECOWAS Member States, Abuja, (31st October 1998), Article 12. “Herdsmen must be 
in possession of identify papers duly issued by the competent authorities in their countries of origin. They 
must be able upon demand, to show proof of the identity and permanent residence of the owner(s) of the 
herd...” 
1293 Gremont, 142. United States Department of State, ‘2010 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices - 
Mali,’ (8 April 2011). See also Stewart, 5. 
1294 Khazanov, Pastoralists, 15. Khazanov lists the forced settlement of nomads in Russia in 1930-1931 and in 
Iran under the Shah, as well as the forced relocation and settlement of nomads in Somalia in 1974. 
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environment.1294F1295 Northern Mali has suffered heavily from climate change, with a 30% 
decrease in rainfall since 1998. 1295F1296 and the Sahara is expanding south at a rate of 30 miles a 
year.1296F1297 Both the Malian government and the international aid community have pushed 
for the settlement of the Tuareg as a way to prevent desertification. 1297F1298 Even the Pastoral 
Charter contained language linking pastoralism to environmental degradation. 1298F1299 
It is beyond the scope of this paper as to whether and to what extent pastoralism is bad for 
the environment or causes desertification in the Sahel. Proponents of pastoralism argue 
restrictions on mobility have limited the Tuareg’s ability to adapt to cyclical drought, 
intensifying desertification. The hard borders restricting Tuareg movement cannot be 
adjusted for the expansion of the Sahara. This has taken away the Tuaregs’ ability to 
manage their territories as necessary to minimize drought. Over farming has added to the 
problem.1299F1300 As well, Tuareg settlement has created a strain on arable land, bringing the 
Tuareg into greater conflict with their settled neighbours.  
Only recently have opinions about the environmental sustainability of nomadic pastoralism 
in the Sahel shifted in favour of nomadism. Ironically, the settlement of the Tuareg, so long 
a goal of both the colonial and the post-colonial government as well as held up as good land 
stewardship by international NGOs, is now fuelling a conflict over land in an increasingly 
arid environment. With modern research into the negative effects of intensive agriculture 
on the Sahel, the government of Mali has recently created some programs to assist the 
Tuareg, including husbandry cooperatives, fixed prices for the sale of animals, and 
employment projects for settled, urban Tuareg to adopt wage labour. But all of these 
programs seek to control pastoralism or provide for a transition to a non-pastoral lifestyle. 
Recent attempts by the Malian government to reduce Tuareg dependence on foreign aid by 
the Malian government by encouraging pastoralism have been too little, too late to halt 
settlement.1300F1301 As long as pastoralism is seen as backward by both governments and 
international actors, it will be discouraged by government policy, leading to more 
settlement. 
 
1295 United Nations, ‘Our Common Future’ Sec. 5.2 (1987) paras. 95-96. 
1296 Stewart, 28-29. 
1297 Stewart, 29. 
1298 Khazanov, Pastoralists, 7, 13. Boilley,, Les Touaregs, 1999 315. 
1299 Article 7, while supporting the right of pastoral communities to practice traditional pastoralism, including 
nomadism within Mali and, where possible by bilateral agreement, between Mali and neighboring countries, 
clearly states that; “the exercise of pastoral activities is subject to the obligation to preserve the 
environment.” Charte Pastorale du Mali, Loi N. 01-004 of 27 Feb. 2001. Oxby argues that a similar initiative in 
Niger, the Charte Pastorale, was too late and too ineffective to stop sedentarization. Oxby, 53. 
1300 J. McDougall, ‘Frontiers, Borderlands, and Saharan/World History’ in J. McDougall and J. Scheele (eds .) 
Saharan Frontiers: Space and Mobility in Northwest Africa (Indiana UP 2012) 84-85. 
1301 Diarrah, 275-285.  
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Meanwhile, the marginalization and exclusion of the Tuareg from both land ownership and 
political participation has meant that government policy continues to be set by urban 
Malians and agricultural interests. The continued disenfranchisement and lack of 
registration and political opportunities of pastoral peoples like the Tuareg makes it difficult 
for them to be heard by their governments, and even more challenging to create pro-
pastoral policies. 1301F1302 This has created a cycle of settlement, land overuse and conflict. The 
linking of registration, voting and legitimacy to settlement and land ownership has only 
fuelled further settlement and reduced the voices and political power of pastoral nomads 
like the Tuareg. The failure of decades of forced and coercive settlement policies will not be 
easily undone in the Sahel, and the lack of a political solution between the Tuareg and the 
Malian government only makes the problem worse. 
As this section has shown, Malian land use policy is deeply connected to Tuareg nationality, 
registration and voting. Throughout the 1980s, 1990s and 2000s, Malian land use policy 
continued to favour settlement, agriculture and the seizure and communal use of Tuareg 
lands in the Niger Bend region, even as these policies put a strain on the available land for 
farming. The link between land ownership and voting led some Tuareg to abandon 
nomadism in an attempt to prove title to their lands. The experience of living as refugees in 
camps distanced many younger Tuareg from nomadism, while international development 
programs targeted nomadism as bad for the environment. With little political clout, it was 
hard for Tuareg communities to challenge these policies. Meanwhile, potential mineral and 
oil wealth in the Sahara fuelled continued Malian government concerns over separatism in 
the north of Mali, leading to continued crackdowns on northern Tuareg. 
  
 
1302 Diarrah, 285. 
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Malaysia, Oil, Tourism and Sama Dilaut Ocean Rights 
 
Above: Approximate location of offshore oil blocks in relation to the border, author’s map 
Below: Tun Mustapha Marine Park 
 
Like in Kuwait and Mali, concerns over the integrity of Sabah’s ocean borders would be 
fuelled by the discovery of massive amounts of natural resources, specifically oil, under the 
oceans that were once the domain of the Sama Dilaut and other fishing communities. While 
the status of the Sama Dilaut is a much lower profile issue in Malaysia than that of the 
bidoon in Kuwait or Tuareg in Mali, as this section will show, concerns over sovereignty 
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and natural resources in Malaysia, including the establishment of tourist parks, had 
arguably a great deal of indirect influence on the status of the Sama Dilaut. 
The settlement of the Sama Dilaut has been continuing since the colonial period. According 
to Sather, by 1965, the population of nomadic Sama Dilaut had declined to about 660 in the 
Semporna district. 1302F1303 In 1967, James Warren noted the rapid abandonment of boat 
nomadism by the Sama Dilaut. 1303F1304 According to Carol Warren, by 1969, the sedentary 
population of Sama Dilaut at Semporna had doubled, and ten years later, only 25 to 30 boat 
dwelling families remained. 1304F1305 
Sama Dilaut nationality may appear to be unrelated to bigger questions about the inclusion 
of Sabah in Malaysia and the ownership of Sabah’s vast oil reserves and tourist parks, but 
in reality, Sama Dilaut nationality and legitimacy are directly impacted by the quest to 
exclusively control natural resources in Sabah. As the section on nomads before 
colonization showed, the Sama Dilaut occupy the Sulu Sea, now a sensitive maritime border 
zone and the location of the majority of Malaysia’s oil and some of its most lucrative tourist 
parks. Ocean areas once occupied by the Sama Dilaut is now some of the most valuable in 
the world.1305F1306 Like in Kuwait and Mali, the presence of natural resources has greatly raised 
the stakes for border security and Malaysia’s sovereignty over the oceans around 
Sabah.1306F1307 This section will explore how the discovery of oil and the creation of tourist 
parks in were once Sama Dilaut fishing zones has influenced Sama Dilaut belonging and 
how questions of sovereignty, borders and ocean rights have helped perpetuate their 
statelessness. 
While during the colonial period described in Part 2 north Borneo was considered to be a 
remote part of the British Empire, a place where the BNBC struggled to make money, today, 
Sabah’s offshore oil is a key driver of Malaysia’s economy. As described above, under a 
closely related European theory to that of terra nullius, the oceans around Sabah are 
 
1303 Sather, Adaptation, 1997, 28. The number of nomadic families is difficult to determine, in part because 
nomadism is difficult to quantify. Sather and Warren are in agreement, however, that boat nomadism greatly 
declined in the region following independence. I am indebted to Helen Brunt for her comments on this point. 
1304 J. Warren, Chartered, 1971, ix. Though according to some accounts, there may be as many as 5,000-7,000 
Sama Dilaut still living a nomadic or semi-nomadic lifestyle in Sabah today. The number of Sama Dilaut who 
continue to practice some form of boat nomadism, however, is unknown. I am indebted to Helen Brunt for her 
comments on this issue. 
1305 C. Warren, Consciousness, 1980, 228. See also Sather, Adaptation, 1997, 28. Sather points out that the 
number of settled Bajau also increased due to the influx of refugees from the Philippines. In Indonesia, many 
Sama Dilaut families were similarly settled in villages in the 1950s to crack down on piracy, leading to 
poverty and overfishing. C. Majors and J. Swiecicka, ‘Missing the boat?’ Inside Indonesia (June 24, 2007). See 
also L. Lenhart, ‘Orang Suku Laut Communities at Risk: Effects of Modernization on the Resource Base, 
Livelihood and Culture of the ‘Sea Tribe People’ of the Riau Islands (Indonesia),’ 5 Nomadic Peoples 67 (2002). 
1306 See generally Wright. See also Fernandez, 55; G. Poling, ‘The South China Sea in Focus: Clarifying the 
Limits of Maritime Dispute’ (Center for Strategic and International Studies 2013); Hooker , 221-222. 
1307 Kassim and Zin, 110. 
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considered to be mar liberum and are exclusively under the centralized control of the 
Malaysian government. The federal government has strengthened its control over the 
Borneo territories in recent decades by coming to dominate their finances and controlling 
their oil.1307F1308  
Currently, the federal government is focusing heavily on exploration in Sabah and Sarawak, 
with oil fields pushing up against the maritime boundaries with Brunei and the Philippines, 
who, in turn, have their own off-shore wells.1308F1309 Important deep-water oil discoveries off 
the coast of Sabah continue to be made. As well, the region continues to be vital to oil 
refining and export. 2017 saw the building of an important new refinery. 1309F1310 Western 
Sabah houses the Sabah Oil and Gas Terminal (SOGT), the Sabah-Sarawak Integrated Oil 
and Gas Project, and the Sabah-Sarawak Gas Pipeline. 1310F1311 Altogether, Sabah and Sarawak 
are crucial to Malaysia’s economy. 
Yet, as Part 2 explored, the inclusion of Sabah and Sarawak in Malaysia was not without 
controversy, and regionalism remains a strong part of identity in Sabah and Sarawak. 
Sabah has been the site of several independence movements, including a Communist 
insurgency in the 1960s, and more recently under Chief Minister Donald Stephens. 1311F1312 
Tensions over separatism, however, have never risen to the level of armed conflict as they 
have in Mali.  
Like northern Mali, several attempts have been made over the years to secure some 
independence for the Borneo states. This autonomy has been considerably weakened as oil 
has slowly come to dominate Malaysia’s economy. Until the discovery of oil, Sabah and 
Sarawak maintained a degree of financial independence, suffering through the decline of 
the timber industry in the 1960s and beginning to develop tourism as an alternative. 1312F1313 
But as oil production took off, Sabah grew in economic importance to Malaysia. Starting in 
the 2000s, oil and gas surpassed tin, palm oil, rubber, fishing, and other, more traditional 
economic drivers in Sabah as the dominant export, becoming a large part of Malaysia’s total 
GDP.1313F1314 
 
1308 Goh Beng Lan, 340. 
1309 See maps, below.  
1310 US Energy Information Administration, ‘Malaysia: International Energy Data and Analysis’ at 
http://www.eia.gov/beta/international/analysis.cfm?iso=MYS (July 2020). 
1311 US Energy Information Administration, ‘Malaysia: International Energy Data and Analysis’ at 
http://www.eia.gov/beta/international/analysis.cfm?iso=MYS (July 2020). 
1312 Singh, 222. See also Cheah Boon Kheng, 102. It is not the purpose of this dissertation to chronicle the 
history of separatism in Sabah, but simply to point out that the legitimacy of Sabah’s inclusion into Malaysia 
has frequently been called into question. 
 
1313 Andaya, 335. See also Sather, Adaptation, 1997, 27. 
1314 Singh, 218. 
247 
 
Thanks to oil and gas from across Malaysia, of which Sabah is crucial both for production 
and refining, 1314F1315 the Malaysian economy went through a boom, becoming a major world 
producer of oil and gas and a regional manufacturing and tech hub. But the economic 
growth has benefited different groups to different extents. Despite being the location of 
much of Malaysia’s oil wealth, the Borneo states have a lower GDP than Peninsular 
Malaysia.1315F1316 In particular, minorities like the Sama Dilaut and aboriginal peoples have 
been the most left out of this economic growth.  
As a result of the need to maintain exclusive, federal control of the oil, Sabah and Sarawak’s 
semi-independent status has become more fiction than fact. By law, the federal government 
of Malaysia is responsible for “health, education, finance, external affairs, internal security 
and civil and criminal law” and the state governments responsible for land regulation and 
use, education, civil service. In reality, Sabah has little say when it comes to oil exploration. 
While Sabah and Sarawak continue to set their own immigration policy, over time, the two 
states have slowly become more incorporated into the federation economically. 1316F1317 The 
federal government has in recent decades come to exert more control over Sabah’s affairs, 
particularly on the issues of border control and oil exploration. 1317F1318  
Importantly, though each state has its own constitution, finances are very centralized and 
oil production and revenue are controlled at the federal level. 1318F1319 The oil and gas revenue 
is almost wholly controlled by Petronas, Malaysia’s national oil company, and the federal 
government.1319F1320 Yet, though Sabah produces almost one third of Malaysia’s oil and gas, it 
receives only five percent of royalties. 1320F1321 Out of this, almost no money goes to the Sama 
Dilaut. 
Along with internal tensions, however, Sabah and Sarawak’s somewhat arbitrary inclusion 
within Malaysia have fuelled a series of border and sovereignty disputes with her 
neighbours. In this way, the situation in Sabah is similar to that of Kuwait, though Sabah 
has not been subjected to a sustained invasion by a neighbouring state the way Kuwait was 
 
1315 US Department of Commerce International Trade Administration, ‘Malaysia - Oil and Gas’ (June 18, 2017). 
1316 Young, Bussink and Hasan, 3, 283. See also Hooker, 243. 
1317 Young, Bussink and Hasan, 17, 18. The special rights granted to Sabah and Sarawak to restrict 
immigration from the rest of Malaysia are not without controversy. Malaysia Today, ‘The Real Purpose of 
Sarawak and Sabah’s Immigration Controls’ (7 April 2014). 
1318 Andaya, 335. 
1319 Malaysia’s national oil company, Petronas, controls all of Malaysia’s oil and is owned by the federal 
government. Control of Malaysia’s oil and gas industry was transferred from the states to the federal 
government in 1974. Sabah and Sarawak receive 5% royalty payment. E. Lee, ‘Scope for Improvement: 
Malaysia’s Oil and Gas Sector’ (Research for Social Advancement 2013) i-ii. See also Lim Hong Hai 101; Astro 
Awani, ‘Najib assures Sabah of more revenue from oil, gas resources" (15 Nov. 2014); Hooker , 226. 
1320 Hooker, 250. 
1321 Hooker, 251. 
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by Iraq. Nevertheless, tensions over the border and control of oil would come to drive 
much of the region’s politics and, as this section will show, influence how the Malaysian 
government has approached the subject of nationality for the Sama Dilaut. 
As Part 2 explored, the border between Sabah and the Philippines divided the Sultanate of 
Sulu. Because the original border demarcations were based on a disputed colonial-era 
treaty, the issue of the border cannot be easily solved as long as the legitimacy of the treaty 
is called into question. Under the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, each state has an 
“exclusive economic zone” 200 nautical miles off its coast, including islands, a critical 
provision for claiming oil exploration rights. 1321F1322 Yet, if the original treaty is not valid, the 
placement of the border is called into question, along with these oil rights. 
At federation, oil production had not yet assumed its central role in Malaysia’s economy. 
The biggest concern over the sovereignty of Borneo was the threat of communist influence, 
not the prospect of oil rights. The Philippines and Indonesia strongly objected to the plans 
for federation. In Indonesia, Sukarno began a somewhat limited military campaign to 
“crush Malaysia.” Meanwhile, the Philippines began a long, diplomatic campaign to regain 
what it claimed were parts of the historical Sultanate of Sulu. 1322F1323  
This prompted unresolved tensions over the border as the Philippines cut off diplomatic 
relations with Malaysia, complicating any attempts to resolve the border dispute or 
questions of nationality. The issue of Sabah’s sovereignty has not been helped by the fact 
that the Malaysian government continues to pay an annual fee to the Sultan of Sulu, based 
on the original agreement signed with the BNBC. 1323F1324 The dispute with the Philippines over 
the placement of the border should be viewed not as an isolated issue, but as part of 
broader anxieties over Malaysia’s sovereignty in the region. 1324F1325  
More recently, in 2002, Indonesia took one of its claims to the International Court of Justice. 
The Philippines tried to do the same, but Malaysia would not cooperate. 1325F1326 Tensions 
 
1322 UN Convention Law of the Sea, Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 397 (1982), with 168 states parties. 
1323 Hooker, 219. See generally Cheah Boon Kheng. 
1324 Once again, the purpose of this section is not to take a side in the border dispute, but rather to point out 
that the dispute exists, is very important to both sides, and is long-standing. 
1325 Another related conflict that does not directly impact the Sama Dilaut, but adds to the general anxiety 
over the integrity of Sabah’s maritime borders, is the dispute over the Celebes Sea between Malaysia and 
Indonesia, where the two countries have, for example, granted competing contracts to Shell Oil. This dispute 
is relevant to the Orang Laut living off the coast of Riau, in a closely related example of disputed borders 
impacting a nomadic “sea gypsy” community. L. Lenhart, ‘Orang Suku Laut Ethnicity and Acculturation’ 
(Bijdragen tot de Taal-, Land- en Volkenkunde Deel 153, 4de Afl. 1997) 577-604, 581. See also US US Energy 
Information Administration, ‘Malaysia’ at http://www.eia.gov/beta/international/analysis.cfm?iso=MYS. For 
a summary of the relevance of oil to the border dispute between Malaysia and Indonesia, see generally 
International Court of Justice, Case Concerning Sovereignty Over Pulau Ligitan and Pulau Sipadan (Indonesia 
v. Malaysia) (Merits) Judgment of 17 December 2002.  
1326 International Court of Justice, Case Concerning Sovereignty Over Pulau Ligitan and Pulau Sipandan 
(Indonesia v. Malaysia) (Merits) Judgment of 17 December 2002. See also R. Haller-Tros, ‘The Territorial 
249 
 
between Malaysia and the Philippines over the maritime border would prove particularly 
relevant to the status of the Sama Dilaut. 
While unlike in Kuwait and Mali, border tensions between Malaysia and the Philippines 
have not led to war, they have stoked Malaysian fears about the possibility of a military 
incursion into Sabah by factions from the Philippines. The actual validity of the supposed 
threat is unclear and beyond the scope of this dissertation, but Malaysia has, at times, 
accused the Philippines of being behind incursions by armed groups, first in 1968 and 
again in 2013.1326F1327  
The extent to which the government of the Philippines is involved in these invasions is a 
matter of debate, but these incidents have kept the problem of the border an issue of major 
concern for the Malaysian government. As this section will show, this has led to the 
securitization of the border region that is similar to that of northern Mali. It has driven the 
Malaysian government to aggressively police and control its maritime border as a security, 
rather than a civilian, zone. 
One important background issue to the debate over ownership of Sabah’s natural resources 
is the economic imbalance between Malaysia and the Philippines. While Brunei and 
Malaysia have forged ahead with exploration, the Philippines has been slow to grant oil and 
gas concessions and remains a net energy importer, though the government is trying to 
change this.1327F1328 Like in northern Mali, security issues in the Southern Philippines have 
created an environment that is unfriendly to oil exploration, making it difficult for oil 
companies to establish their claims and conduct business. 1328F1329  
As a result of all of the factors discussed in the proceeding paragraphs, there is now a 
perception in the Malaysian government that the Philippines regards Sabah as part of the 
Philippines, that conflict with the Philippines would impede oil exploration, and that this 
threat of conflict, in turn, impedes a bilateral solution between the two countries on issues 
 
Dispute Between Indonesia and Malaysia Over Pulau Sipadan’ (IBRU Boundary and Territory Briefing 1995); 
Hooker 222. Both Indonesia and the Philippines claimed title to areas of north Borneo based on pre-colonial 
claims, as well as the numerous treaties of the colonial period. 
1327 There have also been acts labeled as terrorism by the Malaysian government, carried out by Moro rebels 
in Sabah, including kidnappings and murder. Ferandez, 55. For a brief history of the 1968 incident, see Al 
Jazeera, ‘Remembering the “Jabidah massacre”’ 18 March 2013 (accessed July 2020). 
1328 Republic of the Philippines Department of Energy, ‘Frequently Asked Questions. See also US Energy 
Information Administration, ‘Philippines: International Energy Data and Analysis’. The extent of oil and gas 
reserves under the Sulu Sea is unknown. US Dept of State, ‘Limits in the Seas: No. 142 Philippines’ (2014). See 
also Manila Standard Today, ‘Total, Mitra Ready Sulu Sea Oil Drilling’ (8 March 2015); Government of the 
Philippines, ‘Petroleum Potential of the Sulu Sea Region, Philippines’; Coordinating Committee for Geoscience 
Programs in East and Southeast Asia, ‘Petroleum Potential of West Palawan Basins and Sulu Sea Region’. Note 
that some oil companies have pulled out, citing insufficient deposits. Philippine Commodities Digest ‘Very 
Thin Prospects for Philippine Oil and Gas Exploration,’ (21 Jan 2013). 
1329 E. Watkins, ‘ExxonMobil seeks Philippines military security for Sulu Sea site’ Oil and Gas Journal (January 
25, 2010). 
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like border security and immigration. 1329F1330 Today there is no Philippines consulate in Sabah 
due to the ongoing tensions, which impedes any solution to the question of nationality for 
various groups in Sabah. 1330F1331  
The simmering border dispute between Malaysia and the Philippines as to the sovereignty 
of north Borneo must therefore be viewed through the prism of oil and gas exploration and, 
in particular, the requirement that governments exclusively and centrally control the 
territory where oil and gas is located. 1331F1332 This dispute has had an important impact on the 
issue of migration to Sabah from the Philippines, as the Philippines continues to produce a 
large number of immigrants and refugees in Sabah, many of whom have not been able to 
gain Malaysian nationality. 1332F1333 The Sama Dilaut occupy and uncomfortable place in this 
dispute, as their seasonal migrations have become the object of scrutiny by both 
governments and their fishing practices are often presented as violating the ocean security 
zone the Malaysian government is attempting to create around Sabah. 
Yet, as Part 2 showed, it is precisely the historic fishing zones of the Sama Dilaut that are 
now under the exclusive ownership of the Malaysian government and which contain much 
of Sabah’s most valuable natural resources. As with the Tuareg and the Bedouin, the idea 
that the Sama Dilaut or other local peoples might have some ownership claims to the 
oceans off the coast of Sabah is not a topic that is ever entertained by the Malaysian 
government, as far as this dissertation has been able to ascertain. As noted above, while 
Aboriginal groups on Peninsular Malaysia have had some success asserting their land 
rights, the Sama Dilaut have not had similar success asserting their maritime rights. 
Today, as discussed above, there is the entrenched view by many officials that all Sama 
Dilaut are from the Philippines. 1333F1334 The insistence that the Sama Dilaut are not from Sabah 
has led to all denial of any rights they might have to their traditional fishing zones in 
Sabah’s waters. Undeniably, however, much of Malaysia’s oil deposits, wells and 
infrastructure are located in what were once Sama Dilaut fishing and migration zones. Yet 
today, oil and natural gas from offshore of Sabah is almost entirely controlled by Kuala 
Lumpur. As with Kuwait, there seems to have never been a serious conversation in 
Malaysia over whether or not the local inhabitants of coastal Sabah should have any 
ownership stake in Malaysia’s oil.  
 
1330 Tan Sri Datuk Amar Steve Shim Lip Kiong (Chairman) and Commissioners, ‘Report of the Commission of 
Enquiry on Immigrants in Sabah,’ Royal Commission of Enquiry (2012) 256. 
1331 Navallo, 4. 
1332 P. Ghosh, ‘It’s Not Just China Vs. Everybody Else: Bizarre, Ancient Conflict in Southeast Asia Between 
Philippines and Malaysia Intensifies’ IBT (March 7, 2013). 
1333 Allerton, Lives, 2014, 5. Indonesian residents, however, would need to register within five years under the 
pre-2006 law.  
1334 Brunt, Vulnerability, 35-36. 
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The need to secure offshore oil and gas production has led to a clampdown on maritime 
activities that are seen as at odds with security, such as small-scale fishing. Beginning in 
1992, the Malaysian government instituted an ongoing program of border surveillance and 
security in the oceans around Sabah, a program which came to sharply curtail Sama Dilaut 
fishing access. 1334F1335 Border control activities are tightly conducted by the military and police. 
The creation of the Sabah Oil and Gas Terminal has led to the loss of fishing zones for local 
fisherman, including Sama Dilaut fishermen. The government has banned fishing within a 
200km zone around the Terminal, citing security concerns. 1335F1336 Any small-scale fishing is 
often blamed on so-called foreigners who are intruding into Malaysian waters.1336F1337 This 
feeds the perception that Sama Dilaut fishermen are outsiders with no fishing rights in the 
area.  
But the Malaysian government has not only taken the view that the Sama Dilaut are 
foreigners without any rights to the oceans around Sabah. It has sometimes adopted the 
more extreme view that in the past, the Sama Dilaut have no land rights at all because they 
are nomads. The government has therefore adopted the common position that nomads do 
not own, but merely wander over, their lands. As a result, most conversations on Sama 
Dilaut fishing rights that do occur centre on access, not ownership. 
In a closely related issue, the government has also claimed that the Sama Dilaut were 
without a nationality due to their nomadism. In litigation before the International Court of 
Justice with Indonesia, speaking of the pre-colonial period, the Malaysian government drew 
a careful distinction between “wandering...sea gypsies” who were “effectively beyond the 
jurisdiction of any of the States in the region, including the Sultan of Sulu...” and other, 
settled Bajau groups, who were subjects of the Sultans and, later, nationals of their 
countries.1337F1338  
This sort of language echoes the opinions of many colonial administrators of not only the 
BNBC, but also the Sahel and the Persian Gulf region, as discussed in Part 2. The idea that 
the Sama Dilaut did belong anywhere and could not own land because of their nomadism, a 
view that had come up repeatedly during the colonial period in Kuwait and Mali as well, 
conveniently reinforces the view that the Sama Dilaut have no historical right to ownership 
 
1335 Kassim and Zin, 21-22. 
1336 Daily Express, ‘Fishermen Lament Loss of 200km Zone’ (5 April 2011). For more on the Terminal, see the 
Sipitang Oil and Gas website. 
1337 See for example Daily Express, ‘Encroachments into Oil Platforms at Alarming Levels’ (20 August 2015). 
1338 “Indonesia tries to minimize the significance of these (Bajau) local communities by presenting the Bajaus 
as a single group of sea gypsies, wandering up and down the whole east coast and effectively beyond the 
jurisdiction of any of the States in the region, including the Sultan of Sulu. It is true that there were Bajau 
communities along the coast, but these were distinct groups, not a single wandering tribe of nomads. The 
Bajaus of Darvel Bay had their own leaders and were based on the islands and reefs of the locality. They had a 
cemetery at Omadal, which still exists. Local leaders were appointed or confirmed by the Sultan of Sulu; they 
were often themselves Sulu by birth.” International Court of Justice, ‘Sovereignty over Pulau Ligitan and Pulau 
Sipadan (Indonesia/Malaysia): Reply of Malaysia’ (2 March 2001) 10. 
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of their traditional fishing grounds, as well as the view that they have no right to a 
nationality.  
Statelessness has been devastating on the Sama Dilaut on many fronts,1338F1339 but perhaps no 
more so than the denial of any ownership or right to occupy their traditional fishing zones. 
In addition to being unable to access most government services, they suffer from the 
constant threat of deportation as part of the undocumented population in a highly 
militarized border zone where the government of Malaysia has asserted exclusive title over 
most of the ocean. In this way, the move by the Malaysian government to seize exclusive 
ownership of oil fields resembles that of Kuwait, where the government exclusively 
controls the land and any competing claims are entirely ignored. Like in Mali, the border 
zone in Sabah is highly militarized. 
As with the Tuareg and Bedouin, the governments of Malaysia and Sabah frequently argue 
that Sama Dilaut nomads are detrimental to the environment. Yet, the settlement of 
nomads in Malaysia often takes place alongside government-sponsored logging, which has 
produced deforestation on a massive scale, oil exploration and large-scale fishing, all of 
which have serious environmental consequences. 1339F1340 While the Malaysian government 
pumps thousands of barrels of oil through pipelines in the area, Sama Dilaut communities 
are often accused of being, 
associated with illegal and destructive practices such as blast fishing, cyanide 
fishing, coral mining, and the harvesting of protected species..., as well as over-
exploiting individual fisheries to the point of collapse. 1340F1341 
The Sama Dilaut allegedly account for a ‘disproportionate amount” of small-scale, 
“artisanal” fishing in the Celebes Sea, but their actual impact on the natural environment is 
disputed and unclear. 1341F1342  
 
1339 Brunt, Vulnerability, 3. See also Navallo, 4. 
1340 Y. Lyons, ‘Offshore Oil and Gas in the SCS and the Protection of the Marine Environment, Part 1, A Review 
of the Context and a Profile of Offshore Activites’ Center for International Law, National University of 
Singapore (2011). See also Andaya 306-307, 322. See also Goh Beng Lan, ‘Dilemma of Progressive Politics in 
Malaysia: Islamic Orthodoxy versus Human Rights’ in W. Mee and J. Kahn, Questioning Modernity in Indonesia 
and Malaysia (Nus Press 2012) 306-307. 
1341 See generally J. Clifton and C. Majors ‘Culture, Conservation and Conflict: Perspectives on Maritime 
Conservation Among the Bajau of Southeast Asia’ 25 Society & Natural Resources (2012) (hereinafter Clifton 
and Majors). See also J. Clifton ‘Achieving congruence between conservation and community: the Bajau ethnic 
group and marine management within the Wakatobi and south-east Asia’ in J. Clifton, R. Unsworth and D. 
Smith (eds.) Marine Research and Conservation in the Coral Triangle: The Wakatobi National Park (Nova 
2010). 
1342 See generally Clifton and Majors, 2012. 
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According to Clifton and Majors, Sama Dilaut subsistence fishers practice a complex system 
of fish stock management, closely following seasonal fish spawning cycles. 1342F1343 Many Sama 
Dilaut are subsistence fishers who take only what they need to support their families. 1343F1344 
Meanwhile, the competition of large scale commercial fishing, much of which is licensed by 
the government, 1344F1345 means many Sama Dilaut have adopted engines, nets and other 
modern fishing aids that have greatly increased their take. 1345F1346 It could be argued, as Clifton 
and Majors suggest, that it has been the settlement of Sama Dilaut families, rather than 
their traditional fishing practices, that have negatively impacted the environment, 
particularly in an environment where large-scale commercial fishing is tolerated and even 
promoted.1346F1347 
More so than in Kuwait and Mali, the statelessness of the Sama Dilaut also goes hand in 
hand with the creation of tourist parks exclusively owned by the government from which 
they are excluded. 1347F1348 For nomads like the Sama Dilaut who have no legal standing to 
challenge their removal, such government development projects continue apace and the 
Sama Dilaut have little say over them. 1348F1349 Malaysia is looking at the creation of the Tun 
Mustapha Park, the largest of its kind in Malaysia, at the northern tip of Sabah. 1349F1350 This 
park will not only further limit small scale fishing, but will also greatly increase tourism in 
the region, a priority for the Sabah government. One study found that the tourism potential 
of the park outweighed even the value of potential untapped oil reserves in the area. 1350F1351 
While the creation of the park calls for the involvement of the local community, the Sama 
Dilaut are not being included. 1351F1352 
 
1343 See generally Clifton and Majors, 2012. 
1344 See generally Clifton and Majors, 2012. 
1345 World Wildlife Fund Malaysia, ‘Assessment of Coastal Fisheries in the Malaysian-Sabah portion of the 
Sulu-Sulawesi Marine Ecoregion’ (August 2001). 
1346 Sather, Adaptation, 1997, 79-80. 
1347 See generally Clifton and Majors, 2012. 
1348 See generally Clifton and Majors, 2012. 
1349 The Sama Dilaut are not the only sea nomad group to face fishing restrictions. See for example the Moken 
and the establishment of pearl fishing and subsequent issuance of licenses in Burma, and failure to issue 
licenses to the Moken. White, 1981, 70-71, 108. 
1350 R. Jumin and K. Kassem, ‘Ecosystem-based Management in a proposed marine protected area: Tun 
Mustapha Park’ (World Wildlife Fund Malaysia 2011). Also see the creation of the Tun Sakaran Marine Park 
off Semporna in 2004. I am indebted to Helen Brunt for her comments on this point. 
1351 Coral Triangle Initiative, ‘Valuation Study of the Proposed Tun Mustapha Park’ (17 March 2011). 
1352 Clifton et al., 86. See also Brunt, Stakeholders, 43. 
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In Part Ten of their report on the creation of Semporna Islands Park, the Semporna Islands 
Project argues that, 
(t)he high percentage of non-Malaysian citizens living in the proposed park 
should not be seen as an obstacle. The questions of citizenship can be addressed 
later, but in the meantime, it is important to establish the park and introduce 
management strategies for resource use and other activities...The nomadic Sama 
Dilaut have a unique lifestyle and have been using the area for hundreds of years. 
They should be allowed into some parts of the park, where they will be required 
to comply with all regulations concerning resource use. 1352F1353 
Nevertheless, as the report itself points out, 
(t)he Semporna Islands Park will be a special case because it will include State 
Land, land with Native Titles and land claimed under Customary Rights. The 
situation is complicated by the fact that there are a number of unresolved land 
claims, so it is not yet certain who owns what. 1353F1354 
The government must first establish legal title to the land, which means resolving 
ownership under Malaysia’s Native Titles laws, mentioned above. But this will be difficult 
to do for the Sama Dilaut, as their nationality is not established and, therefore, they have no 
way of establishing their title to areas in the park. Meanwhile, as the above quotes 
demonstrate, their right to enter and use their traditional territories is presented not as a 
right, but instead as largess by the government. 
Perhaps the entire counter-intuitive logic of the government position towards the Sama 
Dilaut is captured in this paragraph: 
The Sama Dilaut should be considered a special case because they are an 
indigenous people with a unique wandering lifestyle who have been using the 
area for hundreds of years. Their lack of official citizenship should not be seen as 
a reason for excluding them from the park. However, it is important to maintain a 
status quo. Those who have consistently used the area could be allowed to 
continue to do so, but measures should be taken to ensure that the park does not 
become a magnet for the many others who might be attracted to the area. 1354F1355 
These quotations show that the Sama Dilaut are viewed less as nationals of Sabah whose 
opinions must be consulted and whose rights to land must be upheld and more as outsiders 
without legal standing or rights. At the same time, the paragraph begins by acknowledging 
the Sama Dilaut’s long standing presence in the region as “indigenous peoples.” In 
particular, while it notes the indigenous status of the Sama Dilaut, it in no way makes 
 
1353 Semporna Islands Project, ‘Management Plan for the Semporna Islands Park (Draft: 1-2001) Part 10: 
Legal Aspects and Regulations’ 133 (hereinafter Semporna Islands Project). 
1354 Semporna Islands Project, 135, 137. 
1355 Semporna Islands Project, 137. 
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reference to any claims of title this might give them to the oceans which are here assumed 
to belong exclusively to the government.  
In this way, the treatment of the Sama Dilaut mirrors that of other indigenous and 
aboriginal peoples in Sabah, such as the Batek people, who have been confined by the 
government to a small area of so-called communal land next to a national park. 1355F1356 The 
point of these observations is not to question the creation of a marine park, but rather to 
point out, as Clifton et al. have done, that nomadic peoples cannot have a say in massive 
government projects regarding their lands unless their rights as nationals are respected. In 
such cases, the issue of indigenous status is often used or manipulated in ways that deny 
title to nomads. 1356F1357 
  
 
1356 K. Dickerman and J. Delano, ‘The eroding life for the Batek of Kuala Koh, Malaysia’s last hunter-gatherers’ 
(November 29, 2019). 
1357 See generally Clifton et al. The Sama Dilaut are not the only group of sea nomads who have felt the effects 
of ocean conservation projects without consultation due to their statelessness and perceived lack of 
ownership of the oceans which they have occupied for hundreds, if not thousands, of years. See generally E. 
Cohen, ‘Tourism and Land Grab in the Aftermath of the Indian Ocean Tsunami’ 11 Scandinavian Journal of 
Hospitality and Tourism 224 (2011).  
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Conclusion 
It is clear from the examples that the presence of statelessness has been bad for the states 
of Kuwait, Mali and Malaysia, yet these states have only allowed statelessness to become 
more entrenched for many of the nomadic populations. The question then becomes, given 
the negative impact of statelessness on all parties, why haven’t states like Kuwait, Mali and 
Malaysia taken steps to end statelessness or resolve basic questions of inclusion and 
belonging? 
This question cannot be answered simply by a legal analysis. As a result, this section looked 
beyond the law at political, social and economic factors that drive nomad exclusion in 
Kuwait, Mali and Malaysia. It would seem that rushing to clarify the nationality status of the 
population would be a key state goal following decolonization, but as this section has 
shown, there were often competing concerns that led governments to ignore or even 
perpetuate the problem of statelessness for nomads and former nomads. 
This section in particular focused on two important state goals of the post-colonial period: 
forging national unity and exclusively controlling land and natural resources. Nationality, 
along with border security, civil registration and immigration controls, became crucial 
tools to achieve these two goals. As a result, this section focused on what nationality means 
to states and how both nationality and statelessness can sometimes be useful to states. 
In post-colonial countries like Kuwait, Mali and Malaysia, hostility towards nomadism led 
to nomads being excluded from registration as nationals because (1) nomads were 
increasingly seen as detrimental to national unity and/or the balance of power between 
various political factions, (2) nomad lands were now seen as too valuable for anything 
apart from exclusive state ownership, and (3) borders placed nomads at the edge of the 
newly created countries where contested borders raised the risk of separatism and foreign 
invasion.  
As a result, nomads faced relentless discrimination that took a number of forms, including 
statelessness but also assimilation. Nomadism itself was often redefined as crime or 
terrorism. Successive governments failed to resolve the status of many nomadic 
populations in the decades following decolonization, locking nomads in limbo. In the case 
of the Tuareg, state policies around nationality and inclusion have driven armed conflict 
and the collapse of northern Mali into a failed state. 
One major conclusion of this dissertation is that while the failure of governments to grant a 
nationality to nomads in states like Kuwait, Mali and Malaysia was caused in part by lack of 
administrative state capacity, when examined more closely, failure to register nomads and 
resolve their status also demonstrates a lack of political will, a “moral disengagement.”1357F1358 
A bias against nomadism as being somehow incompatible or detrimental to states 
 
1358 Galaty, 158. See also K. Belton, ‘Statelessness: A Matter of Human Rights’ in R. Howard-Hassmann and M. 
Walton-Roberts, The Human Right to Citizenship: A Slippery Concept (U. Penn 2015) 35. 
257 
 
continued from colonization into post-colonial politics. The continuity between colonial 
and post-colonial policy towards nomads is striking. 1358F1359  
As the examples showed, governments continued to forcibly settle nomads and attempt to 
shift local economies away from pastoralism and mobile, small-scale fishing. Settlement, as 
the examples showed, was often accompanied by registration, while those groups who 
remained nomadic found themselves increasingly unregistered and shut out of a 
nationality. This continued bias against nomads did not occur in a vacuum, but was part of 
a larger, global push against nomads not only by governments but also western institutions 
and academia. The view that nomads cannot participate in civic life or own land became 
somewhat entrenched in the social sciences during the 20th century, adopted by 
international aid organizations and post-colonial governments alike. 1359F1360 
Nomads and National Unity 
As this section showed, the states of Kuwait, Mali and Malaysia often continued colonial 
policy towards nomads. But they also had extra challenges and goals that extended well 
beyond the concerns of colonial governments. While the colonizing powers had begun to 
develop the idea of cultural nationalism and ethnic groups, these ideas arguably exploded 
in importance during the post-colonial era of fragile new states. The desire for a unified 
national identity to support state sovereignty and unity would drive post-colonial politics 
in countries like Kuwait, Mali and Malaysia. This would lead these post-colonial 
governments to promote policies that excluded or assimilated minorities, including 
nomads.  
Governments created national origin myths, such as the Battle of Jahra, to support the 
theory of romantic nationality as a basis for nationality. Ethnicity came to be widely 
employed to justify the territorial state and used as a basis for nationality. In Mali, sub-
Saharan African identity was supported by nationality law, re-imagining post-colonial Mali 
as a reincarnation of ancient Malian civilization. There was little room in these constructs 
for nomadic minorities like the Sama Dilaut, the Tuareg and many Bedouin tribes.  
Importantly, however, settled nomads were often registered as nationals during the 
transitional periods, meaning that nomadic minorities as nomads, rather than as ethnic, 
linguistic or religious groups, were most vulnerable to statelessness or receiving a lesser 
nationality status. Other factors besides mobility sometimes played a role in statelessness, 
 
1359 This continuation of colonial policy has also been documented by other scholars in other countries. Aukot 
describes how colonial authorities labeled pastoral nomads in Kenya as a “problem.” E. Aukot, ‘Am I stateless 
because I’m a nomad?’ 32 Forced Migration Review 18 (2009) 18. 
1360 For examples of expert opinions on nomad land use and statehood from the modern period, see for 
example E. Marx, ‘The Tribe as Unit of Subsistence: Nomadic Pastoralism in the Middle East’ 79 Am. 
Anthropologist 346 (2009) 351, 344, 355 (arguing that nomads “secure” and “hold” territory); T. Myers 
‘Defended Territories and No-man’s-lands’ 78 Am. Anthro. 354 (1975) (arguing that the presence of boundary 
markings proves nomad land ownership). A good summary of the literature in this debate can be found in 
Nadasdy’s 2002 article on land claims in Canada. P Nadasdy, ‘”Property” and Aboriginal Land Claims in the 
Canadian Subarctic: Some Theoretical Considerations’ 104 Am. Anthro. 247 (2002). See also Moretti, 38. 
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however, such as in the case of the Bedouin nomads, where tribal affiliation often made the 
difference between statelessness and receiving a lesser nationality status. But even in 
Kuwait, mobility was the key factor in determining who was not considered to be an 
original Kuwaiti and led to the cultural distinction between Bedu and Hathar. 
The theory of Romantic nationalism, first introduced above, became a powerful 
government tool during the post-colonial period. In particular, the European idea of a 
“national homeland” was widely adopted in the post-colonial context, as can be seen in the 
examples of Kuwait, Mali and Malaysia. 1360F1361 As Manby puts it, speaking of the African 
context, “(a)lthough the laws drafted for the new African states for the most part eschewed 
in their language the racism of the colonial era, nervousness about the loyalty of certain 
groups of residents - those most easily asserted to be not ‘from’ the territory - nonetheless 
shaped the ways in which they were drafted and above all applied.”1361F1362 The idea of a 
national homeland was actively promoted despite the relatively recent origins of modern 
borders of post-colonial states. 1362F1363 
Over time, the conversation over nomad origins evolved to increasingly portray them not 
as nomads, but as immigrants or foreigners, a portrayal which was used to justify their 
continued exclusion. Where immigration posed a risk to national unity, nomadism and 
cross-border movement was increasingly conflated with immigration. Many nomads began 
the post-colonial period in a state of contested or undetermined nationality, but would 
become stateless over time, as governments missed multiple opportunities to resolve their 
status and the very lack of registration and documents became evidence of their foreign, or 
outsider status.  
National identity in the post-colonial context was therefore the deliberate creation of post-
colonial governments who use it to foster unity and prevent separatism or claims by 
neighbouring states.1363F1364 In the African context, for example, “fear of fissiparous politics and 
potential state fragmentation creating an overwhelming emphasis on ‘national unity..."’ 1364F1365 
As Manby puts it in the African context, “(a)mong the most difficult challenges of nation-
building tasked to the newly independent African States of the 1960s was the 
 
1361 See Tendayi Bloom’s analysis in Bloom, Members, 2017, 155. 
1362 Manby, Trends, 175. 
1363 “National myths often perpetuate the idea that imagined communities are very old, based on the idea that 
nations have a long history in a given place, when in fact they are much more recent.” A. Jones, Human 
Geography: The Basics (Routledge 2012) 65-66 (discussing the theories of Benedict Anderson.) 
1364 Beaugrand, Transnationalism, 2010, 30. See also A. Smith, 22-23 (discussing how a sacred land or 
homeland is often used to justify nationalism); Donner, 127; Weis, 3; Verzijl, 7; Miller, 19, 68; Maury, 11-12. 
Smith explains; “(b)ut the earth in question cannot be just anywhere; it is not any stretch of land. It is, and 
must be, the ‘historic’ land, the ‘homeland’...” A. Smith, 9. See also Bloom, Members, 2017, 153 (speaking of 
indigenous belonging in the context of settler states). 
1365 S. Dorman, ‘Citizenship in Africa’ in E. Isin and P. Nyers, (eds.) Routledge Handbook of Global Citizenship 
Studies (Routledge 2014) 162. 
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determination of who could claim membership of these polities: the definition of who was a 
citizen.”1365F1366  
Post-colonial governments struggled to create an organizing principle to justify their 
somewhat arbitrary borders and unify diverse populations. As this section showed, jus 
sanguinis was sometimes applied in post-colonial states to lock immigrants out of a 
nationality, even in diverse states with contested borders. This process happened rapidly 
after decolonization to the bewilderment of many border populations.  
As the examples showed, it was arguably used to cement loyalty to the centralized state at 
the expense of regional, or cross-border forms of social organization. This was devastating 
for nomads, who frequently found themselves straddling borders and, due to the theory of 
exclusive allegiance, forced to settle in one state in order to satisfy the requirements of 
nationality. It is hard to escape the conclusion that the original rational for jus sanguinis as 
way to maintain cultural cohesion in the face of immigration has given way to its use as a 
tool to deny a nationality to unwanted minorities.  
In the cases of the Tuareg and the Sama Dilaut, there is an ethnic and religious dimension to 
their claimed outsider status and discriminatory application of nationality law and 
registration procedure. For the Bedouin, discrimination occurred along tribal lines, though 
even Bedouin granted a nationality ended up with a lessor status and fewer rights. 
Discrimination against nomadism as a way of life appears to be a primary motivator for 
nomad statelessness and is well documented in all the examples cited. 
The rationale for jus sanguinis is that a population centred on a homeland has a special 
connection to that land and the right to exclude outsiders. But it was unclear in the 1960s, 
for example, what it meant for there to be a Malaysian nation centred on a Malaysian 
homeland. Malaysia was a new construction put together out of colonial administrative 
units, splitting older empires and joining territorial areas that had historical ties, but were 
not contiguous. As Part 2 discussed, post-colonial governments in Kuwait, Mali and 
Malaysia therefore began appealing to romantic nationalism in an attempt to unify post-
colonial states based on arbitrary borders. Jus sanguinis was arguably an important tool to 
shape post-colonial populations. 
It is important to note that in some ways, jus sanguinis reflected local modes of belonging 
that had existed prior to colonization. It brought in elements of belonging that were 
common in Islamic legal systems and local custom prior to the colonial period, principles 
that could have been helpful to nomads. But because the creation of a first body of 
nationals had been based on territorial considerations and exclusive belonging, jus 
sanguinis laws in actual fact failed to promote continuity with the systems of belonging of 
before and simply perpetuated the rupture with pre-colonial, nomadic systems of 
belonging. In fact, jus sanguinis simply served to lock many nomads out of a nationality 
once the initial period for registration had closed. Jus sanguinis was applied in many post-
colonial states despite the fact that the underlying rational for jus sanguinis, outlined above, 
 
1366 Manby, Trends, 172. 
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the need to protect the indigenous, cultural nation from immigrant populations, was not 
applicable in many post-colonial contexts and instead, jus sanguinis was frequently used to 
exclude minorities who had been present in the region for centuries. 
Nomads and Natural Resources 
Though not originally a topic of this dissertation, the correlation between land use issues, 
the seizure of nomad lands by the state, and nomad statelessness could not be ignored. 
Control of nomad lands and the natural resources therein has emerged as a major cause of 
the disenfranchisement of nomads and former nomads through the denial of the claims to 
land.1366F1367 Critically, however, as the examples showed, the granting of nationality has not 
resulting in protections for nomad lands. Rather, civil registration has often been used as a 
tool to remove nomads from their lands to make way for eminent domain. In other cases, 
nomad statelessness has correlated closely with their forced removal from land. 
As the section on nomads and natural resources showed, in the decades following 
decolonization, oil, natural gas, and minerals would only become more valuable, while 
international tourism would push the creation of national parks in so-called remote areas 
inhabited by nomads in Kuwait, Mali and Malaysia. This discouraged states from solving 
the problem of the nationality status of nomads, as doing so would arguably justify nomad 
claims to land, call into question the placement of borders and potentially provide a 
platform for separatism. The push to claim natural resources has caused conflict and 
refugee flows in Kuwait, Mali and, to a lesser extent, Malaysia. 1367F1368 
The exclusion of nomads occurred during a period of radical economic transformation that 
greatly weakened the role nomads played in the regional economy and corresponded with 
a massive decrease in mobility in parts of the world that had once been typified by mobile 
lifestyles. As a result of resource extraction, nomad lands, rather than nomad livelihoods, 
became vital to the economic security of the emerging states in the post-colonial period. 
Nomads increasingly found nomadism to be economically superfluous to the broader state 
economy.  
Meanwhile, oil, gas, gold, tourism and other uses for land exploded in value. States began to 
see border control as a greater good than the economic boost that used to be brought by 
regional trade. As Manby points out in the African context, statelessness, migration, 
colonial policy, conflict and “land expropriation” are “linked” in many parts of Africa. 1368F1369 
Lands deemed valueless during the colonial period, existing as the furthermost outposts of 
vast empires and, as a result, somewhat overlooked by distant colonial governments, were 
 
1367 For other examples of nomad land seizures, see the eviction of the San from the Central Kalahari Game 
Reserve in Botswana in 2006. F. Ogbuitepu, ‘Realising indigenous peoples’ rights: The case of the Kalahari 
Bushmen of Botswana’ (Consultancy Africa Intelligence 2011). 
1368 UNHCR points to refugees as being one of the main populations at risk of statelessness. UNHCR, ‘Ensuring 
Birth Registration for the Prevention of Statelessness: Action 7,’ (Good Practices Paper 2014). 
1369 Manby, Trends, 172. 
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now central to the economy of post-colonial states, the generators of extreme wealth and in 
need of protection from neighbouring states, criminal migrants and other threats. 
While nomadic trade could accommodate a wide variety of land uses, from farming to 
pastoralism to fishing, resource extraction requires centralized control and massive, state-
owned infrastructure. Likewise, tourism requires state control. Nomadism went from an 
activity which generated wealth from areas not suitable for agriculture to a hindrance to 
massive state-owned programs for resource extraction and security.1369F1370Any potential land 
claims by nomads or former nomads are not even raised as possible topics for discussion. 
Nomads and former nomads are instead branded as illegal foreign immigrants and a 
security threat. “Investing in mechanisms that enable the conversion or reversion of risky 
people to the status of foreigner simplifies the equation of state security...”1370F1371 
As the examples showed, efforts to settle nomads often went hand-in-hand with removing 
them from land. Nationality was often used coercively to force nomads to abandon their 
lands and settle in urban housing projects or towns in exchange for a status. 1371F1372 This 
occurred in Kuwait, where many Bedouin were encouraged to relocate to urban housing 
projects, clearing desert areas and providing the state with a workforce. In Mali, many 
Tuareg were forcibly settled as part of a push towards increased agriculture. In Sabah, 
many Sama Dilaut were encouraged to settle in coastal towns.  
Sometimes, cooperative populations would be granted a nationality, often limited in scope, 
in exchange for their assimilation. This was the case for some Bedouin in Kuwait and some 
urban Tuareg and Sama Dilaut. As the Segovia Declaration of Nomadic and Transhumant 
Pastoralists pointed out, the nationalization of nomadic lands has been a widespread, 
global problem. 1372F1373  As a result, there has been little incentive for governments to resolve 
the undetermined status of nomads by granting them a nationality, which might trigger 
land ownership claims and/or claims for territorial autonomy. 
Not only would such programs become regular practice for post-colonial governments, 
they have also been supported by international organizations as part of economic 
modernization. Views of state formation, nationality policy, legitimacy and control in the 
modern period would be merged with environmental and land management theories that 
disfavoured pastoralism and nomadism in favour of settlement.1373F1374 As Dawn Chatty puts it, 
 
1370 Scott, 2009, 11. See also Chatty, Adapting, 15. See also Clifton et al., 83 (Discussing the impact of the 
creation of the Coral Triangle Initiative, a massive conservation zone, on Sama Dilaut statelessness.) See also 
Accialioli et al., 240-244. 
1371 A. Macklin, ‘The Securitization of Dual Citizenship’ in T. Faist and P. Kivisto, Dual Citizenship in Global 
Perspective: From Unitary to Multiple Citizenship (Palgrave MacMillan 2007) 42. 
1372 Bloom, Members, 2017, 167-168. 
1373 Segovia Declaration of Nomadic and Transhumant Pastoralists, La Granja, Segovia, Spain (14 September 
2007). 
1374 As discussed above, nomadism and nomadic land use and social structures became the subject of 
extensive anthropological study during the 20th century. See for example Sack 27, 56-57, 66 (discussing 
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“(d)evelopment plans aimed at nomadic pastoral populations in the Arabian Peninsula and 
Fertile Crescent have meant, as a rule, projects to settle them.”1374F1375 In many ways, these 
programs mirrored those of colonial administrations as discussed in Part 2, and often used 
the same tactics to achieve similar goals. They have been continued, for example in 
northern Mali, where EU aid has now been tied to border security and an end to cross-
border movements. 
Nomads and Border Control 
Nomadism is most recently associated with a particular threat: terrorism. 1375F1376 
A new factor that was less present during the colonial period, but helped to shape 
nationality enforcement in the post-colonial period, was borders. Many nomads were now 
living in contested border zones.1376F1377 The post-colonial period arguably represents the 
largest case of succession of states in modern history, a widely acknowledged risk factor 
for statelessness as it involved the breakup of large colonial units into smaller states and 
the creation of numerous border disputes worldwide which raise the risk of 
statelessness. 1377F1378  
Borders, which had either been politically unimportant or non-existent during the colonial 
period, were suddenly held out as inviolate, splitting many nomadic groups who had ended 
up in border regions. As well, mobile modes of life did not fit within the centralized political 
structure being imposed on previously fluid regions, a structure that was heavily territorial 
in nature, comprised of circles and arrondissements in the case of French colonies, and was 
set up, at least in part, to restrain mobility. As Part 2 showed, the goal of establishing 
exclusive, territorial sovereignty, clear borders and the exclusive allegiance of the 
population would be inherited by post-colonial states, when they would become even more 
important.1378F1379 
 
territoriality); Khazanov, Outside, 10, 228-231 (discussing nomadic statehood); Jackson and Smith, 
‘Ownership or Tenure? A Case Study,’ in M. Relaki and D. Catapoti (eds.) An Archeology of Land Ownership 
(Taylor and Francis 2013) 154 (using the term land tenue for nomads); J. Nicolaisen and I. Nicolaisen The 
Pastoral Tuareg; Ecology, culture and society, Volume Two (Thames and Hudson 1997) 204 (on Tuareg land 
ownership); Sather, Adaptation, 1997, 106-107; Lecocq, Desert, 2002, 132 (discussing Tuareg land use); 
Chatty, Pastoralists, 81.  
1375 Chatty, Pastoralists, 1. 
1376 N. McDonell, The Civilization of Perpetual Movement: Nomads in the Modern World (Hurst 2016). 
1377 See for example Manly, 2014, 108, citing ‘UNHCR, Action to Address Statelessness: A Strategy Note’ 
(March 2010) para 35. 
1378 See the Draft Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights on the specific Aspects of the 
Right to a Nationality and the Eradication of Statelessness in Africa, (May 2017). 
1379 “History, tradition, and, above all, the circumstances under which the state is created and its legitimacy is 
maintained – all contribute to the way citizenship is conceptualized and put into practice.” Longva, 
Citizenship, 197. See also Kasaba, 5-6. 
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As was pointed out in above, nomads often came to inhabit the border zone between states, 
as colonial borders were drawn through areas the European empires found less useful to 
them at the time. Large cities on the coasts or located within fertile, farming regions, 
became the capitals of post-colonial states. So-called remote areas away from cities and 
agricultural regions remained marginalized. The defence of borders would become, if 
anything, of even greater concern to post-colonial governments over time. For nomads, it 
meant that for the first time, they would clearly and unequivocally have to fall under the 
exclusive sovereignty and assert exclusive belonging to one state, even in cases where their 
territories and traditional trading relationships spanned what were now multiple states 
and multiple governments.  
Some experts speak of cross-border movement as a modern phenomenon, 1379F1380 but this was 
not the case in nomadic regions and trade-based societies. Yet due to the securitization of 
many borders, nomadism is now presented as an anomaly and a threat. Governments have 
equated nomadism in northern Mali and coastal Sabah in particular with crime, terrorism, 
people smuggling and insecurity, branding the regional trade that is the economic 
contribution of nomadism as a threat to national security. As a result, populations who 
remain nomadic find themselves increasing cast not as unregistered, rural nationals of the 
state, but as criminals not deserving of nationality because they are a danger to the 
state.1380F1381 As a result, the exclusion of nomads goes far beyond that of many rural, 
unregistered populations. 
Nationality policy in the modern era has become linked to controlling cross-border 
movement. As Pilgram notes in the EU context, “security concerns...and issues of 
immigration control play a part in the design of citizenship regimes.”1381F1382 With time, nomad 
mobility was increasingly inflated with migration, supporting the idea that nomads were 
not part of the population of the state, but were instead criminal transients. “Militarisation 
and criminalisation are defensive responses which states use to reassert their sovereignty 
in the face of transnational migrations.”1382F1383 Nomads became increasingly criminalized as 
stateless persons and alleged foreigners. 
Responses to nomadism in the post-colonial context in the decades following 
decolonization therefore often fell on a spectrum between “benign neglect”, where 
governments indirectly encouraged settlement as part of forced school attendance or to 
facilitate the collection of taxes, and “radical government intervention,” where pastoral 
lands were perceived as ripe for agricultural and resource development and forced 
 
1380 Benhabib, 23. 
1381 For a discussion of statelessness resulting from perceived risks to the state, see Gibney, 2014, 54. 
1382 Pilgram, 9. See also P. Cole, ‘Introduction: ‘Border Crossings’ - The Dimensions of Membership’ in G. 
Calder, P. Cole and J. Seglow (eds.) Citizenship Acquisition and National Belonging: Migration, Membership and 
the Liberal Democratic State (Palgrave 2010) 4. 
1383 Benhabib, 24. 
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removal, deportation or forced settlement are the stated goals of the government. 1383F1384 
Forced settlement was often used in tandem with the relocation of settled peoples to 
formally nomadic areas, a process that Scott calls “internal colonization.”1384F1385 Galaty calls 
such programs “moral disengagement of governments from the plight of the pastoral 
populace...”1385F1386 While nomad settlement was also the result of globalization, urbanization 
and technological change, as the examples showed, states also pursued deliberate policies 
of exclusion and failed to take steps to resolve nomad statelessness in order to accomplish 
or further state goals.  
Finally, as the case of the Bedouin shows with particular intensity that nationality has often 
not been a panacea for nomads, particularly when that nationality is decidedly second 
class. Nationality has been frequently used as a tool for the assimilation of nomads and, in 
particular, their forced settlement. This mirrors the ways in which registration during the 
colonial period was used as a tool of assimilation. As Lindsey Kingston points out, a 
“legalistic focus” can often ignore the “subtle realities” of nationality. 1386F1387 In this case, the 
problems with nationality for nomads surpass the subtle. Instead of ensuring rights, 
nationality has been used as a tool to achieve state goals like forced settlement and the 
removal of nomads from land. This issue touches on the question of “functioning 
citizenship” for nomads, because nationality was often used not as a tool of empowerment, 
but as a weapon of assimilation and the destruction of nomadic culture. Granting a 
nationality to nomads has often resulted in their assimilation and the loss of nomadism as a 
way of life.  
 
  
 
1384 J. Galaty, ‘The Maasai Group-Ranch: Politics and Development in an African Pastoral Society,’ in Salzman 
(ed.) When Nomads Settle (Praeger 1980) 158 (discussing the government occupation and development of 
pastoral lands in the African and Middle Eastern contexts). 
1385 Scott, 2009, 12. See also Minority Rights Group International, ‘State of the World’s Minorities and 
Indigenous Peoples’ (2016) 25. (on the disastrous consequences of forced relocation and settlement on 
indigenous and minority groups.) 
1386 Galaty, 158. 
1387 Kingston, Worthy, 17-18. See generally Kingston, Stateless, 2014; Conklin, 196-202; Batchelor, 1998, 158; 
Handbook, 2014 5; Van Waas, Nationality, 2008, 20.  
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2.4 The Bedouin, the Tuareg and the Sama Dilaut Today 
This section will summarize the nationality and statelessness of nomads today, exploring 
their general human rights and their ability to access rights and services such as health 
care, education and work. Some sources for this section are academic in nature, but non-
governmental reports, policy documents and news articles will be used to provide 
statistics, up to date information or to explore the opinions of governments and other key 
actors. 
The Bidoon Today 
Today, arguably no Bedouin nomads remain in Kuwait, though statistics on the Bedouin are 
hard to establish. 1387F1388 While all Bedouin in Kuwait are settled, however, many maintain 
multiple residences, often in several different countries. 1388F1389  
For the former Bedouin, life is now very difficult. 
The living conditions of most Bedouin are substandard at best. Both Jahra and 
Sulabiya outside Kuwait City are highly populated with Bedouin living in small 
concrete and aluminium structures, barely resembling a home. Furnishings are 
limited, and many families sleep in one room on mats on the floor. 1389F1390 
The Kuwaiti government is increasingly concerned not only with the political issue of the 
bidoon population, but also with the growth of so-called “tribal,” or Bedu, politics of the 
naturalized population. 1390F1391 The voting patterns of the Bedu have become an issue of major 
 
1388 Al-Nakib 1. Chatty notes that statistics on the remaining Bedouin in Arabia as a whole are difficult to 
establish. Chatty, Persistance, 17 (citing Syria and Lebanon.) Beaugrand notes that nomadism continues in 
northern Arabia. Beaugrand, Stateless, 2018, 69. 
1389 Thanks to Dawn Chatty for her comments on this issue. See also Beaugrand, Transnationalism, 2010, 31. 
See also Al-Nakib, 1. 
1390 F. Diane, ‘Nameless, Faceless, Stateless: Bedouin of Kuwait Struggle for Identity’ The Arab American News 
(January 5, 2011). 
1391 F. Wehrey, Sectarian Politics in the Gulf: From the Iraq War to the Arab Uprisings (Columbia UP 2014) 163, 
166-167, 172. Kuwaiti politics is also dominated by concerns over the Shi’a population, but this is not as 
relevant to the bidoon as the issue of Bedu politics. 
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concern.1391F1392 The Kuwaiti government views the Bedu population, even those now long 
settled and holding a nationality, with a degree of suspicion. 1392F1393  
Meanwhile, the government has yet to resolve the problem of the bidoon. At the present 
time, Kuwaiti nationals remain a minority in their own country. 1393F1394 Because the Bedu in 
general are often equated with dangerous tribalism, 1394F1395 the idea of enfranchising more 
Bedu people is vigorously opposed by many Hathar. 1395F1396 In 2000, under increased 
international pressure, the government made a limited attempt to register some 
bidoon.1396F1397 These efforts, however, ended up being mostly for show. Bidoon were required 
to prove residence going back to 1965, which was impossible for most families. 1397F1398 Those 
who were able to register were issued not with a nationality, but with a “security card,” or 
“green card,” attesting to their statelessness. 1398F1399 The issue of whether or not bidoon are 
“genuine Kuwaitis” has become so contentious that at one point the government proposed 
genetic testing, a plan which was later abandoned as impossible. 1399F1400 
By branding the bidoon as foreigners, the Kuwaiti government has essentially removed the 
moral justification for granting nationality to the bidoon and tried to transform the debate 
from one over nomad inclusion to one over immigrant rights. Under these circumstances, 
talk of eliminating statelessness through the nationalization of the bidoon is seen not as 
rectifying a historical and legal gap, but as rewarding illegal immigration. The lack of clarity 
over the historical role played by the Bedouin in Kuwait’s history continues to influence 
how they are perceived and Kuwaiti politics continues to blur the distinction between 
 
1392 Negative and contradictory views of the Bedouin are not limited to Kuwait, but persist across the Arabian 
peninsula states as governments have used forced settlement, exclusion, and neglect to assimilate or remove 
so-called troublesome Bedouin communities. H. Gilbert, 2011, 8 (overview of the ways in which various 
governments in the region have treated the Bedouin). 
1393 Longva, Citizenship, 193. See also Donner, 137; Van Panhuys, 35; Verwhilgen, 53; Van Waas, Nationality, 
32; Boll, 44-48. 
1394 See for example G. Okruhlik ‘The Identity Politics of Kuwait’s Election’ (Brookings Insitute Feb 8, 2012) 
(accessed July 2020). Dawn Chatty’s notes commonalities among government responses to the Bedouin and 
Bedu accross the region. Chatty, Pastoralists, 165-166. 
1395 Wehrey, 185, discussing government efforts to shut down tribal primaries. See also J. Etheridge, ‘Kuwaiti 
tribes turn parliament to own advantage’ Financial Times (2 Feb. 2009). 
1396 See generally Okruhlik, 2012. 
1397 A. Shiblak, ‘Arabia’s Bidoon’ in B. Blitz and M. Lynch, Statelessness and the Benefits of Citizenship: A 
Comparative Study (Oxford Brookes 2009) 89. 
1398 Crystal 178. Refugees International, ‘Without Citizenship, Statelessness, Discrimination and Repression in 
Kuwait (2012). 
1399 Human Rights Watch, ‘Prisoners of the Past: Kuwaiti Bidun and the Burden of Statelessness’ (June 13, 
2011). 
1400 Beaugrand, Transnationalism, 2010, 154.  
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nomad and immigrant. Today, the notion that bidoon are foreigners is firmly established in 
the minds of Kuwaiti nationals and is largely accepted. 1400F1401 Many bidoon, however, argue 
they are original members of the Kuwaiti body politic and should receive a nationality, 
while the government continues to reject this contention. 1401F1402  
As discussed above, the Kuwaiti government argues that many bidoon are immigrants who 
have come to Kuwait in recent decades as economic migrants, people who are a security 
risk due to their alleged ties to Saudi Arabia, Iraq and other Arab states. As well, the 
government increasingly views the bidoon community as a potential source of radical 
Islamic terrorism, a new factor in the presentation of the bidoon.1402F1403 Ironically, over the 
decades that many bidoon families have been permanently settled in Kuwait, the bidoon 
have only seen the rhetoric against them as outsiders become more entrenched. In 2009, a 
prominent Kuwaiti politician said that “true” Kuwaitis are the descendants of those who 
lived inside the walls of Kuwait City and surrounding villages, not Bedu from the 
desert.1403F1404  
There is a misconception in Kuwaiti discourse today that the stateless or bidun 
are people who came from somewhere else (Syria, Jordan, Iraq) and destroyed 
their original nationality papers. 1404F1405 
As stated above, it is not the aim to argue over the origins of the Bedu who make up the 
majority of Kuwait’s bidoon population. The costs of maintaining a stateless population 
within its borders remains high. The number of bidoon in Kuwait may be as high as 
100,000. The point of this section is to expose how current Kuwaiti policies have failed to 
come up with a solution for the bidoon. In trying to limit access to nationality and balance 
various interest groups by excluding those deemed to be problematic, the Kuwaiti 
government has arguably further divided the population and worsened the very security 
problems it was seeking to avoid.  
The primary structural division — Kuwaiti versus non-Kuwaiti — splintered into 
additional and equally problematic oppositions: Kuwaiti men versus Kuwaiti 
women and their rights; bedu versus hathar; citizen versus bidoun; Muslims versus 
Christians; and, let’s be honest, Sunni versus Shi‘a, too. 1405F1406 
The effect of statelessness on the lives of the Kuwaiti bidoon population has been 
devastating. Bidoon status prevents many people from accessing their basic human 
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rights.1406F1407 Many live in poverty on the margins of Kuwaiti society with few services and 
little ability to improve their circumstances. 1407F1408 Bidoon cannot work except in the black 
market, they cannot in many cases attend school or access state run health care. 1408F1409  
Repeated government promises to resolve the situation of the bidoon expose the difficulties 
the bidoon community have had in advocating for their inclusion in Kuwaiti society. 1409F1410 In 
2011, bidoon began organizing for their rights, demonstrating against the Kuwaiti 
government. The government so far has responded to riots with repression, tear gas and 
arrests.1410F1411 The government points to the alleged high rate of crimes committed by bidoon 
as a justification for viewing them as a security threat, though as Beaugrand points out, the 
government frequently cites to the very “illegal” nature of the bidoon presence in Kuwait as 
evidence of their criminality.1411F1412 The government also continues to cite their supposed ties 
to Iraq and Saudi Arabia as evidence of their links to terrorism, criminality and foreign 
invasion.1412F1413 In general, the issue of the bidoon in Kuwait is usually presented by the 
government as being a security issue, akin to irregular migration. 1413F1414 The rights of the 
bidoon are now treated as part of the larger issue of migrant rights by both the Kuwaiti 
government and the international community. 1414F1415  
In 2013, the government of Kuwait promised to grant a nationality to as many as 4,000 
bidoon, but as of yet, few bidoon have benefited from this or other promised naturalization 
proposals.1415F1416 The government has set up a central body to resolve the status of the bidoon, 
the Central System to Resolve Illegal Residents’ Status, but as of yet, little progress has been 
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made.1416F1417 Only small numbers of applicants become naturalized Kuwaiti citizens each year 
because Kuwaiti law limits the number of citizens that can be naturalized annually to 2000 
and Kuwait usually does not meet even this low target. 1417F1418 Most recently, the government 
has pursued the idea of deporting the bidoon to the Comoros Islands. 1418F1419 
Nationality for the Bedouin has always been approached as a gift bestowed by the ruling 
family on useful Bedouin in order to foster cohesion, balance out competing power-centres 
amongst the Kuwaiti population, and cement loyalty to the Al-Sabah family, rather than as a 
right under the law, as it is for so-called “original” Kuwaitis. This is a highly instrumentalist 
approach to nationality. The passing of many decades has not weakened the historical 
narrative that the nomadic origins of the Kuwaiti Bedu population justify their treatment as 
foreigners. 
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The Tuareg Today 
The involvement of some pastoralists in armed conflicts such as in northern 
Mali has led to an emerging narrative of pastoralism as a security issue 
(World Bank, 2014) or even the unhelpful perception that pastoralists are 
terrorists (Global Terrorism Index, 2015). Such discourse feeds into the 
existing stigmatization of pastoralists as the dangerous ‘Other’ and obstructs 
efforts at establishing peaceful and productive relationships between 
pastoralists and other groups. 1419F1420 
Unlike in Kuwait, many Tuareg remain nomadic or semi-nomadic. In 2009, there were 
approximately 14.5 million nomads in Mali, including Tuareg, Arabs, Fulani and Moors. 1420F1421 
Crossing international borders continues to be difficult for the Tuareg. Despite liberal laws 
supporting pastoralism, such as the Pastoral Charter, many Tuareg struggle to continue 
their way of life. 
While Malian legislation on international transhumance is fairly liberal, 
Malian pastoralists face problems when attempting to cross international 
borders. One of the major problems concerns the harassment of pastoralists 
and the levying of informal taxes by the security forces. 1421F1422 
The basic questions of Tuareg inclusion and separatism are still unaddressed. In 2011, a 
fresh round of fighting broke out in northern Mali, this time involving well-trained Tuareg 
troops returning from Libya. Gaddafi had from time to time indicated his possible support 
for an independent Tuareg state and Libya had become the de facto base of the 
independence movement. 1422F1423  
In 2011, Gaddafi’s fall led approximately 2,000-4,000 heavily armed, well trained Tuareg 
fighters to return to Mali, finding only squalid camps, simmering resentment on the part of 
the non-Tuareg population, and few job prospects. The new rebellion benefited from the 
training and weapons of the Libyan army and quickly advanced against poorly equipped 
Malian troops. By 2012, the Tuareg resistance had managed to take over several key cities, 
including Gao, and appeared to be pushing southward. Outrage at the Malian government’s 
failure to equip and support its troops led to a coup in 2012, ushering a period of instability 
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that led to Mali being suspended from the African Union and asking for French military 
support.1423F1424 
By 2012, the Tuareg resistance movement had been taken over by foreign funded Islamic 
organizations, many with roots in Algeria and Libya. 1424F1425 The connection between the 
rebellion and Algeria and Libya fuels southern suspicions that the Tuareg rebels are foreign 
agents.1425F1426 Throughout this period, the Malian government’s view that the Tuareg 
constituted a national “problem” and a security threat only strengthened. Now, instead of a 
breakaway province, the government feared a Tuareg takeover.  
With French support, the Malian army drove the rebellion back, but returned to treating 
northern Mali as a police state occupied by hostile foreigners. 1426F1427 The recent upsurge in 
drug trafficking by Colombian cartels through Mali has only fed the view that the Tuareg 
are bad for security. 1427F1428 The imposition of conservative Islamic law in northern Mali 
radically altered life for people living there and caused yet more displacement. 1428F1429 
Many Tuareg see their future in Mali as bleak, and the peace in neighbouring Niger as 
fragile. The issue of cross-border movement, and the attendant pressures on land and 
resources, continues to be a point of contention.1429F1430 Government policy is oriented towards 
preventing Tuareg returns, forcing or coercing settlement and denying Tuareg land 
ownership. 
UNHCR estimates that hundreds of thousands of people are refugees in neighbouring 
countries, while tens of thousands more are internally displaced within Mali. In 2012, 
UNHCR noted that lack of documentation is a major issue for Tuareg refugees. 1430F1431 In 
refugee camps, UNHCR has been conducting camp registrations and issuing families with 
refugee cards, yet serious gaps persist. In Libya, 
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(t)he UNHCR identified as many as 25,000 primarily nomadic Tuareg in the 
southwest who had been living in the country for several decades but held no 
citizenship documentation. The UNHCR estimated the number of potentially 
stateless Tuareg and Tebu (another nomadic group) during the year as high as 
100,000 and that approximately an additional 50,000 persons were at risk of 
becoming stateless. 1431F1432 
As refugee children in Mauritania do not receive birth certificates, lack of documentation 
among Malian refugees in Mauritania is only being compounded. 1432F1433  
As well as struggling to obtain civil documents outside of Mali, Tuareg refugees struggle to 
return. In 2014 and 2016, bilateral treaties were signed between Mali and Niger, 
Mauritania and Burkina Faso for the return of Malian refugees to Mali. 1433F1434 In 2013, UNHCR 
facilitated the return of 2,000 Tuareg refugees to Mali, issuing them with travel documents 
and facilitating their registration with the Malian authorities. 1434F1435 But as of 2015-2016, 
UNHCR was still struggling to promote safe return for refugees to northern Mali. 1435F1436 Some 
Malian Tuareg have been able to return, but the situation in northern Mali remains so 
unstable, many are not ready to go back. 1436F1437  
As a result, is likely that for many Tuareg returnees, UNHCR refugee cards are the only 
official documentation they have. UNHCR notes that the rates of documentation of returned 
refugees is unknown. More research is needed to uncover the extent of Tuareg 
documentation, or lack of documentation, today. 1437F1438 Mali has recently created a 
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commission to study the issue of statelessness in Mali, 1438F1439 but violence in northern Mali 
makes a survey of Tuareg documentation extremely unlikely. As the UNHCR Mali office put 
it in a report,  
L’identification des personnes apatridies, ainsi que les causes et les 
conséquences de la problématique reste un inconnu pour le HCR et le 
Gouvernement malien. Le processus de la documentation des Maliens de la 
diaspora reste imprécis et méconnu. (The identification of stateless people, 
as well as the causes and consequences of the problem remain unknown for 
UNHCR and the Malian government. The process of documentation for 
Malians and the diaspora remains imprecise and badly known.) 1439F1440  
The implications of the lack of documents and contested nationality of many Tuareg in Mali 
are very serious and go right to the heart of Malian politics and statehood. As one UN aid 
worker pointed out: 
The fact that displaced people and refugees will not be able to vote (in the 2013 
election) will play into the hands of separatists who do not recognise the Malian 
state. In the worst-case scenario, the National Movement for the Liberation of 
Azawad will be able to claim that a low voting rate in the north is proof that the 
region does not recognise the Malian state. 1440F1441 
UNHCR attempted to arrange for out-of-country voting for Malian refugees, including 
Tuareg, but the program was not implemented by the Malian government. 1441F1442 According to 
UNHCR, out of about 173,000 refugees in neighbouring countries, only 10,300 were on the 
voter registries, and only about 1,220 actually voted. 1442F1443  
To vote, eligible refugees needed to present a biometric ID card (NINA card) 
with their details. They also needed documentation showing their names and 
photographs on the electoral lists. Many had one or the other, but not 
both.1443F1444 
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Many were not able to vote in 2018 as a result. 1444F1445 As one UNHCR staff member pointed 
out, voting was “a sign of renewal, a sign of reconciliation,”1445F1446 but it is also a sign of the 
potential political power of the Tuareg as a group and what role they may play in Malian 
politics. Voting is also a sign of political inclusion and a way to prove membership in Mali. 
Malian Arabs and Tuaregs felt deeply ambivalent about voting in Mali’s elections in 2013, 
though many saw voter registration as a way to get vital documents.  
Some of those who have registered told Al Jazeera that their real motive is to 
acquire Malian national ID cards that would hopefully facilitate their 
movement across the border and within Mali and help them revisit their 
families back home. 1446F1447  
The issues of voting, registration, land ownership and the right to cross the border are 
therefore entwined, part of the larger debate over Tuareg inclusion, as can be seen by 
controversy over the electoral rolls in the election of 2018. 1447F1448 
Currently, northern Mali resembles a failed state, the project of Tuareg incorporation into 
Mali remains a failure, but there is little hope of a political solution for the time being. What 
had started as a poorly organized uprising in the newly independent Mali of the early 
1960s had morphed into an international war over territory between Algeria, Mali and 
Libya, with the Tuareg caught in the middle. 1448F1449 The status of the Tuareg therefore must be 
seen in the context of armed conflict, separatism and refugee flows, while the basic 
question of whether there should be a Tuareg state remains unaddressed.1449F1450 
The militarization of specific areas — northern Mali and the Lake Chad region in 
particular — is seen as further testing the social contract between the population 
and ineffective and distant governments and as a challenge for humanitarian 
access.1450F1451 
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Meanwhile, European states have fed the view that the issue of Tuareg belonging is one of 
border security. Ending migration and drug trafficking are the primary goals in the 
region.1451F1452 This has completely side-lined the underlying question, unresolved since 
colonial independence in the middle of the 20th century, of whether or not the Tuareg 
require their own state, or whether a different political solution can be found. 1452F1453 
“Azawad is a dream,” as a Tuareg man from Niger once put it. 1453F1454 Understanding the 
exclusion of the Tuareg in Mali requires an acknowledgement that the question of Tuareg 
nationality ultimately revolves around the question of Tuareg separatism.  1454F1455 Today, many 
Songhai believe they are the original owners of the Niger Bend region, while the Tuareg are 
so-called foreigners from north Africa, a viewpoint which has only been encouraged by 
successive Malian governments. 1455F1456 “It appears that the Malian government considers the 
recognition of indigenous peoples as a threat for the national unity.”1456F1457  
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The Sama Dilaut Today 
Today, the Sama Dilaut continue to suffer from movement restrictions, lack of 
documentation and the presumption that they are naturally stateless. 1457F1458 As non-nationals 
the Sama Dilaut have been subjected to a number of development and modernization 
programs encouraging settlement and circumscribing their movement without recourse to 
the courts to challenge such programs or without laws protecting them as a group. 1458F1459 
National parks are created around their traditional ocean regions without their input and 
without compensation, while their culture and languages go without protection. As a result, 
statelessness contributes to the destruction of Sama Dilaut culture and way of life. 
Nowhere is the conflict over the status of the Sama Dilaut as an indigenous group and the 
government of Malaysia more apparent than in the creation of national maritime parks. 
Yet, there is evidence that granting a nationality to the Sama Dilaut might accelerate 
assimilation and settlement.1459F1460 In Indonesia, other sea nomad groups are recognized as 
nationals of Indonesia and have been relocated to settlements by the government, often 
unsuccessfully.1460F1461 The aboriginal peoples on the peninsula have also been the targets of 
an aggressive settlement program as part of the government’s stated goals of economic 
development, environmental protection and land reform, though they are recognized as 
nationals of Malaysia. 1461F1462 Sarawak’s nomadic peoples have also seen forced settlement 
with devastating health and cultural consequences, even when they have been recognized 
as native peoples.1462F1463 As a result, it is not clear that nationality would help to prevent this 
assimilation.  
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Importantly, however, some aboriginal peoples in Malaysia have used their status as 
nationals to successfully advocate for their rights and resist coercive settlement and 
government land grabs, 1463F1464 tactics which are not available to the stateless Sama Dilaut. 
While the aboriginal population in Peninsular Malaysia have been successful in claiming 
ownership of their traditional lands as an aboriginal group, the Sama Dilaut are denied all 
legitimate ownership of their traditional waters. 1464F1465 Likewise, many groups in Sabah and 
Sarawak, such as the Ibans, are recognized as nationals and have the right to own land, 
though these rights are constantly under pressure from logging companies and national 
infrastructure projects, such as dams. 1465F1466 Despite enormous challenges, nationality for 
some of Malaysia’s nomads and indigenous peoples has led to greater access to their rights, 
especially through the courts, even as it has accelerated assimilation for others. 1466F1467 What is 
clear is that a nationality for the Sama Dilaut must not come in exchange for their 
settlement and relinquishment of fishing rights. 
The current population of Sama Dilaut is unknown, but in 2002, anthropologist Clifford 
Sather published an article in the journal Nomadic Peoples stating that there were probably 
only a few thousand Sama Dilaut still practicing nomadism around Sabah. 1467F1468 Today, most 
of the remaining boat nomads in Sabah are semi-nomadic, though exact statistics are not 
available, and it is difficult to define nomadism precisely. Publishing in the late 1990s, 
Sather believed there may have been fewer than 5,000 boat nomads left in Malaysia, living 
alongside a much larger settled and semi-settled population. 1468F1469 Today, Helen Brunt 
estimates that "true nomadism” among the Sama Dilaut today is rare, though the numbers 
are unknown.1469F1470 
Most Sama Dilaut today are either settled or semi-settled, spending at least a portion of 
each year on islands such as Pulau Bum Bum or in pile-house villages, such as Bangau 
Bangau village off the coast of Semporna town. 1470F1471 The link between statelessness, forced 
settlement and so-called development programs for the Sama Dilaut is similar to those 
documented for the Tuareg and Bedouin, above. Meanwhile, like many post-colonial states, 
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the governments of Malaysia and Sabah have struggled to unite disparate groups into a 
single nationality, fuelling concerns over territorial unity and sovereignty and confusing 
the issue over what it means to be indigenous to Sabah. 1471F1472  
Closely related to the militarization and centralized control of the ocean in Sabah’s border 
regions, the securitization of immigration and registration in coastal Sabah means that 
undocumented persons are treated as a security threat. In this way, the current situation of 
the Sama Dilaut, while less extreme, resembles that of the Tuareg. As discussed above, the 
association of the Sama Dilaut with alleged criminality, piracy and backwardness was a 
hallmark of the colonial period. It has become a mainstay of Malaysian government policy 
towards the Sama Dilaut. 1472F1473 As in both Kuwait and Mali, lack of documents is now used as 
evidence that the Sama Dilaut are themselves somehow illegal, rather than as evidence of 
the failure of previous registration efforts and government policies. This occurs even when 
the government sometimes acknowledges the part played by the Sama Dilaut in Sabah’s 
cultural history. In echoes of the Kuwaiti government’s nostalgia for Bedouin history, the 
statelessness of the Sama Dilaut persists even as they are marketed as a tourist 
attraction.1474  
As with the Bedouin and Tuareg, it is not so much that the Sama Dilaut are actually believed 
to have no historic ties to the area that is now Sabah’s territorial sea, but rather that the 
Sama Dilaut “do not have a homeland” in Malaysia.1475 The idea of nomads as being 
incapable of forming or taking part in territorial states, an idea adopted from the western 
tradition as explained in Part 2, exerts a strong influence over discourse on the Sama Dilaut 
in Sabah. As a result, the Sama Dilaut are simultaneously presented as a traditional group 
for tourism purposes and as foreigners for the purposes of nationality. 
As Acciaoli puts it, discussing the Indonesian context, the Sama Dilaut are “a people whose 
continuing lifestyle on the water puts them in opposition to state priorities...”1476 As the 
Asia Pacific Refugee Rights Network puts it, “(t)he Sama Dilaut...are arguably some of the 
most marginalized people in Malaysia...” and “a classic example of a protracted and inter-
 
1472 Brunt, Stakeholders, 38. See also the Malaysia Asia Pacific Refugee Rights Network, ‘The Vulnerability of 
Sama Dilaut (Bajau Laut) Children in Sabah’ (2015) 4. 
1473 Eklof, 157. 
1474 For example, the Regatta Lepa promotes the “traditional” boat culture of the Bajau Laut sea gypsies. See 
for example http://www.pulaumabul.com/regatta-lepa/ (accessed July 2020). 
1475 C. Majors and J. Swiecicka, ‘Missing the boat?’ Inside Indonesia (July 24 2007) (accessed July 2020).  
1476 G. Acciaoli, ‘”Archipelagic culture” as an exclusionary government discourse in Indonesia’ 2 Asia Pacific 
Journal of Anthropology 1 (2001) 5 (Discussing state policy in Indonesia). 
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generational statelessness situation.”1477 Undocumented Sama Dilaut today live in fear of 
various government authorities, afraid of being arrested, detained or even deported.1478  
Despite their historical connections with the wider Sulu-Sulawesi region...many 
Sama Dilaut now find themselves stateless and living in areas where resource use, 
extraction and access are restricted by legislation.1479  
The experience of the Sama Dilaut in the decades following colonial independence has been 
one of forced settlement, exclusion, marginalization and statelessness. They now form part 
of an undifferentiated group of people of undocumented, or non-national, status, including 
refugees and irregular migrants from the Philippines, living on the margins of Sabah 
society.1480 
Many land Bajau and other inhabitants of Sabah have negative views of the Sama Dilaut as 
illegal immigrants, pagans and criminals.1481 As this section has argued, these perceptions, 
which have greatly impacted the enactment and implementation of nationality in Sabah, 
stem from the wider political context, where ownership of the ocean border zone is hotly 
contested and extremely sensitive. The traditional migrations of the Sama Dilaut and their 
association with the Philippines are causes for suspicion for the Malaysian government, as 
well as the potential claims to territory that might be made by the Sama Dilaut themselves, 
appears to threaten the Malaysian government’s absolutely ownership of the territorial 
waters around Sabah. 
In the Malaysian context, the Sama Dilaut are simultaneously a traditional people of north 
Borneo and dangerous, illegal foreigners closely related to the influx of migrants from the 
Philippines. Government hostility to the Sama Dilaut is closely related to the control over 
territorial seas containing oil and natural gas that make up much of Malaysia’s wealth and 
how the presence of sea-faring groups raises concerns over border security and the 
sovereignty of the oceans. In particular, the situation of the Sama Dilaut exposes how the 
question of indigenous status can be manipulated to perpetuate statelessness. 
The typical position of the government can be seen by this quote from a local newspaper 
“The Star”: 
 
1477 Asia Pacific Refugee Rights Network, ‘The Vulnerability of Sama Dilaut (Sama Dilaut) Children in Sabah, 
Malaysia’ (2015) 2. 
1478 I am indebted to Helen Brunt for her comments on this point. See also H. Chiew, ‘Bajau Laut: Once sea 
nomads, now stateless’ Malaysiakini (17 May 2019). 
1479 Brunt, Stakeholders, 30. 
1480 Asia Pacific Refugee Rights Network, ‘The Vulnerability of Sama Dilaut (Sama Dilaut) Children in Sabah, 
Malaysia’ (2015) 3. 
1481 Sather, Adaptation, 1997, 83, 87. 
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Another census on the Palau people or sea gypsies of Semporna will be done in 
August amid allegations they act as the ‘eyes and ears’ of cross border criminals, 
such as kidnappers.1482 
Such statements echo the treatment of the Sama Dilaut and other seafaring, mobile peoples 
as pirates by colonial authorities. As put by the former head of the Eastern Sabah Security 
Command (ESSCom) (which was created in response to the 2013 incursion from the 
Philippines); “(Sabah) is our birthplace, and that of our children. We do not want Sabah to 
be colonised, destabilized and its sovereignty challenged by outside elements...”1483 
In the words of one participant in a workshop in Sabah on the issue of conservation, “The 
Sama Dilaut are not original people of Sabah. They are from the Philippines...They must 
learn about religion, education and living in a house.”1484 In the eyes of many Malaysians, 
the Sama Dilaut are not an indigenous, native or aboriginal population, but rather a 
“marginal group" of “questionable origin.”1485 This view persists despite the fact that the 
Sama Dilaut are often held out as one of the traditional ethnic groups for tourist purposes 
and presented as indigenous to outsiders.1486 
Today, the rhetoric against the Sama Dilaut as criminals and outsiders feeds the perception 
that despite their long-standing ties in the region, they are undeserving of nationality. The 
Sama Dilaut are looked down upon as a so-called pariah people, despite their recent 
attempts to assimilate by settling and converting to Islam.1487 Indeed, as Sather points out, 
the land-based peoples of Borneo were forever trying to explain the Sama Dilaut, giving 
rise to several origin myths of the Sama Dilaut as a group who had been cast out of Islam 
and regular society.1488  
In 2015, Al Jazeera’s 101 East released a documentary on stateless children in Sabah, 
including the Sama Dilaut. They focused on “water villages” settled by both Sama Dilaut and 
Filipino migrants. “The authorities call some of these villages ‘black areas’ – hotspots for 
drug dealers, insurgents and armed intrusion. Police have stepped-up operations to flush 
 
1482 See for example The Star Online, ‘ESSCOM to hold another census’ (11 July 2015) (accessed July 2020).  
1483 ESSCOM Times, ‘Unity Among ESSZone Coastal Communities Vital (28 Sept 2015). See also The Star, 
‘ESSCom Keeping a Close Watch on Sabah’s Sea Gypsies’ (4 Feb 2015).  
1484 Brunt, quoting a workshop participant, 37. 
1485 Ali 157. 
1486 See for example the Malaysia government tourism website at http://blog.tourism.gov.my/the-regatta-
lepa-colourful-and-excitement/ (accessed July 2020). 
1487 Sather, Commodity, 2002, 25, 35. See generally Clifton and Majors. 
1488 Sather, Commodity, 2002, 36-37. 
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out illegal migrants, smuggling and drug dealing in recent months.”1489 The Sama Dilaut are 
often mentioned in the same sentence in the media as pirates, criminals and Islamist 
separatists...1490 Stateless Sama Dilaut are often blamed for any acts of cross border 
criminality.1491 ESSCOM, the Sabah security agency, has taken a census of “water villages” 
in ten Sabah districts in preparation for their relocation in order to cut down on crime and 
improve security.1492 According to the census, “58%” of the water village population in 
Sandakan are “aliens.” The debate around whether or not Sama Dilaut should receive 
documents therefore centres round whether or not they originate from Malaysia or not,1493 
an unhelpful framing in a region of recent, contested borders and a long history of 
mobility.1494 This debate can be seen in local media, which frequently presents the Sama 
Dilaut as coming from the Philippines, mis-characterizing the history explained in Part 
2.1495 
Recently, the issue of Sama Dilaut statelessness has become more prominent in Sabah. 
Some NGOs have focused on the human rights of the Sama Dilaut. A review of current news 
articles shows the diametrically opposed views of the Sama Dilaut as Malaysians whose 
rights are being denied, often the view of non-profits and civil society groups, versus as 
foreign infiltrators and criminals seeking to take advantage of Sabah’s weak civil 
registration, often the view presented by various government agencies.1496 At the time of 
writing, UNHCR and various local civil society groups in the Philippines are looking at the 
nationality status of Sama Dilaut settled in the Philippines.1497 Information on the 
movements of nomadic Sama Dilaut between the two countries, however, has been 
impeded by armed conflict.  
Today, immigration to Sabah has become one of the most contentious political issues in 
Malaysia and has become a primary national security concern. For example, immigration to 
 
1489 Al Jazeera, ‘Meet Sabah’s Invisible Children’ (1 May 2015). See also New Internationalist, ‘Sabah’s 
Invisible Children’ (8 May 2015) (accessed July 2020). 
1490 J. Langenheim, ‘Blast Fishing in Borneo: bombs are quick, but they kill the coral reefs" The Guardian (1 
July 2014) (accessed July 2020). 
1491 Brunt, Vulnerability, 36. 
1492 Tan Sri Datuk Amar Steve Shim Lip Kiong (Chairman) and Commissioners, ‘Report of the Commission of 
Enquiry on Immigrants in Sabah,’ Royal Commission of Enquiry (2012) 357-358. 
1493 Ali, 162. 
1494 Ali, 162. 
1495 Qin Xie, ‘Last of the sea gypsies: Fascinating images of the nomadic Borneo tribe who spend their lives on 
the water’ (8 Feb. 2016) (accessed July 2020). 
1496 The Star Online, ‘Look into the Plight of the Sama Dilaut Urges NGO’ (7 July 2015) (accessed July 2020). 
See also The Malay Mail Online, ‘Poor and Stateless: Sabah’s 50,000 undocumented children denied access to 
education, health care’ (30 April 2015). 
1497 SunStar Philippines, ‘CFSI validate Sama Badjaos status’ (2 Sept. 2017) (accessed 2020). 
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Sabah is managed by a separate federal agency from the rest of Malaysia, the National 
Security Council of the Prime Minister’s Office, rather than the Department of Immigration. 
Policy on irregular migration is managed by the Special Task Force for Sabah and 
Labuan.1498 These moves have taken immigration out of the usual sphere of governmental 
authority and placed it firmly within the orbit of the state security services.  
The issues of irregular migration and border security have also become closely related to 
that of documentation. In order to stay longer in Malaysia and avoid punishment, 
imprisonment and deportation, some migrants allegedly purchase fake documents.1499 The 
issue has been heavily reported in the media and, as a result, irregular migration has come 
to be closely linked in the minds of many Malaysians to the issue of fake or fraudulent 
identity documents.1500 Malaysia has strict visa requirements, particularly under the 
Immigration Act of 2002, and often does not issue enough visas to meet demands. The laws 
include harsh measures such as automatic deportation for pregnant workers, laws that 
make life for temporary workers in Malaysia very precarious. This creates a market for 
fake documents, though the actual extent of the problem is unknown.1501  
For many Malaysians, however, the use of fake and fraudulent documents by some 
migrants has led to the association of immigrants with criminals, so-called infiltrators, 
terrorism and voter fraud.1502 In 2001, a court in Sabah nullified the 1999 election in Likas 
neighbourhood due to alleged irregularities in the rolls and “phantom voters.”1503 The 
association between a lack of documents, criminality, terrorism and voter fraud in Sabah 
mirrors concerns in Kuwait and Mali, discussed above.1504 
In 2008, in an attempt to resolve the status of stateless persons in Sabah the government 
issued temporary “green MyKads” to people with Malaysian birth certificates who did not 
qualify for the “blue MyKad” given to nationals. The program was poorly administrated and 
highly controversial, as it essentially branded stateless people with Malaysian birth 
certificates as non-nationals with only temporary status.1505 This program bares a certain 
 
1498 Kassim and Zin, 20. 
1499 Kassim and Zin, 107. 
1500 See for example The Star, ‘RCI Report: Who are the Illegals?’ (4 December 2014).  
1501 Clark and Pietsch, 170. 
1502 Sadiq, 108-109, 116-117. See also the ongoing debate over security, the MyKad and Islamic terrorism in 
Sabah. Carruthers 2. 
1503 See also Lim Hong Hai, 116. See also Harris Mohd Salleh v. The Returning Officer, Ismail Majin & Ors (And 
Another Petition) (2001) 3 CLJ 161. 
1504 Oakeshott, 37-371. It is beyond the scope of this dissertation to go too deeply into the connection 
between statelessness and insecurity. 
1505 Ali, 163. See also Malaysia Today, ‘Thousands register for green MyKad’ 19 Nov. 2008, at 
http://www.malaysia-today.net/thousands-register-for-green-mykad/. 
283 
 
resemblance to that of the bidoon in Kuwait. Most Sama Dilaut were left out of this 
program, however, as it required a birth certificate.1506  
So controversial has the matter of irregular migration and fake documents become, that the 
Malaysian government convened a Royal Commission of Inquiry in 2012, tasked with 
determining if any irregular migrants had been fraudulently issued IDs and, if so, if any had 
voted.1507 The Commission also examined allegations that the population of Sabah has 
increased at three times the rate of neighbouring Sarawak, and whether or not this was 
part of a deliberate government program to shift the demographics in Sabah. In the press, 
this alleged program to change the demographics of Sabah by increasing the Muslim 
population is called “Project IC” or “Project Mahathir,” after the former Prime Minister Tun 
Dr Mohamad Mahathir.1508 Many non-Malay Sabahans claim that fraudulent documents are 
being sold to Filipino and other Muslim immigrants to increase Sabah’s Muslim population 
and, by extension, the clout of the ruling United Malays National Organization (UMNO).1509 
While the Royal Commission did not find that NRD officers had acted inappropriately, nor 
did they find evidence of a larger political project to affect voting in Sabah, they did 
conclude that some IDs had been issued to non-citizens, usually because of incorrect 
information given by village chiefs as to a person’s identity and ignorance of the proper 
procedures by some NRD employees.1510 The report, while modest in its conclusions, is a 
valuable record of public and local government opinion on immigration and documentation 
in Sabah.  
The report records the views held by local government officials in Sabah, who testified, for 
example, that parts of Sabah are now majority Filipino and that “squatter communities” 
were “hotbeds for illegal activities” and “bad for the environment.”1511 The view of 
immigrants in the report is overwhelmingly negative, and again and again, Sabahans and 
local officials link immigrants to criminality, environmental degradation and poor border 
security. Recently, calls for a revamped ID card for nationals have gotten louder in Sabah, 
with the Sabah4Sabahan movement.1512 In particular, these movements have grown in non-
 
1506 Ali, 163. 
1507 Tan Sri Datuk Amar Steve Shim Lip Kiong (Chairman) and Commissioners, ‘Report of the Commission of 
Enquiry on Immigrants in Sabah,’ Royal Commission of Enquiry (2012). See also Holst 135.  
1508 A. Carruthers, ‘Sabah ICs for Sabahans: Will it Help?’ Yusof Ishak Institute (2016) 4 (hereinafter 
Carruthers). 
1509 Sadiq, 102. See also Brunt, Vulnerability, 2-3. 
1510 Tan Sri Datuk Amar Steve Shim Lip Kiong (Chairman) and Commissioners, ‘Report of the Commission of 
Enquiry on Immigrants in Sabah’ Royal Commission of Enquiry (2012) 305-308. 
1511 Tan Sri Datuk Amar Steve Shim Lip Kiong (Chairman) and Commissioners, ‘Report of the Commission of 
Enquiry on Immigrants in Sabah’ Royal Commission of Enquiry (2012) 261-278, 314. 
1512 Carruthers, 5. 
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Muslim communities.1513 A counter-terrorism program begun in 2016 has again raised the 
“perennial” issue of whether or not the government should issue new ICs, and if so, to 
whom.1514 In 2019, Malaysia and Indonesia announced a new initiative to tackle the 
statelessness of migrants and border populations.1515 It is not yet clear how this policy will 
affect the Sama Dilaut. 
Civil registration has also become a focus for international and regional organizations. On 
the topic of birth registration, Malaysia has joined other governments in the region and the 
United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific to “Get Everyone 
in the Picture” by improving civil registration, including birth registration.1516 In 
neighbouring Philippines, Bajau communities have recently benefited from birth 
registration drives,1517 yet this has not been the case for the Sama Dilaut in Malaysia Even 
as the region pushes for greater cooperation and trade and freedom of movement has 
increased for certain segments of society, such as foreign workers who qualify under the 
“smart card” program between Singapore and Indonesia, there has been a corresponding 
increase in restrictions and reduction on mobility for “sea nomads,” irregular migrants and 
other undesirable groups.1518 
It is not the aim of this section is not to plunge into the debate on fake ICs in Sabah, but 
merely to provide the context in which the statelessness of the Sama Dilaut is taking place. 
IC fraud has been cited as increasing security threats to Sabah, including encroachment by 
factions within the Philippines and potential Islamic terrorism.1519 The issue of Filipino 
migrants in Sabah is particularly contentious, due, in part, to the ongoing border and 
sovereignty dispute between Malaysia and the Philippines. But another view in Sabah is 
that Filipinos are actually being encouraged by the federal government to come to Sabah to 
increase the Muslim population.1520  
 
1513 Carruthers, 6. 
1514 Carruthers, 1. 
1515 See for example The Star ‘Malaysia, Indonesia to tackle Sabah stateless issue’ (24 Apr 2019) (accessed 
July 2020). 
1516 See the webpage of the United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific ‘Get 
Everyone in the Picture at http://www.unescap.org/news/governments-agree-steps-get-every-one-picture 
(accessed July 2020). 
1517 See for example the Philippine Daily Inquirer, ‘Badjaos recognized through pilot birth registration’ (17 
December 2019) (accessed July 2020). See also R. Lacuata, ‘Unlisted no more: Sama Bajaus in Zamboanga City 
get birth certificates’ ABS-CBN News (10 Dec. 2019) (accessed July 2020). 
1518 Chao Riau, 251. 
1519 Sadiq, 102. 
1520 Navallo, 5. 
285 
 
These somewhat contradictory positions illustrate the opinions in Sabah today over the 
role of immigrants in society. On the one hand, Filipino immigrants share a similar culture, 
religion and history with many Sabahans. But on the other hand, local communities, fuelled 
by media coverage, fear the social and economic impacts of continued immigration. These 
concerns influence the question of Sama Dilaut belonging, as the Sama Dilaut are today 
grouped by the media, local officials and many Sabahans, and even civil society groups, as 
part of a larger problem of undocumented immigrants. 
Statelessness has affected the lives of the Sama Dilaut in many ways. Stateless Sama Dilaut 
children continue to lose out in terms of access to education and health care.1521 Some of 
the Borneo Child Aid Society’s learning centres for Sama Dilaut children have been closed 
under protest of resources being spent on so-called non-Malaysian children.1522 When 
Sama Dilaut do have documents, these are often regarded as forgeries, meaning that even 
many Sama Dilaut with documents cannot claim their rights. While lack of registration and 
documents among the rural poor in Sabah is presented as a technical problem that is the 
responsibility of NRD to solve, rather than as a security or fraud issue, for the Sama Dilaut, 
lack of registration is treated as a security issue.1523  
Perhaps unsurprisingly after years of struggle for recognition and negative treatment by 
successive governments dating to the colonial period, there is a great deal of mistrust and 
confusion among the Sama Dilaut regarding registration.1524 The arbitrary exclusion of 
people from registration by NRD in the Borneo states continues to be a problem today, with 
many activists calling for clearer rules and a more rigorous system. The Sama Dilaut are 
often the victims of document scams in their desperation to obtain documents, paying 
money to swindlers for documents that turn out to be fake, which are then used as further 
evidence of Sama Dilaut criminality.1525 
Today, the Sama Dilaut are trapped in a cycle of marginalization and illegality whereby 
their traditional lifestyle, migrations, fishing and culture are all branded as ipso facto illegal 
and criminal by the state. Meanwhile, as pointed out above, statelessness enables the 
government to restrict Sama Dilaut fishing and keep them out of tourist parks and oil fields, 
impeding Sama Dilaut access to their traditional livelihoods and encouraging yet more 
 
1521 Asia Pacific Refugee Rights Network ‘The Vulnerability of Sama Dilaut (Sama Dilaut) children in Sabah, 
Malaysia’ (23 March 2015).  
1522 Brunt, Vulnerability, 35. 
1523 NRD is using mobile registration clinics and the internet to get poor, disabled and sick people registered. 
See for example the Borneo Post, ‘70,000 Late Registration Cases in Sabah’ (18 August 2013) (accessed July 
2020). 
1524 A. Unis, ‘Government Urged to Solve the Sama Dilaut Identity Issue, Says Analyst" Astro Awani (18 Sept 
2013) (accessed July 2020). I am indebted to Helen Brunt for her comments on this issue. 
1525 Brunt, Vulnerability, 4. 
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settlement in what may be viewed as a continuation of colonial era policy towards the 
Sama Dilaut.1526  
 
  
 
1526 Ali 158. 
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Nomads Today 
Part 2 ends with a discussion of the situation of nomads today. Statelessness and contested 
nationality have had a devastating effect on the practice of nomadism. As the examples in 
this dissertation explored, while a tiny minority of nomads continue to migrate across what 
are now international borders, most nomads are now settled. This settlement took place 
due to a number of interlocking factors, yet there can be no doubt that aggressive 
government policy played a large part. Those who remain nomadic either within or 
between countries face rampant exclusion and statelessness, alongside massive human 
rights violations. Many nomads cannot access or own their lands, register or access 
services. They face deportation, fines and imprisonment. Nomadism has been re-branded 
by governments as dangerous criminal activity or terrorism. “To be stateless is, as we have 
seen, typically to be dis-empowered.”1527  
For those nomads who remain mobile, what cross-border movement continues today is 
usually limited, or has been significantly transformed, by modern border restrictions. The 
government has outlawed economically necessary migrations, which are now labelled 
illegal. The fact that nomads and former nomads are undocumented is often used as 
evidence of both their criminality and their foreign status.1528 As a result, modern nomads 
are usually labelled as criminal foreigners by their states, rather than as nationals with 
rights.1529 A large part of the problem is arguably that many states do not see the 
nationality of nomads in human rights terms. Rather, as the examples showed, states see 
the removal and regulation of nomads as an issue of national security and border control, 
areas of competency that state sovereignty reserves exclusively for states. 
Birth registration and the issuance of identification documents remains uneven in many 
countries like Kuwait, Mali and Malaysia, heavily favouring settled, urban populations.1530 
The Committee on the Rights of the Child has recommended that states increase birth 
registration particularly for nomads, though, for example, mobile registration clinics.1531 As 
the above section showed, however, rampant discrimination against nomads forms a 
powerful barrier to nomads accessing many civil documentation programs. 
 
1527 Gibney, 2014, 53. See also Arendt, 1976, 278. 
1528 This issue is discussed in Handbook, 2014, 7. 
1529 While Part 2 focused on three case studies, this has been widely documented in other contexts. See 
generally F. Caselliy, M. Morelli and D. Rohnerx, ‘The Geography of Inter-State Resource Wars’, 130 Quarterly 
Journal of Economics 267 (2015). See also M. Klar, Resource Wars: The New Landscape of Global Conflict (Holt 
2002). See also D. Chatty, ‘Multinational Oil Exploitation and Social Investment: Mobile Pastoralists in the 
Sultanate of Oman’ in D. Chatty (ed.) Nomadic Societies in the Middle East and North Africa: Entering the 21st 
Century (Brill 2006) 496-516; Fabietti, 57. 
1530 UNICEF, ‘Every Child’s Birth Right: Inequalities and Trends in Birth Registration’ (2013).  
1531 Committee on the Rights of the Child, Algeria, para 36, quoted in Gilbert, Nomadic, 2014 161. 
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Evidence that nomads may have a legitimate claim to nationality is ignored or even erased. 
When nomads interact with officials of the state, a presumption of non-nationality is 
usually applied to nomads and former nomads. This occurs even in places like Sabah, 
where the Sama Dilaut are simultaneously labelled criminals and foreigners while also 
being celebrated as part of Sabah’s traditional culture. In fact, using nomads to claim land 
or for tourism while denying them legitimacy for nationality and rights is present in all 
three examples. The re-branding of nomads as foreign often goes hand in hand with claims 
by governments of exclusive sovereignty over nomad lands.1532 As It is not clear the extent 
to which nomad statelessness is driven by the desire of governments to exclusively control 
nomad lands, but there is a strong correlation. 
Today, nomadism continues to be characterized as problematic for the environment, such 
as when the Sama Dilaut are criticized for blast fishing, even as state governments pump 
millions of barrels of oil nearby and large fishing companies employ drag net fishing. While 
the examples, above, did not delve into a great deal of detail about the environmental 
impact of mass settlement programs and the conversion to a wage economy, disturbing 
evidence exists that such programs, far from being for nomads’ own good, have actually 
devastated sensitive, pastoral and fishing environments. In the case of the creation of Tun 
Mustapha Park in Malaysia, one can see the preoccupation with nomads as being somehow 
bad for the environment, pitting nomad rights against environmental protection.1533 
It is also important to note the negative role played by some academic discourse on the 
subject of nomadism, which has frequently labelled the nomadic way of life as a problem or 
barrier to development.1534 Rather than pushing for nomadic rights, most international 
efforts in the 1960s and 1970s were actually geared towards eliminating nomadism as a 
problem for post-colonial states, either on developmental, environmental or political 
grounds. Current discourse too often focuses on the supposed links between nomadism, 
 
1532 Van Genugten et al., 2014, 102. The authors cite the example of Batwa living in the Democratic Republic of 
Congo. 
1533 While this dissertation has focused on three specific examples, the environmental impact of international 
development programs targeting nomads have been the subject of frequent, recent study. See for example C. 
Hesse, « La création de richesses grâce à la variabilité de l’environnement: l’économie du pastoralisme dans 
les zones arides d’Afrique orientale » in Pasteurs Nomades et Transhumants Autochtones (L’Harmattan 2010) 
31. See also Hesse, 37-39. 
1534 C. VerEecke, Nigeria’s Experiment with a National Program for Nomadic Education, (Ohio State U. 1989) 1, 
(discussing the “problem” of nomad education in Nigeria); D. Morris and J. Francombe, ‘The Ngisipet and 
trachoma prevention: Solving the Latrine Problem in Nomadic Tribes,’ (Community Eye Health 2007) 
(discussing the “problem” of sanitation among nomads); A. Meir, ‘Delivering Essential Services to Arid Zone 
Nomads,’ 4 Desert Development 132 (1985) (discussing the “problem” of delivering western development aid 
to nomads); A. Meir, ‘Nomads, Development and Health: Delivering Public Health Services to the Bedouin in 
Israel,’ 69 Geografiska Annaler 115 (1987) (discussing the “problem” of delivering health services to nomads 
in Israel). See contra, J. Simel, « Le pastoralisme et les défis du changement climatique » in M. Jensen, Pasteurs 
Nomades et Transhumants Autochtones (L’Harmattan 2010) 65, where, speaking of African pastoralists, he 
states, « (b)eaucoup de personnes faisant partie de la société dominante actuelle, soit l’élite politique et les 
décideurs, voient les pasteurs d’Afrique comme l’incarnation d’une société primitive qui s’oppose au 
changement et au développement. » 
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terrorism, smuggling and criminality. The impact of western development agencies, 
including increased settlement and, in some cases, severe environmental degradation, were 
highlighted, above, in all three examples.  
The question of indigenous status for the former Bedouin, Tuareg and Sama Dilaut has 
become weaponized, as the nomadic and mobile lifestyle is often used to justify the claim 
that nomads and former nomads are immigrants and not indigenous. This has allowed 
states to place them within the context of irregular migration to justify their continued 
exclusion. In this way, modern debates over nomad nationality often mirror debates 
stretching back to the colonial period, when a bias developed against nomads and, in some 
places like the Sahel and the Sulu Sultanate, even prior to the colonial period. This bias 
continued through the post-colonial period and continues to influence nomad-state 
relations to this day. 
Finally, nationality can bring important human rights protections for nomadic 
communities, but it can also be used as yet another tool in the state toolbox to encourage 
settlement and assimilation. For many nomads, receiving a nationality from the 
government often meant giving up their rights to land, an exchange that hardly comports 
with the modern view of the right to a nationality. It is therefore important that any 
solution for nomad statelessness comports with their human rights and provides them 
with solutions to upholding further rights.1535  
For example, the granting of nationality will not resolve the issue of nomad education, but 
it will provide nomads with a platform from which to advocate for culturally appropriate 
schooling or the legalization of nomad livelihoods, economically necessary movement or 
the use and protection of traditional lands, either through voting, legislation and/or the 
courts.1536 Stateless nomads may not only be unable to attend school, but lose all authority 
over the curriculum, meaning that schooling ends up being a weapon of assimilation, as it 
was in Mali during the Keïta regime.1537 
The question of nomad land rights, however, will likely remain a thorny one for many 
nomadic groups, even where nationality is established and achieved. While Kingston is 
right in pointing out that “legal status alone will not cure the social ills affecting the world’s 
de jure stateless populations,”1538 nationality remains vital and irreplaceable for both 
 
1535 Van Waas, Nationality, 218. 
1536 See for example the use of strategic litigation in obtaining Roma school desegregation. Open Society 
Justice Initiative, ‘Strategic Litigation Impacts: Roma School Desegregation’ (Open Society Foundations 2016). 
See also S. Pedersen, ‘The Coastal Sami of Norway and their rights to traditional marine livelihood’ 3 Arctic 
Review on Law and Politics 51 (2012) 60. 
1537 For more on the link between statelessness, assimilation and settlement of nomads and schooling, see H. 
Alexander, ‘The Open Sky or a Brick and Mortar School? Statelessness, Education and Nomadic Children’ in 
Institute on Statelessness and Inclusion (ed.) The World’s Stateless Children (January 2017). 
1538 Kingston, Stateless, 133. 
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individuals and groups to enforce their rights and participate in the political process of 
their states.  
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Conclusion: Some Root Causes of Nomad Statelessness 
(I)n a world on the move, a fundamental openness is needed to what people 
contribute to the communities in which they live and work. Citizenship or 
nationality of a state…has thus become the basis for equal protection, solidarity and 
a democratic voice in the norms by which citizens feel bound.1539 
This dissertation explored three example groups to uncover some of the root causes of 
nomad statelessness. While three examples cannot possible uncover all of the myriad 
causes of nomad statelessness, they highlighted some important similarities in how 
governments apply, or do not apply, nationality to nomads, as well as some of the driving 
factors behind nomad statelessness. The examples explored above highlight the spectrum 
of exclusion and discrimination faced by many nomads, including many important 
differences between various groups, while also showing how similar are the circumstances 
of many nomads today.  
Perhaps the most significant cause of nomad statelessness uncovered by the above analysis 
is the fact that the western system of nationality is inherently biased against mobility and, 
therefore, does not fit well with nomadism. Heavily reliant on concepts like habitual 
residence and exclusive allegiance, the system of nationality laws, borders and ID cards is a 
poor match for the nomadic way of life. This bias against mobility and nomadism as a way 
of life has left the door open to rampant discrimination against nomads. 
Part 2 began with an overview of the three nomad groups used as examples. It explored the 
nomadic way of life. It explained how nomads related to the pre-colonial kingdoms with 
whom they had close relations. It showed that far from being outsiders, nomads were 
important allies, competitors and subjects of pre-colonial kingdoms. It also showed the 
importance of land to nomadic societies, demonstrating that nomads frequently had 
sovereignty and control over their territories. 
Part 2 went on to discuss the colonial period when nationality law was first developed in 
Europe and applied, to a limited extent, in the colonies. Nationality laws were developed in 
Europe during the feudal period. These laws almost universally privileged settlement, 
exclusive land use and exclusive, centralized systems of government. Colonial 
administrators gave little thought as to how European concepts like permanent residence 
would be applied to nomads. 
Colonization brought a number of structural changes that were very negative for many 
nomads, of which nationality was one. During the colonial period, nomads were seen as 
naturally stateless. The colonial period marked a long period of decline for nomads, with 
colonial policy centralizing the state around urban centres and concentrating power with 
settled rulers, even as it mythologized and romanticized some nomads. The colonial period 
also divided many nomadic areas by borders, placing nomads at the periphery of colonies 
 
1539 Hirsch Ballin, 2014, 65. 
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and setting the stage for their political division at decolonization. Nomads were often 
administrated under separate systems from settled communities, and often placed under 
military rule. While this may have appeared to give nomads more independence, it set the 
stage for their supposed outsider status at decolonization. 
The settlement of nomads became a major goal of many colonial administrators, fostering 
distrust and resentment among many nomadic communities and beginning a period, which 
continues to the present day, where registration and government services were linked to 
settlement and assimilation. Critically, the power to issue documents and determine status 
within a colony often vested with settled rulers, who became the governments of the post-
colonial period. During colonization, nomads suffered a sharp decline in status. 
At decolonization, the separation of colonies into individual states was accomplished 
quickly and nomads found themselves divided by hard borders, living in what would now 
become border zones. These contested border zones of foggy sovereignty would quickly 
become flash points between governments, with nomads caught in the middle. 
Decolonization also brought a sudden acceleration of the roll out of nationality law in 
regions where nomads lived. The government in many of these new countries were the 
same urban elites who had been handed vast powers under the colonial system. Nomads 
were now placed under their jurisdiction, even in places like northern Mali, where many 
Tuareg rulers wished to be independent.  
While transitional nationality laws to create the first body of nationals in post-colonial 
states appeared neutral on their face, in reality, vagueness as to the meaning of key terms 
like habitual residence and the recent nature of many borders allowed for rampant 
discrimination against nomads. The suddenness of this process of imposing European legal 
systems on the colonies cannot be overstated. Within a decade, previous systems of 
belonging, such as kinship and trade ties, were replaced by a system that focused 
exclusively on residence and place of birth. Documents and registration became critical. 
Importantly, nomads were often not granted the presumption of nationality, like other 
rural peoples, but rather the presumption of foreign status, or even, in the most severe 
cases, the presumption of statelessness.  
Following this arbitrary and discriminatory transitional period, often lasting only a few 
years, jus sanguinis was instituted in some countries. This was done even though the 
borders of most post-colonial states were new and/or set by disputed, colonial-era treaties. 
In majority Muslim countries, this use of jus sanguinis made cultural and political sense, but 
following an arbitrary, discriminatory and incomplete transitional period, jus sanguinis 
actually functioned to lock many minority groups out of a nationality, including many 
nomads. Even in countries where the law provided for protections from strict jus sanguinis, 
these protections were not applied to nomads due to ongoing discrimination. 
For the Tuareg, inclusive nationality laws and prior nationality under the French system 
should have prevent statelessness, but armed conflict and separatism has inhibited a 
solution. The case of the Tuareg showed that questions over nationality and statehood can 
sometimes devolve into armed conflict for nomads. The treatment of the Tuareg as enemies 
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of the state has meant that the Tuareg have not, in many cases, been able to take advantage 
of civil registration and legal systems.  
In the decades following decolonization, states missed multiple opportunities to regularize 
the status of nomads, opting instead to pass ever stricter laws to exclude foreigners, a 
category of persons that came to include many nomads and former nomads. This occurred 
in tandem with the discovery of massive natural resources in “empty” nomad lands. While 
causation cannot be established, there is high correlation between nomads being moved off 
their lands and either statelessness or the granting of lesser nationality status.  
One important observation of Part 2 is the fact that continued discrimination against 
nomads, including in the granting of nationality, coincided closely with their relocation off 
their lands. Many nomad lands have now been found to contain valuable natural resources 
which were seized for the exclusive use of the state. While more research is needed, the 
correlation between nomad statelessness, eminent domain over nomad lands, and 
nationality in exchange for the abandonment of nomad lands to the state, either for oil and 
mineral exploration or for national parks, should all warrant further investigation. 
Instead of resolving nomad statelessness, many governments have simply re-branded 
nomads as foreigners. The difference between mobility as a way of life and immigration 
became increasingly blurred. Civil registration requirements have been tightened for 
nomads, even as states took steps to provide documents to their unregistered rural 
populations who are settled. Today, statelessness serves not as proof of the failure of state 
civil registration policies, but instead as proof that nomads are criminals and lawbreakers. 
Finally, it is important to note that Part 2 uncovered a serious problem with governments 
using civil registration as a tool of assimilation. In working to end nomad statelessness, it is 
therefore important to acknowledge that nationality should always be a human right and a 
tool of empowerment, not a gift to be bestowed, or a weapon to coerce, assimilate or 
exclude problem groups. Nor is nationality a bargaining chip to be exchanged for 
settlement or the relinquishment of claims to land. The forced and coerced settlement of 
nomads described throughout the examples, a process that was often done in exchange for 
nationality and/or registration, points to the problems with focusing only on the fact of 
statelessness among nomads, without accepting the inherent biases baked into the system.  
Part 2 identified some of the root causes of nomad statelessness: (1) the creation of nomad 
statelessness during colonization and the failure to resolve the statelessness of nomads at 
decolonization or, in the case of the Tuareg, the failure to roll-over colonial-era nationality, 
(2) the conversion of nomads into minorities living in border zones (3) discrimination 
against nomads in the granting of nationality, (4) a bias against nomads that is inherent in 
nationality laws due to an over-reliance on residence, proof of place of birth and 
documentation. 
Part 2 also examined why nomad statelessness persists to the present day, including (5) 
the application of strict jus sanguinis in some countries that locked nomads into inter-
generational statelessness, (6) the settlement and assimilation of nomads in order to seize 
their lands and (7) the link between nomad statelessness and armed conflict in some cases. 
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Part 3 will examine the extent to which international law provides a solution to nomad 
statelessness. Part 3 will not be an exhaustive expiration of every aspect of international 
law that may be relative to nomads, but will instead focus on several key areas. To choose 
these areas of international law, Part 3 will explore some of the international legal 
frameworks that appear most relevant to the causes of nomad statelessness identified 
above. It will also examine the international law frameworks currently being promoted by 
UNHCR in the global campaign to end statelessness. 
These frameworks are: (1) the application of the right to a nationality during the 
succession of states, (2) the prohibitions in international law against discrimination against 
minorities in the granting of nationality, (3) the extent to which international law limits the 
use of jus sanguinis to protect against statelessness, and (4) the recognition of statelessness 
under the law and the laws to resolve it. In so doing, this dissertation acknowledges that 
there are other international frameworks that may be useful to resolving nomad 
statelessness, such as the refugee framework and the indigenous rights framework, which 
will not be discussed in detail here, but which might form the basis for future study. 
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Part 3: Nomad Statelessness and International Law 
Introduction 
I do not think that the issue of statelessness can be addressed simply by 
throwing money at it, because it is self-inflicted, because it is man-made, 
because of deep-seated stereotyping, because of discrimination, because of 
deep-seated pigeon-holing of those individuals who belong and those who do 
not belong.1540 
During the latter half of the 20th century, as the unregistered status of many Bedouin, 
Tuareg and Sama Dilaut slowly ossified into inter-generational statelessness, there were 
revolutionary developments in the international laws of nationality and the concept of 
nationality as a human right. Part 3 will analyse if international law, properly applied, 
provides a solution to the gaps identified in Part 2. To do so, Part 3 will look at a series of 
Pathways created by combining different facets of existing international law. It should be 
noted that this exploration is not exhaustive, as many potentially useful areas of 
international law are not included, such as the refugee protection regime or an exhaustive 
examination of indigenous rights. But it is hoped that this dissertation will serve as a 
jumping off point for further inquiry. 
Gap (1) was the failure to resolve the statelessness of nomads at decolonization and, in the 
case of the Tuareg, the failure to “roll-over” colonial-era nationality where possible, 
creating inter-generational statelessness. It will be the subject of Pathway I, which looks at 
international law on the right to a nationality and the prohibitions against statelessness 
during the succession of states. It will also look at the closely related right to birth 
registration. As Part 2 showed, decolonization was a major cause of nomad statelessness in 
the 1960s and 1970s. Pathway I will examine to what extent, if any, international law can 
resolve cases of inter-generational statelessness among nomads that arose out of the 
decolonization process.  
Successions of states continue to occur, often as a result of the breaking up of former 
colonies.1541 Pathway I will also look at to what extent international law may help to  
prevent the creation of nomad statelessness during the succession of states. To do so, 
Pathway I will apply international standards as they exist today, as well as emerging 
normative developments, to the prevention of statelessness among nomads during state 
 
1540 An interview with Benyam Dawit Mezmur, Chairperson of the United Nations Committee on the Rights of 
the Child, in Institute on Statelessness and Inclusion, ‘The Worlds Stateless Children’ 137. 
1541 For example, see the separation of South Sudan from Sudan in 2011. 
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succession. To do so, Pathway I will apply the modern international law framework to the 
gaps identified in Part 2. 
Gap (2) is the conversion of nomads into minorities living in border zones, Gap (3) is  
discrimination against nomads from the colonial period to the modern day, and Gap (4) is a 
bias against nomads that is inherent in nationality laws due to an over-reliance on 
residence, proof of place of birth and documentation. Pathway II will explore the 
international laws prohibiting discrimination in both nationality law and in the registration 
of nationality to see if they prevent and resolve nomad statelessness. 
Gap (5) the subsequent application of strict jus sanguinis in some countries that locked 
nomads into inter-generational statelessness. Pathway III will examine how inter-
generational statelessness may be solved through the identification of stateless persons 
examining in particular how the implementation of strict jus sanguinis is qualified and 
limited by states in international law, particularly under the Statelessness Conventions. It 
will examine to what extent the identification of stateless persons may form part of a 
solution for nomads under international law. 
Gap (6) is the usefulness of both nationality and statelessness to assimilate nomads and 
seize their lands, which may be providing an incentive to keep nomads stateless or register 
them as nationals only in exchange for their lands, and Gap (7) is the link between nomad 
statelessness and armed conflict in some cases. Part 3 will conclude by examining the 
extent to which international law protects nomads against assimilation and sedentarisation 
and addresses the link between armed conflict and statelessness . Part 3 does not take an 
exhaustive look at these issues. It instead represents a jumping off point, rather than a 
destination, in the search for solutions for nomad belonging. 
One facet of nomad statelessness that was not explored in depth by Part 2 is the opinions 
and views of nomads themselves on nationality. Due to decades of bad experiences with 
coercive nationality and statelessness, but also bad experiences with the international 
community and even human rights discourse itself, there is an understandable lack of trust 
between many nomads and external actors, including at the regional and international 
levels.1542 While this dissertation focuses mostly on the views, policies and solutions 
offered by governments and the international community, true solutions will only come 
from close cooperation with nomads themselves. As Ekuru Aukot, a member of the Ateker 
nation with Kenyan nationality, asks: 
What benefits accrue to me from having a nationality since I move through 
porous borders, de-linked from government machinery? When I come across 
government agents such as the police, they are more often than not the 
instruments of persecution. As a nomadic pastoralist, I owe my first 
 
1542 While this dissertation has focused on three examples, it could be expanded to include many more. See 
Bloom, Citizenship, 2018, 116, where she discusses the Haudenosaunee of North America. There are many 
others. It is hoped that this dissertation will be a jumping-off point for future research. 
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allegiance to the Ateker nation in all its manifestations across four 
countries.1543 
 
  
 
1543 E. Aukot, ‘Am I stateless because I’m a nomad?’ 32 Forced Migration Review 18 (2009). 
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The International Norms Relating to Nationality 
It is generally accepted today that nationality is an inherent right of all human 
beings.1544 
 
Part 3 will begin in this section with a brief overview of the regulation of nationality in the 
international sphere and the development of the right to a nationality under international 
law. As discussed in the section on sources above, Part 3 will focus on treaty law, but it will 
also canvass the development of international law more generally, highlighting among 
others draft conventions and declarations, as well as case law, the dicta of courts, the 
findings of committees and the opinions of experts. For more on sources, see the section on 
sources in Part 1. 
In the 19th and early 20th centuries, nationality was widely thought to be under the almost 
exclusive purview of sovereign states, part of state sovereignty, as discussed in Part 2. It 
was therefore largely exempted from the realm of international law, unless as stipulated by 
treaty. According to influential nineteenth and twentieth century positivist thinkers such as 
Austin, Westlake and Hart, nationality was a matter for states to decide owing to their 
absolute sovereignty over domestic matters within their territory. The influence of this 
conception of nationality in the international sphere can be seen throughout the 
development of international law of nationality in the early 20th century.1545 Asked in 1923 
whether the League of Nations was competent to settle a nationality dispute between 
France and England, the Permanent Court of International Justice stated authoritatively 
that nationality was solely within the competence of sovereign states.1546 
The 20th century saw the emergence of a framework of norms limiting state sovereignty 
over nationality in certain cases. This process occurred in tandem with the development of 
nationality as an area of law and with the decolonization process, described above in Part 
2. The Permanent Court of Justice and the Hague Convention on Certain Questions Relating 
to the Conflict of Nationality Laws, addressed the issue of how to resolve conflicts between 
states over nationality.1547 International and regional courts played an increasing role in 
 
1544 Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Case of the Girls Jean and Bosico v. Dominican Republic, Judgment 
of September 8, 2005 para. 138, quoting Proposed Amendments to the Naturalization Provision of the 
Constitution of Costa Rica, Advisory Opinion OC-4/84 of January 19, 1984, Series A No. 4, para. 35 
(hereinafter Jean and Bosico). 
 
1545 Edwards, 16. For more on nationality in international law, see de Groot and Vonk. See also Part 2, above. 
1546 Permanent Court of International Justice, Tunis and Morocco Nationality Decrees (1923). 
1547 League of Nations, Convention on Certain Questions Relating to the Conflict of Nationality Law, 13 April 
1930, League of Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 179, 89, No. 4137. The Convention was ratified by only 20 states 
and the League of Nations ceased operations in 1946. See also Brownlie, Principles, 383-394; Fransman, 16; 
Shaw, 2008, 258, 659; Brownlie, Nationality, 285-289; Batchelor, 1998, 156; Van Waas, Nationality, 37. 
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the regulation of nationality between states. In the early 20th century, states were limited 
in their right to impose nationality by tribunals such as the American-Mexican Mixed 
Claims Commission, the Permanent Court of International Justice and the International 
Court of Justice.1548 The limits on imposing nationality, however, were mainly presented by 
these tribunals as necessary to preserve state sovereignty because nationality decisions by 
states often impacted other states. International law had a duty to prevent states from 
infringing on the sovereignty of one another.1549 
The Codification of International Law Conference held at The Hague in 1930 under the 
auspices of the League of Nations, early in the decolonization process, marked an important 
attempt to regulate nationality in the international sphere.1550 Importantly, the Convention 
in Article 1 reserved the rights of states to determine their nationals and, therefore, 
supported state sovereignty over nationality. It resulted in the Convention on Certain 
Questions Relating to the Conflict of Nationality Laws by the League of Nations which 
codified norms on the nationality of children and married women.1551  
In 1955, the International Court of Justice handed down an opinion in the Nottebohm case 
on nationalities where the individual did not have an adequate “link,” or who was not 
“closely connected,” to the state.1552 This case marked a departure from the absolute right 
 
1548 See for example cases before the American-Mexican Mixed Claims Commission; Nottebohm, 1955 I.C.J. 4 
(1955). Verzijl, 21, 23-24; Maury, 20. 
1549 Van Waas, Nationality, 35. See also Weis, 65; Lauterpacht, 6; Verzijl, 20; Maury, 20. 
1550 Hague Convention on Certain Questions relating to the Conflict of Nationality Laws (1930). See also 
Donner, 45; Van Waas, Nationality, 37; Weis, 26; Maury, 9-10, 74; Brownlie, Nationality, 387. 
1551 League of Nations, Convention on Certain Questions Relating to the Conflict of Nationality Law, 13 April 
1930, League of Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 179, p. 89, No. 4137. The Convention was ratified by only 20 
states and the League of Nations ceased operations in 1946. 
1552 (N)ationality is a legal bond having as its basis a social fact of attachment, a genuine connection of 
existence, interests and sentiments, together with the existence of reciprocal rights and duties. It may be said 
to constitute the juridical expression of the fact that the individual upon whom it is conferred, either directly 
by the law or as the result of an act of the authorities, is in fact more closely connected with the population of 
the State conferring nationality than with that of any other State. International Court of Justice, Nottebohm 
Case (Liechtenstein v. Guatemala), Second Phase, 1955 I.C.J. 4 (6 April 1955) 23. 
It is in no way argued, however, that the Court’s definition of nationality is universally accepted or definitive, 
merely to point out that the court in Nottebohm also endorsed the concept of settlement in territory as the 
foundation of the nationality link. Nottebohm has been highly criticized by international scholars as vague, 
unsupported by state practice, and incomplete. See for example Slone, 2009, 1 (calling the language of 
Nottebohm “quixotic”). See also J. Mervyn, ‘The Nottebohm Case’ 5 Int. and Comp. L. Q. 230 (1956) 239 
(criticising the definition of nationality in Nottebohm, particularly as to its effects on jus sanguinis nationals 
living abroad); J. Kuntz, ‘The Nottebohm Case (Second Phase)’ 54 Am. J. of Int. L. 536 (1960) 538-539 (for a 
summary of the numerous articles criticising Nottebohm, concluding that the case is “controversial”). But see 
contra Brownlie, Principles, 416 and Brownlie, Nationality, 349-350 (arguing that the court’s formulation 
relying on a “social fact of attachment” is merely the distillation of general principles already in existence, 
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of states to determine nationality, at least when it came to the obligations of other states to 
respect that nationality.1553 Yet Nottebohm also clearly, if indirectly, emphasized the 
territorial nature of nationality, with its focus on a state’s “population” and on links like 
birth, residence and descent from a national.1554 As Part 2 explored, descent from a national 
was also an expression of the territorial conception of nationality because it granted 
nationality to the first couple generations derived from the national homeland.1555 The 
emphasis on territorial “links” in Nottebohm show the continuing emphasis in international 
law on the feudal conception of nationality, where nationality is linked to settlement, as 
discussed above in Part 2. As a result, under international law, as under municipal law, 
“mere physical presence” over the short term is not enough to create a “link.”1556 
Once again, Part 2 briefly summarized the development of nationality in Europe and its 
application in the colonies, exploring how nationality arose out of the feudal system in 
Europe and was rooted in the concepts of territoriality and settlement on land.1557 
Throughout the Pathways explored below, echoes of feudalism and the territorial 
conception of nationality, see in Nottebohm, will continue to impact the international laws 
of nationality and the ways in which they may be applied to nomads.  
Traditionally, as Part 2 explored, exclusive allegiance was also a founding principle of 
nationality, with dual nationality often regarded as big a problem as statelessness. With 
Nottebohm, territoriality and exclusivity were recognized by the Court. As a result, 
international law supports the territorial approach to nationality discussed at length in 
 
such as those used for functional nationality); Donner, 59; Van Waas, Nationality, 2008, 31-36, 42; K. Deaux 
‘Social Identity’ Encyclopedia of Women and Gender Vols. 1 and 2 (2001). 
1553 De Groot and Vonk 42, 52. See also Handbook, 2014; L. Beckman, ‘Is Residence Special? Democracy in the 
Age of Migration and Human Mobility’ in L. Beckman and E. Erman (eds.) Territories of Citizenship (Palgrave 
2012) 21-22; Shaw, 2008, 647-648; Brubaker, 35; Koessler, 61; Kymlicka, 174; Shachar, 13; Van Panhuys, 
195; Courbe, 23; Maury, 28-29. 
1554 In his book on international law, Shaw defines nationality thus: “(s)ince every state possesses sovereignty 
and jurisdictional powers and since every state must consist of a collection of individual human beings, it is 
essential that a link between the two be legally established. That link connecting the state and the people it 
includes in its territory is provided by the concept of nationality.” Shaw, 2008, 659. See also Stilz, 188; 
Shachar, 49-50; Weissbrodt, 26-27.  
For more examples of the territorial concept of a “link” see Florence Strunsky Mergé vs. The Italian Republic, 
Case No. 3, Decision No. 55 and Mazzonis Case, Decision No. 56 (10 June 1955) XIV 249-251 before the Iran-
US Claims Tribunal. See also A. Edwards, ‘The meaning of nationality in international law in an era of human 
rights: procedural and substantive aspects’ in A. Edwards and L. van Waas (eds.) Nationality and Statelessness 
under International Law (Cambridge UP 2014) 11. 
1555 See Part 2, State Building and the Exclusion of Nomads, Conclusion, Nomads and National Unity, above. 
1556 Verwhilgen, 62. See also Maury, 14. 
1557 Gilbert, Nomadic, 2014, 93. 
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Part 2. This approach, however, has more recently been tempered by a universal right to a 
nationality for everyone, including nomads. 
The Right to a Nationality Today  
Contemporaneously with the development of nationality as one of the most important 
features of modern life, international law today acknowledges the critical role nationality 
plays in the life of the individual as part of an emerging body of human rights law.1558 The 
right to a nationality today finds support in a large number of international treaties, in the 
decisions of international tribunals and in universal principles of law.1559The right to a 
nationality limits state sovereignty in critical ways, placing a burden on the state system as 
a whole to eliminate statelessness. Of foremost importance to the development of a right to 
a nationality for individuals was the, non-binding, Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
(UDHR), which guarantees the right to a nationality in Article 15, stating; “everyone has the 
right to a nationality. No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his nationality nor denied the 
right to change his nationality.”1560 It is important to note that this right is presented as 
absolute. It is not qualified by reference to territory, settlement, residence, birth or other 
factors. Yet, it also does not establish to what extent and under what circumstances 
particular states have a duty to grant nationality.  
The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), which is binding on States 
Parties1561, mandates that; “every child has the right to acquire a nationality” without 
qualification. Other international treaties that support the right to a nationality include the 
Convention on the Rights of the Child,1562 the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
 
1558 The International Law Commission has noted the role played by the evolution of human rights law in 
establishing the right to a nationality. International Law Commission, ‘Draft articles on nationality of natural 
persons in relation to the succession of States with commentaries, 1999’ Report of the International Law 
Commission on the work of its fifty-first session, 24 (hereinafter Draft Articles). See also Jault-Seseke, 43; 
Edwards, 38-41. 
1559 For a summary, see the Handbook, 2014, 9. See also Pilgram, 2. 
1560 UN General Assembly, Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 217 (III) A (Paris 1948) Art. 15. See also 
Lauterpacht, 412; Donner, 191; Van Waas, Nationality, 58. 
1561 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, New York, 16 December 1966, 23 March 1976, No. 
14668. The Covenant has 173 states parties. For a list of signatories and reservations, see the United Nations 
Treaty Collection website at https://treaties.un.org/pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=IV-
4&chapter=4&clang=_en. 
1562 Convention on the Rights of the Child, New York, 20 November 1989, adopted and opened for signature, 
ratification and accession by General Assembly resolution 44/25 of 20 November 1989, entry into force 2 
September 1990, in accordance with article 4949(1), 1577 United Nations Treaty Series 3, with 196 states 
parties (hereinafter Convention on the Rights of the Child). 
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Racial Discrimination.1563 The Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples1564 also 
supports the right to a nationality for indigenous peoples, though it lacks the binding 
nature of the treaties listed above.  
Regional treaties establishing the right to a nationality, including those relevant to the right 
to a nationality in the Gulf region and the Sahel, include the Arab Charter on Human Rights 
of 2004,1565 Article 29. The right to a nationality finds further support in the African 
Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child,1566 Article 6, and the Covenant on the Rights 
of the Child in Islam, Article 7.1567 The African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights1568 
guarantees the right to freedom of movement and to enter and exit one’s country in Article 
12, rights adjacent to nationality.  
Other regional treaties and declarations include the American Convention on Human 
Rights,1569 Article 20, and the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man of 
1948,1570 Article 19. In Europe, regional treaties include the Strasbourg Convention of 1963 
on the Reduction of Cases of Multiple Nationality,1571 the 1973 Convention to Reduce the 
Number of Cases of Statelessness in Europe, and the European Convention on Nationality of 
1997.1572 Treaty bodies and courts have opined upon the meaning of international and 
 
1563 International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, New York, 7 March 
1966, United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 660, 195, with 182 states parties. 
1564 United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP), 13 September 2007. Adopted 
by UN General Assembly by 144 states. 
1565 League of Arab States, Arab Charter on Human Rights, 15 September 1994, with 22 states parties. 
1566 African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child (1990) (Adopted by the African Member States of 
the Organization of African Unity, 11 July 1990), adopted by 48 member states. 
1567 Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC), Covenant on the Rights of the Child in Islam, June 2005, 
OIC/9-IGGE/HRI/2004/Rep. 
1568 African [Banjul] Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights, adopted June 27, 1981, OAU Doc. CAB/LEG/67/3 
rev. 5, 21 I.L.M. 58 (1982), with 54 states parties. 
1569 American Convention on Human Rights "Pact of San José, Costa Rica", 18 July 1978, UNTS 1144, 123, 
with 25 states parties. 
1570 American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man (1948) (Adopted at the Ninth International 
Conference of American States, Bogota, Colombia, 2 May 1948) 
1571 Council of Europe, European Treaty Series-No. 43, Convention on the Reduction of Cases of Multiple 
Nationality and on Military Obligations in Cases of Multiple Nationality, Strasbourg, 6.V.1963. 
1572 Council of Europe, European Convention on Nationality, ETS No.166, 01/03/2000 with 10 ratifications. 
303 
 
regional treaties, such as by stating that states have a general duty not to adopt laws that 
create statelessness,1573 or by prohibiting the discriminatory withdrawal of nationality.1574 
The Statelessness Conventions, binding on states parties,1575 also discussed above in the 
Introduction, support the right to a nationality, and provide a pathway to a solution for the 
problems of many stateless people and a framework to prevent statelessness. The 
Statelessness Conventions may therefore be seen as adding more specificity to the right to 
a nationality by mandating the conditions under which nationality is established in some 
circumstances and by creating a duty on the part of states to identify, prevent and resolve 
statelessness.1576  
Soft law has also played an important role in guiding state practice. Procedural guidance 
also plays a role in guiding state practice in ensuring the right to a nationality. Perhaps the 
most important guidance on statelessness to come out in recent years is the UNHCR 
Handbook on the Protection of Stateless Persons, which provides guidance for identifying 
stateless persons in a migratory situation.1577 It marks a vital step in bringing rigor to the 
identification of statelessness as a formal category under international law. The lack of a 
rigorous identification process can impede solutions where identification is critical.  
It should be noted, however, that there is no international tribunal tasked with adjudicating 
cases of statelessness, as would have been created by Article 11 of the 1954 Draft 
Convention on the Elimination of Future Statelessness. As a result, identification of 
statelessness falls to national governments, with guidance from UNHCR. The Handbook 
also provides important guidance and protections for stateless migrants. It asserts, for 
example, that unlawful presence in a state should not be grounds for states to deny access 
to a statelessness determination.1578  
Therefore, while the right to a nationality is commonly recognized as a universal right, 
there remains a lack of specificity as to the content of this right. As the Pathways below will 
 
1573 Jean and Bosico. The Inter-American Court stated that; “(s)tates have the obligation not to adopt practices 
or laws concerning the granting of nationality, the application of which fosters an increase in the number of 
stateless persons.” 
1574 Human Rights Council, Twenty-fifth session, ‘Human rights and arbitrary deprivation of nationality’ 
Report of the Secretary-General (19 December 2013.) 
1575 For a list of signatories and reservations, see the United Nations Treaty Collection website at 
https://treaties.un.org/pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=IND&mtdsg_no=V-4&chapter=5&clang=_en for the 
Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness with 75 states parties and 
https://treaties.un.org/pages/ViewDetailsII.aspx?src=IND&mtdsg_no=V-
3&chapter=5&Temp=mtdsg2&clang=_en for the Convention Relating to the Status of Stateless Persons with 
94 states parties. 
1576 1961 Convention. 
1577 Handbook, 2014, 17. 
1578 Handbook, 2014, 28. 
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also show, much soft law has failed to be adopted by states. While international law 
mandates the prevention of statelessness, 1579 as Van Waas points out, the provisions in the 
Statelessness Conventions stop “short of prescribing obligations that will decisively 
eliminate statelessness in all circumstances.”1580 For example, de-naturalization was widely 
acknowledged to be a threat to the rights of neighbouring states in the wake of the Second 
World War, but though limited, it has not, even today, been completely prohibited.1581 
There is also no specific prohibition on a government of one state imposing the nationality 
of another state on a minority group in order to resolve statelessness, as the government of 
Kuwait is attempting to do. Such a “solution” would arguably violate human rights law,1582 
but international human rights law lacks specificity in this and several other crucial areas. 
The lack of specificity in the right to a nationality for nomads will be highlighted at length 
in the Pathways, below. 
The Right to Registration at Birth  
The previous section provided an overview of the right to a nationality in international law. 
There is another area of laws and procedures that is crucial to preventing statelessness, 
that of civil registration.  
Civil registration is defined as the continuous, permanent, compulsory and universal 
recording of the occurrence and characteristics of vital events pertaining to the 
population, as provided through decree or regulation in accordance with the legal 
requirements in each country.1583  
Civil registration provides evidence of nationality, for example, by proving birth within the 
territory of the state, descent from a national, marriage to a national, habitual residence or 
other evidence required for nationality. Other forms of registration, such as documents like 
land deeds, leases, bank records and other documents may also be used as evidence 
towards meeting the criteria for nationality in some cases, particularly by showing 
residence in the state.  
 
1579 Statelessness Conventions. See also Maury, 20; Brownlie, Relations, 386. 
1580 Van Waas, Statelessness Conventions, 75-76. She goes on to point out that such a provision was suggested 
by the Draft Convention on the Elimination of Future Statelessness, but was not adopted in the existing 
Conventions.  
1581 Weis, 32, 45. See also Verzijl, 19; Maury, 20. Arendt discussed the problem at length in The Origins of 
Totalitarianism, first published in 1951. Arendt, 1976 ,278-279. See also Fripp, 2016, 12; U.N. Ad Hoc 
Committee on Refugees and Stateless Persons, ‘A Study of Statelessness’ United Nations, August 1949, Lake 
Success - New York, 1 August 1949, E/1112; E/1112/Add.1; Lauterpacht, 384; European Court of Human 
Rights, K2 v UK, First Section Decision, 42381/13 (2017) (finding that it was not a violation of a defendant’s 
human rights to strip UK nationality from a defendant that had another nationality.) 
1582 Donner, 141. 
1583 Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Statistics Division, Statistical Papers, ‘Principles and 
Recommendations for a Vital Statistics System, Revision 3’ Series M No. 19/Rev.3 (2014) 65. 
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Birth registration is now required by states in international law. The right to birth 
registration is guaranteed in Article 24, paragraphs 2 and 3 of the International Covenant 
on Civil and Political Rights. The Convention on the Rights of the Child and the Committee 
on the Rights of the Child also mandate birth registration.1584 Under current international 
law, however, the right to civil registration is limited to registration at birth.1585 The non-
binding Goal 16 of the Sustainable Development Goals is to “provide legal identity for all, 
including birth registration” by 2030,1586 but international law has not expanded on the 
types of civil documentation states are required to provide. 
The International Commitments of Kuwait, Mali and Malaysia 
The examples of Kuwait, Mali and Malaysia were selected to provide insights into the 
statelessness of nomads more generally, therefore Part 3 will not limit itself to those 
international and regional treaties ratified by the three countries used as examples. The 
purpose of this section is instead to explore if international law, writ large, can provide 
solutions to common causes of nomad statelessness. Nevertheless, ratification of key 
treaties by particular states is relevant to show the various ways in which international law 
has, or has not, been adopted and implemented by states in dealing with nomads and the 
extent to which it has already been used to provide solutions. This section will list the key 
international treaties ratified by the countries used as examples in this dissertation. 
Kuwait has ratified several key international treaties that are helpful to ending 
statelessness, though it has not ratified the Statelessness Conventions.1587 Kuwait is a party 
to the Convention on the Rights of the Child and the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights.1588 Yet, as Part 2 showed, inter-generational statelessness persists in 
 
1584 “The child shall be registered immediately after birth and shall have the right from birth to a name, the 
right to acquire a nationality and, as far as possible, the right to know and be cared for by his or her parents. 
2. States Parties shall ensure the implementation of these rights in accordance with their national law and 
their obligations under the relevant international instruments in this field, in particular where the child 
would otherwise be stateless.” Convention on the Rights of the Child, Art. 7. 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Art. 24, Adopted and opened for signature, ratification 
and accession by General Assembly resolution 2200A (XXI) of 16 December 1966 entry into force 23 March 
1976, in accordance with Article 49. See also Office of the U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights, ‘Birth 
registration and the right of everyone to recognition everywhere as a person before the law: Report of the 
Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights’ Human Rights Council Twenty-seventh 
session, A/HRC/27/22 (17 June 2014). 
1585 Fransman, 43. Though see the Convention on the Issue of a Certificate of Nationality, ICCS Convention No. 
28 (1999), which has been signed by a handful of European countries. 
1586 See the U.N. Sustainable Development Goals website at 
http://www.un.org/sustainabledevelopment/peace-justice/. 
1587 See the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, ‘Ratification Status for Kuwait’ at 
http://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/TreatyBodyExternal/Treaty.aspx?CountryID9̄2&LangĒN. See also 
Human Rights Watch ‘Prisoners of the Past: Kuwaiti Bidun and the Burden of Statelessness’ (June 13, 2011).  
1588 See UNHCR, ‘States Party to the Statelessness Conventions as of 1st October 2017’ map at 
http://www.refworld.org/pdfid/54576a754.pdf. See also United Nations Human Rights Office of the High 
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Kuwait. Rather, documentation for stateless children in Kuwait has become simply another 
tool in the continuation of that statelessness. 
Mali has ratified the ICCPR and the ICESCR, the Convention on the Rights of the Child, and 
many regional human rights treaties, including the African Charter on the Rights and 
Welfare of the Child in Africa.1589 It acceded to the Statelessness Conventions in 2016.1590 
Mali has therefore committed itself to ending statelessness.  
Mali is also a member of ECOWAS, which has issued the non-binding Abidjan Declaration of 
Ministers of ECOWAS Member States on Eradication of Statelessness.1591 Of particular note, 
the Abidjan Declaration states that ending statelessness is key to peace and security in the 
region, recognition of the role statelessness plays in fuelling conflicts like the one occurring 
in northern Mali.1592 The agreement has begun being implemented by states and it will be 
interesting to see what effect, if any, it has on the Mali conflict and the documentation 
problems of the Tuareg.1593 
But so far Malian laws and adherence to international conventions has not resulted in 
inclusion, enfranchisement, or identity documents for the Tuareg. “Although formal legal 
nationality had been assured in most countries of sub-Saharan Africa at independence, 
meaningful nationality has remained elusive for individuals who are members of particular 
groups.”1594 The question is, why? Like many nomads in Africa, problems with registration, 
failure to register, and stringent registration rules have left many Tuareg without 
nationality documents to prove their nationality. But the situation in Mali goes beyond 
poorly implemented laws and neglect. The Tuareg have been the victims of a deliberate 
campaign of violence, forced removal, coercive settlement and disenfranchisement as a 
perceived security risk to a level that arguably raises to the level of persecution. Today, 
northern Mali resembles a failed state. As Part 2 showed, this conflict is deeply related the 
question of Tuareg belonging, where their nationality is disputed. Though many rural 
 
Commissioner at 
http://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/TreatyBodyExternal/Countries.aspx?CountryCodeK̄WT&LangĒN for 
the reporting status of Kuwait on various treaties. 
1589 Information on Mali’s treaty status can be found at Claiming Human Rights, Guide to International 
Procedures Available in Cases of Human Rights Violations in Africa at 
http://www.claiminghumanrights.org/mali.html.  See also African Commission para 82; UNHCR, ‘Global 
Focus, Mali, Strategy for Each PPG’ (2016) at http://reporting.unhcr.org/node/10064. 
1590 UNHCR, ‘Statelessness in West Africa Newsletter #9 (April – June 2016)’ at 
https://data2.unhcr.org/ar/documents/download/53849 
1591 Regional Treaties, Agreements, Declarations and Related, Abidjan Declaration of Ministers of ECOWAS 
Member States on Eradication of Statelessness, (25 February 2015) (hereinafter Abidjan Declaration). 
1592 Abidjan Declaration, 3. 
1593 Manby, Citizenship, 2018. 
1594 L. Smith, 21. 
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people in Africa lack documents, the Tuareg are facing a crisis of legitimacy and 
membership that is intimately related to the question of Tuareg separatism, a larger 
political question which has overshadowed the rights of ordinary Tuareg to a nationality. 
Yet it is clear that providing a nationality for all Tuareg in the Sahara region will be a major 
part of any sustainable peace agreement. 
Malaysia is not a party to the Statelessness Conventions, though it is a party to the 
Convention on the Rights of the Child, the International Covenant on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.1595 But while 
Malaysia is not a party to the 1961 Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness, 
nevertheless, the Constitution of Malaysia provides for the nationality of otherwise 
stateless persons in the Second Schedule.1596 Malaysia’s federal law also contains strong 
protections against statelessness by granting a nationality to otherwise stateless children 
born in Malaysia.1597 Yet, as Part 2 demonstrated, establishing before the courts that 
children in Malaysia are being born stateless has not, so far, lead to real solutions. 
 
  
 
1595 See the website for the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, ‘Ratification Status for 
Malaysia’ at http://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/TreatyBodyExternal/Treaty.aspx?CountryID9̄2&LangĒN. 
1596 Malaysian Constitution, Second Schedule, Part 2 (1957) (c) states that nationals are, “every person born 
within the Federation after September 1962, of whose parents one at least was at the time of the birth either 
a citizen or permanently resident in the Federation, or who was not born a citizen of any other country..." and 
Part 2, (e) states that nationals are those born after Malaysia day who are, “...born within the Federation who 
(are) not born a citizen of any country otherwise than by virtue of this paragraph.” Sinnadurai, 321, 332.  
1597 Constitution of Malaysia (1957) 2nd Schedule, art. 1(c). 
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Pathway I: The Right to a Nationality During the Succession of States 
Whether the creation of a new State on the territory of another results in 
statelessness of the nationals of the previous State there resident, or an automatic 
change in nationality, or in retention of the previous nationality until provision is 
otherwise made by treaty or the law of the new state, is a matter of some 
doubt.1598 
Pathway I will look at the right to a nationality during the succession of states. As Part 2 
showed, decolonization was a major cause of statelessness for some nomads. There are 
populations of nomads who have been stateless for at least fifty or sixty years. 
Decolonization is also an ongoing process that will continue to affect nomads in the future.  
As a result, Pathway I will examine to what extent modern international law offers 
solutions to prevent and resolve statelessness as a result of a succession of states. To do so, 
it will explore proposed developments in international law to see if statelessness among 
the Bedouin, the Tuareg and the Sama Dilaut could have been prevented at the time, were 
these developments to be adopted. It will also explore the extent to which international law 
may offer solutions to intergenerational statelessness as a result of past decolonization. 
In the examples explored above, some nomads entered the decolonization period with a 
nationality under the colonial system. The Tuareg were granted a nationality under French 
law prior to decolonization and some efforts were made towards civil registration, but the 
process remained incomplete at the time of decolonization. Some Sama Dilaut received a 
nationality under British law based on residence and jus soli immediately preceding 
decolonization, but this law appears to have existed mostly on paper. In Kuwait, the Emir 
also passed a law granting nationality based on residence, but mass civil registration did 
not follow until later. As well, under British law, BPP status was available to some, though it 
was not really a nationality status. 
Despite often qualifying for a nationality under colonial-era laws, many nomads entered 
the decolonization period without any civil documents or with documents that did not 
establish nationality, but may have established residence. Many nomads had had bad 
experiences with colonial registration programs that made them mis-trustful of post-
colonial registration. As well, the power to issue documents had now vested with settled 
and urban rulers, meaning that many nomads could not determine their own nationality. 
Transitional laws passed by the new states establishing the first body of nationals were 
usually based primarily on birth and residence within the newly established borders of the 
state. 1599 Birth created a clear category upon which to grant nationality, though 
 
1598 Crawford, 52-53. 
1599 In supporting the continuation of existing borders, the United Nations and international community were 
following the doctrine of uti possidetis, a principle of international law that cements existing borders during 
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documenting place of birth was not a priority for many nomads. The concept of habitual 
residence, however, was vague, discriminatory and/or and undefined when applied to 
nomads, particularly in what were now border areas. For laws based both on birth and 
habitual residence, many nomads continued to have no documents to prove their eligibility. 
Rather than setting up a committee or regional process to regulate the creation and 
transfer of nationality to ensure that everyone received or retained one during 
decolonization, nationality was left to the individual states. The United Nations and the 
international community did not pay enough attention to the risk of statelessness during 
decolonization for marginalized groups like nomads. While nationality as a question of 
international relations was taken up by the League of Nations, and later by the United 
Nations, for Mandate and Trust territories, neither the League of Nations, nor the United 
Nations, were involved in determining the status of persons in other colonial entities such 
as Protectorates and Protected States.1600 When there was international involvement in the 
decolonization process and the establishment of nationality, such as in Malaysia with the 
Reid Commission, it was usually from the former colonial entity, in this case, the British 
Commonwealth. As Part 2 explored, while aware of the problem of statelessness, most 
colonial administrations were primarily concerned with shoring up borders and 
centralized governments. 
Some of these problems could have been resolved by regional or bilateral treaties, but, as 
Weis points out, few cases of decolonization were governed by treaty.1601 While the 
International Court of Justice ruled on the nationality status of persons in Mandate 
territories like South-West Africa, it was not asked to decide cases of disputed nationality 
between sovereign states in most post-colonial states.1602 Today, there is some evidence 
the Philippines, Malaysia and Indonesia may embark on such a process, including a recent 
MOU signed by Malaysia and Indonesia, but nothing like this regional process was done at 
the time. As a result, gaps were perhaps inevitable and there was a real danger of 
discrimination against minorities and other vulnerable groups. 
As Part 2 discussed, the nationality laws of post-colonial states were often drafted with the 
help of international experts. Importantly, nationality was often treated during the 
decolonization process as an aspect of state sovereignty for the newly emerging states, not 
as an individual right. As Part 2 showed, the focus of the decolonization process was much 
more on stabilizing borders and regulating relations between the new states than on 
establishing a nationality for all or registering the population.1603 In the 1960s, 
 
independence or state succession and discourages fuzzy or contested sovereignty. Shaw, Boundaries, 1997 
478. 
1600 For a summary of nationality in the Mandate and Trust territories, see Weis, 20-22. 
1601 Weis, 153. The countries he cites are Algeria, Burma, Cyprus, and Indonesia. 
1602 See International Court of Justice, International Status of South-West Africa, I.C.J. Reports (1950) quoted 
in Weis, 22. 
1603 For an overview of the decolonization process, see Crawford 384-388. 
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international law was also not particularly helpful in guiding states to enact universal 
registration policies.1604 International law during decolonization was greatly concerned 
with self-determination for former colonies, but not necessarily with nationality as an 
individual right. For example, Article 1 of both the 1966 International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights and the 1966 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights focused on the right to self-determination, not the right to a nationality.1605  
Yet, despite the lack of attention paid to the problem of statelessness as a result of 
decolonization, the chances of statelessness and the problems with undocumented persons 
during decolonization were known at the time. In 1949, the United Nations commissioned a 
study on stateless refugees and displaced stateless persons.1606 The study, however, took 
little note of stateless persons in their own countries, despite the fact that the risk of 
statelessness occurring from decolonization was noted at the time by experts such as 
Hannah Arendt.1607 One notable exception was the adoption, in 1954, of the Convention 
Relating to the Status of Stateless People, which mandated in Art. 10 that treaties of state 
succession contain protections against statelessness.  
For state succession without a treaty, however, the problem of statelessness did not receive 
enough attention. Nationality could not automatically transfer where there was no 
predecessor State, as was the case during decolonization in many places.1608 As Weis 
pointed out in 1979, towards the end of the decolonization period, “we cannot assume that 
the nationality of the extinct State is ipso facto replaced by that of the successor State.”1609   
Pathway I will examine the right to a nationality during state succession. As noted above, 
the right to a nationality has developed extensively since the decolonization period. Could 
statelessness have been prevented in the examples by the application of modern 
international laws, norms and principles? Could international law today provide a 
retroactive solution to nomad statelessness that resulted from the decolonization process? 
 
1604 For an overview of international law relating to proof of nationality at the time of decolonization and in 
the decades following, see Weis, 204-236. 
1605 U.N. General Assembly, International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 16 December 
1966, United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 993, 3, with 171 states parties 
1606 U.N. Ad Hoc Committee on Refugees and Stateless Persons, ‘A Study of Statelessness’ United Nations, 
August 1949, Lake Success - New York, 1 August 1949, E/1112; E/1112/Add.1. 
1607 Arendt, 1976, 297. As Arendt had pointed out, speaking of Europe, “(s)ince the Peace Treaties of 1919 and 
1920 the refugees and the stateless have attached themselves like a curse to all the newly established states 
on earth which were created in the image of the state.” Arendt, 1976, 290. Arendt called the statelessness 
created in Europe during WWII “the newest mass phenomenon in contemporary history.” Arendt , 1976, 277. 
It should be noted, however, that Arendt did not distinguish between refugees and stateless persons. 
Nevertheless, her point is compelling. 
1608 Weis, 136. 
1609 Weis, 137. 
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The Norms of State Succession 
Today, there is a clearly established right to a nationality during state succession.1610 This 
right is supported by a number of international and regional laws that are binding on 
states, as well as draft treaties and by the opinions of experts.1611 This dissertation will look 
closely at proposed developments in the law, to see if changes to the law could have 
prevented the statelessness of nomads and provide a pathway to a solution for existing 
cases of statelessness that resulted from state succession. 
Yet it is important to note that the international law of state succession was already quite 
developed by the time of decolonization, though it had not yet been codified. The breakup 
of empires had been common in Europe in the 19th and early 20th centuries.1612 Prior to 
decolonization, there had also been cases of transfers of territory within the colonial 
system.1613  
The general rule establishing nationality during state succession has long been that 
nationality follows sovereignty.1614 Under this general rule, which was widely recognized at 
the time of decolonization as well as today, nomads who held nationality under the colonial 
system should have automatically received a nationality in the new state. Prior to 
decolonization, international law cases relied heavily on birth and habitual residence to 
determining nationality in cases where nationality was unclear or contested. 1615  
Beginning at decolonization, international law has fleshed out the basic rules for the roll-
over of nationality during state succession. Relevant laws include the 1961 Convention on 
the Reduction of Statelessness, non-binding instruments like the Venice Declaration on the 
Consequences of State Succession for the Nationality of Natural Persons of 1996 and the 
Draft articles on nationality of natural persons in relation to the succession of States of 
1999.1616 Regional laws include the Convention on the Avoidance of Statelessness in 
 
1610 See generally Van Waas, Nationality, Chapter VI. 
1611 For a summary of the opinions of experts writing during the post-colonial period, see generally Weis, 
published in 1979. See also M. Sanderson, ‘Statelessness and Mass Expulsion in Sudan: A Reassessment of the 
International Law’ 12 Nw. J. Int’l Hum. Rts. 74 (2014). For a summary of more recent developments in the 
norms of state succession and dual nationality, see L. J. van der Baaren, Emigrant nationality. A comparative 
analysis of the toleration of dual nationality from an emigrant perspective (PhD Maastricht 2020). 
1612 Van Waas, Nationality, 122. 
1613 Weis explores several colonial examples of transfers of colonial sovereignty during the late 1800s (Burma 
and southern Africa). Weis, 139. 
1614 Brownlie, Principles, 656. Van Waas says this reflects “the feudal concept of territorial sovereignty  where 
‘ownership’ of  population  and  property  follows  ownership  of  the  land.” Van Waas, Nationality, 126 . 
1615 See for example, Agapios v. Sanitary and Quarantine Council of Egypt, Gazette des Tribunaux Mixtes 
(1920) cited in Weis, 141. 
1616 International Law Commission, Draft Articles on Nationality of Natural Persons in relation to the 
Succession of States with commentaries, Yearbook of the International Law Commission, 1999, vol. II, Part 
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Relation to State Succession by the Council of Europe of 20091617, and regional draft laws 
include the Draft Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights on the 
specific Aspects of the Right to a Nationality and the Eradication of Statelessness in 
Africa.1618  
International law supports the regulation of nationality and the prevention of statelessness 
by succession treaties. Article 10 of the 1961 Convention placed an affirmative duty on 
states to prevent statelessness in treaty provisions. Draft laws lend further support, 
including Article 20 of the Draft Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples 
Rights on the Specific Aspects of the Right to a Nationality and the Eradication of 
Statelessness in Africa also addresses succession by treaty, as does the Venice Declaration 
on the Consequences of State Succession for the Nationality of Natural Persons of 19961619 
also mandates that states respect human rights and avoid statelessness. 
But what about succession in the absence of a treaty, a common occurrence during 
decolonization? International law has created a duty for stateless to avoid creating 
statelessness at succession, even in the absence of a treaty. Critically, however, these rules 
applied only to the nationals of the predecessor state. The 1961 Convention placed a duty 
on states in the absence of a treaty to confer nationality on those who would otherwise be 
stateless as a result of succession.  
In 1999, the International Law Commission drafted a set of specific articles on nationality 
during state succession for persons with a nationality in the predecessor state regardless of 
the existence of a treaty.1620 While non-binding on states, it is worth examining whether 
these articles would have prevented nomad statelessness had they been applied at the 
 
Two. The Draft articles were “adopted by the International Law Commission at its fifty-first session in 1999. 
At its fifty-fifth session, in 2000, the General Assembly took note of the Articles... By resolution 66/92 in 2011, 
the Assembly decided that, upon the request of any State, it will revert to the question of nationality of natural 
persons in relation to the succession of States at an appropriate time, in the light of the development of State 
practice in these matters.” Václav Mikulka, ‘Introductory note, Articles on Nationality of Natural Persons in 
Relation to the Succession of States 1999,’ Audiovisual Library of International Law (2020) at 
https://legal.un.org/avl/ha/annprss/annprss.html. 
1617 Council of Europe Convention on the avoidance of statelessness in relation to State succession, CETS No. 
200, Strasbourg, 19/05/2006, with 7 states parties. 
1618 Draft Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights on the specific Aspects of the Right to 
a Nationality and the Eradication of Statelessness in Africa (Draft September 2015) at 
https://www.achpr.org/public/Document/file/English/draft_citizenship_protocol_en_sept2015_achpr.pdf 
The draft protocol remains under consideration. https://au.int/en/newsevents/20180507/member-states-
experts-meeting-draft-protocol-african-charter-human-and-peoples. See also Manby, Citizenship, 2018. 
1619 Declaration on the consequences of state succession for the nationality of natural persons, CDL-NAT 
(1996)007rev-e, Adopted at its 28th Plenary Meeting, Venice, 13-14 September. 
1620 International Law Commission, Draft Articles on Nationality of Natural Persons in relation to the 
Succession of States  with commentaries, Yearbook of  the International Law Commission, 1999, vol. II, Part 
Two. 
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time, or if they provide for a solution to intergenerational statelessness today. Article 1 
reaffirms the right to a nationality in one of the successor states, but only for persons who 
had the nationality of the processor state. Article 2 states that: 
‘Person concerned’ means every individual who, on the date of the succession of 
States, had the nationality of the predecessor State and whose nationality may be 
affected by such succession. 
The Commentaries to Article 2 specify that: 
Accordingly, the term ‘person concerned’ includes neither persons who are only 
nationals of third States nor stateless persons who were present on the territory of 
any of the ‘States concerned.’  
(W)hen there is more than one successor State, not everyone has the obligation to 
attribute its nationality to every single person concerned. Similarly, the predecessor 
State does not have the obligation to retain all persons concerned as its nationals. 
Otherwise, the result would be, first, dual or multiple nationality on a large scale 
and, second, the creation, also on a large scale, of legal bonds of nationality without 
appropriate connection. 
Article 4 does not therefore encompass persons resident in the territory of the 
successor State who had been stateless under the regime of the predecessor State. 
The successor State has certainly a discretionary power to attribute its nationality to 
such stateless persons. But this question is outside the scope of the present draft 
articles.  
The Commentaries then cite to O’Connell where he says, “[t]here is an ‘inchoate right’ on 
the part of any State to naturalize stateless persons resident upon its territory.” In other 
words, providing a nationality to stateless persons in their territory is not obligatory for 
states. Article 2 of the Council of Europe Convention on the Avoidance of Statelessness in 
Relation to State Succession of 2006 and Article 20 of the Draft Protocol to the African 
Charter, discussed above, likewise limit the right to a nationality in a successor state to 
persons who had the nationality of the predecessor state. 
How must states ensure that no one becomes stateless as a result of state succession? 
Article 4 of the Draft Articles places an express duty on states to take “appropriate 
measures” to prevent statelessness during the succession of states for persons with a 
nationality in the processor state.1621 Article 19 reinforces the fact that states are not 
required to grant nationality to persons with no qualifying “link” to their territory, unless 
the person would become stateless.  
 
1621 The Commentaries to the Draft Articles cite to the ‘Report of the experts of the Council of Europe on the 
citizenship laws of the Czech Republic and Slovakia and their implementation’ (Council of Europe, Strasbourg, 
2 April 1996), document DIR/JUR(96)4), para. 54 stating that “there is an international obligation for the two 
States (involved in a succession) to avoid statelessness.” 
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Article 3 of the Council of Europe Convention also employs the language “appropriate 
measures” to prevent statelessness for persons with a nationality in the predecessor state. 
The Committee on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, in General 
Recommendation 30, has advised states to “(r)egularize the status of former citizens of 
predecessor States who now reside within the jurisdiction of the State party.”1622  
For persons who were nationals of the predecessor state, soft law  supports the use of birth 
and habitual residence as the “links” used to establish nationality in the new state. The 
Draft Articles support the automatic transfer of nationality where possible.1623 They go on 
to establish in Art. 5 a presumption of nationality based on habitual residence during any 
transitional period that may elapse prior to the enactment of nationality laws. According to 
the Commentaries, this presumption is intended to establish nationality during the 
transitional period if there is a time lag between succession and the passage of a nationality 
law. It creates a rebuttable presumption of nationality.  The use of birth, habitual residence, 
or “another appropriate connection” are also evoked for cases of state dissolution and state 
dismemberment in Articles 22 and 24.  
For the nationals of the processor state who are habitually resident outside the successor 
state, Article 8 mandates that successor states grant nationality to such non-residents only 
to avoid statelessness. The Commentaries to the Draft Articles support the use of birth (if 
the person would otherwise be stateless) in Article 11 and former habitual residents who 
were forced to leave as a result of events arising out of the succession, in Article 14 as the 
“links” upon which a bond of nationality should be founded.1624 For children of nationals of 
the predecessor state born after succession, Article 13 mandates that they be granted 
nationality in the state in which they were born. 
Regional conventions also support the use of birth and habitual residence. The Council of 
Europe Convention supports the right of automatic transfer of nationality during state 
succession and codifies birth and habitual residence as the “links” to establish nationality 
for persons holding the nationality of the predecessor state.1625 In Art. 6, it also creates a 
duty on the part of the predecessor state not to withdraw nationality if the result would be 
statelessness and in Art. 9, it supports the facilitation of nationality for habitual residents 
who are stateless as a result of the succession. The Draft Protocol to the African Charter 
 
1622 Committee on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, 64th Session, General 
Recommendation 30, Discrimination Against Non-Citizens, CERD/C/64/Misc.11/rev.3 (23 February-12 
March 2004). 
1623 See generally the Draft Articles. See also Donner, 51; Maury, 11. 
1624 Articles 5, 11, 14. “(P)ersons may have links to two or even more states involved in a succession. In this 
event, a person may end up with a nationality in two or more states. Under no circumstances, however, shall a 
person be denied the right to acquire at least one such nationality...” Commentaries, Commentary (5), 25. See 
the commentary to Article 1 providing for the right to a nationality, the commentary to Articles 4 and 5 on the 
prevention of statelessness, the commentary to Article 19 on page 40 and the commentary to Article 20, 
which particular concerns nationality during decolonization. See also the Draft Articles, 28, 40. 
1625 Council of Europe Convention on the Avoidance of Statelessness in Relation to State Succession (2009). 
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creates a presumption of nationality for the holders of nationality in the predecessor state 
based on habitual residence in the successor state. 
The Venice Declaration, another non-binding instrument, also says that states must prevent 
statelessness as a result of succession for the nationals of the predecessor state. 
Specifically, it mandates that successor states grant nationality to permanent residents of 
the territory and persons originating in the territory and resident outside the territory who 
would otherwise become stateless as the result of the succession.1626 It is not clear what is 
meant by the term “originating,”1627 but it is interesting to ask if this term might be defined 
in a way more friendly to the practice of nomadism, as a replacement for habitual 
residence. Might “originating” instead refer to pre-colonial histories and modes of 
belonging? 
The review of soft law and regional instruments above demonstrates that there is support 
for the extension of nationality to those who had a nationality in the predecessor state and 
would be otherwise left stateless, both when the process is governed by treaty and when it 
is not,1628 as well as for birth and habitual residence as the two main “links” creating a duty 
on the part of successor states to grant a nationality to the nationals of the predecessor 
state. 
While the term  “reasonable measures” to ensure that statelessness is not created as a 
result of state succession appears frequently in these instruments, there is less guidance on 
what “reasonable measures” entail, even in soft law. Under the Draft Articles, the term 
“reasonable measures” is not defined.1629 For example, the General Recommendation 30 of 
the Committee on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination mandate states to 
“(r)egularize the status of former citizens of predecessor States who now reside within the 
jurisdiction of the State party.” The Draft Protocol to the African Charter, however, creates 
a duty on the part of states to facilitate naturalization for persons with the nationality of 
the predecessor state. As well, Articles 15 and 16 of the 1999 Draft Articles and Article 4 of 
the Draft Protocol to the African Charter also mandate that the process of transferring 
nationality during a succession of states be accomplished without discrimination. Taking 
into account soft law sources, therefore, facilitated naturalization and non-discrimination 
may therefore be regarded as two requirements of “reasonable measures.”  
The duty of states to establish the nationality of those who are stateless or whose 
nationality is unestablished or unclear in the predecessor state, however, finds little 
support even in soft law. For persons who were stateless or of unclear nationality at 
 
1626 Venice Declaration on the Consequences of State Succession for the Nationality of Natural Persons (14 
September 1996) Article 10.  
1627 Explanatory Report on the Declaration on the Consequences of State Succession for the Nationality of 
Natural Persons, adopted at its 28th Plenary Meeting, Venice, 13-14 September 1996. 
1628 Batchelor, Statelessness, 1998, 157. 
1629 Draft Articles 5 and 8. 
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decolonization, there is only the general right to a nationality discussed in the preceding 
section.  
The Right of Option to Choose a Nationality 
The right to a nationality for nomads during the decolonization process also raises the 
issue of the right of option, or the right to choose nationality during a succession of states. 
This is particularly relevant to nomads with links to two or more states.  
At the time of decolonization, the right of option was far from being a universally accepted 
principle of law in cases of state succession. As Weis noted, traditionally the right of option, 
or election, was limited to “the right to decline the nationality of the acquiring State 
implicitly by leaving the transferred territory after the change in sovereignty had taken 
place.”1630 It did not traditionally include the right of positive, or affirmative, option, 
whereby an individual would go through an administrative or judicial process to elect 
nationality.1631  
A right of option was not always included in treaties of cession1632 and not always open to 
all classes of people, though it had been used in countries as diverse as Canada, Cyprus and 
Algeria.1633 It was also employed in the early 20th century in Europe1634 and to certain 
former colonies.1635, but subsequent draft treaties have expanded on this right.  
 
1630 Weis, 156-157. There remains no clear, affirmative right of option under international law today due to 
the non-uniform behavior of states and the lack of enforceable treaty law. Van Ert, 160 and sub. 
1631 Weis, 156-159. Weis notes, citing Halleck, the problems with an implied option based on physical 
presence. Weis, 157, quoting H. W. Halleck, International Law, or Rules Regulating the Intercourse of States in 
Peace and War, 2 vols. 4th English edition (Baker 1908). 
1632 The 1999 Draft Convention Commentaries cites to the right of option in treaties as a way to avoid 
statelessness. It is a “technique used by the legislators of States concerned in the case of a succession of States 
is to enlarge the circle of persons entitled to acquire their nationality by granting a right of option to that 
effect to those who would otherwise become stateless. Examples of provisions of this nature includes section 
2, subsection, of the Burma Independence Act, 37 article 6 of Law No. 40/1993 of29 December 1992 on the 
acquisition and loss of citizen-ship of the Czech Republic,38 and article 47 of the Yugoslav Citizenship Law 
(No. 33/96).” 
1633 Weis, 157. For an exploration of the right of option in the Canadian context, see Van Ert, 151. See also the 
summary in Weis, 158-159. 
1634 Weis, 157. The problem of “which state” had come up frequently at the end of World War One. Van Ert 
,157. See also Treaty of Peace with Austria (St. Germain-en-Laye, 10 September 1919) Arts. 70-82; UNHCR, 
‘Nationality Laws of the Former Soviet Republics,’ (1 July 1993). 
1635 A right of option based on the concept of “effective link” was applied during the decolonization process in 
Vietnam. Van Ert, 158. See also Convention Between France and Vietnam on Nationality, (1959) Recueil des 
traités et accords de la France 62 (16 August 1955). 
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An affirmative right of option for persons with a nationality in the predecessor state who 
would otherwise be stateless would be guaranteed by the 1999 Draft Articles. Article 11(2) 
of the Draft Articles states, 
Each State concerned shall grant a right to opt for its nationality to persons 
concerned who have appropriate connection with that State if those persons 
would otherwise become stateless as a result of the succession of States.1636 
An “appropriate connection” encompasses the “links” used to establish nationality, such as 
birth and residence, but may also include other types of connections. The Commentaries 
mention birth and habitual residence. Birth and habitual residence are also mentioned in 
Art. 20, to be applied during a transfer of territory, in Art. 22, to be applied during the 
dissolution of a state, and in Art. 24, to be applied during a separation of part of the 
territory of the state. The Commentaries to Art. 20 cite to “prevailing state practice” in 
using birth and habitual residence to determine states where an option may be taken.  
Article 17 establishes that an administrative procedure is necessary for making an option 
and mandates that such a procedure be made without undue delay. Decisions should be 
made in writing and subject to review. An affirmative right of option is also provided for by 
the Council of Europe Convention1637 and the Draft Protocol to the African Charter on 
Human and Peoples’ Rights on the specific Aspects of the Right to a Nationality and the 
Eradication of Statelessness in Africa guarantees the right of option.1638 The African Court 
on Human and Peoples’ Rights has also recommended that states observe an affirmative 
right of option in cases of state succession.1639 There is room in the right of option, as well, 
for connections beyond birth and habitual residence to be used to establish nationality. As 
a result, the right of option finds some support in soft law. 
Gaps in the Laws and Norms of State Succession for Nomads Who Were Registered at the 
time of Decolonization 
Several gaps emerge from this analysis. First, it is important to point out that 
decolonization is not necessarily best categorized as a succession of states. As Weis points 
out, “decolonization may either be regarded as secession, dismemberment or even cession, 
or as a special mode of State succession.”1640 Crawford uses the term “devolution,”1641 
noting that decolonization was accomplished by a number of different means, including the 
 
1636 Draft Articles Article 11. 
1637 Venice Declaration para. 13. 
1638 Draft Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights on the specific Aspects of the Right to 
a Nationality and the Eradication of Statelessness in Africa, May 2017 art. 20. 
1639 African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights, ‘The Right to Nationality in Africa’ (2015) 47. 
1640 Weis, 136. See also Beaugrand, Transnationalism, 2010, 39-41. 
1641 Crawford, 330-373. 
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passage of legislation, the termination of protection agreements, the signing of treaties, or a 
combination of methods.1642 It is not the intention of this dissertation to debate to what 
extent decolonization qualifies as a succession of states, but this dissertation will adopt the 
view that the laws pertaining to the succession of states may be looked to for solutions to 
statelessness as a result of decolonization, but the fact that colonies were not states 
impacts the effectiveness of those laws.  
Colonization was marked by a vacuum of state sovereignty, with vast empires existing 
mostly on maps. Colonial administrators, as Part 2 discussed, did not see themselves as 
administrating populations of nationals, but populations of colonized persons, many of 
whom were regarded not as nationals of their colonies, but as the subjects of their local 
leaders or tribal chiefs, even when the latter had no real authority. In some cases, colonized 
persons were granted a nationality in the colonial state, but the lack of a civil registration 
system meant that this nationality existed only on paper, complicating efforts to roll it over.  
In some cases, nationality was based on jus soli but colonial era borders were almost 
constantly fluid and changing, calling into question the applicability of jus soli in border 
areas. Some forms of colonial personal status, like BPP status, were never intended to 
function as a nationality except in the international context. In many cases, decolonization 
was, at best, incomplete,1643 calling into question whether a succession had properly 
occurred. This impacts the effectiveness of the laws on state succession. For example, while 
the Draft Articles on the Succession of States in Respect of Treaties of 1974 specifically 
applies to decolonization,1644  it may not be possible to “roll over” colonial era forms of 
status that lacked the features of modern nationality. 
Registration of all kinds, including civil registration, but also the taking of the census and 
registration for various licenses and permits, was often done as part of coercive colonial 
policy or simply to raise taxes, rather than to establish nationality or grant rights. Many 
people had not been registered during the colonial period in any way. Many groups actively 
resisted registration as part of the fight for independence, including some nomads, as the 
Tuareg example above discussed in detail.1645 Nomads, in particular, tended to be left out of 
registration. The usefulness of the international law framework is therefore lessened by the 
 
1642 Crawford, 331. 
1643 R. Ryser, Indigenous Nations and Modern States; The Political Emergence of Nations Challenging State 
Power (Routledge 2012) 199 (discussing its failure to take into account minority nations.) 
1644 “The expression ‘newly  independent  State’, defined in paragraph 1(f), signifies a State  which has arisen 
from a succession of States in a territory  which immediately before  the   date  of  the  succession of States 
was a dependent  territory for the international relations of which the predecessor State was 
responsible…After studying the various historical types of dependent territories (colonies, trusteeships, 
mandates, protectorates, etc.), the Commission concluded that their characteristics do  not  today justify 
differences in treatment from the standpoint of the general rules governing succession of States in respect of 
treaties.” Draft Articles, Art. 2, Commentaries. 
1645 The issue of resistance to the centralized state is a fraught one for many nomads. See the section on the 
Tuareg for more on this question. 
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uniqueness of decolonization, where colonial empires were not states with nationals, but 
empires.  
Nevertheless, the international framework, particularly within soft law, contains much that 
may have been helpful to nomads at decolonization and could be helpful to nomads in 
future cases of state succession. In particular, proposed international laws on the right to a 
nationality during the succession of states divide persons into two groups: those with the 
nationality of the predecessor state and those without. For the former group, the 
international draft laws are quite specific. As stated above, some nomads entered the 
decolonization process with colonial-era identity documents of various kinds. In cases like 
these, applying soft law, nationality could “roll over”.  
For example, the burden would be on the state to prove that nomads with documents in the 
predecessor state were not nationals of that state and/or that their documents were invalid 
for some reason. Should these draft laws be ratified, they would place a burden on member 
states during future succession of states to allow nationality to roll over.  
Yet, there is a not insignificant amount of vagueness in the draft laws described above, 
particularly when applied to nomads, through which statelessness may occur.1646 As the 
Commentaries to the 1999 Draft Articles point out, even in the soft law, reasonable 
measures to prevent statelessness do not obligate each state to provide a nationality to 
every person at risk of statelessness that may result from the succession.  
Van Waas points to another serious gap in the proposed international norms of state 
succession.1647 There is no clear duty on the predecessor state to refrain from withdrawing 
nationality until possible cases of statelessness have been resolved. As Part 2 showed, there 
was a rush to withdraw colonial forms of nationality and lay the problem squarely on the 
shoulders of the new states. Post-colonial states were left with the enormous undertaking 
of registering populations that had never been properly registered. The extent to which 
predecessor states may have had more of an active role to play in preventing statelessness 
is under-addressed in international law, even in draft conventions.  
As Part 2 explored, many nomads live in contested border areas, making it difficult to 
determine from which state they should receive a nationality. More could be done under 
international law to expand “appropriate connections” for nomads.1648 Lack of birth 
registration due to armed conflicts that so frequently occur as part of state successions 
 
1646 Van Waas, Nationality, 40. See also Conklin, 14; F. Costamagna, ‘Statelessness in the Context of State 
Succession: An Appraisal Under International Law’ in A. Annoni and S. Forlati, The Changing Role of 
Nationality in International Law (Routledge 2013) 36. See also I. Ziemele, ‘State Succession and Issues of 
Nationality and Statelessness’ in A. Edwards and L. van Waas (eds.) Nationality and Statelessness under 
International Law (Cambridge UP 2014) 217. 
1647 Van Waas, Nationality, 132. 
1648 Brownlie, Principles, 657; Van Panhuys, 30, 75. “Those properly to be considered nationals of the new 
state are those who have their permanent domicile in the territory, are born in the territory, or return soon 
after the change of sovereignty.” Donner, 254. 
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should be more explicitly addressed.1649 More conformity between refugee law and the 
laws of state succession may be helpful to resolve gaps. For example, refugees displaced 
during wars of state succession could have a right of option both in their state of refuge and 
their state of origin or birth. The concept of residence could be expanded to include the 
idea of “originating” in a state, mentioned above, which might include historical and pre-
colonial connections to the territory that is now the state, moving beyond a focus on 
borders. 
Gaps in the Laws and Norms of State Succession for Nomads without a Nationality at 
Decolonization 
The most serious gap in the right to a nationality during state succession is the lack of 
specificity even in the soft law as to how to resolve the statelessness of persons who did not 
have the nationality of the predecessor state and/or who were stateless. Many nomads 
were already stateless under the colonial system, having been entirely excluded or omitted 
from colonial-era laws and civil registration and, in many cases, treated as naturally 
stateless by colonial governments. With some populations of nomads still suffering from 
inter-generational statelessness, as Part 2 showed, this is problem that may persist and 
compound in future state successions. Yet, the 1961 Convention does not address how a 
state should determine if it is the appropriate actor to resolve cases of statelessness.1650 As 
Shaw noted, Article 10 lacks specifics as to how unclear or disputed nationality is to be 
resolved during state succession.1651 Interestingly, the Draft Convention on the Reduction 
of Future Statelessness of 1954 would have placed an affirmative duty on states to prevent 
and resolve cases of statelessness during succession.1652 This language was removed in the 
1961 Convention. 
An earlier draft of the 1961 Convention, prepared by the International Law Commission, 
placed a duty on states to avoid statelessness for their “inhabitants”, 
1. Every treaty providing for the transfer of a territory shall include provisions for 
ensuring that, subject to the exercise of the right of option, the inhabitants of that 
territory shall not become stateless. 2. In the absence of such provisions, a State to 
which territory is transferred, or which otherwise acquires territory, or a new 
State formed on territory previously belonging to another State or States, shall 
confer its nationality upon the inhabitants of such territory unless they retain 
 
1649 For a more recent example of the importance of birth registration for refugee children, see Refugees 
International, ‘Senegal: Voluntary repatriation critical for protecting stateless Mauritanians’ (9 Feb. 2007).  
1650 See also Edwards, 14. 
1651 Shaw, 2008, 1005. See also Weis, 144. 
1652 UN General Assembly, Elimination or Reduction of Future Statelessness, 4 December 1954, A/RES/896, 
Art. 10. 
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their former nationality by option or otherwise or have or acquire another 
nationality.1653 
This clause was removed from the final version. There is evidence from the Commentaries 
that this removal was deliberate, so as not to burden states by requiring them to 
automatically grant nationality to all inhabitants in their territory following a state 
succession, but rather to limit nationality to those who clearly had a nationality in the 
predecessor state.1654  
Likewise, the Draft Articles limited themselves to preventing statelessness in persons who 
had the nationality of the predecessor state. As the Commentaries to the Draft Articles put 
it,  
(a)ccordingly, the term ‘person concerned’ includes neither persons who are only 
nationals of third States nor stateless persons who were present on the territory of 
any of the ‘States concerned’.”1655  
The commentaries cite to D. P. O’Connell, where he states that “(t)here is an ‘inchoate right’ 
on the part of any State to naturalize stateless persons resident upon its territory.”1656 The 
Draft Articles, however, stop short of creating a duty on the part of states to grant 
nationality to those who were already stateless at the time of succession. 
As a result, there is a lack of specificity as to how existing cases of statelessness or unclear 
nationality are to be resolved during a succession of states. Nevertheless, as Weis puts it, 
for cases where nationality was not already established prior to succession, there is some 
support for using birth and habitual residence as links to create a presumption of 
nationality.1657 Given the general obligation on states to resolve statelessness, might a duty 
under international to grant nationality to stateless persons during a succession of states 
be inferred as part of a progressive interpretation of the law? Could this duty be based on 
birth and habitual residence in the territory of the state? 
 
1653 International Law Commission, sixth session, (1954), submitted to the General Assembly, para. 25, 
Yearbook of the International Law Commission, 1954, vol. II. The term “inhabitants” was not defined. 
1654 “Mr. HARVEY (United Kingdom), explaining the reasons for the submission of his delegation’s amendment 
to article 10...the Commission’s text went too far in providing that stateless persons resident in a ceded 
territory would acquire automatically the nationality of the acquiring...The article should simply provide that 
persons who possessed a nationality should not become stateless in consequence of a transfer of territory.” 
U.N. Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Status of Refugees and Stateless Persons, Summary Record of the 
Nineteenth Meeting, 26 November 1951, A/C0NF.9/C.1/SR.9, page 2. 
1655 Report of the Commission to the General Assembly on the work of its forty-ninth session, Commentary to 
Art. 2., Yearbook of the International Law Commission 1997, Vol. II, Part 2 (1997). 
1656 D. O’Connell, The Law of State Succession (Cambridge UP 1956), 245, 258, cited in Commentary to Art. 2. 
1657 Weis, 145-146. 
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Any solution based on birth or habitual residence is problematic for nomads. First, while 
birth in the territory of the state is a clear category on which to base nationality and birth 
registration is required by states in international law, place of birth for a nomadic family 
may be difficult to establish in some cases. Registration centres may be in urban areas and 
nomadic cultural practice may make registration more difficult than for other groups. 
There is a risk that place of birth for some nomad families may actually be an inappropriate 
way of establishing nationality if, for example, the family spends a period of the year 
outside their state of primary residence. The Committee on the Rights of the Child has 
recommended that states increase birth registration particularly for nomads, though, for 
example, mobile registration clinics,1658 yet there is little guidance from international law 
as to whether or not states must take extra steps to facilitate birth registration for nomads.  
The concept of habitual residence for nomads is even more problematic. It is not a clear 
category and, as a result, it may mean different things in different contexts, particularly for 
nomads. It is also nowhere defined under international law. There is no doubt that nomads, 
like all people, create links and connections to the territories they occupy, but habitual 
residence implies an exclusive relationship that has always been difficult for mobile 
peoples to establish, as explained in Part 2.1659 
Defining “Habitual Residence” for Nomads Under International Law 
Various attempts to define habitual residence by experts, treaties and draft laws and other 
instruments have not been very successful, particular when applied to nomads. Weis 
attempts to define habitual residence as “those usually called the inhabitants of the 
territory, it being understood that physical presence at the material time is essential,” and 
excluding “persons who happen to be in the territory accidentally or temporarily.”1660 He 
notes the importance of some sort of intent on the part of the individual to establish 
residence. For persons outside of the territory of the state at the time of transfer, “return or 
travel to the transferred territory with the intention of establishing residence there may be 
regarded as implicit acceptance (of nationality.)”1661  
Yet for nomads, seasonal migrations should never be taken as evidence of an intent to 
establish residence in a particular state to the exclusion of others. This is particularly true 
under governments that were in conflict with nomadic populations, such as Mali in 1960-
1962. Without a formal process to establish that an option has been taken, as discussed 
above, a reliance on supposed intent as interpreted by the government is unlikely to 
 
1658 Committee on the Rights of the Child, Algeria, para 36, quoted in Gilbert, Nomadic, 2014 161. 
1659 See also Gilbert and Begbie-Clench, 2018, 3-4 for a discussion on the challenges nomads face in proving 
exclusive land use. 
1660 Weis, 146. Here, he cites to a series of British cases on determining the nationality of citizens of Ireland 
living in the UK. 
1661 Weis, 149. 
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produce a good result. Here, an affirmative right of option may be helpful, but once again, 
an administrative or judicial procedure may not be easy for nomads to comply with. 
Importantly for nomads, Weis defines residence as occurring in only a single location; it is 
implied in Weis’s reasoning that one cannot be the resident of two or more places. Here, 
the definition of residence begins to resemble exclusive allegiance, a concept that is difficult 
for many mobile and nomadic peoples, as well as settled peoples who may maintain 
multiple residences, such as in the example of former Bedouin. Conklin points out the 
conceptual vagueness surrounding the use of habitual residence in establishing nationality. 
“How long,” he asks, “does it take for residence to become habitual? What if there is not a 
perfect fit between a state’s border and the habitual residents of its territory? What if a 
person is unable to return to her/his state of habitual residence?”1662  
The Draft Protocol to the African Charter, quoting the Council of Europe Convention, 
defines habitual residence thus: 
‘Habitual residence’ shall mean stable factual residence, or the place where a 
person has established his or her permanent or habitual centre of interests.1663 
Once again, residence is presented as occurring in a single location. The Draft Articles 
discuss habitual residence at length, also treating it as an either/or state of being.  
Drawing more widely on international law to see if the meaning of habitual residence may 
be further illuminated, the 1951 Refugee Convention, arguably an important human rights 
document,1664 implies in article 10 that residence is a single location.1665 The European 
Committee of Ministers defined habitual residence thus: “the place where the person had 
 
1662 Conklin, 224-228. Conklin goes on to discuss the concept of “own country” in international law. One may 
ask what the concept of own country means for nomads. 
1663 Draft Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights on the Specific Aspects of the Right to 
a Nationality and the Eradication of Statelessness in Africa: Explanatory Memorandum (2018) at 6, citing to 
Explanatory Report to EU Council of Ministers Regulation (EC) No 2201/2003 concerning jurisdiction and the 
recognition and enforcement of judgments in matrimonial matters and the matters of parental responsibility 
(known as “Brussels II”) prepared by Dr. Alegría Borrás, para. 32. 
1664 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees, Geneva, 28 July 1951, 22 April 1954, No. 2545 with 146 
states parties. J. McAdam, ‘The Refugee Convention as a Rights Blueprint for Persons in Need of International 
Protection’ UNHCR Research Paper No. 125 (2006). 
1665 UNHCR defines habitual residence as “stable, factual residence,” citing a number of international 
instruments, including, “the Hague Conferences on Private International Law,… Article 1A(2) of the 1951 
Convention relating to the Status of Refugees (and) the Travaux Préparatoires of that treaty, (where) it refers 
to ‘the country in which (the stateless applicant) has resided and where he had suffered or fears he would 
suffer persecution if he returned’.” UNHCR Guidelines 9, citing UN Ad Hoc Committee on Refugees and 
Stateless Persons, Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on Statelessness and Related Persons (Lake Success, New 
York, 16 January to 16 February 1950), 17 February 1950, E/1618; E/AC.35/5, 39 and the UNHCR Handbook 
on Procedures and Criteria for Determining Refugee Status and Guidelines on International Protection Under 
the 1951 Convention and the 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, April 2019, 
HCR/1P/4/ENG/REV. 4, paragraph 103. 
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established, on a fixed basis, his permanent or habitual centre of interests, with all the 
relevant facts being taken into account for the purpose of determining such residence.”1666 
Such definitions, if adopted by international treaty, might be problematic for nomads. 
Establishing Alternative “Links” for Nomads 
International soft law has attempted to create rules for establishing “links” in the absence 
of a clear, unitary habitual residence for nomads. The Council of Europe in 1983 
recommended, for example, that states recognize a broader set of “links” for nomads: 
For the establishment of such a link, one or more of the following criteria could in 
particular be taken into consideration: 
a. the state concerned is the state of birth or origin of the nomad or the state of 
origin of his immediate family; 
b. habitual residence or frequent periods of residence of the nomad in the state 
concerned provided that the residence in question is not unlawful; 
c. the presence in the state concerned of members of the nomad’s immediate family 
lawfully staying in that state or possessing its nationality.1667  
While this introduces other elements, it is not clear how useful they are. It is not clear to 
what extent there is a distinction between “frequent periods of residence” and “mere 
physical presence,” which is not sufficient to create a nationality “link”.1668 The focus on 
“lawful” residence may also be problematic for stateless nomads. A government may argue 
that the residency of nomads is illegal because they are stateless or foreign, as Part 2 
showed, creating a self-reinforcing cycle of exclusion.1669  
When writing definitions, international law, including crucial soft law, could do more to 
take into account the actual modalities and practices of nomadism, including pastoralism, 
hunter-gatherer lifestyles and peripatetic trade, rather than continuing to employ vague 
terms like “residence”. Article 8 of the Draft Protocol to the African Charter attempts to do 
so. “Links” for nomads include water points, seasonal grazing zones, and the burial sites of 
ancestors. Such lists take into account the actual modalities of nomadism, as mentioned 
above, but in so doing, they raise further concerns. It is not clear if and how having special 
rules for establishing residence for nomads, a category of persons that has never been 
 
1666 Explanatory Report to EU Council of Ministers Regulation (EC) No 2201/2003 concerning jurisdiction and 
the recognition and enforcement of judgments in matrimonial matters and the matters of parental 
responsibility (known as “Brussels II”) prepared by Dr. Alegría Borrás, para 32) as quoted in the proposed 
Draft Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights on the Specific Aspects of the Right to a 
Nationality and the Eradication of Statelessness in Africa: Explanatory Memorandum. 
1667 Council of Europe: Committee of Ministers, Recommendation No. R (83) 1 of the Committee of Ministers 
to Member States on Statelessness Nomads and Nomads of Undetermined Nationality, 22 February 1983. 
1668 Verwilghen, 62. See also Maury, 14. 
1669 Donner, 254. See also Brownlie, Principles, 655-656; Weis, 137. 
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defined under the law, is a good idea.1670 Who is the appropriate government authority for 
determining when such connections between nomads and land become suitable grounds 
for recognizing a “link” for the purposes of nationality? Using alternative evidence to prove 
residence also raises the question of discrimination, as any system tailored towards 
nomads’ risks placing nomads in a special category of persons that are treated differently 
from other residents. The question of discrimination against nomads by states will be 
discussed extensively in Pathway II.  
Establishing “Links” and the Burden of Proof 
The extent to which states have a burden to establish nomad residence is also somewhat 
unclear. For example, the Council of Europe Recommendation 83(1) requires states to 
“facilitate” the establishment of residence for nomads.1671 The Recommendation goes on to 
say, however, that, 
where the link of a nomad with a given state has been established in accordance 
with principle No. 2 above, this state should take appropriate measures in order 
to permit him to reside on its territory, to travel abroad and to return to its 
territory.1672 
In Anudo Ochieng Anudo v. Tanzania, the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights 
recently mandated that in the African context, the burden is on the state to disprove 
nationality for persons who have documents to prove nationality in the predecessor 
state.1673 The recent Draft Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples Rights on 
the Specific Aspects of the Right to a Nationality and the Eradication of Statelessness in 
Africa suggests that; “(t)he duty to ‘facilitate’ acquisition of nationality is a term used in 
other international treaties that involves at least making such acquisition significantly 
easier than for foreigners generally, for example by reaching out to communities known to 
be lacking documentation of nationality, by providing a non-discretionary process of 
acquisition, such as those known in different countries as declaration, registration or 
option, or by reducing the period of residence required.”1674 The Draft Protocol also 
suggests that states take into account oral testimony in determining nomad “links”. 
International treaties could do more to mandate states parties to accept non-documentary 
forms of proof to establish residence, including oral testimony, family records and the 
 
1670 See Costamanga, 46. See also the section on definitions in Part 1, above. 
1671 Council of Europe Recommendation 83(1) principle 2. 
1672 Council of Europe Recommendation 83(1) principle 3. 
1673 See generally B. Manby, ‘Case Note: Anudo Ochieng Anudo v. Tanzania (Judgement) (African Court on 
Human and Peoples’ Rights, APP No. 012/2015, 22 March 2018)’ 1 Statelessness and Citizenship Review 170 
(2019). 
1674 Draft Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights on the Specific Aspects of the Right to 
a Nationality and the Eradication of Statelessness in Africa: Explanatory Memorandum (2018) para. 48. 
326 
 
historical or present-day use of wells and moorage points, though doing so may not resolve 
the question of residence. Such alternative proofs might also include the recognition of pre-
colonial land arrangements, trade agreements, payment under traditional tax systems and 
genealogies, though the necessity of establishing a single point of residence may continue 
to be a barrier for nomads. Nevertheless, it would be good for international soft law and 
legal experts to engage more systematically on this topic, perhaps in consultation with 
nomad leaders. The 2007 Segovia Declaration of Nomadic and Transhumant Pastoralists, 
first mentioned in the Introduction, above, calls for the recognition of pastoral land 
ownership, a potentially key step in helping to prove pastoral residence. The problem of 
establishing nomad residence, therefore, is linked to the question of nomad land 
ownership, discussed extensively in Part 2, above. 
Experts continue to come up with new ways for nomads to prove land ownership, methods 
which may provide nomads with a firmer footing to establish their residence for the 
purpose of nationality. In a recent paper, Jérémie Gilbert and Ben Begbie-Clench argue that 
a different system of proving land ownership, one they call “mapping,” may be used by 
courts to establish land ownership for nomads.1675 In some court cases, like a recent case in 
Sarawak, courts have rejected such efforts as unofficial, but in others, such testimony has 
been accepted.1676  
The Segovia Declaration of Nomadic and Transhumant Pastoralists calls for the recognition 
of, and compensation for, pastoral ownership and loss of land. Such recognition could also 
be used to establish nomad “links” to the territory of the state for the purposes of proving 
nationality based on residence. Yet, reliance on proof of land ownership to prove 
nationality may create a dangerous cycle for nomads, privileging land owners over non-
owners and further politicizing both the question of nomad nationality and the question of 
nomad land ownership. Only intensive consultations with nomad communities can thread 
this needle. 
All of the above risks predicating nationality too much on nomads’ land claims and land 
use. Given that statelessness is a human rights violation, the fact that the Bedouin, the 
Tuareg and the Sama Dilaut have been present as communities in their regions for 
centuries or longer renders an individualistic focus on water points and place of birth 
somewhat bizarre. A more reasonable standard would be to apply a presumption of 
nationality to all members of a nomadic community with a pre-colonial presence in a 
certain region who are recognized as members by that community, through whatever 
internal process that communities has or creates, based on a set of stringent principles and 
subject to a due, transparent and deliberative process.  
Inspiration could be taken from the French principle of possession d’état de national, or the 
idea that a community who prior to colonization had always held themselves out as 
nationals and been treated as such by their community should be granted state nationality, 
 
1675 Gilbert and Begbie-Clench, 2018, 9-11 citing a case over land ownership brought by the Batwa in Uganda. 
1676 Gilbert and Begbie-Clench, 2018, 20.  
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perhaps based on an agreement between the nomadic community and the state.1677 If a 
nomadic individual is accepted by his or her community as a member of that community, 
nationality is automatically granted by the state. Under this system, civil registration by the 
state would no longer be needed; validation by nomadic leaders would be enough to confer 
nationality. This system would predicate nationality in a state on nomadic forms of 
belonging. 
Of particular importance is the question of colonial-era documents. International law does 
not provide any guidance as to how colonial-era documents that did not explicitly establish 
nationality were to be used, if at all, in helping nationality to “roll over” at 
independence.1678 Even if other types of colonial documents were to be accepted as 
evidence of colonial-era nationality, which colonial era documents should be used? What, 
for example, is the role of British Protected Persons passports? What about persons whose 
names appear in colonial-era registries, or who hold colonial-era land title documents, or 
membership in colonial organizations? Might such documents be used as evidence of 
probable colonial-era nationality in a place like the former French Soudan, where the 
intention of the colonial government was to establish a universal nationality? 
The Role of Regional and Bilateral Treaties in Resolving Statelessness Resulting from 
Decolonization 
States, through treaty norms, could also take a more pro-active role in mandating treaties 
to resolve statelessness resulting from decolonization and other historical cases of 
succession.1679 It is interesting to contemplate the potential role of UNHCR, as the 
mandated agency for the Statelessness Conventions, in drafting model procedures for 
resolving statelessness originating from the decolonization process. A Memorandum of 
Understanding has been signed by Malaysia, Indonesia and the Philippines to look into the 
matter of cross-border statelessness has been reported in the press.1680 Increasingly, 
regional organizations have been exploring the use of tripartite agreements and regional 
action plans to resolve statelessness in such cases, though many of these agreements fall 
short of directly addressing the problem of disputed and contested nationality of groups 
that straddle borders, including nomads.1681 Most rely on the implementation of national 
action plans and the focus of these efforts remains individualized at the nation-state level.  
The Banjul Plan of Action for the ECOWAS system, of which Mali is a member, does contain 
clauses pertaining to the nationality status of persons living in disputed border regions and 
 
1677 Manby, Citizenship, 2018, 13. This concept is discussed in the Tuareg sections in Part 2. 
1678 See for example the discussion in Crawford, 264. 
1679 Batchelor, Statelessness, 1998, 156, 168-169. See also Conklin, 19; Costamanga, 44. 
1680 Star Online ‘Malaysia, Indonesia to tackle Sabah stateless issue’ (24 Apr 2019). 
1681 See for example the Action Plan of the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR) on the 
Eradication of Statelessness 2017-2019 and the Banjul Plan of Action of the Economic Community of West 
African States (ECOWAS) on the Eradication of Statelessness 2017 – 2024. 
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those who became stateless as a result of the succession of states.1682 Such clauses may 
represent the first steps towards a negotiated regional solution for nomads in border zones 
like the Tuareg (though in the case of the Tuareg, neither Libya nor Algeria are members of 
ECOWAS). 
Dual Nationality 
As mentioned above, dual nationality may have been a solution for some nomads during 
decolonization, particularly those in border zones. As Rubenstein and Lenagh-Magquire 
note, the Nottebohm case served as an important touchstone in the debate over the legality 
of dual nationality.1683 The ongoing debate shows the enduring quality of the concept of 
exclusivity as a central component of nationality, a concept that, it is argued, strongly 
affected the ability of nomads to claim nationality at decolonization, when their loyalty to a 
single state was often questioned. 
The issue of dual allegiance, or dual nationality, continues to be contentious in modern law, 
though there has been some acceptance of it by states.1684 Paul Weis considered dual 
nationality to be a conflict of laws and a “problem.”1685 The level of acceptance by states of 
dual nationality today could perhaps be best characterized as ranging from toleration to 
hostility. As a reflection of this, early attempts to codify rules on nationality often adopted a 
conservative approach to dual nationality. For example, the 1930 Hague Convention on 
Certain Questions relating to the Conflict of Nationality Laws codifies the general principles 
in cases where dual nationality is allowed,1686 but the Convention falls well short of 
establishing a right to dual nationality and, indeed, one of the goals of the Convention was 
to reduce dual nationality. The Draft Articles on nationality of natural persons in relation to 
the succession of States of 1999 also adopted the position that dual nationality on a large 
 
1682 “Establish a committee consisting of representatives from ECOWAS, and respective states to confirm the 
nationality of affected populations living in border / disputed areas with the support of UNHCR.” Economic 
Community of West African States (ECOWAS), Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) Plan of 
Action on Eradication of Statelessness, 2017 – 2024, 2017 (Banjul Plan of Action) Objective 5.3. 
1683 K. Rubenstein and N. Lenagh-Maguire, ‘More or less secure? Nation laity questions, deportation and dual 
nationality’ in A. Edwards and L. van Waas (eds.) Nationality and Statelessness under International Law 
(Cambridge 2014) 266-269 (hereinafter Rubenstein and Lenagh-Maguire). 
1684 “Historically, exclusivity has been an essential characteristic of nationality.” (The authors note the 
continuing problem with determining an individual’s “own country.") Rubinstein and Lenagh-Magquire, 270-
271. See also generally P. Spiro, At Home in Two Countries: The Past and Future of Dual Citizenship (New York 
U. 2016); Brownlie, Principles, 389. As Van Ert notes, the matter of dual nationality in cases of the succession 
of states remains unsettled. “Attempts are being made to settle this area of law.” Van Ert, 152. See also L. J. 
van der Baaren, Emigrant nationality. A comparative analysis of the toleration of dual nationality from an 
emigrant perspective (PhD Maastricht 2020). 
1685 Weis, 170. 
1686 Hague Convention on Certain Questions relating to the Conflict of Nationality Laws (1930) Art. 3. See also 
Weis, 186. 
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scale is not something that international law wishes to promote.1687 While dual nationality 
is not prohibited by the Draft Articles,1688 it is not offered as a potential solution to cases of 
contested nationality.1689 As a result, while the implementation of the Draft Articles during 
the decolonization process would have been greatly helpful to many nomads, much would 
have still been left up to the discretion of states. Most problematically, dual nationality is 
framed as something to be avoided, a position taken by the drafters that would have been 
extremely unhelpful to nomads. 
Historically, exclusivity has been an essential characteristic of nationality...(i)in 
the absence of any international legal mechanism to regulate nationality in a 
comprehensive way, dual nationality attracted various legal responses in the 
international and domestic spheres.1690 
Today, there is greater acceptance in international law for dual nationality, but more could 
be done to promote dual nationality as a solution to statelessness for nomads during state 
succession. It is worth noting, however, that dual nationality would not automatically 
provide a solution to the question of nomad land rights identified in Part 2. Nevertheless, it 
could form part of a solution were it to gain greater acceptance under international law. 
For example, the non-binding 2007 Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples states 
that indigenous peoples separated by borders have the right to “develop contacts" across 
borders, but does not mention dual nationality nor does it present dual nationality as a 
solution to the question of “which state” during a succession.1691 Even recent regional 
instruments fall short of actively promoting dual nationality.1692 Meanwhile, international 
law remains a long way from endorsing dual nationality or creating a right to dual 
nationality and many countries continue to outlaw it or do not recognize it, including 
Malaysia and Kuwait. 
While government hostility to dual nationality may, at first, seem unrelated to their 
hostility to nomadism, in actual fact, both hostilities stem from the traditional 
 
1687 Draft Articles Commentaries, Commentary (6), 28. 
1688 “The recognition of the possibility of multiple nationality resulting from a succession of States does not 
mean that the Commission intended to encourage a policy of dual or multiple nationality.  The draft articles in 
their entirety are completely neutral on this question, leaving it to the discretion of each and every State.” 
Draft Articles Commentary to Art. 1. 
1689 “When a person concerned who is qualified to acquire the nationality of a successor State has the 
nationality of another State concerned, the former State may make the attribution of its nationality dependent 
on the renunciation by such person of the nationality of the latter State.” Draft Articles Art. 9. 
1690 Rubinstein and Lenagh-Magquire, 265-266.  
1691 U.N. Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, The United Nations Declaration on the Rights of 
Indigenous Peoples, August 2013, HR/PUB/13/2, Art. 36. 
1692 Draft Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights on the Specific Aspects of the Right to 
a Nationality and the Eradication of Statelessness in Africa: Explanatory Memorandum (2018), discussing the 
increasing acceptance of dual nationality in Africa para. 77. 
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preoccupation in the European system of statehood with the concept of exclusivity, 
discussed above in Part 2, and a corresponding dislike of mobility. Dual nationality could 
have been part of a workable solution for many nomads during decolonization, but there is 
no evidence it was ever seriously entertained, not only by national governments, but by the 
international community.1693 In fact, the idea of granting the Tuareg nationalities in Algeria, 
Mali and Niger would probably have been seen not as a solution but as tantamount to 
creating an independent Tuareg state and a threat to regional security. 
Nevertheless, the provision of dual nationality today could potentially be part of a solution 
for nomads who straddle boarder regions and migrate across borders, and who therefore 
lack clearly exclusive ties to a single state. The idea of dual nationality as a solution to 
statelessness, rather than as a source of problems for state security, is not supported by 
states in international law in its current form. Rather, dual nationality continues to be 
framed as an unfortunate by product of the nation-state system, rather than a solution for 
populations, like nomads, who may have ties to multiple states.  
A grant of dual nationality could be part of a negotiated settlement between countries to 
help resolve tensions over the border and ensure the right to a nationality for cross-border 
groups like nomads. But this would require an enormous change of attitude on the part of 
such states regarding the purpose and structure of exclusive nationality and how it relates 
to allegiance, loyalty, national identity and other issues. Regional solutions are currently 
under discussion in West Africa under the auspicious of ECOWAS, which might be 
particularly relevant for Mali. In some cases, however, including Mali, the chance of a 
negotiated solution seem dim as disputed border areas remain a sense of great tension. 
Malaysia and the Philippines lack diplomatic relations, in large part because of disputes 
over their border. A negotiated agreement on dual nationality for border populations is 
therefore heavily reliant on a political solution. 
Arguably, not enough has been done at the international level to promote dual nationality 
as a solution for mobile and nomadic populations by highlighting dual nationality not 
simply as a problem for the nation-state system, but as a potential solution in tense border 
regions. For example, this dissertation was not able to uncover evidence that governments 
like Mali have even been asked by international organizations to consider dual nationality 
as part of negotiated peace agreements, for example.  
Conclusion 
Pathway I explored the right to a nationality at state succession as a solution to nomad 
statelessness and to prevent possible future statelessness. In addition to the general right 
to a nationality under international law, the 1961 Convention obligates states to prevent 
stateless resulting from state succession by treaty. Soft law has also added much specificity 
in the form of draft treaties and declarations. While the rules on succession of states under 
these instruments would have much to offer nomads with a nationality in their colonial 
states, the rules for establishing nationality for persons already stateless, or whose 
 
1693 Once again, more research on this point is needed. 
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nationality was simply unclear, are far less articulated even in soft law instruments. These 
gaps may have serious consequences for nomads in future cases of state succession as a 
result of the ongoing decolonization process, particularly nomads who live in what may 
become border zones. More could be done to articulate how a right of option would work 
for nomads and to guarantee that refugee communities benefit from this right. In 
particular, habitual residence, a key concept, is too vague even in soft law to properly guide 
states when it comes to establishing the nationality of nomads, though as Spiro points out, 
it may become more accepted as a grounds for granting nationality in the future.1694  
While more recent draft laws have attempted to come up with more precise definitions of 
habitual residence for nomads, a lot more could be done to clarify to meaning of this term 
and to move beyond a western-centric conception of how “links” between persons and 
states are formed. In particular, habitual residence is often treated as occurring in only one 
location, a problem for nomadic and mobile peoples. As a result, it is not clear that even soft 
law contains enough specificity to truly resolve the problem.  
States, through treaty norms, could promote the use of alternative methods of proof of 
“links” between states and nomads, such as oral testimony, and revisit the relevance of 
colonial era documents and records. Archives might prove a fruitful place to begin 
constructing a history of nomad residence, alongside oral histories, cultural practices and 
other sources of information that establish residence on a group basis. A holistic approach 
might be necessary to establish long term nomad residence, though it remains an open 
question as to whether or not special rules for nomads in the establishment of nationality 
poses a risk to nomads. Placing questions of belonging in the hands of nomad communities 
might be another approach. The value of such approaches, however, remains debatable. 
One unexplored solution for many nomads would be the right to dual, or even multiple, 
nationality. At the moment, a historical predilection for exclusive allegiance has done much 
to harm nomad inclusion. Such a solution could have been offered at the time of 
decolonization, but it could also be used today. 
Finally, Pathway I explored the role of treaties under international law in establishing 
nationality as a result of historical state succession. The 1961 Convention supports treaties 
at the time of succession to resolve questions of nationality, but there is no clear 
mechanism for resolving unclear nationality status retroactively. International law, 
however, could do more to mandate bilateral, tripartite or regional cooperation today as a 
means to resolving statelessness resulting from historical cases of succession.  
As mentioned above, discrimination is prohibited in the rolling over of nationality at state 
succession, yet the laws of state succession are less specific about prohibiting 
discrimination against persons who are already stateless or whose nationality is unclear at 
the time of state succession. The next section will look at to what extent international law 
prohibits discrimination against nomads in the granting of nationality to see if anti-
 
1694 P. Spiro, ‘A New International Law of Citizenship’ 105 American Journal of International Law 694 (2011). 
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discrimination laws, if applied to cases of nomad exclusion during decolonization, could 
have helped stateless nomads to challenge their continued exclusion. 
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Pathway II: Prohibiting Discrimination against Nomads in the Application of 
Nationality 
Rules which appear to apply equally...may, on closer examination, disadvantage 
stateless children and so amount to indirect discrimination.1695 
The examples showed that discrimination, defined as “(t)reating one or more members of a 
specified group unfairly as compared with other people”,1696 clearly played a role in the 
failure of post-colonial governments to register nomads during decolonization. This 
occurred despite the fact that the nationality laws in Kuwait, Mali and Malaysia were non-
discriminatory on their face. In part, as the examples showed, this discrimination resulted 
from the structure of European nationality itself, which required settlement in territory to 
establish residence and a binary choice between discrete nation states. As well, the “broad 
discretion" given to post-colonial administrators in determining nationality left room for 
discrimination.1697 In some cases, discrimination was the result of the deliberate exclusion 
of nomadic groups based on their history and culture of nomadism.  
As the example of Kuwait demonstrated, discrimination against nomadism played a role 
both in the granting of a lesser nationality status to mobile Bedouin tribes in general and in 
the prioritization of certain Bedouin clans over others. It played a role in the targeting of 
the Tuareg as a security threat and a threat to the integrity of Mali’s northern border. And it 
might have also played a role in the exclusion of nomadic Sama Dilaut from registration, 
though this is less clearly established by the review of literature in this dissertation.  
The examples also demonstrated how discrimination continues to play a role in 
government policy towards nomads, as governments branded nomads as de facto 
criminals, non-nationals and threats to security. Statelessness itself has now become 
grounds for the further marginalization of nomads and experts on statelessness have noted 
that discrimination based on “nomadic lifestyles" plays a role in causing the statelessness 
of nomads.1698  
Given that discrimination was a cause of nomad statelessness, can international law offer a 
solution? Pathway II will examine the international legal framework against discrimination 
in the granting of nationality and if this framework can offer a solution to nomads. First, 
Pathway II will summarize the international law relating to discrimination. Then, it will 
look at the extent to which discrimination against nomads occurred. Finally, it will look at 
the grounds upon which discrimination occurred and examine to what extent 
 
1695 De Chickera and Whiteman, 100. 
1696 This definition is taken from the Oxford Reference Dictionary at 
https://www.oxfordreference.com/view/10.1093/oi/authority.20110803095721450 
1697 De Chickera and Whiteman, 104. 
1698 De Chickera and Whiteman, 103-104. 
334 
 
discrimination against nomadism as a cultural practice is prohibited under international 
law.  
 
The International and Regional Laws Prohibiting Discrimination in the Granting of Nationality  
Non-discrimination has long been a founding principle of human rights law. International 
law expressly prohibits discrimination in the granting and withdrawal of nationality for 
enumerated reasons, in particular, that of race, ethnicity, religion, disability and gender or 
other status.1699 Relevant instruments, some of which have been mentioned above in the 
introduction to Part 3 and in Pathway I, include the Charter of the United Nations,1700 the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights, the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and the 
International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination.  
Other laws that establish the principle of non-discrimination include the ILO Convention 
concerning Discrimination in Respect of Employment and Occupation No. 111 of 1958,1701 
the UNESCO Convention against Discrimination in Education of 1960,1702 the UNESCO 
Declaration on Race and Racial Prejudice of 1978,1703 and UN declarations such as the UN 
Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance and of Discrimination based on 
Religion or Belief of 1981.1704 Non-discrimination is a founding principle of the Convention 
on the Rights of the Child in Article 2. It is also a principle of Article 5 of the Convention on 
the Rights of Persons with Disabilities1705 and the indigenous rights framework, primarily 
 
1699 Human Rights Council, Thirty-first session, Impact of the arbitrary deprivation of nationality on the 
enjoyment of the rights of children concerned, and existing laws and practices on accessibility for children to 
acquire nationality, inter alia, of the country in which they are born, if they otherwise would be stateless, 
Report of the Secretary-General, A/HRC/31/29 4. See also Human Rights Council Nineteenth session, Human 
rights and arbitrary deprivation of nationality, Report of the Secretary-General, A/HRC/19/43 (December 
2011). See also the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Art. 2 
1700 United Nations, Charter of the United Nations, 24 October 1945, 1 UNTS XVI. 
1701 International Labor Organization, Discrimination (Employment and Occupation) Convention, 1958 (No. 
111), with 175 ratifications. 
1702 United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, Convention against Discrimination in 
Education 1960, Paris, 14 December 1960. 
1703 United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, Declaration on Race and Racial 
Prejudice, 27 November 1978. 
1704 United Nations, Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance and of Discrimination Based 
on Religion or Belief, General Assembly resolution 36/55 of 25 November 1981. 
1705 United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, New York, 13 December 2006, 3 
May 2008, No. 44910 with 182 parties. 
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ILO Convention 1691706 and the 2007 Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, Arts. 
15 and 22, discussed above in the introduction to Part 3. 
Several international treaties expressly prohibit discrimination in the granting of 
nationality. The International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial 
Discrimination guarantees a right to a nationality without racial prejudice in Article 5, 
though Article 1, paragraph 2 carefully preserves states’ rights to set nationality law.1707 
Non-discrimination on racial grounds expressly extends to non-citizens.1708 Nevertheless, 
(a)rticle 1, paragraph 2, must be construed so as to avoid undermining the basic 
prohibition of discrimination; hence, it should not be interpreted to detract in any 
way from the rights and freedoms recognized and enunciated in particular in the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the International Covenant on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights.1709 
The 1961 Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness prohibits the withdrawal of 
nationality for reasons of race, ethnicity, religion or on political grounds. Gender 
discrimination in nationality law is prohibited by the 1957 Convention on the Nationality of 
Married Women and the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination 
Against Women, which in Article 9 guarantees women equal rights with men in obtaining 
and maintaining their nationality, as well as passing it to their children.1710 The Convention 
on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities in Article 18 guarantees the right to a nationality 
without discrimination based on disability and mandate that states provide for “reasonable 
accommodation” to disabled persons.  
 
1706 International Labour Organization, Convention (No. 169) concerning indigenous and tribal peoples in 
independent countries, Geneva, 27/06/1989, with 23 ratifications. 
1707 See also Interights, ‘Non-Discrimination in International Law: A Handbook for Practitioners’ (2011) and 
the High Commissioner for Human Rights, ‘Minority Rights: International Standards and Guidance for 
Implementation’ (2010). See also R. Govil and A. Edwards, ‘Women, Nationality and Statelessness: The 
Problem of Unequal Rights’ in Institute on Statelessness and Inclusion, The World’s Stateless: Children 169. See 
also Van Waas, Nationality, 59; Edwards, 25. 
1708 The Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, Sixty-fifth session (2005), General 
recommendation XXX on discrimination against non-citizens. 
1709 Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, General Recommendation 30, Discrimination 
against Non-citizens (Sixty-fourth session, 2004), U.N. Doc. CERD/C/64/Misc.11/rev.3 (2004). 
1710 Prohibitions on discrimination in the granting of nationality for reasons of gender are also supported by 
resolutions of the UN Human Rights Council. Human Rights Council, Thirty-second session, Resolution 
adopted by the Human Rights Council on 30 June 2016, A/HRC/RES/32/5 (15 July 2016). See also Human 
Rights Council, Twenty-third session, ‘Report on discrimination against women on nationality-related 
matters, including the impact on children’ A/HRC/23/23 (15 March 2013). 
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Non-discrimination is a founding principle of international law when it comes to both law 
and practice. Under international law, discrimination in both purpose and effect is 
prohibited. 
While  these  conventions  deal  only  with  cases  of  discrimination  on  
specific  grounds,  the  Committee  believes  that  the  term  ‘discrimination’  
as  used  in  the  Covenant  should  be  understood  to  imply  any  distinction,  
exclusion,  restriction  or  preference which is based on any ground such as 
race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or 
social origin, property, birth or other status, and which has the purpose or 
effect of nullifying or impairing the recognition, enjoyment or exercise by all 
persons, on an equal footing, of all rights and freedoms.1711 
Not only may a law violate the norm of non-discrimination on its face, but facially neutral 
laws may be applied in discriminatory ways. Discrimination in the application of law may 
take place at the national, regional or local level. It may be committed by all organs of 
government, including the police, courts, government agencies and others. 
Non-discrimination is also central to regional human rights law. It is contained within the 
African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child, to which Mali is a party, as well as 
the Arab Charter on Human Rights, to which Kuwait is a party.1712 Regional human rights 
courts, including the European Court of Human Rights, the Inter-American Court of Human 
Rights and the African Commission and African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights, have 
handed down decisions on discrimination in the application of nationality, which will be 
discussed below.1713 Non-discrimination in the granting and withdrawal of nationality has 
been claimed before regional courts and treaty bodies with some success. Litigation can be 
a particularly effective tool in pressuring states to resolve cases of discrimination.1714  
Many experts consider the principle of non-discrimination to be jus cogens.1715 
Additionally, Kuwait, Mali and Malaysia are parties to several of the binding conventions 
mentioned above, including the Convention on the Rights of the Child.1716 Malaysia also 
ratified the Child Act of 2001, however, where it noted its reservation to Article 7 on the 
right to a nationality in the Convention on the Rights of the Child. Kuwait and Mali are also 
 
1711 UN Human Rights Committee (HRC), CCPR General Comment No. 18: Non-discrimination (10 November 
1989) (my italics). 
1712 League of Arab States, Arab Charter on Human Rights (22 May 2004), reprinted in 12 Int’l Hum. Rts. Rep. 
893 (2005), entered into force March 15, 2008. Additional information on the specific treaty obligations of 
Kuwait, Mali and Malaysia is available above in the section on the international laws of nationality. 
1713 See for example the European Court of Human rights, K2 v. United Kingdom 42387 (2017). 
1714 See generally L. Bingham and L. Gamboa, ‘Litigating Against Statelessness’ in L. van Waas and M. Khanna, 
Solving Statelessness (Wolf LP 2016). 
1715 Report of the International Law Commission, Sixty-sixth session, A/69/10 (2014). 
1716 See the above section on the international obligations of Kuwait, Mali and Malaysia. 
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parties to the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial 
Discrimination, though notably, Malaysia is not.1717 Mali is also a party to the International 
Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of their 
Families, though Malaysia and Kuwait are not. Given the strength of support for non-
discrimination, would international law, if applied to nomads in Kuwait, Mali and Malaysia 
at decolonization, have assisted nomads to register as nationals? Could these laws provide 
them with a means to challenge their statelessness today? 
 
Applying the International Protections Against Discrimination to Nomads 
(E)xclusion is often experienced in newly independent States that define 
citizenship in a manner that excludes persons belonging to certain minority 
groups who are considered as ‘outsiders’ despite long-standing ties to the 
territory of the new State.1718 
Nomads suffered from severe discrimination during the colonial period and post-colonial 
period in Kuwait, Mali and Malaysia. Nomads continue to suffer from discrimination to the 
present day. This discrimination has taken many forms. Colonial administrators used 
registration and forced settlement as forms of coercive assimilation. Colonial borders split 
nomadic communities, entrenching their status as minorities that were outnumbered and 
dominated by settled communities.1719 As a result, nomadic communities entered the post-
colonial period as minorities and wary of government registration. Nomads ended up with 
ties to multiple states, making it more difficult to establish their loyalty and belonging in 
the rush to register nationality that followed political independence. A lack of civil 
registration, particularly in rural areas, left nomads without a way to prove their residence 
or place of birth. 
Discrimination against nomads would only continue into the post-colonial period, including 
in the granting of nationality. While some nationality laws, like that of Mali, contained 
explicitly, racially discriminatory language, there is no evidence these clauses were used to 
exclude specific ethnic groups within Mali. Instead, as Part 2 discussed, many post-colonial 
nationality laws appeared neutral on their face when it came to nomads, but these laws 
reflected a systemic bias against mobility and nomadism inherent in nationality law. This 
bias made it difficult for nomads to access at nationality. For example, a reliance on 
habitual residence in granting nationality during a succession of states is permissible under 
 
1717 International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, 21 December 1965, 
United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 660, 195 ratified by Kuwait 15 October 1968, by Mali, 16 July 1974. 
1718 OHCHR, ‘Fact Sheet No.18 (Rev.1),’ Minority Rights 4-6. 
1719 Nomads are not always in the minority in all parts of the world, as the example of Mongolia shows. Even 
today, one fourth of the population of Mongolia remains nomadic. The government has instituted a number of 
programs to support nomadism in Mongolia, which is seen as an important part of the country’s heritage.  
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international law, as Pathway I discussed. Yet, habitual residence, as Part 2 showed, may be 
especially difficult for nomads to establish.  
In addition, as Part 2 showed, nationality laws were often applied in a discriminatory way. 
While in Mali, as Part 2 showed, there is evidence that some Tuareg may have rejected 
Malian nationality, many others appear to have never had the opportunity to register due 
to the military crackdown and armed conflict in their region. While some Tuareg leaders 
resisted joining Mali, promises of an independent state by the former colonial power did 
not come to fruition. Instead, the Tuareg found themselves being administered by a 
military government with little interest in civil registration. Rather than reach out to 
nomadic communities to make sure they were included in registration exercises, some 
post-colonial governments, like that of Kuwait, actively prevented nomads from registering 
as nationals and took advantage of many Bedouins’ feelings of ambivalence about 
registering as Kuwaiti nationals. In other cases, like Malaysia, governments failed to reach 
out to nomads, who were seen as unsuitable for nationality, even as they registered 
sedentary members of the same community. No effort was made to present the Sama Dilaut 
with an informed choice about the availability of Malaysian nationality and to what extent 
registering with the state would remain open to them in the future. 
Successive governments in Kuwait, Mali and Malaysia came to view stateless nomads as 
security threats, terrorists or criminals, while settled communities were not treated in this 
way. Nomads were sometimes placed under military, rather than civilian rule, or their 
territories were administered by the military, further restricting their access to civil 
government and, as a result, civil registration. As Part 2 demonstrated, while many nomads 
did not see the importance of registering as nationals in the immediate post-colonial 
period, their descendants sometimes attempted to rectify this problem but found 
themselves locked out by the introduction of strict jus sanguinis nationality laws or by 
limitations on naturalizations and other restrictions. 
Intent on promoting nationality unity, governments pushed to settle nomads and 
assimilate them into the majority population, or to further isolate and exclude them. Places 
to register were located in distant, urban areas and nomad forms of belonging were 
ignored in favour of a system based on documents. The statelessness of many nomadic 
families became entrenched and inter-generational as governments moved nomads off of 
valuable lands containing oil and natural resources. As a result, nomads, often more than 
other groups, were targeted for forced removal from their lands, worsening nomad-
government relations.  
Coercive settlement policies decimated nomadic populations, further reducing them to 
minority status. While not tied to nationality on their face, coercive settlement policies and 
removal from land often went hand-in-hand with civil registration, placing nomadic 
communities in an impossible position and linking nationality to assimilation.  
Is such discrimination against nomads and mobile groups prohibited by states in 
international law and/or regional law? It is hard to charge individual states with 
discrimination against nomads given the systemic bias against mobility in nationality law. 
It is the purpose of nationality laws to draw a distinction between an in-group and an out-
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group.1720 Drawing distinctions between foreigners and nationals is considered to be a 
permissible function of nationality and, in fact, is one of the principle functions of 
nationality. It is not required under international law that states grant a nationality to 
immigrants,1721 only that they apply immigration laws without discrimination on the basis 
of other grounds, such as race. The grounds on which distinctions are drawn are therefore 
critically important to determining when a violation of international law has occurred. The 
next sections will examine to what extent nomads were discriminated against in the 
application of nationality on grounds that are not permissible under international law. 
Discrimination Against Nomads Based on Race, Ethnicity, National Origins and Historical 
Migration 
The power to exclude foreigners as a class of people is not prohibited by states in 
international law, unless such exclusion is discriminatory because it is on account of 
certain prohibited grounds like race.1722 The United Nations Human Rights Council has 
specified that failure to grant nationality to a child for reasons of discrimination based on 
“race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national, ethnic or social 
origin, property, disability, birth or other status” amounts to an arbitrary deprivation of 
nationality.1723  
Regional courts and commission have given guidance on how treaties prohibiting 
discrimination should be applied to individual cases. In IHRDA v. Mauritania, the African 
Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights held that illegal, racial discrimination was the 
cause of the denationalization and expulsion of black Mauritanians from Mauritania that 
began in 1989 under a racially targeted program of “Arabization”.1724 Such expressly racial 
 
1720 As Van Waas puts it, an important function of nationality is to decide, “...who is ‘us’ and who is ‘them’..." 
Van Waas, Nationality, 2008, 31. See also E. Isin and P. Nyers, who call it “inside/outside logic.” Isin and Nyers, 
2014, 4. For a detailed discussion of nationality’s innately discriminatory purpose, see also Habermas, 107; 
Crawford, 263. 
1721 Except in limited humanitarian circumstances, such as by providing a pathway to nationality for refugees 
under the 1951 Refugee Convention. 
1722 UN Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (CERD), CERD General Recommendation XXX 
on Discrimination Against Non-Citizens, (1 October 2002). 
1723 Human Rights Council, Thirty-first session, ‘Impact of the arbitrary deprivation of nationality on the 
enjoyment of the rights of children concerned, and existing laws and practices on accessibility for children to 
acquire nationality, inter alia, of the country in which they are born, if they otherwise would be stateless’ 
A/HRC/31/29 (16 December 2015) 3. See also Brownlie, Principles, 384. 
1724 IHRDA v. Mauritania, African commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights (May 11, 2000). In 2006, 
applicants filed a case before the European Court of Human Rights arguing that the removal of at least 18,000 
ethnic non-Slovenians from the civil registry, including many Roma, was discriminatory under Article 14 of 
the European Convention. The Court applied other legal grounds and did not make a finding on the 
discrimination claim. Case of Kurić and Others v. Slovenia, third section, European Court of Human Rights (13 
July 2010) 80-82. 
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grounds for failing to grant a group of nationality is clearly prohibited under international 
law.  
Indirect, or de facto, racial discrimination is also prohibited: 
The Special Rapporteur would like to highlight that the prohibition on racial 
discrimination in international human rights law aims at much more than a formal 
vision of equality. Equality in the international human rights framework is 
substantive, and requires States to take action to combat intentional or purposeful 
racial discrimination, as well as to combat de facto or unintentional racial 
discrimination.1725 
Regional courts have also established that discrimination in the granting and withdrawal of 
nationality is prohibited on the grounds of national origins. In Yean and Bosico v. Dominican 
Republic, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights clarified that national origins cannot 
be grounds for discrimination in the granting of nationality. The case concerned the 
Dominican Republic, a country that follows jus soli. The Inter-American Court of Human 
Rights addressed the issue of withdrawal of nationality from persons of Haitian descent 
whom the government had labelled as being the descendants of “transients” not 
permanently settled in the Dominican Republic, despite being born there.1726 This case 
dealt with both ethnic and racial discrimination, but also discrimination based on national 
origins. 
The Inter-American Commission had previously argued that the government had violated 
the jus soli provision of its own Constitution by denying birth certificates to qualifying 
children born in the territory of the state for improperly discriminatory reasons based on 
race.1727 The Court argued that migratory status of one’s parents or grandparents can never 
be a condition of nationality in a jus soli country.1728 It therefore concluded that the law was 
discriminatory on the basis of national origins. 
In 2011, the issue of discriminatory nationality laws for reasons of national origins and 
ethnicity was also adjudicated by the African Committee of Experts and the Rights and 
Welfare of the Child, the treaty body for the African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of 
the Child.1729 Nubians in Kenya were brought to the country by the British during the 
colonial period. Because the government had decided that children of Nubian descent in 
Kenya did not have an “ancestral homeland” in Kenya, they were deemed to not qualify as 
 
1725 Human Rights Council, Thirty-eighth session ‘Report of the Special Rapporteur on contemporary forms of 
racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia and related intolerance’ (18 June – 6 July 2018) 6. 
1726 Jean and Bosico. The case dealt with the refusal of the government of the Dominican Republic to issue 
birth certificates to certain children based on their national origin. 
1727 Jean and Bosico, paras. 111 and 112. 
1728 Jean and Bosico, para. 156. 
1729 See generally Nubian Children. 
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Kenyan nationals.1730 This case turned on the use of nationality to exclude an ethnic group 
that was claimed to be an immigrant group by the Kenyan government, despite being long 
settled in Kenya since prior to decolonization.  
In this case, the government clearly pushed for a definition of nationality based on a 
combination of ethnic grounds and national origins. The Committee, however, rejected the 
argument that discrimination on the basis of ethnicity and national origins is permissible 
under regional human rights law and found instead that discrimination against children of 
Nubian descent clearly violated their human rights. The migration history of the ancestors 
of the Nubian population was not enough to justify the continued denial of nationality. In 
short, the historical migrations of a community going back several generations were simply 
irrelevant to their current nationality status.  
How might this case be applied to nomads? Under this case, discrimination in the granting 
of nationality in jus sanguinis countries is impermissible when done on grounds of ethnicity 
and/or historic migration to the region, where the migration stretched back to colonial or 
pre-colonial times. Importantly, however, the non-nationals in this case were long settled 
in the territory of the state, not practicing a mobile, cross-border lifestyle.  
It is unacceptable to describe the alleged victims in this case as foreigners in transit, 
since those who live for 10, 15 or more years in a country cannot be described as 
transients.1731  
In Nubian Children before the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights, also discussed 
above, the Nubian population in Kenya is clearly and indisputably long settled in Kenya, not 
migrating across an international border. Beyond the vulnerability of cross-border 
populations, even former nomads may find it difficult to prove their long-standing 
settlement in the area. As well, labelling nomads as historical migrants or persons of a 
different national origin risks reinforcing the idea that nomads are immigrants who lack 
long-standing ties to the territories in which they now live, reinforcing government 
arguments in favour of their exclusion and the seizure of their lands. 
How might these cases be applied to nomads? Classifying nomads as racial or ethnic 
minorities may be appropriate in some contexts but not in others, depending on the group 
and the circumstances. As Part I showed, the concept of nomads as separate, distinct races 
or ethnicities was a colonial construction. This is not to say that discrimination against 
nomads as a perceived race or ethnicity is never useful, rather that classifying nomads as 
separate ethnicities or races may not be universally accepted and may continue to impose 
an external world-view on them. Also, it can be difficult to link the supposed race or 
ethnicity of nomads, or their language or religion, to their statelessness because, as Part 2, 
it is the practice of nomadism, more than any other factor, that has led to discrimination in 
the granting of nationality by states. While race, ethnicity, language and religion may all be 
factors contributing to discrimination against nomads, particularly as part of an 
 
1730 Nubian Children, para. 3. 
1731 Jean and Bosico, 111. 
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intersectional approach,1732 the centrality of discrimination against mobility and nomadism 
as a way of life cannot and should not be overlooked. 
Meanwhile, classifying nomads as “historical migrants” is also problematic as it implies that 
nomads are from somewhere else, a claim that many states have used to justify persecution 
of nomads and their removal from their lands. Such a “solution” therefore risks entrenching 
anti-nomad bias, rather than supporting nomad rights. Furthermore, Jean and Bosico 
reaffirms the principle under international law that nationality is tied to residence and 
settlement, a principle that may be challenging for nomads who wish to continue practicing 
a mobile lifestyle, particularly a cross-border mobile lifestyle. Because nationality is tied to 
settlement and long-term residence, the international and regional laws of nationality 
appear themselves to reinforce discrimination against mobility and nomadism. Labelling 
nomads as historical migrants or persons of different national origins risks entrenching, 
rather than solving, their exclusion. 
What emerged most clearly from the analysis of the root causes of nomad statelessness is 
the centrality of discrimination against nomadism and mobility as a way of life and cultural 
practice in the three examples discussed above, yet nomadism is not articulated as one of 
the grounds for protection from discrimination under international law. Discrimination 
against nomadism is therefore often the central factor in nomad statelessness, though 
other factors like ethnicity and religion play an important role. The question then becomes 
whether or not discrimination in nationality law based primarily the practice of a mobile 
lifestyle, particularly a cross-border mobile lifestyle, might be inferred under international 
law? This question is particularly thorny, as was highlighted above, because of the systemic 
bias against mobility and, by extension, nomadism that is baked into nationality law, even 
at the international level. 
Discrimination on the Grounds of Minority Status 
Non-discrimination in international law is also closely tied to minority rights. Under the 
non-binding United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National or 
Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities, minority status may be protected on grounds of 
nationality, ethnicity, culture, religion or language.1733 Discrimination frequently targets 
minorities and, as Part 2 discussed, many nomads now find themselves as ethnic, religious, 
or linguistic minorities in every state in which they live. They are also minorities based on 
their nomadic lifestyle. 
 
1732 Human Rights Council, Thirty-eighth session ‘Report of the Special Rapporteur on contemporary forms of 
racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia and related intolerance’ (18 June – 6 July 2018) 9-12. 
1733 U.N. General Assembly, Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious 
and Linguistic Minorities, 3 February 1992, A/RES/47/135. 
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Minorities may be simply defined as “[a] group numerically inferior to the rest of the 
population of a State...”1734 or as, 
a non-dominant group of individuals who share certain national, ethnic, 
religious or linguistic characteristics which are different from those of the 
majority population.1735 
Under the 1992 United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National 
or Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities, minorities have the right to fully exercise 
their human rights and to practice their cultures, languages, religions, traditions and 
customs.1736 Particularly important for nomads, cross-border minorities have the right to 
participate in decision-making on both the national and regional level and maintain 
contacts with one another across borders. Minorities have the right to participate in public 
life. 
The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), binding on states, in 
Article 27 prohibits discrimination against ethnic, linguistic and religious minorities 
specifically in the practicing of those minorities’ cultures, languages and religions. As the 
Human Rights Council specified, 
The terms used in article 27 indicate that the persons designed to be 
protected are those who belong to a group and who share in common a 
culture, a religion and/or language. Those terms also indicate that the 
individuals designed to be protected need not be citizens of the State party... 
migrant workers or even visitors in a State party constituting such minorities 
are entitled not to be denied the exercise of those rights.1737 
In the context of discrimination, minority status is often based on a characteristic such as 
ethnicity, language or religion. Under Article 27 of the ICCPR, ethnic, linguistic and religious 
minorities have the right to practice their own culture, languages and religions. 
 
1734 Castellino and Doyle, 16, quoting F. Capotorti, Special Rapporteur, Study on the Rights of Persons 
Belonging to Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities, UN Doc E/CN.4/Sub.2/384/Rev.1 (1977). 
1735 OHCHR, Fact Sheet No.18 (Rev.1), Minority Rights. 
1736 U.N. General Assembly, Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious 
and Linguistic Minorities, 3 February 1992, A/RES/47/135, Art. 4. 
1737 Human Rights Committee general comment No. 23 (1994) on the rights of minorities, quoted in Note by 
the Secretary-General, Effective promotion of the Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National 
or Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities, A/74/160 (15 July 2019) 16. Minority may also be defined as 
“[a] group numerically inferior to the rest of the population of a State.” Castellino and Doyle, 16, quoting F. 
Capotorti, Special Rapporteur, Study on the Rights of Persons Belonging to Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic 
Minorities, UN Doc E/CN.4/Sub.2/384/Rev.1 (1977). 
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(A minority is a) non-dominant group of individuals who share certain 
national, ethnic, religious or linguistic characteristics which are different 
from those of the majority population.1738 
Also: 
An ethnic, religious or linguistic minority is any group of persons which 
constitutes less than half of the population in the entire territory of a State 
whose members share common characteristics of culture, religion or 
language, or a combination of any of these. A person can freely belong to an 
ethnic, religious or linguistic minority without any requirement of 
citizenship, residence, official recognition or any other status.1739 
Minority rights include special rights to protect against assimilation.1740 The 1992 
Declaration supports the rights of minorities to their own cultures.1741 As well, the ICCPR 
protects the rights of ethnic minorities to practice their cultures and minority status 
regularly is defined by, among other attributes, the practice of a common culture. It is less 
clear, however, to what extent minority rights protect the right to a nationality, the right to 
civil registration and protect against statelessness.  
As Part 2 discussed, many nomads became minorities during the colonial period, when 
they were divided by colonial borders. Aggressive settlement tactics have only shrunk 
many nomadic populations, further reducing them to minority status. Many nomads are 
minorities and have suffered ancillary discrimination on account of their language or 
religion, enumerated categories under minority rights. The link between non-
discrimination for minorities and their right to a nationality under international could be 
clearer. This is particularly important for groups, like nomads, who do not always easily fit 
under the categories of race or national origin. For nomads who identify as linguistic, 
ethnic, religious and cultural minorities, protections against discrimination in the granting 
of nationality on account of their minority status could be more strongly articulated under 
international law. The minority rights framework could also do more to specifically 
prohibit discrimination in the granting of nationality and accessing civil rights. 
Minority rights could also be strengthened by specifically listing nomadism as a cultural 
practice. While nomads are frequently discriminated against based on language, religion 
and ethnicity, defining nomadism as a type of cultural practice would make this 
 
1738 OHCHR, Fact Sheet No.18 (Rev.1), Minority Rights. 
1739 Note by the Secretary-General, Effective promotion of the Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging 
to National or Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities, A/74/160 (15 July 2019). 
1740 P. Brett, ‘Discrimination and Childhood Statelessness in the Work of the UN Human Rights Treaty Bodies’ 
in Institute on Statelessness and Inclusion, The World’s Stateless: Children (Wolf 2017) 169-178. See also 
Arendt 1976 273, where she discusses the dangers of assimilation for minorities. 
1741 Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities, 
A/RES/47/135, 18 December 1992. 
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discrimination, which was described at length in Part 2, above, clearly prohibited under 
international law.  
Nomadism and Indigenous Status 
The indigenous rights framework protects indigenous persons from discrimination in the 
granting of nationality. Over the course of the last few decades, international law has 
increasingly recognized collective rights, or the rights of groups to make claims against 
their governments on a group basis.1742 The theory of collective rights underpins the 
indigenous rights framework, including the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of 
Indigenous Peoples, the flagship, though non-binding, international instrument 
enumerating indigenous rights.1743  
Article 6 of the non-binding 2007 UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples 
states that “every indigenous individual has the right to a nationality.”1744 It goes on to 
protect indigenous ways of life and outlaw discrimination based on indigenous status. The 
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples in Article 2 prohibits discrimination 
against indigenous persons on the bases of indigenous identity: 
Indigenous peoples and individuals are free and equal to all other peoples and 
individuals and have the right to be free from any kind of discrimination, in the 
exercise of their rights, in particular that based on their indigenous origin or 
identity.1745 
The indigenous rights framework has assisted in raising the profile of indigenous rights, 
including the rights of many nomads.1746 Nomadism may be framed as a protected cultural 
practice under the indigenous rights framework. Nomadism as an indigenous cultural 
practice may therefore be related to nomadism as a cultural practice for the purposes of 
minority status. The two frameworks would therefore complement each other. Nomadism 
 
1742 Kymlicka, 3, 7, 34. See also Miller, 86. 
1743 United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, resolution adopted by the General 
Assembly, 2 October 2007, A/RES/61/295. See also Crawford 112; Van Genugten et al., 2014, 98; Castellino 
and Doyle, 8.  
Kuwait, Mali and Malaysia all voted in favor of the Declaration. For more on indigenous rights, see generally 
the International Work Group for Indigenous Affairs at http://www.iwgia.org. Kuwait, Mali and Malaysia all 
voted in favor of the Declaration. For more on indigenous rights, see generally the International Work Group 
for Indigenous Affairs at http://www.iwgia.org. 
1744 UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples Article 6. 144 states voted in favor. See also Van 
Genugten et al., 2014, 99. 
1745 UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples Article 2. 
1746 “(I)ndigenous groups have managed to establish alternative routes to recognition and voice, leading to 
the creation, for example, of the UN Working Group on Indigenous Populations and the 2007 Indigenous 
Declaration which aimed to alleviate this exclusion from international systems (e.g. see OHCHR 2013), as well 
as through resistance and protest.” Bloom, Members, 2017, 166. 
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could also be classified as a “traditional economic activity” protected under Articles 3, 5 
and 20 of the Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples and under Article 27 of the 
ICCPR.1747 As with the minority rights framework, however, the indigenous rights 
framework could be more specific in defining nomadism in these ways. 
While many nomads identify as indigenous peoples, however, this framing may not be ideal 
for others. In cases where a group’s indigenous status may be disputed by the government, 
it is important to note that there is no settled definition of indigenous, nor methods by 
which such disputes could be settled.1748 
Indigenous communities, peoples and nations are those which, having a 
historical continuity with pre-invasion and pre-colonial societies that 
developed on their territories, consider themselves distinct from other 
sectors of the societies now prevailing in those territories, or parts of them. 
They form at present non-dominant sectors of society and are determined to 
preserve, develop and transmit to future generations their ancestral 
territories, and their ethnic identity, as the basis of their continued existence 
as peoples, in accordance with their own cultural patterns, social institutions 
and legal systems.1749 
Legal experts have offered varying opinions on how to define indigenous status. Some 
scholars argue that first occupancy of land lies at the heart of the concept of indigenous, but 
others dispute this claim.1750 Others argue strongly in favour of self-identification and of 
identification by other indigenous groups, akin to the recognition that states give to other 
states, the approach taking by ILO Convention 169, which emphasizes state recognition of 
indigenous or tribal status.1751 The United Nations Development Group, which provides 
guidance on mainstreaming the sustainable development goals, cites a variety of factors 
that may be relevant to the identification of indigenous peoples, including most 
importantly self-identification, but also historical continuity with pre-colonial societies, 
priority in time, a strong link to particular territories and natural resources, distinct social 
systems and culture from the majority population, and a history of discrimination.1752  
 
1747 Gilbert, Still, 2004-2005, 144-145, 159.  
1748 Concerns over the lack of a definition of indigenous status were raised during the drafting of the UN 
Declaration. See Castellino and Doyle, 27. 
1749 Statement of the former United Nations Special Rapporteur on Discrimination against Indigenous 
Populations, José Martínez Cobo at http://indigenousfoundations.web.arts.ubc.ca/global_actions/. 
1750 For a brief overview of the debate, see Castellino and Doyle, 17-18. 
1751 International Labour Organization, Indigenous and Tribal Peoples Convention, C169, 27 June 1989, C169 
(1989), Art. 1. See also Castellino and Doyle, 19. 
1752 United Nations Development Group, ‘Guidelines on Indigenous Peoples’ Issues’ (New York and Geneva 
2009) 8-9. See also Gilbert, Territories, 2007, 12. Gilbert notes that the United Nations, World Bank and 
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As Part 2 explored, governments often refuse to recognize nomads as indigenous, framing 
them instead as immigrants. Using the indigenous rights framework as a pathway to a 
solution for nomads therefore carries the risk that the right to a nationality for nomads gets 
lost in a debate over the status of nomads as indigenous persons. The framework is 
frequently applied in so-called “settler states,” where the majority population are recent 
immigrants, but this is not the case in many parts of the world where nomads live.1753 It is 
not always easy to apply this framework in places like Malaysia and Mali, where the 
government sometimes treats nomads like the Tuareg and Sama Dilaut as either 
immigrants or foreigners.1754 As Castellino and Doyle point out, other international 
frameworks, such as minority rights, might be more appropriate for nomads in some 
cases.1755  
In states like Kuwait, Mali and Malaysia, concepts of indigenous rights have often been 
employed to justify nomad exclusion. Indigenous is often used as a synonym for native, 
implying that an indigenous group was present in a location before colonization.1756 This 
view, that indigenous implies first in time, appears to have been at least implied by the 
Government of Kenya in Endorois case.1757 “(P)articular importance is always placed on the 
requirement that the group...must have occupied and used a fairly definable territory 
before present day state borders...”1758 As Part 2 explored, the claim of being “first in time” 
or present in a certain territory before a certain date may be difficult for nomads to defend. 
Recently, however, indigenous rights have begun to move away from its classical colonial 
framing of “first in time.”1759 For example, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights 
 
International Labor Organization have all offered working definitions, with self-identification as the 
foundation. Gilbert, Territories, 2007, 14. 
1753 See generally Bloom, Members, 2017, 155-156 for a discussion of the usefulness of the indigenous rights 
framework to indigenous statelessness. 
1754 For a discussion of nomads as indigenous peoples, see Gilbert, Territories, 2007, 695. See also Gilbert, 
Nomadic, 2014, 57; S. Imai and K. Buttery, ‘Indigenous Belonging: A Commentary on Membership and Identity 
in the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous People’ 49 York UP (working paper, 2013) 
(hereinafter Imai and Buttery). 
1755 Castellino and Doyle, 25-27. 
1756 Van Genugten et al., 2014, 100. 
1757 Endorois, 139, 159-160. 
1758 M. Ahren, ‘The Provisions on Lands, Territories and National Resources in the UN Declaration on the 
Rights of Indigenous Peoples: An Introduction’ cited in Castellino and Doyle, 30. 
1759 See for example the courts language in Endorois, para. 154, where it says, “(t)he African Commission is 
also aware that though some indigenous populations might be first inhabitants, validation of rights is not 
automatically afforded to such pre-invasion and pre-colonial claims.”  
“Some suggest that a state has a right to territorial sovereignty if the individuals who constitute the state can 
prove that they are the original occupants (or their rightful successors) of the territory in question.” C. 
Hanjian, The Sovrien: An Exploration of the Right to Be Stateless (Polyspire 2003) 116-117. Hanjian goes on to 
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extended indigenous status to a group descended from African slaves brought to Suriname 
in Saramaka v Suriname. This broadened the definition of indigenous to groups who 
arrived to what is now Suriname during the colonial period.1760  
Speaking of the African context, Castellino and Doyle say, 
(i)t is not the issue of aboriginality, who came first, that is a fundamental 
aspect of the definition of indigenous peoples, as suggested by the states, but 
rather the current relations of oppression within those African societies.1761 
The extension of indigenous rights to groups who were not “first in time” shows a possible 
way forward for some nomads.1762 A progressive interpretation of indigenous may make 
the indigenous rights framework helpful to a broader class of nomadic peoples. 
As a practical matter, however, it can be difficult to establish indigenous status when 
indigenous practices and lifestyles are gone.1763 For example, as Part 2 explored in detail, it 
may be difficult to define the bidoon as an indigenous group, since some bidoon are not 
descended from Bedouin groups and are not indigenous to the region. In other cases, 
bidoon families may have no way to prove their family history. Changes to group identity 
over time may therefore complicate indigenous status.1764   
The point of this section is not to voice an opinion one way or another as to whether nor 
not specific nomadic groups are indigenous, but to point out that many factors, including 
government programs of assimilation, the risk of conflation between nomadism and 
migration, the long-term removal of nomads from their lands, as well as the fact of mobility 
itself, sometimes make the indigenous rights framework difficult, or maybe even risky, to 
apply to nomads. Nevertheless, with state buy-in, the indigenous rights framework remains 
a potential tool to preventing discrimination and, critically, assimilation for some nomads. 
It may be used in tandem with minority rights to protect nomads from discrimination in 
the granting of nationality. 
 
ask, “Which...criteria (are) to be used to determine the first occupants? Who has the legitimate authority to 
decide this matter?”  
1760 Endorois, 159-160. For more on recent developments on this question, see F. MacKay, ‘The Rights of 
Maroons in International Human Rights Law’ Cultural Survival Quarterly Magazine (December 2001); C. 
Tavani, Collective Rights and the Cultural Identity of the Roma: A Case Study of Italy (Brill 2020) 48-49. 
1761 Castellino and Doyle, quoting Regino, Montes and Cisneros, 29. 
1762 F. MacKay, ‘The Rights of Maroons in International Human Rights Law’ Cultural Survival Quarterly 
Magazine, (December 2001). 
1763 Endorois, para. 161. 
1764 For more on how governments themselves construct and influence indigenous identities, see the 
discussion in Bloom, Members, 2017, 166. 
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Nomadism as an “Other Status” under International Law 
Does international law provide other solutions? Under the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights, Art. 2 and the International Covenants, the inclusion of a category for “other status” 
has potentially opened up protections from discrimination to a broader class of persons. 
Could nomadism be considered to be an “other status” under the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights and a progressive interpretation of international law? This approach has had 
clear success when it comes to discrimination based on sexual orientation, in part because 
the United Nations has made such a progressive interpretation a focus of its work.1765 
Could a similar progressive interpretation be made for nomadism? Put another way, is 
there an express right to be nomadic under international law?  
Freedom of movement is a fundamental human right. Does it support the right to be 
nomadic? For example, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights guarantees 
freedom of movement in Article 12, including the right to enter and leave one’s country. 
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights does so likewise in Article 13. The American 
Declaration of 1948 in Article 8 guarantees that; “every person has the right to fix his 
residence within the territory of the state of which he’s a national...” Freedom of movement 
in the 1951 Refugee Convention is closely tied to the establishment of a residence in Article 
26. 
Though the right to freedom of movement, in the sense of changing residence within a 
state, is well established in international law, the right to engage in a mobile lifestyle 
arguably is not.1766 Gilbert notes that right to freedom of movement is designed not to 
support a mobile lifestyle but to allow settled people to change residence.1767 As Gilbert 
points out, “international law is fundamentally in favour of settled societies in supporting 
predominantly sedentarist States to the detriment of nomadic forms of organization.”1768 
Gilbert also notes that “(f)ree movement being the essence of nomadism, it is surprising 
how little the right to free movement has been associated with a nomadic lifestyle.”1769  
The Council of Europe Recommendations on Stateless Nomads and Nomads of 
Undetermined Nationality (R 83(1)) and on the Social Situation of Nomads in Europe (R 
75(13)) contain support for nomadism as a way of life, a right that is supported by the 
freedom of movement generally enjoyed within the European Union. These Council of 
 
1765 J. Gary and N. Rubin, ‘Are LGBT rights human rights? Recent developments at the United Nations UN 
Matters,’ Psychology International (June 2012). 
1766 Human Rights Committee, ‘General Comments Adopted by the Human Rights Committee Under Article 
40,’ Paragraph 4, of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Addendum General Comment No. 
27(67): Freedom of Movement (article 12). 
1767 Gilbert, Nomadic, 2014, 75. 
1768 Gilbert, Nomadic, 2014, 58. 
1769 Gilbert, Nomadic, 2014, 72. 
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Europe Recommendations are two of the few instruments that expressly mention a right to 
be nomadic.  
Some support for the right to cross borders and maintain a mobile lifestyle as part of 
seasonal transhumance may be found under the ECOWAS framework, such as in the 
ECOWAS Protocol on Transhumance (1998) and supporting Regulation (2003), where it 
states that ECOWAS should take measures to “facilitate” transhumance.1770 As well, there 
has been some acknowledgment of nomadic peoples’ rights to cross international borders 
as part of the freedom to enter or leave one’s country, such as via the Jay Treaty between 
the United States and Canada.1771 The International Labor Organization Recommendation 
104 recommends that government protect tribal rights to cross borders.1772 In general, 
however, the practice of nomadism and/or a mobile lifestyle lacks clear protections under 
both regional and international law. The rarity of such clauses points to a gap in 
international law on guaranteeing the right to be nomadic. This is not a coincidence, but is 
deeply related to the systemic bias against nomadism in nationality law. 
While support for protections for a mobile lifestyle or cultural practice remains thin under 
international law, there are signs this is beginning to change. In Europe, with respect to the 
nomadic Roma, there has been some acknowledgment that freedom of movement might 
entail freedom to maintain a mobile residence and practice a mobile lifestyle as a cultural 
practice and identity. This progression may be assisted by a growing right to freedom of 
movement in the European Union, though more research on this topic is needed. Such 
developments point to growing recognition of the Roma not only as an ethnic minority, but 
also as a mobile minority, where mobility is central to their minority status. For example, 
Recommendation 14 (2004) of the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe 
recommended expanding freedom of movement to include the right to maintain a mobile 
residence.1773 Much more could be done, however, to expressly prohibit the discrimination 
in nationality law on the basis of mobility and nomadism. 
It is quite possible that a progressive interpretation of international law would find that 
nomadism is protected as a type of “other status,” but this requires stronger articulation. In 
particular, any classification of nomadism as a protected status when it comes to the 
granting of nationality should be explicit under international law to combat the systemic 
bias against mobility in nationality law and the nation-state system. Strong, unequivocal 
support from United Nations organs in the recognition of nomadism as a protected cultural 
 
1770 Forty-ninth Session of the Council of Ministers, Regulation C/REG.3/01/03 Relating to the 
implementation of the regulations on Transhumance between the ECOWAS Member States (Dakar 26-28 
January, 2003) Article 2(5). 
1771 See generally Standing Senate Committee on Aboriginal Peoples, ‘Border Crossing Issues and the Jay 
Treaty’ Senate of Canada (June 2016). 
1772 ILO Recommendation 104, quoted in Gilbert, Nomadic, 2014 82-83. 
1773 Recommendation no. 14 of the Committee of Ministers to member states on the movement and 
encampment of Travelers in Europe (2004), quoted in Gilbert, Nomadic, 2014 77. 
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and economic practice is needed. In particular, a right to dual or multiple nationality for 
nomadic and mobile peoples may be necessary in order to preserve and protect the right to 
be nomadic as part of nomadic peoples’ special status or indigenous status. The right to 
freely cross borders may need to be asserted. There remains the open question as to what 
extent a special package of rights for nomads may need to be given special status, or 
whether all human beings have the right to maintain a mobile lifestyle if we choose.  
Statelessness as “Other Status” 
An important body of law also protects both recent migrants and stateless persons from 
discrimination vis a vis other non-nationals. Might this framework offer additional 
protections to nomads from discrimination in the granting of nationality? Under a 
progressive interpretation of international law, might statelessness itself be a kind of 
“other status”? 
As the examples showed, statelessness itself is often used as a justification for 
discriminating against nomads in the granting of nationality, by inferring that these groups 
are somehow naturally criminal or transgressive and, therefore, not deserving of 
nationality. This can be seen in the example of the Sama Dilaut, whose historic migration 
has been branded by governments as inherently criminal since the colonial period.  
This circular logic has a long history. As Arendt points out, “(t)he stateless person, without 
right to residence and without the right to work, had of course constantly to transgress the 
law."1774 The labelling of stateless people as criminals today is frequently linked to public 
rhetoric against undocumented people more generally, including immigrants, where the 
lack of a government status is, itself, used as evidence of criminality and foreignness. 
States may limit the enjoyment of certain human rights to nationals, but any 
such restriction must nevertheless meet stringent conditions so as to comply 
with the principle of non-discrimination.1775 
While stateless persons and non-citizens are not entitled to be granted the nationality of a 
specific state, they must be treated the same as other immigrants. Article 29 of the 
International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and 
Members of Their Families1776 prohibits discrimination against migrants and protects the 
right to a nationality for the children of migrants. The Committee on the Elimination of All 
Forms of Racial Discrimination in General Recommendation 30 recommended to states 
that they ensure non-citizens and stateless persons were also protected from racial 
 
1774 Arendt, 1976, 286. 
1775 Human Rights Council Nineteenth session, Human rights and arbitrary deprivation of nationality, Report 
of the Secretary-General, A/HRC/19/43 (December 2011) 3. See also the Guidance Note of the Secretary-
General on the United Nations and Statelessness (June 2011). 
1776 United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 2220, p. 3; Doc. A/RES/45/158, with 55 states parties. 
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discrimination.1777 The Committee advised states to remove discrimination against groups 
with regard to access to nationality and naturalization and to regularize the status of the 
nationals of predecessor states. Article 32 of the Convention relating to the Status of 
Stateless Persons mandates states to facilitate the naturalization of stateless persons and 
the Statelessness Conventions require that children born otherwise stateless be granted a 
nationality. According to the Committee, states must not create unreasonable barriers to 
naturalization for long-term residents. Finally, international law mandates that states 
protect the basic human rights of non-nationals and stateless persons.1778 
As De Chickera and Whiteman point out, however, prohibiting discrimination against 
stateless persons does not find the same level of obvious support in international law as 
race, ethnicity and the other factors described above.1779 The Statelessness Conventions 
lack a treaty body of their own, meaning that the issue of discrimination against stateless 
persons must be addressed through other treaty bodies such as the Committee on the 
Rights of the Child.1780 As the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights has 
observed, freedom from discrimination against stateless persons does not require that the 
state in question grant stateless persons a nationality, only that they be given the same 
treatment as other non-nationals.1781 As a result, the failure of governments to provide a 
nationality to nomads because of their statelessness is not prohibited under international 
law unless this failure is on account of their race, religion, ethnicity or another prohibited 
ground discussed above.  
Rather than providing a pathway to a solution, the Statelessness Conventions would only 
place nomads in the same position as other foreigners, reinforcing their status not as de 
facto nationals but as foreign. As well, labelling nomads as stateless risks perpetuating the 
view that they are “naturally stateless” and unable to form or participate in states, a view 
that has done incalculable damage to nomads, as discussed at length in Part 2. 
Conclusion 
Part 2 exposed a substantial bias against mobility and nomadism in nationality law. 
Inevitably, this bias encouraged the assimilation and settlement of nomads. As Pathway II 
 
1777 Committee on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, 64th Session, General 
Recommendation 30, Discrimination Against Non-Citizens, CERD/C/64/Misc.11/rev.3 (23 February-12 
March 2004). 
1778 See generally the Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and Reparation for Victims of 
Gross Violations of International Human Rights Law and Serious Violations of International Humanitarian 
Law, Adopted and proclaimed by General Assembly resolution 60/147 (16 December 2005). See also Donner 
194; Van Waas, Nationality, 15, 28, 36, 40, 50; Van Waas, Statelessness Conventions; Donner, 29; Verzijl, 48. 
1779 De Chickera and Whiteman, 111. 
1780 See generally Handbook, 2014. 
1781 U.N. Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, Fact Sheet No. 18 (Rev.1), Minority Rights, 
February 1998, No. 18 (Rev.1). 
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has shown, this bias extends into international law. While discrimination against nomadism 
is often a central cause of nomad statelessness, international law does not directly address 
this discrimination. Stronger and more specific protections for nomadism are needed.  
Specific protections for nomadism are largely missing from the international laws and 
declarations prohibiting discrimination in the granting of nationality. Nomadism is not 
expressly defined as a cultural practice under the ICCPR or as a type of indigenous identity 
under the Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples. Other areas of human rights law 
do not necessarily support the right to maintain a mobile or cross-border lifestyle. 
Meanwhile, requiring that nomadism be framed as a type of historical migration or national 
origins risks promoting settlement as the “solution” to the problem of nomad statelessness.  
While anti-discrimination laws have much to offer nomads, it is not always easy to link the 
statelessness of nomads to their status as ethnic, religious, linguistic or racial groups 
without acknowledging the centrality of nomadism as the cause of their exclusion. In order 
to resolve this oversight, language protecting nomadism as a way of life and prohibiting 
discrimination against nomads on account of their mobile way of life, including in the 
granting of nationality, would need to be included in an international treaty or other 
binding instrument of law. 
This dissertation advocates that nomadism and mobile lifestyles be more clearly treated 
under international law not as types of cross-border mobility, but instead as a cultural 
practice and economic activity firmly distinct from immigration or migration and protected 
from discrimination under international law, particularly when it comes to the granting of 
nationality. A progressive approach, like that encouraged by the U.N. General Assembly,1782  
to indigenous and minority rights might more clearly frame nomadism as a group identity 
and a cultural practice in need of protection.  
Such express support for nomadism is particularly necessary given the powerful bias 
against mobility that is baked into nationality law at every level. Simply drafting a new 
treaty to protect nomads from discrimination, however, may not be enough to remove this 
bias. Nationality law has proven to be, in and of itself, an engine of nomad assimilation and 
settlement in many places. Nomad nationality in existing nation-states tends to be 
accompanied by settlement and the abandonment of nomadism. Even explicit protections 
for nomadism as a cultural practice may not be enough to counteract the bias against 
mobility and, in particular, cross-border mobility that is a founding principle of nationality 
law.  
  
 
1782 The UN General Assembly is mandated to encourage a progressive approach to international law under 
Article 13, paragraph (1)(a), of the Charter of the United Nations. See Codification and Progressive 
Development of International Law website at https://legal.un.org/cod/. 
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Pathway III: Identifying and Resolving Inter-generational Statelessness 
The adoption of sanguinis by post-World War, newly independent states, has 
often had a discriminatory impact in favour of the dominant ethnic group on the 
states’ territories.1783 
As Part 2 discussed, the modern concept of jus sanguinis fit well with the systems of 
belonging in many pre-colonial societies, particularly those based on Islam, where 
belonging was passed down along the paternal line. Yet, jus sanguinis in post-colonial states 
often followed a relatively short period creating the first body of nationals, a period that 
was marked by unclear laws, poor administration and rampant discrimination against 
certain groups like nomads. As the examples showed, the feasibility and appropriateness of 
the rapid and strict adoption of jus sanguinis by numerous post-colonial states was never 
questioned during the decolonization process, despite the arguably high risk of creating 
statelessness as a result.1784 As a result, minority populations, border groups and many 
nomads were locked out of a nationality. 
As Part 2 demonstrated, the enactment of strict jus sanguinis laws without exceptions to 
prevent statelessness was a cause of inter-generational statelessness for nomads and 
former nomads in countries like Kuwait. In other countries, like Malaysia, limits on jus 
sanguinis have either not been implemented or are implemented in a way that excludes 
many nomads and former nomads. 
Pathway III will look at breaking the chain of inter-generational statelessness for nomads 
through the application of international law. Pathway III may be necessary to resolve cases 
of nomad statelessness that cannot be resolved by the first two Pathways, though, for 
reasons explored below, it carries considerable risks. Pathway III will first look at solutions 
for persons who would be otherwise stateless at birth. Pathway III next will look at 
facilitated naturalization for stateless persons to see if identifying nomads as stateless can 
lead to a solution. 
Beyond looking at treaties, Pathway III will also look at court cases on establishing 
statelessness at birth, and guidance from UNHCR. Highly relevant to understanding how 
treaty law might be applied to the benefit of nomadic communities are the UNHCR 
Guidelines on Statelessness No. 4, Ensuring Every Child’s Right to Acquire a Nationality 
through Articles 1-4 of the 1961 Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness.1785 Also 
 
1783 Conklin, 98. 
1784 A widely cited risk factor for statelessness is the strict application of jus sanguinis. See for example, C. 
Dumbrava and R. Bauböck (eds.) ‘Bloodlines and belonging: Time to abandon ius sanguinis?’ European Union 
Democracy Observatory on Citizenship (2015). It should here be noted that the use of jus soli nationality law 
does not preclude statelessness, nor does jus sanguinis automatically result in statelessness. But in some 
cases, jus sanguinis can add to the risk. 
1785 UNHCR Guidelines on Statelessness No. 4, Ensuring Every Child’s Right to Acquire a nationality through 
Articles 1-4 of the 1961 Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness, HCR/BS/12/04 (21 December 2012) 3 
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relevant, the European Court of Human Rights recognized that nationality was an integral 
part of a child’s identity,1786 as did the African Committee of Experts on the Rights and 
Welfare of the Child in Nubian Children, discussed above in Pathway II.  
The International Laws Applicable to Children Born Otherwise Stateless 
Pathway III will first focus on the body of laws that mandate that children born otherwise 
stateless in the territory of the state be granted a nationality. These laws include the 
Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness of 1961, which mandates in Article 1 that all 
persons born in the territory of the state who would otherwise be stateless be granted a 
nationality. 1787 Other relevant treaties include the American Convention on Human 
Rights1788 and the African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child.1789 Important soft 
law contributions include the Draft Protocol to the African Charter.  
It should be noted that this process may be automatic under Art. 1(1)(a), or subject to 
conditions, like habitual residence, under Art. 1(1)(b).1790 According to UNHCR, which 
provides guidance on the implementation of the 1961 Convention, if a state imposes 
conditions, they must not result in leaving the child stateless for a “considerable” period of 
time.1791 The condition of habitual residence cannot be for longer than 5 years and lawful 
residence is not required.1792  
The first step in applying international legal limits on strict jus sanguinis for children born 
otherwise stateless is the granting of a birth certificate. It is important to note that absence 
of birth registration should not be a barrier to implementing Article 1 of the 1961 
 
(hereinafter UNHCR Guidelines on Statelessness No. 4), citing the American Convention Art. 20(2) and the 
African Charter Art. 6(4). 
1786 Menesson c. France, 65192/11, Cour européenne des droits de l’homme, 5e sect., (26 juin 2014). 
1787 Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness. 
1788 American Convention on Human Rights, O.A.S. Treaty Series No. 36, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123, entered into force 
July 18, 1978, reprinted in Basic Documents Pertaining to Human Rights in the Inter-American System, 
OEA/Ser.L.V/II.82 doc.6 rev.1 at 25 (1992). For a list of states parties see: 
https://treaties.un.org/pages/showdetails.aspx?objid=08000002800f10e1 
1789 Organization of African Unity (OAU), African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child, 11 July 1990, 
CAB/LEG/24.9/49 (1990). For a list of states parties see: https://au.int/sites/default/files/treaties/36804-
sl-
AFRICAN%20CHARTER%20ON%20THE%20RIGHTS%20AND%20WELFARE%20OF%20THE%20CHILD.pdf. 
1790 For example, the state may fix a period of 3 to 10 years of habitual residence depending on the 
circumstances. Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness, Article 1(1)b. 
1791 UNHCR Guidelines on Statelessness No. 4, 8. 
1792 UNHCR Guidelines on Statelessness No. 4, 9. 
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Convention, but in practice, birth registration is likely to be an important part of ending 
intergenerational statelessness for nomads under Article 1 of the 1961 Convention.1793 
The birth certificate is crucial to proving the child was born in the territory of the state and 
establishing the child’s parentage for the purposes of establishing their statelessness. The 
Convention on the Rights of the Child mandates in Article 7 that all children born in the 
territory of a state be issued with a birth certificate and establishes the principle of the 
“best interests of the child” in Article 3.1794  
Establishing that Children are Born Otherwise Stateless 
Assuming the Convention on the Rights of the Child were implemented, no nomad child in 
countries like Kuwait, Mali or Malaysia would be unable to prove their birth in the territory 
of the state, establishing the first part of the conditions laid out in Article 1 of the 1961 
Convention. Most nomad children with birth certificates also have important evidence of 
their parent’s nationality, or demonstrate that they cannot establish a link to their parents 
that satisfies the law, for example, in countries where parents must be married to pass on 
their nationality or where only fathers can pass on nationality.  
The child must also be established as having been born otherwise stateless, fact which 
usually requires more inquiry into the circumstances than is provided on a birth certificate. 
UNHCR Guidelines on Statelessness No. 4 provide guidance on how such an inquiry should 
be made. The definition of statelessness for children is that found in the 1954 
Convention.1795 Importantly, the standard “best interests of the child” applies and, as 
interpreted by UNHCR, requires that the child’s statelessness must be resolved as quickly 
as possible.1796 
According to UNHCR, 
a Contracting State must accept that a person is not a national of a particular 
State if the authorities of that State refuse to recognize that person as a 
national. A State can refuse to recognize a person as a national either by 
explicitly stating that he or she is not a national or by failing to respond to 
inquiries to confirm an individual as a national. A Contracting State to the 
1961 Convention cannot avoid the obligations  to grant its nationality to a 
person who would otherwise be stateless under Articles 1 and 4 based on its 
own interpretation of another State’s nationality laws where  this conflicts 
with the interpretation applied by the State concerned.1797 
 
1793 UNHCR Guidelines on Statelessness No. 4, 12. 
1794 Convention on the Rights of the Child, Art. 7(2). 
1795 UNHCR Guidelines on Statelessness No. 4, 4. See also 1954 Convention. 
1796 UNHCR Guidelines on Statelessness No. 4, 3. 
1797 UNHCR Guidelines on Statelessness No. 4, 4. 
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Following this guidance, Malaysia’s national laws, discussed above in Part II, should have 
led to the granting of Malaysian nationality to adopted children born otherwise stateless, 
once the court and parents had made a good faith attempt to establish the children’s 
nationality elsewhere. But important gaps remain in UNHCR’s Guidance. It is not clear, 
however, what qualifies as a “failure to respond” to inquiries. Here, the UNHCR Guidelines 
could better take into account the guidance from the Committee on the Rights of the Child 
and better harmonize the 1961 Convention with the Convention on the Rights of the Child 
and the standard of “best interests of the child.” 
The example of Kuwait is also instructive on this issue. Many bidoon children are now 
registered as bidoon at birth.1798 Were Kuwait to ratify them, this would violate  Article 1 of 
the 1961 Convention and Article 7 of the Convention on the Rights of the Child. Yet, even 
were the Kuwaiti government to ratify and follow the 1961 Convention and the Convention 
on the Rights of the Child, the fact of birth in Kuwait by itself would not automatically 
establish the rights of bidoon children to Kuwaiti nationality. Some sort of procedure 
involving communications with neighbouring states Saudi Arabia and Iraq would be 
required. When countries do not have bilateral relations with the necessary states, or when 
relations are strained, the process of establishing that a child is stateless risks become 
snarled in international relations. 
UNHCR also permits states to give children a designation of “undetermined nationality” 
while a determination of their nationality or statelessness takes place.1799 This “solution,” 
however, may contradict the 1961 Convention if the procedure becomes an excuse to delay 
a resolution. It weakens the protections of the 1961 Convention if the nationality of 
children at birth becomes bound up in red tape and negotiations between governments. It 
should be noted that a finding of “undetermined nationality” is not possible under Art. 20 of 
the American Convention on Human Rights or Art. 6 of the African Charter on the Rights 
and Welfare of the Child.1800 
Crucially, under the 1961 Convention, states may also require parents to satisfy a residency 
requirement. Yet, as discussed at length above, it may be difficult for nomadic families to 
satisfy the residency requirements under the law.  
According to UNHCR, 
It follows from the factual character of “habitual residence” that in cases 
where it is difficult to determine whether an individual is habitually resident 
 
1798 Committee on the Rights of the Child, Sixty-fourth session, ‘Item 4 of the provisional agenda: 
Consideration of reports of States parties: List of issues in relation to the second periodic report of Kuwait’ 
(CRC/C/KWT/2) (16 September – 4 October 2013). 
1799 UNHCR Guidelines on Statelessness No. 4, 6. 
1800 Organization of American States (OAS), American Convention on Human Rights, ‘Pact of San Jose,’ Costa 
Rica, 22 November 1969 Art. 23.1(b). Organization of African Unity (OAU), African Charter on Human and 
Peoples' Rights, 27 June 1981, CAB/LEG/67/3 rev. 5, 21 I.L.M. 58 (1982). See also UNHCR Guidelines on 
Statelessness No. 4, 8. 
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in one or  another State, for example due to a nomadic way of life, such 
persons are to be considered as habitual residents in both States.1801 
Given the challenges in establishing residence for nomads, discussed above, UNHCR could 
provide more guidance on this point. 
The International Norms on the Identification of Statelessness and Facilitated Naturalization 
International law also provides facilitated naturalization as a solution for stateless persons 
under the 1954 Convention relating to the Status of Stateless Persons.1802 This process may 
provide a solution via the identification of stateless persons in Article 1 and access to 
facilitated naturalization in Article 32. While this solution is highly problematic for nomads 
for a variety of reasons discussed below, it remains a possible solution under international 
law that should be explored.  
In addition to the international norms discussed above, this solution draws on the soft law 
guidance of the UNHCR Handbook on the Protection of Stateless Persons and case law. Also 
relevant are the Draft Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights on the 
Specific Aspects of the Right to a Nationality and the Eradication of Statelessness in Africa 
and the Draft Articles on the Protection of Stateless Persons and the Facilities for their 
Naturalization. 
Recent support for the naturalization of stateless persons is found in draft laws such as the 
Draft Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights on the Specific Aspects 
of the Right to a Nationality and the Eradication of Statelessness in Africa.1803 In 2017, 
UNHCR issued Draft Articles on the Protection of Stateless Persons and the Facilities for 
their Naturalization.1804 The Draft Articles provide, in addition to other benefits, the 
removal of residency and language requirements for stateless persons in order that they 
may naturalize.  
 
1801 UNHCR Guidelines on Statelessness No. 4, 10 (my italics). 
1802  Convention Relating to the Status of Stateless Persons. 
1803 Draft Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights on the Specific Aspects of the Right to 
a Nationality and the Eradication of Statelessness in Africa May 2017 art. 18. Recent developments in 
international law further support a pathway to facilitated naturalization for stateless migrants. The Draft 
Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples Rights on the Specific Aspects of the Right to a 
Nationality and the Eradication of Statelessness in Africa would place a clear duty on states to facilitate 
naturalization for stateless migrants. 
1804 U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees, Draft Articles on the Protection of Stateless Persons and the 
Facilities for their Naturalization, February 2017. “The duty to ‘facilitate’ acquisition of nationality is a term 
used in other international treaties that involves at least making such acquisition significantly easier than for 
foreigners generally, for example by reaching out to communities known to be lacking documentation of 
nationality, by providing a non-discretionary process of acquisition, such as those known in different 
countries as declaration, registration or option, or by reducing the period of residence required.” Draft 
Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights on the Specific Aspects of the Right to a 
Nationality and the Eradication of Statelessness in Africa: Explanatory Memorandum (2018) para. 48. 
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UNHCR advises, however, that statelessness determination procedures “may only be 
appropriate for the minority of the world’s stateless persons who are in a migratory 
situation” and “a different approach is called for in the case of stateless persons who are in 
their own country, recognizing their profound connection with that State through, for 
example, birth or longstanding residence.” 1805 According to UNHCR guidance, in situ 
populations should instead be treated as de facto nationals.1806  
Yet, the difference between in situ stateless populations and those in a migratory context is 
often difficult to delineate,1807 particularly, as Part 2 showed, for nomads. As Part 2 
discussed at length, the question of nomad “residence” is a fraught one. If a nomad 
community has been split by a colonial border, which country is their “own country”? Is it 
the responsibility of one state or another to decide this question? There are few guidelines 
as to when “being in a migratory state” ends and in situ status begins.1808 As these terms are 
not defined under international law, there is a risk of compounding or validating the 
tendency of states to class nomads as foreigners, as was discussed at length in Part 2. It is 
imperative to note as well that this solution requires labelling nomads as stateless, a 
practice with a long and troubled history, as also described in Part 2. Without identifying 
nomads as stateless, however, facilitated naturalization under the 1954 Convention does 
not appear possible without further developments the law. 
Establishing Statelessness and the Burden of Proof 
Proving statelessness for either children or adults raises the question of the burden of 
proof, a question that is not answered by either the 1954 or 1961 Convention. The process 
of establishing statelessness often requires that the individual or family provide extensive 
documentary evidence which might be very difficult for many nomads. The question of the 
burden of proof for children born otherwise stateless has been addressed both by UNHCR 
and by national courts.  
In most legal systems, a claimant bears the initial responsibility of 
substantiating his or her claim. Because of the difficulties that often arise 
when determining whether an individual has acquired a nationality, the 
burden of proof must be shared between the claimant and the authorities of 
 
1805 Handbook, 2014, 3, 25-26, 57. The phrase “own country” is taken from the International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights, Art. 12(4). See also European Network on Statelessness, ‘Statelessness Determination 
and the Protection Status of Stateless Individuals’ (2013) 5, citing UNHCR guidelines. For a detailed 
discussion of the concept of “own country” in international law, see C. Vlieks, ‘Contexts of statelessness: the 
concepts “statelessness in situ” and “statelessness in the migratory context”’ in T. Bloom, K. Tonkiss, P. Cole 
(eds.) Understanding Statelessness (Routledge 2017) 40-42 (hereinafter Vlieks). 
1806 Handbook, 2014, 1. 
1807 This observation is made by Oakeshott in his article on statelessness in Southeast Asia. N. Oakeshott, ‘The 
Search for Solutions to statelessness in Southeast Asia: State practice and recent developments’ in L. van 
Waas and M. Khanna (eds.) Solving Statelessness (Wolf L.P. 2016) 349. 
1808 Vlieks, 41. 
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the Contracting State to obtain evidence and to establish the facts as to 
whether an individual would otherwise be stateless. The claimant and his or 
her parents/guardians have the responsibility to cooperate and to provide all 
documentation and information reasonably available to them while the 
relevant authority is required to obtain and present all relevant evidence 
reasonably available to it.1809 
This appears to shift the burden of proof somewhat from the child to the government. For a 
statelessness determination procedure, according to the UNHCR Handbook on the 
Protection of Stateless Persons, the burden of proof to prove statelessness is “shared,” part 
of a “collaborative” effort, and that statelessness should be established to a “reasonable” 
degree.1810 This sentence is vague. It is not clear what the standard for reasonableness 
should be.  
It is not clear if a different standard of proof should be applied to a statelessness 
determination procedure for an adult versus determining if a child would be otherwise 
stateless. Are these different standards, or the same? For children, the human rights norm 
of the “best interests of the child” would seem to weigh in favour of a lower standard of 
proof for children. As UNHCR goes on to stipulate, to be in compliance with the Convention 
on the Rights of the Child, the burden placed on the family to provide evidence of a child’s 
statelessness must be reasonable,1811 but once again, there is little clarity of what this stand 
means in general, or what it might mean for nomads.  
In both cases, there is the additional problem of types of proof, which tend to involve 
documents that nomads may struggle to provide. The UNHCR Handbook, section D, lists the 
types of evidence used to establish statelessness, including responses from foreign 
governments on the question of nationality, identity documents, including travel 
documents, immigration documents, employment documents and school records.1812 On 
the list of forms of evidence, only the testimony of the applicant and of neighbours and 
community members are things that many nomads will be able to provide. In the end, 
however, such a document-focused determination procedure may be impossible for 
stateless persons and families to comply with. 
Courts have often imposed a high burden of proof on stateless persons to prove their 
statelessness. In Hoti v Croatia,1813 the European Court of Human Rights determined the 
applicant to be stateless based on a thorough investigation into his various attempts to 
establish his status in multiple countries following the dissolution of the former 
 
1809 UNHCR Guidelines on Statelessness No. 4, 5. 
1810 Handbook, 2014, 34-35. 
1811 UNHCR Guidelines on Statelessness No. 4, 5. 
1812 Handbook, 2014, 32-22. 
1813 Hoti v Croatia, European Court of Human Rights, First Section, Application No 63311/14 26, 26 April 
2018.) 
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Yugoslavia.1814 The court undertook a thorough review of the individual’s documentation 
and interactions with various authorities. What is notable about this case is the high 
burden of proof placed on the stateless person to prove their own statelessness. The 
applicant interacted with various consulates and government agencies in multiple 
countries, creating an administrative trail that could be evaluated by the courts. 
What burden of proof might national courts impose on stateless children to establish their 
statelessness as part of a procedure under the 1961 Convention? As Part 2 noted, in 2017, 
the Malaysian Federal Court and Home Ministry granted nationality under Malaysia’s 
Constitution to stateless children who had been adopted by Malaysian parents and had no 
documents, showing a path forward for some stateless children, even those who did not 
have a birth certificate. Yet the burden placed on the families in these cases was very high 
and some families were not able to prove their children were stateless. 
Recent court cases in Australia have shown that the burden often falls on children to 
establish their own statelessness.  In Re DLSV and Minister for Immigration and Border 
Protection, the Australian Administrative Appeals Tribunal held that while a child was 
eligible for a nationality in another country (Zimbabwe,) established as the country of 
nationality for the parents, the policies of various Zimbabwean authorities had made it 
impossible for the child to obtain proof of this nationality even after repeated attempts at 
different offices/consulates in different countries. As a result, the Court held that child was 
stateless.1815 This case placed a high evidentiary burden on the child to furnish 
considerable evidence of the attempts made on the child’s behalf to establish its nationality.  
Placing the burden clearly on states in international treaties to prove cases of statelessness 
and mandate a bilateral or regional process where necessary would do much to make this 
process fairer to nomads. UNHCR has advocated for limiting to five years the period that a 
state has to establish the child’s nationality in another country.1816 Such limitations should 
be codified in international law to provide clear limits on the ability of states to drag out 
the process through burdensome litigation. Some experts argue for an even higher burden 
on states. Worster, for example, argues that, “(t)he burden is on the birth state to show that 
another state has definitively exercised jurisdiction, for example, by acquiring a passport in 
hand.”1817 There is also the question of whether the standard of proof should be lower for 
certain groups like nomads. The UN Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination 
Against Women has noted that naturalization procedures may be particularly burdensome 
 
1814 Cited in K. Swider, ‘Case Note: Hoti v Croatia (European Court of Human Rights, First Section, Application 
No 63311/14 26, 26 April 2018)’ 1 Statelessness and Citizenship Review 184 (2018). 
1815 Re DLSV and Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2017) AATA 2999 (27 November 2017), 
cited in K. Rubenstein and E. Harris, ‘Case Note: Re DLSV and Minister for Immigration and Border Protection 
(2017) AATA 2999 (27 November 2017)’ 1 Statelessness and Citizenship Review 177 (2019). 
1816 UNHCR Guidelines on Statelessness No. 6. 
1817 W. Worster, ‘The Obligation to Grant Nationality to Stateless Children Under Treaty Law,’ 24 Tilburg L. R. 
204 (2019). 
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on specific groups or categories of persons, creating discrimination even when appearing 
to be facially neutral.1818 
Finally, it is again worth noting here the risks for nomad communities in establishing 
statelessness, whether at birth or later in life. While most nomads would likely be 
considered in situ populations by the international community, many states frequently 
label nomads as foreign. Establishing that a nomadic individual is stateless risks lending 
credence to this framing, whether at birth or later in life. 
Conclusion 
Pathway III looked at solutions to inter-generational statelessness. In particular, it looked 
at solutions that would resolve statelessness for nomad communities who are currently 
stateless. In some cases, this inter-generational statelessness is caused by the strict 
application of jus sanguinis. International law has created a solution to the inter-
generational statelessness caused by strict jus sanguinis by requiring that children born in 
the territory of the state have birth certificates and acquire a nationality if otherwise 
stateless. International law has also created a procedure for the identification of stateless 
individuals and their facilitated naturalization. Pathway III explored the extent to which 
these solutions might work for nomads. It is not clear which route is preferable for nomads, 
but stronger protections clearly exist for statelessness children and for resolving 
statelessness at birth.  
Mandating that all children be issued with birth certificates has done much to guarantee 
that solutions are available for nomad children to break out of inter-generational 
statelessness, but birth certificates alone cannot resolve the problem in jus sanguinis 
countries because such countries may require under international law that a child first 
establish he or she is stateless. Under the “best interests of the child” standard, the burden 
to establish statelessness would be mostly on the government and the procedures must be 
designed to resolve the status of the child as quickly as possible. UNHCR and other soft law 
guidance, however, could be even stronger on this point and states  could codify a low 
burden of proof for children in these cases.  
A high burden of proof may be placed on stateless individuals to prove their statelessness 
in order to access facilitated naturalization. The burden may unfairly disadvantage certain 
groups, like nomads, even while appearing neutral on its face. States could be clearer in 
placing the burden squarely on themselves in treaties and norms, perhaps by creating 
bilateral or regional processes or by creating a rule that states reach out on behalf of 
applicants within a certain time frame. Such a solution could form part of a progressive 
interpretation of the Statelessness Conventions by courts. 
Any solution that relies on identifying a nomadic individual as stateless also risks 
entrenching the widely held view, much documented in Part 2, that nomads are, by their 
 
1818 UN Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, General recommendation No. 32 on 
the gender-related dimensions of refugee status, asylum, nationality and statelessness of women, 
CEDAW/C/GC/32, 5 November 2014.  
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nature, stateless. Solutions for nomads that involve formal identification as stateless, even 
at birth, should therefore be treated with extreme caution. 
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Conclusion 
(Nomads’) occupational and social relationships lack the fixed territorial 
situs presupposed in treaty and customary doctrinal norms.1819 
This dissertation sought to make a contribution towards answering the following 
questions: (1) What are some of the root causes of nomad statelessness? (2) Why does 
nomad statelessness persist? (3) Does international law provide solutions to nomad 
statelessness? (4) Are these solutions consistent with the human rights of nomads? 
Part 2 identified some of the root causes of nomad statelessness by exploring nomadic and 
previously nomad groups in three example countries: Kuwait, Mali and Malaysia. It 
explored nationality and belonging for nomads in the pre-colonial, colonial and post-
colonial periods and summarized how nationality developed as a concept and as an area of 
law in tandem with the colonial and de-colonial processes.  
Part 2 came to a number of important conclusions. Colonial policy was extremely biased 
against nomadism. Nomad areas were declared empty and many colonial governments and 
administrators sought to settle nomads and convert them to so-called productive activities 
like farming. Nomad areas were divided by borders, transforming many nomads into 
minorities. Colonial registration favoured settled peoples and registration was often used 
to coerce nomad settlement. As a result, many nomads entered the post-colonial period 
with no identity documents and unclear residence and belonging, though some nomads 
had gained colonial-era nationality. 
The international community mostly ignored the problem of nomad statelessness during 
the period of decolonization, even as millions of colonized peoples gained a nationality for 
the first time. Many nomads could not prove habitual residence in order to qualify for 
nationality and many of those with colonial-era documents were not issued post-colonial 
documents. The power to draft nationality laws had often vested with settled, urban rulers 
who adopted forced and coercive settlement policies towards nomad minorities, as had 
their colonial predecessors. Registration and access to nationality were tightened over time 
as discrimination against nomads only increased. Nomads who had been practicing their 
way of life for centuries as linch-pins of the economy were often branded a threat to 
nationality unity and national security. 
The post-colonial period also saw the wholesale seizure of nomad lands as these previously 
remote areas in border zones were now found to contain huge quantities of natural 
resources. Nomad economic importance declined, while their lands became extremely 
valuable to the state. The link between the seizure of nomad territories and nomad 
 
1819 Conklin, 122.  
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nationality and statelessness remains underexplored, but this dissertation uncovered a 
correlation between the two. 
Synthesizing the conclusions enumerated above, Part 2 therefore uncovered the following 
root causes of nomad statelessness: (1) the failure to resolve the statelessness of nomads at 
decolonization or, in the case of the Tuareg, the failure to “roll-over” colonial-era 
nationality, (2) the conversion of nomads into minorities living in border zones (3) 
discrimination against nomads in the granting of nationality, (4) a bias against nomads that 
is inherent in nationality laws due to an over-reliance on residence, proof of place of birth 
and documentation. 
Part 2 also examined why nomad statelessness persists to the present day in Kuwait, Mali 
and Malaysia. It uncovered several root causes, including (5) the application of strict jus 
sanguinis in Malaysia and Kuwait that locked nomads into inter-generational statelessness, 
(6) the settlement and assimilation of nomads in order to seize their lands for resource 
extraction and (7) the link between nomad statelessness and armed conflict in Mali. 
Part 3 was devoted to examining the solutions currently available under international law, 
focusing particularly on those being promoted by UNHCR and the international community, 
such as the right to a nationality, the prohibitions against statelessness and relevant parts 
of the human rights framework. The solutions explored included the right to a nationality 
during state succession, the laws prohibiting discrimination in the granting of nationality, 
the granting of nationality to children born otherwise stateless and facilitated 
naturalization for stateless persons. Part 3 also examined to what extent these solutions 
are consistent with the human rights of nomads. 
As Part 3 showed, international law, if and when implemented, has much to offer nomads 
by way of solutions. In spite of the articulation on paper of the right to a nationality as a 
fundamental human right, to be enjoyed by everyone, the substance of this norm does not 
fully account for the specific challenges that arise in protecting nomads from statelessness. 
International law has evolved such that, for example, there is clear recognition for the 
prohibition of racial discrimination in the regulation of nationality. However, when it 
comes to guaranteeing the right to a nationality in the context of nomadism, the relevant 
treaty norms, jurisprudential precedents and soft law standards are not sufficiently 
pronounced. 
Many of the binding norms may be useful to nomads. For example, the norms prohibiting 
discrimination in the granting of nationality for reasons of race, ethnicity or religion could, 
if implemented by states parties, help some nomads to gain a nationality. Mali, for example, 
has ratified the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial 
Discrimination, discussed above. If discrimination against a nomadic group like the Tuareg 
is framed in racial terms, this Convention has much to offer by way of a solution. Given that 
much of the discrimination suffered by nomads is on account of their nomadic way of life 
and not necessarily on account of their race, ethnicity or religion, however, the 
international framework could be updated by states to specifically include nomadism as a 
way of life. Yet a review of the soft law pertaining to discrimination shows that nomadism 
as a discriminatory category is missing from the broader discussion amongst experts and 
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UN bodies. Likewise, the attempts in soft law to define the meaning of “habitual residence” 
for nomads, while potentially helpful in some regards, stop well short of resolving the 
tension between the exclusivity that lies at the heart of the nationality “link” between 
individual and state and the necessities of the nomadic lifestyle. 
Pathway I established that the right to a nationality during state succession may  provide 
an important solution to prevent statelessness for nomads as a result of successions of 
states and may do much to help avoid nomad statelessness during future cases of 
succession, particularly if the standards articulated in draft conventions were adopted by 
states. But serious normative gaps remain. Most importantly, for nomads who were already 
stateless at decolonization, such as many Sama Dilaut, and who may be stateless during 
future state successions, the laws on the succession of states provide few solutions. For 
nomads with a nationality in the predecessor state, the emphasis on birth and habitual 
residence creates barriers to a solution for nomads. Alternative modes of proof of 
residence tailored to nomads might be necessary, yet this would move away from the 
universality of the right to a nationality. International law, including soft law, provides only 
nascent authority on this point.  
There are also implementation problems in crafting a solution based on the norms of state 
succession. Bilateral or tripartite agreements between states during state succession may 
prevent the creation of statelessness, but international law does not provide clear guidance 
on how such a process might work retroactively. International law, including soft law, does 
not provide a straightforward pathway to a solution for intergenerational statelessness 
resulting from state successions in the past. 
Pathway II explored the laws prohibiting discrimination in the granting of nationality. This 
framework currently offers what are likely the strongest and most explicit prohibitions 
against nomad statelessness. The anti-discrimination framework, however, could be 
stronger and more specific when it comes to nomads. There are several normative gaps, in 
particular, because one of the key functions of nationality law is to discriminate against 
cross-border mobility. Anti-discrimination laws could be more successful for nomads when 
nomadism is framed as a cultural and economic activity. Such protections exist under the 
indigenous rights framework, the minority rights framework and human rights more 
generally, but could be incorporated more clearly into treaty law.  
Automatically granting nationality to nomad children born otherwise stateless is another 
possible solution that was explored in Pathway III. States should re-examine the legitimacy 
of jus sanguinis following a succession of states. It would be helpful to update clauses from 
the 1961 Convention that allow states to place additional burdens of proof for stateless 
children. Apart from these normative issues, there are problems with the implementation 
of this solution. Currently, courts place a high burden of proof on stateless children to 
prove that they do not qualify for a nationality in a foreign country. This creates a high bar 
for many nomad families.  
Pathway III also explored facilitated naturalization for stateless nomads. Once again, there 
are serious problems in implementing this solution. A statelessness determination 
procedure risks labelling in situ populations as stateless, particularly for nomads, who have 
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frequently been labelled foreigners or as naturally stateless throughout their history. Part 
2, above, explored this painful and harmful history for nomads and the many ways it has 
harmed their rights, particularly their rights to land. Such a solution should not be put into 
place in countries with stateless or at-risk nomadic populations without consultations with 
this community and without a hard look at the possible risks involved. 
Most importantly, Part 3 uncovered a bias against mobility and nomadism inherent to 
nationality which also influences international law and makes solutions for nomad 
statelessness difficult to construct out of existing principles. There is something odd in 
finding a solution to nomad statelessness in the very legal tradition that created nomad 
statelessness in the first place and is derived, as Part 2 showed, from a school of thought 
that often branded nomads as incapable of statehood. It is perhaps therefore not surprising 
that Part 3 uncovered several serious normative gaps, even within soft law instruments. As 
explored in Part 2, examples of this bias include the long-standing and entrenched 
preference for exclusive allegiance and long-term settlement on land, particularly the 
productive use of land.  
This bias also manifests as a preference for habitual residence in the territory of the state, 
centralized administrative structures located in towns and cities and hard borders that cut 
across areas not being used for agriculture. As a result, nomad statelessness is often 
entrenched and the barriers to solutions are systemic and are present in international law 
as well as in municipal law. This deep, structural bias against nomadism is inherent in 
nationality law writ large and therefore cannot be easily overcome by drafting new treaties 
or strengthening existing principles within the international legal system. One overarching 
conclusion of this dissertation is that the very system of nationality, including within the 
international legal framework, is structured to limit mobility, promote settlement and 
support state sovereignty over borders and is therefore at odds with nomadism.  
Nevertheless, advances in international law are possible and a great deal may still be done 
to protect the right to a nationality for nomads. Protecting nomad rights might require 
significant advances in international law, including for example support for a right to dual, 
or multiple, nationality and greater support for special rights, like the freedom to pursue a 
mobile lifestyle, the right to cross borders and the right to be registered by nomad 
community leaders, rather than government authorities. Such solutions should be the 
subject of further study. 
Important advances in international law may also be made through addressing areas of 
nomad rights that are currently overlooked. The Pathways did not clearly address all of the 
gaps identified in Part 2 in part because the current international norms do not address 
these issues in any systematic way. For example, Part 2 also discussed the long-standing, 
historical connection between nationality and land ownership. It exposed a strong 
correlation between nomad statelessness and the seizure of nomad lands. Importantly, 
sometimes nomad lands were taken by governments in exchange for nationality. Yet, not 
only does international law, as Gilbert points out, lack “specificity,” on how nomad land 
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rights might be achieved in general,1820 it has little that is specific on the correlation 
between nomad stateless, nomad nationality and nomad land rights. While nomad land 
rights are included under the indigenous rights framework, even here, the link to 
nationality is under-articulated. The intersection between nationality and nomad land 
rights is something that could be addressed more specifically by states in international law. 
In particular, the use of nationality as a tool to assimilate and settle nomads is in urgent 
need of examination. 
The question of to what extent nomad nationality must contain extra, group-based rights is 
particularly salient for nomads, who have often been subjected to nationality as part of 
coercive assimilation, rather than as a pathway to their human rights. For nomads, 
nationality should provide protection and support for their way of life, a right to be 
nomadic, along with access to mechanisms, like voting and the courts, that can be used to 
protect nomadism. For example, a nationality for nomads should guarantee them not only 
access to education, but the ability to shape and influence that education to include 
nomadism. Yet the current international framework does not acknowledge that nationality 
may, in and of itself, serve as a form of assimilation for nomads and the link between group 
rights and nationality remains underarticulated. As Part 2 explored, nationality and, in 
particular, civil registration has often been offered to nomads in exchange for settlement 
and the abandonment of nomadism as a way of life, yet this problem is not addressed by 
the current normative framework, even in soft law. 
The question of group rights for nomads and how they link to nationality also raises the 
question of parallel systems of indigenous, or nomadic, citizenship, an issue not explored in 
the Pathways above.1821 The indigenous rights framework points to a possibly way forward 
for nomads who wish to both have a nationality but avoid its assimilative affects, but to 
date, international law falls well short of providing explicit and detailed solutions. 
International law is mostly silent on whether nomad nationality should be the same, or 
different, from nationality for other groups. While nationality is a universal right, it may be 
necessary to ensure this universal right through a framework that provides extra 
protections for nomads. 
One further, vital conclusion of this dissertation is that only nomads and mobile peoples 
themselves can articulate what the right to a nationality would look like to them. This 
dissertation has focused mainly on the actions and legal frameworks created by states, both 
at the municipal level and through the medium of international law. This dissertation has 
 
1820 Gilbert, Still, 2004-2005, 159. 
1821 For example, Article 36 of the 2007 Indigenous Rights Declaration specifies that states must support the 
rights of indigenous peoples separated by borders to retain contacts with each other through a system of 
indigenous passports. It is not clear what sort of contacts are mandated or how this requirement would fit 
with border restrictions, but indigenous passports can provide a method for nomads to travel freely across a 
border under a special agreement, though in practice, many indigenous, nomadic groups cannot maintain ties 
across borders, even with indigenous passports. Imai and Buttery, 18.  
 
369 
 
attempted to highlight some possible solutions under international law that would make 
accessing the right to a nationality easier for some nomads and bring the institution of 
nationality more into line with the human rights of nomads. As explained, however, the 
international system of laws is derived from the very state-centric system that rendered 
some nomads stateless. Fully articulating the right to a nationality for nomads, one that 
truly comports with nomadism and a mobile way of life, will require a substantial 
rethinking of the entire institution of nationality from the nomadic, and not from the state, 
perspective.  
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Summary 
 
The United Nations has identified nomadic groups around the world as stateless or at risk of 
statelessness. While research exists on the statelessness of individual nomadic populations, less has 
been done to compare the experiences of various groups to uncover the root causes of nomad 
statelessness and explore why nomad statelessness persists. As well, international law is often proposed 
by actors such as the United Nations as a solution for statelessness, but little research has been done as 
to whether international law can provide a solution for nomads. 
This PhD dissertation draws together existing research on former Bedouin in Kuwait, the Tuareg in Mali 
and the Sama Dilaut (Bajau Laut) in Malaysia to answer the following questions: (1) What are some of 
the root causes of nomad statelessness? (2) Why does nomad statelessness persist? (3) Does 
international law provide solutions to nomad statelessness? (4) Are these solutions consistent with the 
human rights of nomads? 
As this dissertation explores through an examination of existing research in law, the social sciences and 
other disciplines, the root causes of nomad statelessness include: (1) the failure to resolve the 
statelessness of nomads at decolonization or, in some cases, the failure to “roll-over” colonial-era 
nationality, (2) the conversion of nomads into minorities living in border zones, (3) discrimination 
against nomads in the granting of nationality, (4) a reliance on residence, place of birth and 
documentation to establish nationality, (5) the application of strict jus sanguinis in some countries, (6) a 
correlation between statelessness and the seizure of nomad lands for resource extraction and (7) the 
link between nomad statelessness and armed conflict in some countries. Most importantly, this 
dissertation identifies a significant and systemic bias against nomadism in nationality law. Nationality as 
a modern institution is simply not working for nomads at a very basic level. 
This dissertation goes on to examine possible solutions to nomad statelessness under international law. 
In particular, this dissertation examines the following areas of international law that have often been 
invoked by international actors and states as solutions for statelessness: (1) the right to a nationality 
under international law, (2) the laws to identify, prevent and reduce statelessness, including through 
registration and the issuance of birth certificates (3) the prohibitions against discrimination in the 
granting of nationality and (4) the prevention of statelessness during the succession of states.   
This dissertation identifies several specific ways in which international law could be reformed to better 
protect the right to a nationality for nomads. Some of these recommendations include: States should re-
examine the legitimacy of jus sanguinis laws following a succession of states. International law should 
provide clear guidance on the prevention and resolution of statelessness during state succession. Anti-
discrimination laws should more clearly prohibit discrimination against nomadism and strengthen 
existing protections. The intersection between nationality, statelessness and nomad land rights is 
something that could be addressed more specifically in international law. In particular, the use of 
nationality as a tool to assimilate and settle nomads is in urgent need of examination. Due to the 
systemic bias against nomadism in nationality law, however, even were international human rights 
norms and the right to a nationality applied perfectly by all states, significant gaps for nomads would 
likely remain. 
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